Security practitioners know that the threats that face an organization are always active, and that while defenders need to get everything right, a good attacker only needs to get one thing right. That’s all well and good for security practitioners, but what about the rest of the company? How do you transform security from a rather inconvenient checklist, to a nascent awareness of the threat? How do you get those responsible for providing your attack surface to ‘actually care about whether it’s secure or not?

1. Welcome to the blue team…
(How building a better hacker accidentally
built a better defender)
Casey Ellis - Converge Detroit 2014
W
e’re
hiring!
jobs@
bugcrowd.com

2. About me
@caseyjohnellis
JABAH (Just Another Blonde Aussie Hacker)
Recovering pentester turned solution architect turned sales guy turned
entrepreneur
Wife and two kids now living in San Francisco
Founder and CEO of Bugcrowd

3. Before we begin…
• I’m not here to sell you anything.
• Let’s be real.
• I’m not a developer. I’m a 100% breaker/fixer. So
I’m speaking to security folks in front of developers.
This will hopefully help all of you.

4. Who’s who
• Who here builds for a living?
• Who here breaks/fixes for a living?
• Who does both? Seriously? You poor bugger.

5. You’re different.
Very different actually…
and we don’t want to change that.
Builders Breakers

6. Say what?

7. You’re paid to do completely
the opposite things.

9. Developer Incentive
Push this feature by this
deadline because $REASON.

10. Security Incentive
Make sure dev doesn’t do anything "
that lets the bad guys in.

11. Side note:
• Those who think like bad guys *greatly*
overestimate the ability for everyone else to think
like a bad guy.
• Doesn’t make security people “better”. Does make
us useful (and really, really annoying).
• Tip: The next time you feel like calling a developer
“dumb”, build and launch a product first.

12. Developer Problem
All this security stuff
is slowing us down

13. Security Problem
Why won’t they take "
me seriously?

14. Side note:
• Development contributes to products which make
money. No dev = no product = no money = no job
= no beuno.
• Security minimizes risk of loss. No security = More
risk… but *maybe* nothing will happen.
• This driver for prioritization happens all. the. time.

15. The real developer problem
I don’t believe in
the boogeyman

16. The real security problem
I don’t have the time/energy/people skills/resources "
to convince you that the boogeyman is real.

17. Side note:
• Thanks to every security vendor ever for making
this even harder.
• FUD works as a awareness tool, but FUD fatigue is
very, very real.

18. Status quo
• Developer checklists
• Check-in testing/CI tests
• Security awareness training
• Pentesting/VA/SCA/outsourced things
BLOCKERS

19. So we do this…
(and let’s be honest, we quite enjoy it too…)

20. It doesn’t work over the long
term.

21. How do we get developers
to believe in the
boogeyman?

22. Boogeyman awareness
>
Annoying checklist

23. Picard Management Tip
The most efficient way to get something the attention it deserves is to set it on fire.
*not a Pickard quote, but it totally should be.

24. The McAfee Version
The most security aware an organization will ever be is straight after a breach.
*not a John McAfee quote, but he’s burning benjamin’s in this pic because it’s true.

25. That’s nice, but
how do I avoid
the whole
“getting pwned”
bit?

26. Bug bounty!!!

27. FOREVER!!!
Pics by @alliebrosh
http://hyperboleandahalf.blogspot.com/2010/06/this-is-why-ill-never-be-adult.html

28. What’s a bug bounty program?

29. History
0
125
250
375
500
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Uptake of bug bounty and vulnerability disclosure programs.

30. It’s not just about being
cheap, or loud…

31. It’s about leveling the
playing field…

32. …and about introducing your
devs to this guy.
Egor Homakov (@homakov)
!
aka “that guy who totally owned
Github that time”
!
Good guy who thinks like a bad guy
!
“I wonder what his next-door
neighbor can do?”

33. Bug bounties create
controlled incidents…

34. … like having your code pwned
by an 18yo kid.

35. Eg 1: Mozilla
Thanks to @mwcoates
http://www.slideshare.net/michael_coates/bug-bounty-programs-for-the-web
Clearing their
assurance debt
Boogeyman
belief

36. Great success!

37. Over 120 programs we’ve seen
this pattern every. single. time.

38. Eg 2: [REDACTED] financial
services
• Extortion attempt from Eastern Europe
• Resolved by creating a “one man bug bounty” (we
didn’t tell him he was the only one though…)
• Bug received in 15 mins

39. Great success!

40. Eg 3: [REDACTED] social
media
• Infosec team having a *very* hard time getting buy-
in from management and engineering
• Invoke Picard Management Mode
• Received budget for another 3 team members

41. Great success!

42. Gamify your SDLC
• Create a pot that benefits your dev team (team
drinks, party, event, whatever) and have bug
bounties paid from it. What ever the hackers don’t
get, the devs keep.
• Level up: Pilot it with internal teams.

43. Ready to start?

44. Bug bounties are awesome…

45. …but hard.

46. The Golden Rule:
!
Touch the code
==
reward the bug

47. The mistake *everyone* makes:
!
VULNERABILITY DATA
PEOPLE

48. Align expectations before
you engage

49. Conclusion
• Bug bounties are cost effective, and highly
marketable, but that’s not the full story…
• …the psychology of external disclosure is
completely different to internal security training,
and it’s extremely effective.
• Go start one.
• More tips and tricks at https://blog.bugcrowd.com

50. Questions?

51. @caseyjohnellis
https://bugcrowd.com
casey@bugcrowd.com
!
Greets to Wolf, @jimmyvo and Converge crew, builditsecure.ly,
Rapid7, iamthecavalry.com, @treyford, @quine, @markstanislav,
@alliebrosh, @mwcoates, @homakov, @codesoda and the
@bugcrowd team.
W
e’re
hiring!
jobs@
bugcrowd.com