2. RESEARCH FOUNDATIONS
• Original goal of research was to consider how we might
regulate virtual environments, grounded firmly in game
studies.
• Because, eventually, they will be regulated somehow...
• Two Case Studies: EVE Online & Offshore Gambling Industry.
• Not “the solution”, or even “a solution” but lessons worth
considering.
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4. Bartle Model
Left Image my own. Right -- IJMC: PopLicks.com
Real world governments
Virtual world admins
Players
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5. GAMBLING VS. VIRTUAL WORLDS
• Many similarities; from mechanics (drop tables, complete
Gacha) to regulatory challenges.
• But other industries are similar too: day-trading, trading
cards.
• The fact that they look similar doesn’t imply what works in
one will work for the other, but does warrant further
consideration.
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6. GAMBLING VS. VIRTUAL WORLDS
“when people lose their life
savings in the stock market, it's
called bad investment. when
people lose their life savings in
sports betting, it's called
gambling problem.”
'Genghis Khan', SBR Forum
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9. Botting in Eve Online
Unattributed composite
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10. EXAMPLE 1: OFFSHORE GAMBLING
• “Cory Roth” vs “EasyStreet Sportsbook”
– Roth played allegedly perfect video poker for 499 minutes (8.3
hours) at the rate of 1,053 hands per hour, hitting two royal
flushes.
• Had previously shown a similar pattern at Northbet (and was to
subsequently do so at Heritage).
• Casino claimed it was obvious he was botting, and confiscated all
his funds. Also alleged he had broken the RNG.
• Player alleged the software had a ‘fast deal’ mode, encouraged
fast play, what he had done was possible, and, even if he were
botting, the game design should have ensured a profit for casino.
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11. EXAMPLE 2: EVE ONLINE
• Participant / EVE News 24 commentator Riverini trained a
“cloaky Loki with a probe launcher to go hunt some bots”,
and developed a repeatable system to identify bots within
systems.
• He “noticed a pattern in the systems which had the same #
of players 13 hours later [and] consulted dotlan for the
suspicious systems. A system with bots would display a
consistent NPC kill count [...] It is relatively unlikely that a
human would have the patience to chain belts for 13
consecutive hours and produce a smooth, even NPC kill
count with low volatility... [These] were surely bots”
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12. EXAMPLE 2: EVE ONLINE
• Norms theory would suggest that codification follows
norms, and so it was with botting in Eve Online.
• Players (Riverini just one example) identified techniques
using the interface to identify bots. CCP, with access to the
backend data, could clearly have optimized this process.
• The answer was either they didn’t want to (botters paid for
their accounts), or that they didn’t have the staff to do so.
• Concerted actions by players forced CCP to take action.
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13. COMMON FEATURES
• Geographical Disparity & Lack of Formal Regulation
• Terms of Service enforcement difficulties, conflicts
between TOS, Community Norms and/or Code.
• Potential for disputes.
• Strength of community: knowledge of mishandled issues
travels fast in both environments.
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14. OFFSHORE REGULATORY HISTORY
• Offshore industry founded out of European operators
seeking to offer services to customers their licenses didn’t
cover.
• In contemporary context, largely island-based operations
targeting US customers, in breach of Wire Act, UIGEA (and
various racketeering statutes)
• Forum-based regulation worked for a while, whilst internet
& industry boomed. Problems started when they started
relying on advertising.
• Mediation panels lost traction after US F1 GP Dispute w /
Olympic.
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15. SBR MODEL
• Other models were also participant based, but it is the
SBR model that gained traction.
• Players submit dispute. SBR attempt to resolve with book
behind scenes. Report back to community via news wire.
• Has evolved over the years. Some disputes are raised in
public first (lower % resolved). Communication now
includes forums, video.
• A negative report from SBR is enough to impact upon your
business.
• Similar to “Greed is Good” & Gaming Media
• Reputation-based regulation.
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16. SOME (BRIEF) HIGHLIGHTS
• Many of the disputes we see in VW's would not be new to
observers from the gambling industry.
• Automation happens in virtual environments just as it has
in poker / video poker /Code has bugs that allow players to
gain an advantage just as sportsbooks have long had code
that accepted correlated parlays.
• Enforcement is not always simple, and over-enforcement
is possible. Players need a way to resolve this. “God”
argument increasingly losing value.
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17. SOME (BRIEF) HIGHLIGHTS
• The models that worked (and did not) in the offshore
gambling industry are worth considering. There is no
reason to repeat the same mistakes.
• Courts an ultimate remedy, but perhaps not the first.
• Complete Gacha, and move towards gambling in social
networks highlights that regulation is impending. Industry
better served by being ahead of the curve.
• Alternative regulatory methods, with different degrees of
formality, often suffer from a timeline. In contemporary
environments, participants less happy to wait a year vs a
week (IBAS vs SBR).
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18. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• ARC Centre for Excellence in Creative Industries and
Innovation (CCI) - http://www.cci.edu.au
• Social Media Research Group -- http://
socialmedia.qut.edu.au
• Queensland University of Technology
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