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SESSION ID:
#RSAC
Mayana Pereira
FIGHTING MALWARE WITH GRAPH
ANALYTICS: AN END-TO-END CASE
STUDY
MLN-F01
Data Scientist
Infoblox Inc.
# R S A C
MACHINE LEARNING
2
Profile picture 
Posts 
 Age
 Gender
 Personality
 Political Preferences
 Advertising
# R S A C
MACHINE LEARNING
3
Profile picture 
Posts 
 Fake Users
 Influencers
# R S A C
MACHINE LEARNING
4
Relations between
users
Graphs
# R S A C
GRAPH DEFINITION
5
Nodes  Users
Edges  Friendship
# R S A C
GRAPH-BASED ANALYTICS
6
A powerful tool for modeling, structuring and understanding relationships
among people, devices, information entities.
Graph mining provides an insightful representation
— Interdependent instances
— Long-range relations
— Node/Edge attributes (data complexity)
— Hard to fake/alter (adversarial robustness)
Security-related applications:
— Exposing Terrorist cells
— Botnet detection
— Reputation propagation of IPs
# R S A C
OUR GOAL IS…
7
How graphs and graph mining can
be used to solve security problems.
Intuitive and easy to understand
approaches.
+ =
Learn Apply Obtain
Identify the data related
problems and how to describe
them through graphs.
Graph-based machine learning
models that complements and
can outperform traditional
techniques.
# R S A C
SUMMARY
8
1. Study Case: Malware Detection using Graph Mining
a) Dictionary-DGA Problem
b) Graph-based analytics to extract malware dictionaries from DNS traffic
2. Graph Mining techniques that are easy to visualize and interpret
a) EgAnomaly Detection
b) Open Source tools for data exploration & visualization tools
# R S A C
SUMMARY
9
1. Study Case: Malware Detection using Graph Mining
a) Dictionary-DGA Problem
b) Graph-based analytics to extract malware dictionaries from DNS traffic
2. Graph Mining techniques that are easy to visualize and interpret
a) Anomaly Detection
b) Open Source tools for data exploration & visualization tools
# R S A C
10
135.175.17.35
MALWARE COMMUNICATION
bad-domain.com
DNS Server
135.175.17.35
Infected Machine Command and Control
# R S A C
11
NXdomain
DOMAIN GENERATION ALGORITHMS
dnskasd.info
DNS Server
135.175.17.35
Infected Machine
Command
and Control
NXdomain
ajdhkbf.info
135.175.17.35
akdjnfag.info
# R S A C
12
DOMAIN GENERATION ALGORITHMS
135.175.17.35
Infected Machine Command and Control
Malicious Payload
Contact 135.175.17.35
# R S A C
13
DOMAIN GENERATION ALGORITHMS
DNS Server
Infected Machine
infoblox.com
infoblox.com
Classification: legitimate domain
infoblox.com
# R S A C
14
DOMAIN GENERATION ALGORITHMS
DNS Server
Infected Machine
z030zy.com
z030zy.com
Classification: darkshell DGA domain
z030zy.com
# R S A C
DGA DETECTION
15
katherinelangford.net
X
kyt6ea4ak4bvo35lrw.net
Can you tell which one is a DGA domain and which one is
a Hollywood actress website?
# R S A C
DGA DETECTION
16
katherinelangford.net kyt6ea4ak4bvo35lrw.net
Rovnix Malware DGA domain
# R S A C
HOW DIFFICULT IS THE PROBLEM?
17
christinepatterson.net
X
christinekirkpatrick.net
Can you tell which one is a DGA domain and which one is
an online art gallery?
# R S A C
18
IT IS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM
# R S A C
IT IS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM
19
christinepatterson.net
Is a DGA domain!
Suppobox Malware Family
# R S A C
20
OBSERVE GROUP OF DOMAINS
hurt
# R S A C
21
THE WORDS REPEAT
honeycutt
# R S A C
SUMMARY
22
1. Study Case: Malware Detection using Graph Mining
a) Dictionary-DGA Problem
b) Graph-based analytics to extract malware dictionaries from DNS traffic
2. Graph Mining techniques that are easy to visualize and interpret
a) Egonet analysis for Anomaly Detection
b) Open Source tools for data exploration & visualization tools
# R S A C
23
BUILDING THE GRAPH
Word Finding
doghouse.com
dog
house
# R S A C
24
BUILDING THE GRAPH
smarthouse.com
smart
house
Word Finding
# R S A C
25
BUILDING THE GRAPH
doghouse.com
smarthouse.com
dog
house
smart
# R S A C
DGA WORDS CONNECT DIFFERENTLY
26
# R S A C
27
WE EXTRACT THE DICTIONARIES WITHOUT REVERSE ENGINEERING EFFORTS!
DETECTING DICTONARIES
# R S A C
MALICIOUS REGION IDENTIFICATION
28
Features
Dmean: Average node degree
Dmax: Maximum node Degree
C: Cardinality of basis of cycles of G
Cv: Average cycles per node
ASPL: Average Shortest Path Length
# R S A C
GRAPH MINING IS POWERFUL
29
DGA
Dict 1
DGA
Dict 2
Alexa Train
Train
DGA
Dict 3
Alexa
Test
Test
Unbalanced Dataset: DGA domains are less than 1%
# of words used by
DGA
# of detected
words
Recall FPR
Round 1 92 92 1 0
Round 2 70 64 0.91 0
Round 3 80 80 1 0
120K Benign Domains
1020 DDGA domains
# R S A C
HIGH DETECTION RATE
30
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Model Precision Recall FPR Precision Recall FPR Precision Recall FPR
WordGraph 1 1 0 1 0.96 0 1 1 0
Random
Forest
(Baseline)
0.056 0.009 10-3 0.031 0.006 10-3 0.0 0.0 10-3
Classification Results
# R S A C
SUMMARY
31
1. Study Case: Malware Detection using Graph Mining
a) Dictionary-DGA Problem
b) Graph-based analytics to extract malware dictionaries from DNS traffic
2. Graph Mining techniques that are easy to visualize and interpret
a) Anomaly Detection
b) Open Source tools for data exploration & visualization tools
# R S A C
ANOMALY DETECTION
32
How can we find anomalies in a graph?
Anomalous behavior could signify
— Fraud
— Network intrusion
— Electronic auction fraud
— Etc.
# R S A C
EGONET
33
# R S A C
EGONET
34
Ego node
# R S A C
EGONET
35
Neighborhood around a node
Ego node
# R S A C
EGONET
36
Ego node
Egonet
# R S A C
ANOMALY DETECTION
37
• Finding Anomalous nodes in graphs by analyzing their Egonets
• Egonet behaviors that can indicate anomaly
# R S A C
ANOMALY DETECTION
38
Spam email accounts
Spamming email accounts usually send
emails in a robotic fashion to many
accounts, that are unrelated to each
other.
# R S A C
ANOMALY DETECTION
39
Finding a Star Egonet (Near-Star)[2]
• E = N⍺ , ⍺ < 1.1
• E: number of edges in a Egonet
• N: Degree of an egonet (numer of nodes)
# R S A C
ANOMALY DETECTION
40
IRS Fraud – Phony tax returns
In a graph model in which each tax form
is a node, and the existence of an edge is
based on tax form similarity, i.e. any two
tax forms that are suspiciously similar
have a relationship (edge), any
sufficiently large clique identifies a
cluster worth studying.
Finding a group of nodes with clique or
near clique egonets  Fraud.
# R S A C
ANOMALY DETECTION
41
Finding a Clique Egonet (Near-Clique)
• E = N⍺ , ⍺ > 1.7
• E: number of edges in a Egonet
• N: Degree of an egonet (number of
nodes)
# R S A C
ANOMALY DETECTION
42
Fraud in Credit Card Transactions
An unusual high transaction can
indicate stolen or cloned credit card.
This is represented by a dominant
edge in an Egonet.
# R S A C
ANOMALY DETECTION
43
Finding a Heavy Edge
• λ = W⍺ , ⍺ > 0.98
• λ : Principal Eigenvalue of an Egonet
• W: Egonet weight (sum of the weights of
all edges)
# R S A C
SUMMARY
44
1. Study Case: Malware Detection using Graph Mining
a) Dictionary-DGA Problem
b) Graph-based analytics to extract malware dictionaries from DNS traffic
2. Graph Mining techniques that are easy to visualize and interpret
a) Anomaly Detection
b) Open Source tools for data exploration & visualization tools
# R S A C
COMMUNITY DETECTION
45
Community structure means that the
network may be clustered to sets of
nodes, each of which relatively
densely-interconnected internally,
with relatively few connections
between sets.
Used in study of many fields such as
social networks, social studies,
computer networks, etc.
# R S A C
COMMUNITY DETECTION
46
• Useful Tool for Graph Exploration
• Can we find communities in a certain graph
structure?
• Detecting Malicious Group Behavior [5]
• Problem of Detecting spammers in Email Service
Providers (ESPs)
• Performs better than Content-based filters.
• Early detection of spamming accounts.
# R S A C
TOOLS FOR GRAPH ANALYSIS
47
How to Explore?
— Python’s Libraries NetworkX and python-Louvain are easy to start.
 https://networkx.github.io
 https://github.com/taynaud/python-louvain
How to visualize?
— Gephi is a great Graph visualization tool that allows to apply community detection
while visualizing the data – this is great for data exploration!
 https://gephi.org
# R S A C
TODAY WE LEARNED…
48
Representing information in the right way is the key to find what you
want.
Graphs are a powerful representation for highlighting group
structures.
They are a powerful ally in: fraud detection and intrusion detection
and group classification problems.
There are powerful open source tools for graph mining and analysis.
# R S A C
APPLY WHAT YOU LEARNED TODAY!
49
Next week you should:
Identify problems that can be represented and explored by graph analytics.
Think of unusual node relations when building graphs, just like our study case
example.
In the first three months following this presentation you should:
Identify which approach is best suitable for the problem you are trying to solve. Is
it Community Detection, Anomaly Detection or Topology Classification ?
Within six months you should:
Be able to compare the graph-based approach with traditional approach.
— Can you combine both approaches in order to achieve better accuracy and lower false
positive rate?
# R S A C
REFERENCES
50
• [1] A Word Graph Approach for Dictionary Detection and Extraction in DGA Domain Names:
https://machine-learning-and-security.github.io/slides/Mayana-final-of-NIPS-DDGA.pdf
• [2] Oddball: Spotting anomalies in weighted graphs
https://link.springer.com/10.1007%2F978-3-642-13672-6_40
• [3] Graph-based irregularity and fraud detection:
http://www3.cs.stonybrook.edu/~leman/icdm12/ICDM12-Tutorial%20-%20PartI.pdf
• [4] Fast unfolding of communities in large networks:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/0803.0476.pdf
• [5] Birds of a Feather Flock Together: The Accidental Community of Spammers
https://www.cs.bgu.ac.il/~snean161/wiki.files/151_0605.pdf
• [6] Gephi:
https://gephi.org
• [7] NetworkX:
https://networkx.github.io
# R S A C
Think Graph!
Thank you!
Questions?
Mayana Pereira :: mpereira@infoblox.com

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Fighting Malware with Graph Analytics: An End-to-End Case Study

  • 1. SESSION ID: #RSAC Mayana Pereira FIGHTING MALWARE WITH GRAPH ANALYTICS: AN END-TO-END CASE STUDY MLN-F01 Data Scientist Infoblox Inc.
  • 2. # R S A C MACHINE LEARNING 2 Profile picture  Posts   Age  Gender  Personality  Political Preferences  Advertising
  • 3. # R S A C MACHINE LEARNING 3 Profile picture  Posts   Fake Users  Influencers
  • 4. # R S A C MACHINE LEARNING 4 Relations between users Graphs
  • 5. # R S A C GRAPH DEFINITION 5 Nodes  Users Edges  Friendship
  • 6. # R S A C GRAPH-BASED ANALYTICS 6 A powerful tool for modeling, structuring and understanding relationships among people, devices, information entities. Graph mining provides an insightful representation — Interdependent instances — Long-range relations — Node/Edge attributes (data complexity) — Hard to fake/alter (adversarial robustness) Security-related applications: — Exposing Terrorist cells — Botnet detection — Reputation propagation of IPs
  • 7. # R S A C OUR GOAL IS… 7 How graphs and graph mining can be used to solve security problems. Intuitive and easy to understand approaches. + = Learn Apply Obtain Identify the data related problems and how to describe them through graphs. Graph-based machine learning models that complements and can outperform traditional techniques.
  • 8. # R S A C SUMMARY 8 1. Study Case: Malware Detection using Graph Mining a) Dictionary-DGA Problem b) Graph-based analytics to extract malware dictionaries from DNS traffic 2. Graph Mining techniques that are easy to visualize and interpret a) EgAnomaly Detection b) Open Source tools for data exploration & visualization tools
  • 9. # R S A C SUMMARY 9 1. Study Case: Malware Detection using Graph Mining a) Dictionary-DGA Problem b) Graph-based analytics to extract malware dictionaries from DNS traffic 2. Graph Mining techniques that are easy to visualize and interpret a) Anomaly Detection b) Open Source tools for data exploration & visualization tools
  • 10. # R S A C 10 135.175.17.35 MALWARE COMMUNICATION bad-domain.com DNS Server 135.175.17.35 Infected Machine Command and Control
  • 11. # R S A C 11 NXdomain DOMAIN GENERATION ALGORITHMS dnskasd.info DNS Server 135.175.17.35 Infected Machine Command and Control NXdomain ajdhkbf.info 135.175.17.35 akdjnfag.info
  • 12. # R S A C 12 DOMAIN GENERATION ALGORITHMS 135.175.17.35 Infected Machine Command and Control Malicious Payload Contact 135.175.17.35
  • 13. # R S A C 13 DOMAIN GENERATION ALGORITHMS DNS Server Infected Machine infoblox.com infoblox.com Classification: legitimate domain infoblox.com
  • 14. # R S A C 14 DOMAIN GENERATION ALGORITHMS DNS Server Infected Machine z030zy.com z030zy.com Classification: darkshell DGA domain z030zy.com
  • 15. # R S A C DGA DETECTION 15 katherinelangford.net X kyt6ea4ak4bvo35lrw.net Can you tell which one is a DGA domain and which one is a Hollywood actress website?
  • 16. # R S A C DGA DETECTION 16 katherinelangford.net kyt6ea4ak4bvo35lrw.net Rovnix Malware DGA domain
  • 17. # R S A C HOW DIFFICULT IS THE PROBLEM? 17 christinepatterson.net X christinekirkpatrick.net Can you tell which one is a DGA domain and which one is an online art gallery?
  • 18. # R S A C 18 IT IS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM
  • 19. # R S A C IT IS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM 19 christinepatterson.net Is a DGA domain! Suppobox Malware Family
  • 20. # R S A C 20 OBSERVE GROUP OF DOMAINS hurt
  • 21. # R S A C 21 THE WORDS REPEAT honeycutt
  • 22. # R S A C SUMMARY 22 1. Study Case: Malware Detection using Graph Mining a) Dictionary-DGA Problem b) Graph-based analytics to extract malware dictionaries from DNS traffic 2. Graph Mining techniques that are easy to visualize and interpret a) Egonet analysis for Anomaly Detection b) Open Source tools for data exploration & visualization tools
  • 23. # R S A C 23 BUILDING THE GRAPH Word Finding doghouse.com dog house
  • 24. # R S A C 24 BUILDING THE GRAPH smarthouse.com smart house Word Finding
  • 25. # R S A C 25 BUILDING THE GRAPH doghouse.com smarthouse.com dog house smart
  • 26. # R S A C DGA WORDS CONNECT DIFFERENTLY 26
  • 27. # R S A C 27 WE EXTRACT THE DICTIONARIES WITHOUT REVERSE ENGINEERING EFFORTS! DETECTING DICTONARIES
  • 28. # R S A C MALICIOUS REGION IDENTIFICATION 28 Features Dmean: Average node degree Dmax: Maximum node Degree C: Cardinality of basis of cycles of G Cv: Average cycles per node ASPL: Average Shortest Path Length
  • 29. # R S A C GRAPH MINING IS POWERFUL 29 DGA Dict 1 DGA Dict 2 Alexa Train Train DGA Dict 3 Alexa Test Test Unbalanced Dataset: DGA domains are less than 1% # of words used by DGA # of detected words Recall FPR Round 1 92 92 1 0 Round 2 70 64 0.91 0 Round 3 80 80 1 0 120K Benign Domains 1020 DDGA domains
  • 30. # R S A C HIGH DETECTION RATE 30 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Model Precision Recall FPR Precision Recall FPR Precision Recall FPR WordGraph 1 1 0 1 0.96 0 1 1 0 Random Forest (Baseline) 0.056 0.009 10-3 0.031 0.006 10-3 0.0 0.0 10-3 Classification Results
  • 31. # R S A C SUMMARY 31 1. Study Case: Malware Detection using Graph Mining a) Dictionary-DGA Problem b) Graph-based analytics to extract malware dictionaries from DNS traffic 2. Graph Mining techniques that are easy to visualize and interpret a) Anomaly Detection b) Open Source tools for data exploration & visualization tools
  • 32. # R S A C ANOMALY DETECTION 32 How can we find anomalies in a graph? Anomalous behavior could signify — Fraud — Network intrusion — Electronic auction fraud — Etc.
  • 33. # R S A C EGONET 33
  • 34. # R S A C EGONET 34 Ego node
  • 35. # R S A C EGONET 35 Neighborhood around a node Ego node
  • 36. # R S A C EGONET 36 Ego node Egonet
  • 37. # R S A C ANOMALY DETECTION 37 • Finding Anomalous nodes in graphs by analyzing their Egonets • Egonet behaviors that can indicate anomaly
  • 38. # R S A C ANOMALY DETECTION 38 Spam email accounts Spamming email accounts usually send emails in a robotic fashion to many accounts, that are unrelated to each other.
  • 39. # R S A C ANOMALY DETECTION 39 Finding a Star Egonet (Near-Star)[2] • E = N⍺ , ⍺ < 1.1 • E: number of edges in a Egonet • N: Degree of an egonet (numer of nodes)
  • 40. # R S A C ANOMALY DETECTION 40 IRS Fraud – Phony tax returns In a graph model in which each tax form is a node, and the existence of an edge is based on tax form similarity, i.e. any two tax forms that are suspiciously similar have a relationship (edge), any sufficiently large clique identifies a cluster worth studying. Finding a group of nodes with clique or near clique egonets  Fraud.
  • 41. # R S A C ANOMALY DETECTION 41 Finding a Clique Egonet (Near-Clique) • E = N⍺ , ⍺ > 1.7 • E: number of edges in a Egonet • N: Degree of an egonet (number of nodes)
  • 42. # R S A C ANOMALY DETECTION 42 Fraud in Credit Card Transactions An unusual high transaction can indicate stolen or cloned credit card. This is represented by a dominant edge in an Egonet.
  • 43. # R S A C ANOMALY DETECTION 43 Finding a Heavy Edge • λ = W⍺ , ⍺ > 0.98 • λ : Principal Eigenvalue of an Egonet • W: Egonet weight (sum of the weights of all edges)
  • 44. # R S A C SUMMARY 44 1. Study Case: Malware Detection using Graph Mining a) Dictionary-DGA Problem b) Graph-based analytics to extract malware dictionaries from DNS traffic 2. Graph Mining techniques that are easy to visualize and interpret a) Anomaly Detection b) Open Source tools for data exploration & visualization tools
  • 45. # R S A C COMMUNITY DETECTION 45 Community structure means that the network may be clustered to sets of nodes, each of which relatively densely-interconnected internally, with relatively few connections between sets. Used in study of many fields such as social networks, social studies, computer networks, etc.
  • 46. # R S A C COMMUNITY DETECTION 46 • Useful Tool for Graph Exploration • Can we find communities in a certain graph structure? • Detecting Malicious Group Behavior [5] • Problem of Detecting spammers in Email Service Providers (ESPs) • Performs better than Content-based filters. • Early detection of spamming accounts.
  • 47. # R S A C TOOLS FOR GRAPH ANALYSIS 47 How to Explore? — Python’s Libraries NetworkX and python-Louvain are easy to start.  https://networkx.github.io  https://github.com/taynaud/python-louvain How to visualize? — Gephi is a great Graph visualization tool that allows to apply community detection while visualizing the data – this is great for data exploration!  https://gephi.org
  • 48. # R S A C TODAY WE LEARNED… 48 Representing information in the right way is the key to find what you want. Graphs are a powerful representation for highlighting group structures. They are a powerful ally in: fraud detection and intrusion detection and group classification problems. There are powerful open source tools for graph mining and analysis.
  • 49. # R S A C APPLY WHAT YOU LEARNED TODAY! 49 Next week you should: Identify problems that can be represented and explored by graph analytics. Think of unusual node relations when building graphs, just like our study case example. In the first three months following this presentation you should: Identify which approach is best suitable for the problem you are trying to solve. Is it Community Detection, Anomaly Detection or Topology Classification ? Within six months you should: Be able to compare the graph-based approach with traditional approach. — Can you combine both approaches in order to achieve better accuracy and lower false positive rate?
  • 50. # R S A C REFERENCES 50 • [1] A Word Graph Approach for Dictionary Detection and Extraction in DGA Domain Names: https://machine-learning-and-security.github.io/slides/Mayana-final-of-NIPS-DDGA.pdf • [2] Oddball: Spotting anomalies in weighted graphs https://link.springer.com/10.1007%2F978-3-642-13672-6_40 • [3] Graph-based irregularity and fraud detection: http://www3.cs.stonybrook.edu/~leman/icdm12/ICDM12-Tutorial%20-%20PartI.pdf • [4] Fast unfolding of communities in large networks: https://arxiv.org/pdf/0803.0476.pdf • [5] Birds of a Feather Flock Together: The Accidental Community of Spammers https://www.cs.bgu.ac.il/~snean161/wiki.files/151_0605.pdf • [6] Gephi: https://gephi.org • [7] NetworkX: https://networkx.github.io
  • 51. # R S A C Think Graph! Thank you! Questions? Mayana Pereira :: mpereira@infoblox.com