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Practical Exploitation of IoT
Networks and Ecosystems
Sanjay V & Nitin Lakshmanan
DEEP
ARMOR
www.deeparmor.com

@deep_armor
SACON 2020
Instructors
Nitin Lakshmanan
Senior Security Analyst
Deep Armor
Aujas Networks, Aricent/
Intel
Sanjay V
Security Analyst
Deep Armor
Deloitte
SACON 2020
Agenda
• IoT Architecture & Intro to IoT Security
• Security Paradigms for the Building Blocks
• Wireless Protocols
• Hands-on Exercises
• Security Development Life Cycle (SDLC) for
IoT
• Fun Hacking Activities
• Summary
Hacking Zigbee-style
Wireless Sensor Networks
Breaking Bluetooth
Security
Attacking Consumer IoT
Ecosystems
AWS IoT Core & Cloud
Services
Hands-on Exercises
SACON 2020
Internet Of Things
• Network of devices connected 

to Internet
• Connect, Collect and Exchange
• Part of the fast growing electronic culture
• Revolution in all the fields
Connected People
Connected Fleets
Connected Infra
Connected Markets
Connected Assets
Connected Products
Network Data
SACON 2020
Messy World of IoT Security
• “Let me get the product out first”
• “I’m paying a supplier for hardware/software. Security is their
responsibility”
• “We don’t store any confidential information”
• “Let me worry about it if/when we get hacked”
• “We are 100% secure (!)”
• …
SACON 2020
Attacks on IoT products
SACON 2020
IoT Security & Businesses
• Security is often seen as zero ROI
• Impedes rapid prototyping and delivery (doesn’t have to)
• Consumers will buy anyway
• Poor awareness; Sometimes, lack of options
• Liability laws are almost non-existent
• Few that exist don’t hold water
SACON 2020
Range / Power of protocols for IoT
Protocol Power Range
WiFi High Long
Zigbee / Z-Wave Low Short to Mid
BT / BLE Low Short
LPWAN Low Long
SACON 2020
Zigbee
• Low data rate wireless applications
• Smart energy, medical, home automation, IIoT
• Two bands of operation: 868/915MHz and 2450MHz
• Simpler & less expensive than Bluetooth
• 10-100m range
• Zigbee Alliance
SACON 2020
Zigbee Security Model
• Open Trust model (Device Trust Boundary)
• Crypto protection only between devices
• All services employ the same security suite
SACON 2020
Practical Exploitation of IoT

Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN)
SACON 2020
Agenda
• IEEE 802.15.4 (Layer 1 & 2 definitions for Zigbee)
• Tools
• Setup
• Attack and Defense
• Packet Generation
• Sniffing and Injection
• Packet Manipulation
• Security Hardening
SACON 2020
802.15.4
• IEEE standard for low-rate wireless personal
area networks (LR-WPANs)
• 6LoWPAN for IPv6 over WPANs
• Zigbee extends 802.15.4 

(wrapper services)
Application
Presentation
Session
Transport
Network
Data Link
Physical
Logical Link Control
Media Access Control
ZigbeeSpec
SACON 2020
Attacking WSN
• IoT product simulator
• 802.15.4-based network
• Packet sniffing, manipulation and injection
• Goals:
• Understanding basic packet header formats
• Security models for protecting communication
• Hardware and software tools for packet sniffing & injection
SACON 2020
Challenges
• Insufficient security research and documentation
• Few testing/debugging platforms
• Reliable ones are very expensive or obsoleted
• Beta quality hardware at best
• Took us weeks, studying blogs, asking questions, trial-
and-error, …
• Lots of future work possible. Wanna collaborate?
SACON 2020
Generating & Analyzing IEEE 802.15.4 WSN
packets (MAC Layer)
SACON 2020
WSN Internals
Payload DASRC
SEQ
NUM
PAN
ID
DST
Payload
D
A
SRC
SEQN
U
M
PA
NID
D
ST
Attacker
Gateway
SACON 2020
Impact
• Compromise integrity of sensor data
• Spoof all legit devices in the network
• Logistics & Asset Management - think Vaccine Transportation!
• Medical Use Cases - Hospital monitoring
• Security and Surveillance
• Rapid emergency response for Industries
• CVSSv3 Score: 9.3
SACON 2020
Hardening the WSN
SACON 2020
Approach
• We care about:
• Integrity of data transmitted (bi-directional)
• Confidentiality (sometimes)
• Device attestation in the WSN
• Crypto
• IoT Platform Constraints
• RAM and flash memory are often in KBs
• Traditional crypto is way too intensive
• Libraries — Few and proprietary
SACON 2020
• Protecting data integrity is (should be) a key security objective
• Use Crypto
• Challenges
• Need for HW Acceleration
• Key provisioning and exchange
• Traditional Public Key Crypto is often unacceptable
• Nonce-based approaches are easy but insecure
• We did not discuss:
• Device Security Measures (Secure Boot, Secure FOTA, etc.)
• Out of the box provisioning, device mapping and reuse
• Key Management
Summary
SACON 2020
Consumer IoT Security

&

AWS-IoT Topics
SACON 2020
Agenda
• Consumer IoT
• Case Study: “X” Fitness Band & “X” Wearable Technology device
• Weaknesses in Smartphone Platforms <—> Wearables channels
• Hands-on hacking of Bluetooth and BLE protocols
• Hardening BLE
• AWS IoT Core
• Secure by Design and SDLC for IoT Platforms
SACON 2020
Wearables Security
SACON 2020
Introduction
• Wireless protocol for short range data exchange
• BT: 1-100m
• BLE: 10-600m
• BLE is Light-weight subset of classic Bluetooth with low power
consumption
• RF range: 2.4 - 2.485 GHz
• Maintained & Governed by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG)
• Popular use cases: wearable devices, smart pay systems, healthcare,
smart security systems etc
SACON 2020
Bluetooth 5
Feature Bluetooth 5 Bluetooth 4.2
Speed Supports 2 Mbps Supports 1 Mbps
Range 40m indoor 10m indoor
Power Requirement Low High
Message capacity 255 bytes 31 bytes
• Latest version of BT and BLE Spec
• Improvements to BLE
• Aimed at IoT (especially consumer)
SACON 2020
Bluetooth LE security
Secure Simple Pairing (SSP)
• Just Works: very limited/no user interface
• Numeric Comparison: devices with display or yes/no button
• Passkey Entry: 6 digit pin as the pass key
• Out Of Band: Out of the band channel for key exchange to
thwart MITM attacks
• Network traffic is encrypted with AES-128
SACON 2020
Practical Exploitation of BLE Systems
SACON 2020
Attacking Wearable - Mobile Ecosystems
Section A
SACON 2020
Section B
BLE Packet Analysis using Wireshark
(“X” Popular fitness tracker)
SACON 2020
Section B: Sniffing with Ubertooth
SACON 2020
Summary
• BT/BLE network packet analysis is easy
• Market-available HW and SW
• Many products do not enable the existing
encryption mechanisms offered by the BT spec
• At the very least, enable LTK-encryption
SACON 2020
Section C
Attacking BLE LTK Encryption
SACON 2020
Section D
Hardening BLE
SACON 2020
IoT Cloud Security
SACON 2020
Agenda
• IoT Services from Modern Cloud Vendors
• AWS IoT Core
• Setting up IoT Core with device simulators
• Secure configuration
• AWS Cloud Security Checks
SACON 2020
• Managed cloud service for connected devices to interact with
cloud applications
• Amazon FreeRTOS — open-source OS for MCUs (low power
& memory)
• Connect and manage devices
• Secure the communication
• Process and Act
• Monitor
What is it?
SACON 2020
Unshackling from Traditional SDLC
SACON 2020
Security Development Life Cycle
Security
Architecture,
Privacy
Requirements
Threat Modeling,
Attack Trees &
Data Access
Reviews
Focused Security
Code Reviews &
Privacy Planning
Fuzzing,
Penetration
Testing, Privacy
Sign-off
Fix verification,
Incident
Response
Planning
Delta Security
Assessment,
Security for
Continuous
Integration/
Delivery
Program Conception Design Implementation Pre-Launch Deployment Maintenance
Reviews
Reviews &
Reports
Reports
Resolution &
Sign-off
Reports
Device
Mobile
Cloud
SACON 2020
Privacy
• Why worry?
• Global Markets
• Country-specific guidelines
• Ecosystems and overlapping policies
GDPR!
SACON 2020
Summary
• Plethora of protocols & standards make IoT security
messy
• Make hardware & software for IoT comms undergo
penetration testing
• RZUSBStick works great. Also, ApiMote
• Not much else
• BT/BLE sniffing is very sketchy
• Cloud Services giants & increasing number of IoT
services
• SDLC and Shift-left
Ecosystem
Protocols
Integration
Interoperability
SACON 2020
www.deeparmor.com | @deep_armor | services@deeparmor.com
SDLC
Vulnerability
Assessments
Security Consulting Trainings

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(SACON 2020) Practical Exploitation of IoT Networks and Ecosystems workshop

  • 1. Practical Exploitation of IoT Networks and Ecosystems Sanjay V & Nitin Lakshmanan DEEP ARMOR www.deeparmor.com
 @deep_armor
  • 2. SACON 2020 Instructors Nitin Lakshmanan Senior Security Analyst Deep Armor Aujas Networks, Aricent/ Intel Sanjay V Security Analyst Deep Armor Deloitte
  • 3. SACON 2020 Agenda • IoT Architecture & Intro to IoT Security • Security Paradigms for the Building Blocks • Wireless Protocols • Hands-on Exercises • Security Development Life Cycle (SDLC) for IoT • Fun Hacking Activities • Summary Hacking Zigbee-style Wireless Sensor Networks Breaking Bluetooth Security Attacking Consumer IoT Ecosystems AWS IoT Core & Cloud Services Hands-on Exercises
  • 4. SACON 2020 Internet Of Things • Network of devices connected 
 to Internet • Connect, Collect and Exchange • Part of the fast growing electronic culture • Revolution in all the fields Connected People Connected Fleets Connected Infra Connected Markets Connected Assets Connected Products Network Data
  • 5. SACON 2020 Messy World of IoT Security • “Let me get the product out first” • “I’m paying a supplier for hardware/software. Security is their responsibility” • “We don’t store any confidential information” • “Let me worry about it if/when we get hacked” • “We are 100% secure (!)” • …
  • 6. SACON 2020 Attacks on IoT products
  • 7. SACON 2020 IoT Security & Businesses • Security is often seen as zero ROI • Impedes rapid prototyping and delivery (doesn’t have to) • Consumers will buy anyway • Poor awareness; Sometimes, lack of options • Liability laws are almost non-existent • Few that exist don’t hold water
  • 8. SACON 2020 Range / Power of protocols for IoT Protocol Power Range WiFi High Long Zigbee / Z-Wave Low Short to Mid BT / BLE Low Short LPWAN Low Long
  • 9. SACON 2020 Zigbee • Low data rate wireless applications • Smart energy, medical, home automation, IIoT • Two bands of operation: 868/915MHz and 2450MHz • Simpler & less expensive than Bluetooth • 10-100m range • Zigbee Alliance
  • 10. SACON 2020 Zigbee Security Model • Open Trust model (Device Trust Boundary) • Crypto protection only between devices • All services employ the same security suite
  • 11. SACON 2020 Practical Exploitation of IoT
 Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN)
  • 12. SACON 2020 Agenda • IEEE 802.15.4 (Layer 1 & 2 definitions for Zigbee) • Tools • Setup • Attack and Defense • Packet Generation • Sniffing and Injection • Packet Manipulation • Security Hardening
  • 13. SACON 2020 802.15.4 • IEEE standard for low-rate wireless personal area networks (LR-WPANs) • 6LoWPAN for IPv6 over WPANs • Zigbee extends 802.15.4 
 (wrapper services) Application Presentation Session Transport Network Data Link Physical Logical Link Control Media Access Control ZigbeeSpec
  • 14. SACON 2020 Attacking WSN • IoT product simulator • 802.15.4-based network • Packet sniffing, manipulation and injection • Goals: • Understanding basic packet header formats • Security models for protecting communication • Hardware and software tools for packet sniffing & injection
  • 15. SACON 2020 Challenges • Insufficient security research and documentation • Few testing/debugging platforms • Reliable ones are very expensive or obsoleted • Beta quality hardware at best • Took us weeks, studying blogs, asking questions, trial- and-error, … • Lots of future work possible. Wanna collaborate?
  • 16. SACON 2020 Generating & Analyzing IEEE 802.15.4 WSN packets (MAC Layer)
  • 17. SACON 2020 WSN Internals Payload DASRC SEQ NUM PAN ID DST Payload D A SRC SEQN U M PA NID D ST Attacker Gateway
  • 18. SACON 2020 Impact • Compromise integrity of sensor data • Spoof all legit devices in the network • Logistics & Asset Management - think Vaccine Transportation! • Medical Use Cases - Hospital monitoring • Security and Surveillance • Rapid emergency response for Industries • CVSSv3 Score: 9.3
  • 20. SACON 2020 Approach • We care about: • Integrity of data transmitted (bi-directional) • Confidentiality (sometimes) • Device attestation in the WSN • Crypto • IoT Platform Constraints • RAM and flash memory are often in KBs • Traditional crypto is way too intensive • Libraries — Few and proprietary
  • 21. SACON 2020 • Protecting data integrity is (should be) a key security objective • Use Crypto • Challenges • Need for HW Acceleration • Key provisioning and exchange • Traditional Public Key Crypto is often unacceptable • Nonce-based approaches are easy but insecure • We did not discuss: • Device Security Measures (Secure Boot, Secure FOTA, etc.) • Out of the box provisioning, device mapping and reuse • Key Management Summary
  • 22. SACON 2020 Consumer IoT Security
 &
 AWS-IoT Topics
  • 23. SACON 2020 Agenda • Consumer IoT • Case Study: “X” Fitness Band & “X” Wearable Technology device • Weaknesses in Smartphone Platforms <—> Wearables channels • Hands-on hacking of Bluetooth and BLE protocols • Hardening BLE • AWS IoT Core • Secure by Design and SDLC for IoT Platforms
  • 25. SACON 2020 Introduction • Wireless protocol for short range data exchange • BT: 1-100m • BLE: 10-600m • BLE is Light-weight subset of classic Bluetooth with low power consumption • RF range: 2.4 - 2.485 GHz • Maintained & Governed by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) • Popular use cases: wearable devices, smart pay systems, healthcare, smart security systems etc
  • 26. SACON 2020 Bluetooth 5 Feature Bluetooth 5 Bluetooth 4.2 Speed Supports 2 Mbps Supports 1 Mbps Range 40m indoor 10m indoor Power Requirement Low High Message capacity 255 bytes 31 bytes • Latest version of BT and BLE Spec • Improvements to BLE • Aimed at IoT (especially consumer)
  • 27. SACON 2020 Bluetooth LE security Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) • Just Works: very limited/no user interface • Numeric Comparison: devices with display or yes/no button • Passkey Entry: 6 digit pin as the pass key • Out Of Band: Out of the band channel for key exchange to thwart MITM attacks • Network traffic is encrypted with AES-128
  • 29. SACON 2020 Attacking Wearable - Mobile Ecosystems Section A
  • 30. SACON 2020 Section B BLE Packet Analysis using Wireshark (“X” Popular fitness tracker)
  • 31. SACON 2020 Section B: Sniffing with Ubertooth
  • 32. SACON 2020 Summary • BT/BLE network packet analysis is easy • Market-available HW and SW • Many products do not enable the existing encryption mechanisms offered by the BT spec • At the very least, enable LTK-encryption
  • 33. SACON 2020 Section C Attacking BLE LTK Encryption
  • 36. SACON 2020 Agenda • IoT Services from Modern Cloud Vendors • AWS IoT Core • Setting up IoT Core with device simulators • Secure configuration • AWS Cloud Security Checks
  • 37. SACON 2020 • Managed cloud service for connected devices to interact with cloud applications • Amazon FreeRTOS — open-source OS for MCUs (low power & memory) • Connect and manage devices • Secure the communication • Process and Act • Monitor What is it?
  • 38. SACON 2020 Unshackling from Traditional SDLC
  • 39. SACON 2020 Security Development Life Cycle Security Architecture, Privacy Requirements Threat Modeling, Attack Trees & Data Access Reviews Focused Security Code Reviews & Privacy Planning Fuzzing, Penetration Testing, Privacy Sign-off Fix verification, Incident Response Planning Delta Security Assessment, Security for Continuous Integration/ Delivery Program Conception Design Implementation Pre-Launch Deployment Maintenance Reviews Reviews & Reports Reports Resolution & Sign-off Reports Device Mobile Cloud
  • 40. SACON 2020 Privacy • Why worry? • Global Markets • Country-specific guidelines • Ecosystems and overlapping policies GDPR!
  • 41. SACON 2020 Summary • Plethora of protocols & standards make IoT security messy • Make hardware & software for IoT comms undergo penetration testing • RZUSBStick works great. Also, ApiMote • Not much else • BT/BLE sniffing is very sketchy • Cloud Services giants & increasing number of IoT services • SDLC and Shift-left Ecosystem Protocols Integration Interoperability
  • 42. SACON 2020 www.deeparmor.com | @deep_armor | services@deeparmor.com SDLC Vulnerability Assessments Security Consulting Trainings