Week 1 Summary Dr. Johnson This week’s readings provided a theoretical foundation for sports, leisure, and recreation. Holland offers a literature review that highlighted some of the major definitions and debates within the field. His ultimate concern is identifying “Black recreational habits.” To do so, he begins with a brief overview of race and racial discrimination in the United States. From there, he presents definitions of play, leisure, and recreation. He defines Leisure as follows: 1. Leisure, in the classical view, is a state of being in which activity is performed for its own sake. 2. Leisure is a social-class attribute. 3. Leisure is free or unobligated time. 4. Leisure activity is carried on in free time. 5. Leisure is a state of being indicated by perceived freedom. (Holland, 20). While Holland does not explicitly state it, leisure is ridden with power dynamics. In other words, certain people are afforded leisure time because others are not, as implied through its characteristic as a social-class attribute. Instead of pursuing this, Holland conflates leisure with recreation, or that “which is pleasurable and has socially redeeming qualities” (19). Holland presents three major theories that explain the varying recreational habits among different racial, ethnic, and socio-economic groups. The first is Marginality Theory, which states “persons with homogeneous socioeconomic status are more likely to participate in similar recreation activities” (24). For proponents of this theory, recreation is determined more by social status than race. Ethnicity Theory, on the other hand, argues “an individual’s subculture determines differences in interest and participation” (26). The implication herein is that ethnic identification encourages different norms. The final theory that Holland discusses is Racial Discrimination, which uses “intentional institutional racial discrimination to understand and explain participation differences” (29). This is, perhaps, best exemplified in the historical exclusion of Black and Latino people from private golf courses. While each of these theories has an implicit acknowledgement of power, their emphasis on marginalized communities of color does not account for the full picture. McDonald further complicates theories of leisure by calling attention to whiteness as an overarching cultural standard. While we currently see large numbers of Black athletes in professional sports, “whiteness” continues to serve as a moral governing force. When Serena Williams wore a black cat suit during a match, it became a scandal. The NBA imposed a strict dress code whereby athletes had to dress as “business professionals” on their way to and from games. Richard Sherman was painted as a “thug” after yelling with excitement for making a game-changing play. “Decorum” becomes a white cultural value disguised as “universal.” Davis provides an historical reading of this phenomenon. Beginning with the era of .

1. Week 1 Summary Dr. Johnson
This week’s readings provided a theoretical foundation for
sports, leisure, and recreation. Holland offers a literature
review that highlighted some of the major definitions and
debates within the field. His ultimate concern is identifying
“Black recreational habits.” To do so, he begins with a brief
overview of race and racial discrimination in the United States.
From there, he presents definitions of play, leisure, and
recreation. He defines Leisure as follows:
1. Leisure, in the classical view, is a state of being in which
activity is performed for its own sake.
2. Leisure is a social-class attribute.
3. Leisure is free or unobligated time.
4. Leisure activity is carried on in free time.
5. Leisure is a state of being indicated by perceived freedom.
(Holland, 20).
While Holland does not explicitly state it, leisure is ridden with
power dynamics. In other words, certain people are afforded
leisure time because others are not, as implied through its
characteristic as a social-class attribute. Instead of pursuing
this, Holland conflates leisure with recreation, or that “which is
pleasurable and has socially redeeming qualities” (19).
Holland presents three major theories that explain the
varying recreational habits among different racial, ethnic, and
socio-economic groups. The first is Marginality Theory, which
states “persons with homogeneous socioeconomic status are
more likely to participate in similar recreation activities” (24).
For proponents of this theory, recreation is determined more by
social status than race. Ethnicity Theory, on the other hand,
argues “an individual’s subculture determines differences in
interest and participation” (26). The implication herein is that
ethnic identification encourages different norms.

2. The final theory that Holland discusses is Racial
Discrimination, which uses “intentional institutional racial
discrimination to understand and explain participation
differences” (29). This is, perhaps, best exemplified in the
historical exclusion of Black and Latino people from private
golf courses.
While each of these theories has an implicit
acknowledgement of power, their emphasis on marginalized
communities of color does not account for the full picture.
McDonald further complicates theories of leisure by calling
attention to whiteness as an overarching cultural standard.
While we currently see large numbers of Black athletes in
professional sports, “whiteness” continues to serve as a moral
governing force. When Serena Williams wore a black cat suit
during a match, it became a scandal. The NBA imposed a strict
dress code whereby athletes had to dress as “business
professionals” on their way to and from games. Richard
Sherman was painted as a “thug” after yelling with excitement
for making a game-changing play. “Decorum” becomes a white
cultural value disguised as “universal.”
Davis provides an historical reading of this phenomenon.
Beginning with the era of slavery, he highlights the historical
trajectory of Black athletes in the United States. As he moves
into the twentieth century, we see a slow integration of the
professional and collegiate playing field. He points out,
however, that we don’t see the same level of integration within
the ranks of leadership. While the playing field may change,
the power holders remain the same.

3. 1
NCAA Division I athletics: amateurism and exploitation
Anthony W. Miller
Introduction
Last winter, National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
president Mark Emmert was
asked by a group of sports media members about the possibility
of paying college athletes.
Emmert responded, "We can never move to a place where we
are paying players to play sports
for us" (Garcia, 2010, para. 9). "No, it will not happen--not
while I'm president of the NCAA,"
he later stated ("NCAA president," 2011, para. 17). These
comments sparked the reoccurring
ethical discussion concerning the topic of amateurism and
exploitation in college athletics. While
many believe as amateurs, college athletes are receiving more
than their fair share through
athletic scholarships, others argue universities are exploiting
their own student-athletes. The
questions remain unanswered. Should college athletes be
compensated beyond their athletic
scholarships, and specifically, are the NCAA and its institutions
exploiting student-athletes?
The questions involved in this discussion are unable to be
answered with a simple "yes" or "no."
In order to knowledgeably discuss the subject, there first needs
to be a foundational
understanding of the basic terms of amateurism and
exploitation. In addition, the relationship
between the two terms and intercollegiate athletics should be
clearly defined. A history of the

4. evolution of college sports and the role of student-athletes over
the last two centuries must be
examined also. The author will attempt to use all of this
information to answer several key
questions related to the topic of paying college athletes in order
to determine if student-athletes
are being exploited and, if exploited should they be
compensated above their athletic
scholarships?
Surprisingly, studies have not demonstrated an overwhelming
support for paying student-athletes
above their athletic scholarships. Schneider (2001) investigated
college students' perceptions of
giving compensation to intercollegiate athletes in addition to
the standard grant-in-aids. Of the
458 students (275 males and 183 females from 1 Division 1
athletic conference) surveyed, only a
slight majority (54%) of the students believed athletes should
receive additional compensation.
Nevertheless, it is a subject that has again (even recently)
become a hot topic in college athletics.
Amateurism and Exploitation in Collegiate Athletics
When it comes to debating whether or not college athletes
should be paid, the two most often
used terms are amateurism and exploitation. Neither term is new
to intercollegiate athletics.
Actually, both subjects have been topics of discussion for the
NCAA since its inception in the
early 1900s ("History," 2010). Today, these two words drive
both sides' arguments concerning
paying and exploiting student-athletes.
Amateurism Defined

5. Simply put, collegiate amateurism refers to the fact the athletes
do not receive remuneration for
their athletic services. College athletes today are referred to as
student-athletes. The governing
body of college athletics, the NCAA, views these individuals as
students, not as professionals or
employees of their member schools. Thus, student-athletes are
not currently monetarily
2
compensated (Murphy & Pace, 1994). According to the NCAA,
student-athletes' participation in
athletics is just another part of their entire education, not the
primary purpose for attending
college (Meggyesy, 2000).
Late in the 19th century, college authorities conceived this idea
of amateurism in an effort to
maintain schools' educational integrity and middle- and upper-
class standing by not technically
paying athletes (Flowers, 2009). "A Gentleman never competes
for money," once wrote author
Walter Camp (Flowers, 2009, p. 354). As sports' popularity and
revenues increased over the next
several years, athletes were given incentives such as free room,
board, and tuition. In the middle
of the 1900s, the NCAA instituted its key piece of legislation,
the Sanity Code, in an attempt to
preserve amateur sports while still allowing schools to
compensate athletes (Kahn, 2007). By
including room, board, and tuition in grant-in-aids (i.e. athletic
scholarships), schools were able
to reward student-athletes without paying them directly. After

6. the Sanity Code's establishment of
athletic scholarships, the term "amateurism," not
"professionalism," would be united officially
with college athletics (Byers, 1997; Flowers, 2009).
In addition to assigning a fixed amount to athletic scholarships,
there are additional ways the
NCAA continues to preserve the "amateur" label in collegiate
sports. Although the NCAA and
the schools reserve the right to use a player's images and names
for commercial purposes, no
athlete may be endorsed by or receive any payment from
businesses or corporations (Suggs,
2009; Murphy & Pace, 1994). Student-athletes also may not
receive financial assistant in
addition to their grant-in-aids or be paid for any work with
private sports camps related to their
sport (Byers, 1997).
Exploitation Defined
The biggest issue in the subject of paying college athletes is the
idea the NCAA and its member
institutions are exploiting student-athletes. Throughout the
years, exploitation has been defined
countless ways by individuals discussing various topics such as
economic, politics, and sports
(Wertheimer, 2008). For the discussion involving college
athletics, exploitation should be
defined as an individual gaining something by taking an unfair
advantage of another individual
(Wertheimer, 2007).
There are generally two arguments used to demonstrate the
exploitation of student-athletes. The
first is student-athletes, many of whom are making large

7. amounts of money for their schools,
often are not receiving any kind of legitimate, quality
education. The second is compensation
student-athletes receive in the form of athletic scholarships is
not comparable to the marginal
revenue products they individually generate for colleges
(Wertheimer, 2007; Brown & Jewell,
2004).
Before examining further these two claims, some distinctions
must be made. Wertheimer (2008)
maintains there are several specific types of exploitation that
apply to this discussion. The first,
called mutually advantageous exploitation, refers to a situation
where both parties, both the one
doing the exploiting and the one being exploited, gain from the
agreement. The second is
referred to as consensual exploitation and involves an instance
where individuals who are
3
exploited have given voluntarily consent to the situation prior
to the transaction. In situations
involving these types of exploitation, it can be argued nothing
morally wrong has occurred.
In most circumstances involving exploitation, the issue is not
whether exploited individuals are
making any gains but rather they are not receiving what they
ought to receive. In other words,
those being exploited are not getting what is considered fair
(Wertheimer, 2008). In the example
of the exploitation of student-athletes, the specific issue is
"they do not receive an appropriate

8. return on the financial surplus" they create for their universities
(Wertheimer, 2007, p. 366).
The Evolution of Intercollegiate Sports and the Student-Athlete
The face of intercollegiate athletics has changed drastically in
the last two centuries. What
started as nothing more than student-organized competitions has
turned into what has been
described as a "sports entertainment enterprise" (Flowers, 2009;
Meggyesy, 2000, p. 25).
Students who once went to school only for an education and
participated in these kinds of
competitions in their free time now often attend these same
universities solely for the purpose of
participating in sports. In most situations, they end up devoting
hundreds of hours to sports-
related activities and end up becoming athletes first and
students second. The end result is a
system that uses students to generate millions of dollars for
both the NCAA and its universities.
The Origins of Intercollegiate Athletics and the Student-Athlete
Modern intercollegiate athletics have their foundations in intra-
collegiate competitions. Sports
were largely an unknown on most college campuses until the
early 1800s when college students
began organizing their own class (e.g. freshman, sophomore,
etc.) teams to compete against other
classes. The popularity of these different competitions grew
over the next 50 years to the point
that by the 1850s, universities were forming their own
intercollegiate teams. At first, school
authorities frowned upon these seemingly frivolous and
sometimes violent competitions. But by

9. the late 19th century, American colleges recognized the prestige
that came from winning
intercollegiate contests and the visibility sports teams provided
for the school were too valuable
to ignore. As the popularity of intercollegiate sports grew,
schools realized they could
manufacture additional income by charging spectators
admission to events. Prestige, visibility,
and money--intercollegiate athletics would now be a permanent
fixture on college campuses
(Flowers, 2009).
The next conclusion drawn by colleges was obvious, and it
shaped intercollegiate athletics into
what they are today. How can a school garner more prestige,
visibility, and money? Win
more games. How can a team win more games? Get the best
players. So in an effort to field the
best teams, schools began accepting students who never would
have been admitted previously to
these institutions. In order to lure athletes, colleges started in
the 1870s to offer both graduates
and undergraduates financial assistance in the form of room and
board, jobs, and even small cash
considerations in exchange for their athletic services (Flowers,
2009). In response to the
"dangerous and exploitive athletics practices of the time,"
college authorities joined together in
1906 to form the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the
United States, which would later
change its name to the NCAA ("History," 2010, para. 1). In
actuality, this new organization was
intended to officially legitimize athletics in higher education
and control athlete admission to and

10. 4
distribution amongst colleges (thus hopefully eliminating some
of the questionable practices of
several schools) (Flowers, 2009; Kahn, 2007).
With sports' popularity growing and athletic revenues
increasing, by the 1940s several schools
were unashamedly paying their athletes (Kahn, 2007). Realizing
amateur intercollegiate athletics
were turning into professional athletics, the NCAA modified its
constitution in 1956 to allow
schools to offer grant-in-aid to any undergraduate athlete. In
addition, the NCAA coined the term
"student-athlete" (instead of "employee") to describe those
receiving athletic scholarships (Byers,
1997). The amateur code was officially established, and the
student-athlete was born.
Modern Intercollegiate Sports and Student-Athletes
The current NCAA Division I intercollegiate sports program has
evolved into a multi-billion
dollar industry where many of the schools' annual revenues
reach above $260 million
(Meggyesy, 2000). In addition to fielding teams in the money-
making sports of men's basketball,
football, and ice hockey, schools also run programs for sports
such as baseball, lacrosse, softball,
soccer, swimming, volleyball, and wrestling (Kahn, 2007).
Because these programs are not self-
supported, they rely on revenues from the men's basketball and
football programs and often some
additional state funding (Suggs, 2009). It is not uncommon for
the coaches of Division I teams to

11. earn several hundred thousand to several million dollars every
year (Wieberg, 2011).
Researchers and economists who have studied intercollegiate
athletics have described today's
NCAA as a cartel (Deschriver & Stotlar, 1996; Zimbalist,
2001). A cartel is defined as a joint
group of members who create policies in order to promote the
mutual interests of the members
(Kahn, 2007). Koch (1983) argued the NCAA's cartel behavior
is manifested when it regulates
the means of acquiring athletes, puts a fixed value on the
amount given to student-athletes,
controls the rights to televising athletic events, periodically
distributes its profits to members,
and enforces policy on its members. According to the NCAA,
all of this is done in an effort to
create equal opportunity for monetary profit, athlete
distribution, and athletic success (Kahn,
2007; Koch, 1983).
The NCAA itself, a non-profit educational organization with
270 employees, has an annual
budget of $32 million (Meggyesy, 2000). Each year, it
distributes over $500 million to its
member schools (Suggs, 2009). Nearly all of the money is
collected from revenue generated by
men's basketball and football, specifically the television rights
to men's college basketball's
March Madness and football's Bowl Championship Series. Just
this past year, the NCAA signed
a 14-year, $10.8 billion contract with CBS and Turner Sports to
have the exclusive rights to
show the men's college basketball tournament (Wieberg, 2011).
History has demonstrated today's universities recruit student-

12. athletes for the purpose of helping
sports teams achieve success on the playing field and thereby
increase the school's prestige and
overall revenue. Using financial records from NCAA Division I-
A universities as well as NFL
and NBA draft data from 1995-1998, Brown and Jewell (2004)
estimated a draft-quality college
football player earns $406,000 in revenue annually for his
school, while a college basketball
player earns $1.194 million. Schools today treat student-athletes
as more than just typical
students (Suggs, 2009). They are given academic assistance,
game tickets, clothing and
5
equipment, medical treatment, weight and conditioning training,
and money towards room,
board, and tuition. A recent analysis by USA TODAY
determined the average NCAA Division I
men's basketball player receives at least $120,000 in goods and
services each year (Weiner &
Berkowitz, 2011). But while these athletes are not living in
poverty, the question still remains.
Are student-athletes being exploited?
Are Today's Student-Athletes Truly Exploited?
The 2011-2012 NCAA Manual states the mission of the NCAA
is to protect student-athletes
"from exploitation by professionalism and commercial
enterprises" (2011, p. 4). Many would
contend the NCAA itself is responsible for exploiting student-
athletes. Their proof would hinge

13. on the two previously mentioned arguments that many of these
students are receiving neither a
legitimate education nor fair compensation for their athletic
services (Wertheimer, 2007). In
addition to considering Wertheimer's two arguments, the terms
mutually advantageous
exploitation and consensual exploitation also factor into this
discussion.
Wertheimer's First Argument
Universities' educational practices are quickly called into
question when college players make
comments similar to the one made by University of Connecticut
men's basketball's Kemba
Walker. While being questioned this past March about his
schooling, the junior basketball star
said, "[Forty Million Dollar Slaves: The Rise, Fall, and
Redemption of the Black Athlete] is the
first book I've ever read" (Layden, 2011, para. 26). Often, there
are times when athletes are put
into either easier courses or courses whose professors are
known to like student-athletes so
athletes are able to achieve and receive higher grades
(Zimbalist, 2001). In these situations, the
argument is student-athletes (B) are being exploited by schools
(A) because A is profiting
thousands, sometimes millions, from B's efforts while B is
receiving nothing of lasting
significance (i.e. a quality education) (Wertheimer, 2007).
In response to this argument, the question is whether student-
athletes are forced into these
positions. It should be determined if student-athletes are
required to attend educational
institutions with weak or questionable academics. The best

14. schools are not available to everyone.
Some athletes are only recruited by schools with poor academic
records. Although players are
not forced to attend one of those schools, some are financially
unable to attend college without
the help of an athletic scholarship. A student-athlete under such
circumstances would be
considered a victim of exploitation. As for an athlete who has
his choice of the best schools and
still selects a poor academic institution, it has been argued that
although he was not coerced into
attending a particular school, a teenager should not be expected
to choose a school based on
whether or not that school will provide him with quality
educational opportunities. In this
situation, a case for exploitation could also be made
(Wertheimer, 2007).
It also must be determined if student-athletes are forced into
classes or majors which result in
them not receiving a quality education. Of course there are
always the "low-ability" level
students who struggle academically and really have little chance
of ever receiving a college
education (Wertheimer, 2007, p.369). However, there are
situations where some students do not
achieve academic success or graduate simply because they fail
to give enough effort in their
6
academics. In these specific examples, an argument for the
exploitation of the low-ability
student-athletes could be made, but it would be harder for this

15. same argument to apply to
student-athletes who do not make an effort academically.
Wertheimer's Second Argument
The second exploitation argument is universities (A) are
exploiting student-athletes (B) due to
the fact B is not receiving fair compensation in relation to B's
generated surplus. This argument
is harder to make because of the difficulty in determining the
surpluses of NCAA Division I
schools. According to NCAA president Mark Emmert, only 14
out of over 1,150 schools
finished the 2009-2010 school year with a financial surplus
(Garcia, 2010). But any surplus
generated by colleges' football and basketball programs are used
to pay for coaching salaries,
academic counselor salaries, and athletic facility renovations. In
most circumstances, a portion of
the money subsidizes schools' other intercollegiate sports
programs (Wertheimer, 2007; Suggs,
2009). Subsequently, very few schools show a surplus in the
end.
In addition to the difficulty in determining universities'
financial surpluses, it is equally difficult
determining nonfinancial surpluses. Dating back to the
beginnings of intercollegiate athletics, the
primary purpose for having these types of sports programs was
the prestige and visibility they
provided for colleges. Today's winning sports teams are given
hundreds of hours of media
attention and television coverage. It is impossible to put a
monetary value on the advertisement
which each intercollegiate team or each student-athlete is
creating for colleges (Wertheimer,
2007).

16. The answer to this question lies in determining what fair
compensation is. At first glance, a $10-
40,000 a year education in return for generating $400,000-$1.2
million seems anything but fair
(Zimbalist, 2001; Brown & Jewell, 2004). But a teenager with
no prior professional experience
who receives the equivalent of $120,000 a year is uncommon in
other professions. When asked
about fair compensation for college athletes, Butler University
men's basketball player Matt
Howard replied, "Forty thousand dollars-plus a year to play,
that's a pretty good salary for an 18-
year-old who has no college education" (Weiner & Berkowitz,
2011, para. 6).
Determining what is fair becomes even more difficult when
considering other situations. First, if
athletes are exploited only when they do not receive fair
compensation for the surplus they
themselves create, then this means only a portion of a school's
student-athletes (in most cases,
only football and basketball players) are being exploited and
should receive compensation. Is it
fair for the volleyball, baseball, and soccer players not to be
paid while their fellow schoolmates,
the male football and basketball players, are paid? After all,
athletes in nonsurplus sports put in
the same amount of time and effort into competing for their
schools as do athletes in surplus
sports. It is no fault of the athletes whose programs are not as
popular in American culture as
other programs (Wertheimer, 2007). Murphy and Pace (1994)
replied to this particular argument
with an example from the professional world. In business, do all
members of a company's team

17. receive the same compensation? Is a secretary who works the
same number of hours and works
just as hard as the boss paid a similar wage? Of course, the
answer is no.
Second, if colleges were to pay athletes, any surplus created by
those programs would be used to
compensate the athletes. Consequentially, many of the non-
revenue generating programs would
7
not have adequate funding to continue. Is it fair to those
athletes to deprive them of an
opportunity to compete collegiately and, for those who would be
unable to financially afford
school, an opportunity for a college education? On the other
hand, requiring universities to use
revenues to pay athletes may force schools to cut down some of
the exorbitant salaries paid to
some Division I coaches and other athletic department
employees.
A Case for Mutually Advantageous and Consensual Exploitation
In this discussion concerning the exploitation of student-
athletes, a case can be made for both
mutually advantageous exploitation and consensual exploitation.
Mutually advantageous
exploitation occurs when A gains from B and B gains from A,
leaving both parties in a better
position than before the transaction (Wertheimer, 2008). Take,
for example, a star high school
basketball player from a low-income family who is recruited

18. and signed by a renowned academic
institution. He competes four years for that school. Along the
way, he helps his team win over
100 games, reach 2 Final Fours, and win a national
championship. After 4 years of education
(worth a total of approximately $160,000) and instruction from
one of the best coaches in the
nation, he graduates with a college degree, is named as a NCAA
All-American, and one month
later is selected in the NBA Draft. Over the next 7 years, the
former student-athlete signs 3 NBA
contracts worth over $28 million, thanks in large part to the
coaching he received while in
college. In this example, both parties made gains which left
them better off. It could be argued,
therefore, no wrongful exploitation took place.
In other examples, athletes have been known to become student-
athletes for the sole purpose of
receiving expert instruction, media exposure, and training. As a
result of those benefits, their
future earning power increased (Kahn, 2007). Many of these
elite athletes stay in college for only
the required amount of time and then leave to become
professionals. Again in such situations,
both the athletes and the schools have entered into agreements
which benefit both groups.
Nothing morally wrong has occurred.
When an individual volunteers or gives informed consent to a
transaction, it is referred to as
consensual exploitation (Wertheimer, 2008). Prior to the start of
a student-athlete's collegiate
career, the individual must agree to sign several eligibility
forms. One of those forms is the
NCAA Student-Athlete Form 10-3a (2010) that reads, "You

19. affirm that you meet the NCAA
regulations for student-athletes regarding eligibility,
recruitment, financial aid, amateur status
and involvement in gambling activities" (p. 2). A separate read
and sign section of the same
document states:
You authorize the NCAA [or a third party acting on behalf of
the NCAA (e.g., host institution,
conference, local organizing committee)] to use your name or
picture in accordance with Bylaw
12.5 including to promote NCAA championships or other NCAA
events, activities or programs.
(p. 4)
The NCAA is not attempting to deceive individuals by having
student-athletes sign confusing
forms so then the schools can make money off the athletes.
Instead, they are presenting a clear,
understandable agreement that essentially says, "In order to
participate in intercollegiate
8
athletics, you must abide by these terms." Players must sign the
agreement to become student-
athletes, but no athlete is forced to sign the NCAA Student-
Athlete Form.
There is a common perception athletes are required to attend
college in order to become eligible
for the professional ranks. This is not the case. The current
NBA Draft eligibility rules state a
player must be 19 years of age, and 1 year must have elapsed

20. since the player's graduation from
high school ("Article X," 2009). In the NFL, a player must be
out of school for three years before
he is eligible for the draft ("NFL Collective Bargaining
Agreement," 2006). In baseball, Major
League Baseball teams can draft any player who has graduated
from high school, while anyone
in hockey who is 19 or older is eligible for the NHL Draft
("First-year Player," n.d.; "Hockey
Operations," n.d.). Neither athletes of surplus sports nor those
participating in nonsurplus sports
are required to attend college in order to be drafted into
professional sports. In most
circumstances, the visibility which comes from playing for
prominent sports programs causes
most athletes to choose to attend college.
Conclusions
Even after knowing all the facts, the questions related to paying
college athletes and the
exploitation of student-athletes are difficult to answer.
However, there is no doubt the current
model for compensating college athletes is ethically
questionable at best. If this were not the
case, then President Emmert would not continue to make
statements suggesting the necessity of
exploring ways to increase the financial assistance given to
student-athletes (Wieberg, 2011).
Just last week, several NCAA conference commissioners began
discussing ways to compensate
their athletes above athletic scholarships. Conference USA
commissioner Britton Banowsky
said, "Unless the student-athletes in the revenue-producing
sports get more of the pie, the model
will eventually break down ...[I]t is only a matter of time"

21. (Schad, 2011, para. 3). When the
current model does break down, the NCAA's members will be
forced to consider the topic of
student-athletes' exploitation prior to establishing a new model.
Going forward, the NCAA and its member institutions must
address several ethical situations in
order to avoid the continued exploitation of student-athletes.
The first step is re-defining
amateurism in college athletics. Currently, intercollegiate sports
are amateur in name only (a
practice continued today by colleges in an effort to avoid
providing workers' compensation and
to continue eligibility for tax exemption status) (Haden, 2001;
Murphy & Pace, 1994). The
second step is deciding whom to pay. If it is determined only
scholarship athletes in revenue-
producing programs (i.e. basketball, football, and ice hockey)
should be compensated, then the
NCAA will have to be prepared to justify excluding some
athletes, including the non-scholarship
basketball, football, and hockey players (Murphy & Pace,
1994). Due to Title IX, which
mandates equitable opportunities and benefits for women
competitors, there is a possibility
schools would be required eventually to extend remuneration to
other student-athletes (Francis,
1993). The third step is determining what fair compensation is
for student-athletes, a difficult
task based on the information mentioned previously. The final
step is choosing where to get the
money to pay athletes.
Deciding where to get additional money opens the door to a vast
array of ethical questions.
Should the money made by men's basketball and football be
used to fund other athletic

22. programs? Instead, should the money be used to pay the
basketball and football players only?
9
Will Title IX allow for only a portion of a school's athletes to
be paid? Are college coaches
overpaid, or are their large paychecks justified by the prestige,
visibility, and money they are
helping to generate for their schools? If smaller schools are
lacking the funds required to pay
student-athletes, is it fair to raise regular students' tuition prices
to help cover costs (Schneider,
2001)? These are just a few of the questions which will have to
be addressed.
Determining which student-athletes are being exploited is a
difficult task. What is clear is both
the NCAA's current amateur rules and the questionable
educational practices of some schools
make it more likely for students-athletes to be exploited
(Murphy & Pace, 1994). Deciding how
to compensate student-athletes more fairly could potentially
result in completely restructuring
intercollegiate athletics. If the NCAA and its member schools
truly desires to protect their
student-athletes "from exploitation by professional and
commercial enterprises," then they will
be forced to reexamine their own practices (2010-2011 NCAA
Manual, 2010, p. 4).
Applications In Sport
The topic of paying college athletes is one of, if not the most
debated issues in collegiate

23. athletics. Understanding the terms of amateurism and
exploitation, a history of intercollegiate
athletics, and how student-athletes are possibly being exploited
may assist in helping to decide if
NCAA student-athletes should be compensated above athletic
scholarships.
References
(1.) 2011-2012 NCAA Manual. (2011). Retrieved from
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D112.pdf
(2.) Article X: Player eligibility and NBA Draft. (2009).
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(3.) Brown, R. W., & Jewell, T. (2004). Measuring marginal
revenue product in college athletics: Updated estimates. In J.
Fizel & R. Fort (Eds.),
Economics of college sports (pp. 153-162). Westport, CT:
Praeger.
(4.) Byers, W. (1997). Unsportsmanlike conduct: Exploiting
college athletes. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
(5.) Deschriver, T. D., & Stotlar, D. K. (1996). An economic
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(7.) Flowers, R. D. (2009). Institutionalized hypocrisy: The
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360.
(8.) Francis, L. P. (1993). Title IX: Equality for women's
sports?. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 20/21(1), 32-47.
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24. emmert-ncaa-pay_N.htm?csp=ip
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(11.) History. (2010). Retrieved from
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About+the+NCAA/Who+We+Are/About+the+NCAA+history
(12.) Hockey operations guidelines. (n.d.) Retrieved from
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doi:10.1257/jep.21.1.209
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student-athletes. Brigham Young University Education & Law
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186.
(18.) NCAA president: Pay-for-play won't happen under his
watch. (2011). USA Today. Retrieved from
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2011-02-13-ncaa-emmert_N.htm
(19.) NCAA Student-Athlete Form 10-3a. (2010). Retrieved
from
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%20XX-

25. 3a.pdf
(20.) NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2006. (2006).
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MENT%202006%20% 202012.pdf
(21.) Schad, J. (2011, May 19). Power brokers discuss paying
NCAA athletes. ESPN. Retrieved from
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10
(22.) Schneider, R. G. (2001). College students' perceptions on
the payment of intercollegiate student-athletes. College Student
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232-241.
(23.) Suggs, W. (2009). Old challenges and new opportunities
for studying the financial aspects of intercollegiate athletics.
New Directions for
Higher Education, (148), 11-22. doi:10.1002/he.364
(24.) Wieberg, S. (2011, March 30). NCAA president: Time to
discuss players getting sliver of revenue pie. USA Today.
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03-29-ncaa-pay-for-play-final-four_N.htm?sms_ss=gmail&
at_xt=4d93d876081f62dd,0%22#
(25.) Wertheimer, A. (2007). The exploitation of student
athletes. In W. J. Morgan (Ed.), Ethics in sport (pp. 365-377).
Champaign, IL: Human
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(26.) Wertheimer, A. (2008). Exploitation. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.),
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from
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(27.) Weiner, J., & Berkowitz, S. (2011, March 30). USA Today

26. analysis finds $120k value in men's basketball scholarship. USA
Today.
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(28.) Zimbalist, A. S. (2001). Unpaid professionals:
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Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
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Corresponding Author
Anthony W. Miller, MEd
4 Amity Lane
Greenville, SC 29609
[email protected]
864-906-2548
Anthony W. Miller is a doctoral candidate at the United States
Sports Academy. He is also a faculty member of Bob Jones
University.
Miller, Anthony W.