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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles


               Exploit Automation with
               the Metasploit Framework


                     James Lee




1
# whoami
●   James Lee
●   egypt
●   Core Developer, Metasploit Project
●   Working full time on Metasploit for




2
User Interface


           Scanning for            Fingerprinting
             Servers                   Clients
            Exploiting                  Exploiting
             Servers                     Clients

                            Post-
                         Exploitation
Overview
3
Automating msfconsole
●   Resource files
    ●   A list of commands to be run in sequence
    ●   Can be anything you would type at the msf> prompt
●   setg
●   save




4
Resource files
●   $ ./msfconsole -r foo.rc
●   msf> resource foo.rc
●   ~/.msf3/msfconsole.rc
    ●   Loaded on startup




5
Example Resource File
setg RHOSTS 10.1.1.1-254
setg USERNAME Administrator
setg PASSWORD password
use auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_login
run
use auxiliary/scanner/telnet/telnet_login
run

6
SERVERS


7
Scanning
●   Have to find servers
    before you can exploit
    them
●   Metasploit has several
    ways to do this
    ●   Run nmap and nexpose
        directly from the console     Israeli Orbiter, surveillance UAV

    ●   Import other tools‟ output
    ●   MSF built-in scanners
        (auxiliary/scanner/*)

8
nmap


●   Two options:
    ●   Run nmap normally with -oX and use db_import to
        store the results
    ●   db_nmap command will run nmap and handle the
        import for you
●   Either way, results get stored in the database


9
●    nexpose_scan
●    db_import
●    If you have a Community license (free), limited to 32
     IP addresses at a time
     ●   Msf will scan the whole range in 32-address chunks




10
Nexpose
●    Also stores vulnerability references
     ●   CVE, BID, …
     ●   Without these, figuring out which exploits to run can
         be more difficult
●    Can be used to launch exploits as well




11
MSF Built-in Scanning
                                ●   Implemented as
                                    auxiliary modules
                                ●   Aux is like an exploit
                                    without a payload
                                    ●   Usage similar to
                                        exploits

FanWing Surveillance Platform   ●   Can go through
                                    meterpreter routes

12
Faster Setup
●    RHOSTS can be nmap-notation or
     “file:<filename>”
●    File should contain nmap-notation address
     ranges
     ●   e.g.:
          10.1.1.2,5,7-254
          10.2.2.*
          10.3.3.0/24


13
Faster Scanning
●    set THREADS 256
     ●   Windows freaks out after 16 threads
     ●   Cygwin doesn‟t handle more than about 200
     ●   Linux? Go to town.
●    Caveat: tunneling through meterpreter




14
Selected Scanners
●    Informational        ●   Pwnage
     ●   smb_version          ●   smb_login
     ●   netbios/nbname       ●   telnet_login
                              ●   mssql_login
                              ●   vnc_none_auth




15
Server Exploits
●    The bulk of msf's exploit modules
     ●   385 as of Jan 9
●    Many protocols implemented in an exploit-
     friendly way
     ●   smtp, imap, http, smb, dcerpc, sunrpc, ftp, …
●    Wide range of protocol-level IDS evasions



16
Automatically Exploiting Servers
●    db_autopwn
●    NeXpose plugin




17
db_autopwn
●    Need to have targets stored in the db
●    If vulnerability references are available, can
     cross-reference against specific hosts
●    Can just use matching ports if you don't have
     refs
●    Checks global MinimumRank to limit exploits to
     a particular safety level


18
NeXpose
●    Scan, detect, exploit all in one command
     ●    nexpose_scan -x <host range>
     1.    Populates the db with hosts, services, vulns
     2.    Cross-references vulns and exploits
     3.    Throws exploits at vulnerable servers
●    Has the potential to give you tons of shells
●    Can take a long time for lots of hosts
●    Uses MinimumRank as well
19
CLIENTS


20
Client Fingerprinting
                ●   User Agent
                    ●   Easy to spoof
                    ●   Easy to change in a
                        proxy
                    ●   Some third-party
                        software changes it
                    ●   Less often changed in
                        JavaScript


21
Fingerprinting the Client
●    Various JS objects only exist in one browser
     ●   window.opera, Array.every
●    Some only exist in certain versions
     ●   window.createPopup, Array.every, window.Iterator
●    Rendering differences and parser bugs
     ●   IE's conditional comments




22
Internet Explorer
●    Parser bugs, conditional comments
     ●   Reliable, but not precise
●    ScriptEngine*Version()
     ●   Almost unique across all combinations of client and
         OS, including service pack
●    ClientCaps



23
Opera
●    window.opera.version()
     ●   Includes minor version, e.g. “9.61”
●    window.opera.buildNumber()
     ●   Different on each platform for a given version
     ●   e.g.: “8501” == Windows
     ●   Not precise, only gives platform, no version or
         service pack



24
Hybrid Approach for FF
●    Existence of
     document.getElementsByClassName
     means Firefox 3.0
●    If UA says IE6, go with FF 3.0
●    If UA says FF 3.0.8, it's probably not lying, so
     use the more specific value




25
Firefox OS Detection
●    Most of the objects used in standard detection
     scripts are affected by the User-Agent
     ●   E.g., when spoofing as iPhone,
         navigator.platform = “iPhone”
●    navigator.oscpu is not
     ●   “Linux i686”
     ●   “Windows NT 6.0”



26
Safari / Webkit
●    Infuriatingly standards compliant in JS
●    Can detect its existence easily
     ●   window.WebkitPoint, many others
●    Most Safari-specific stuff has been around since
     1.2, so not useful for version detection




27
Chrome / Webkit
●    Same javascript engine as Safari
●    So far, no easy way to change UA
●    navigator.vendor is always “Google Inc.”




28
Client Exploits in MSF
●    Extensive HTTP support
     ●   Heapspray in two lines of code
     ●   Sotirov's .NET DLL, heap feng shui
●    Wide range of protocol-level IDS evasion
●    Simple exploit in ~10 lines of code




29
Automatically Exploiting Clients
●    Browser Autopwn Auxiliary module
     ●   I spoke about this at Defcon in 2009
●    Fingerprints a client
     ●   Stores detection in the database
●    Determines what exploits might work
     ●   Uses MinimumRank, too
●    Tries the ones most likely to succeed

30
Advantages of Browser Autopwn
●    OS and client detection is client-side, more
     reliable in presence of spoofed or broken UA
●    Detection results automatically stored in the
     database
●    Not written in PHP
     ●   PHP sucks




31
Browser Autopwn Usage
msf> use auxiliary/server/browser_autopwn
msf (browser_autopwn)> set URIPATH /
msf (browser_autopwn)> set EXCLUDE opera
msf (browser_autopwn)> set MATCH .*
msf (browser_autopwn)> run
[*] Starting exploit modules on host 10.1.1.1...
[*] ---

32
Automating Users
●    Browser Autopwn automates the exploits but
     how do we get users to come to our evil web
     server?




33
Karmetasploit
●    Wireless Access Point of Doom
●    Using aircrack-ng, appears to be every access
     point that anybody probes for
     ●   “Why, yes, I am Office_WiFi, please connect”
●    Lets you control the route, the DNS, everything
     ●   “Yup, I'm your internal web server. And your email
         server. And your file server. And...”



34
More on Karma
●    Actually about 5 years old
●    It still works amazingly well
●    More info about getting it working is on our wiki:
     http://www.metasploit.com/redmine/projects/framework/wiki/Karmetasploit




35
Assagai
●    Complete phishing framework
●    Uses Metasploit exploits and payloads
●    Gathers other statistics
●    Has common email templates




36
37
38
39
Metaphish
●    Use the target‟s public information against them
●    See valsmith, Colin, and dkerb‟s talk from BH
     USA 2009




40
Automating Post-exploitation
●    Meterpreter scripts
     ●   set AutoRunScript <script name>
●    Plugins
     ●   Can be auto loaded at startup with resource files




41
Meterpreter scripts
●    Just a ruby script
●    Easy to write, lots of flexibility
●    Access to Meterpreter API




42
Meterpreter API
●    Core + Extensions
     ●   Core is basic, mostly useful for loading extensions
●    Current extensions:
     ●   Stdapi
     ●   Priv, Incognito
     ●   Espia
     ●   Sniffer


43
Meterpreter Stdapi: process
●    client.sys.process
     ●   Acts like a Hash, where keys are image names and
         values are process IDs
     ●   client.sys.process[„explorer.exe‟]
     ●   => 1408




44
Meterpreter Stdapi: memory
p=
client.sys.process.open(pid,PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS)
addr = p.memory.allocate(length)
p.memory.write(addr, “stuff”)
p.thread.create(addr)




45
Meterpreter Stdapi: filesystem
●    client.fs.file.upload_file(dest, source)
●    client.fs.file.download_file(dest, source)
●    client.fs.file.expand_path(“%TEMP%”)




46
Priv and Incognito
●    Stuff that requires privileges, SYSTEM
     preferred
●    Priv
     ●   Dump hashes, alter file MACE
●    Incognito
     ●   list impersonation/delegation tokens




47
Espia
●    client.espia.espia_image_get_dev_screen
     ●   Returns a bitmap as a String
     ●   From commandline, „screenshot‟ stores to file
●    client.espia.espia_audio_get_dev_audio
     ●   No command for this yet, only available from API




48
Meterpreter Sniffer
●    client.sniffer.capture_start
     ●   Starts capturing
●    client.sniffer.capture_dump
     ●   Puts the captured packets into a buffer we can read
●    client.sniffer.capture_dump_read
     ●   Reads from the buffer




49
Sniffer caveat
●    The packet format isn‟t standard, so we have to
     convert it to PCAP to be useful
●    Console command does it for you




50
Some Nifty Existing Scripts
●    vnc -- Uploads a VNC server to the target and
     tunnels traffic through the current TCP
     connection or a new connect-back
●    packetrecorder -- Starts a sniffer on the target
     and retrieves packets every <interval> seconds
●    persistence -- Builds a meterpreter.exe that
     connects back every <interval> seconds
●    killav -- Runs through a list of known Anti-Virus
     process names and kills anything that matches
51
Colin and Dave‟s talk
●    Don‟t miss it
●    Right after lunch
●    About using meterpreter‟s memory API for
     doing all kinds of crazy stuff




52
MSF Plugins
●    Can extend or replace parts of the framework
●    Full access to Rex and Msf APIs
●    Can add callbacks for various events, add
     commands to the console, anything you can
     think of




53
Hooking sessions from a plugin
include SessionEvent
def on_session_open(session)
      # Do something with the session
end
def initialize(framework, opts)
      framework.events.add_session_subscriber(self)
end


54
Some notable events
●    on_session_open
●    on_module_run
●    on_exploit_success




55
Some Nifty Existing Plugins
●    db_credcollect – automatically retrieves hashes
     from new meterpreter sessions, stores them in
     the database
●    pcap_log – just like running tcpdump in the
     background
●    session_tagger – creates a directory on new
     sessions as proof of compromise


56
Demonstrations




57
Conclusions
●    Lots of automation available that requires no
     programming skills
●    A little bit of ruby gives you lots of power and
     flexibility
●    Don‟t type any more than you have to
     ●   Carpal Tunnel Syndrome sucks




58
Download it
●    svn co http://metasploit.com/svn/framework3/trunk
●    Submit patches to msfdev@metasploit.com




59
Questions?




60

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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Exploit Automation with the Metasploit Framework

  • 1. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Exploit Automation with the Metasploit Framework James Lee 1
  • 2. # whoami ● James Lee ● egypt ● Core Developer, Metasploit Project ● Working full time on Metasploit for 2
  • 3. User Interface Scanning for Fingerprinting Servers Clients Exploiting Exploiting Servers Clients Post- Exploitation Overview 3
  • 4. Automating msfconsole ● Resource files ● A list of commands to be run in sequence ● Can be anything you would type at the msf> prompt ● setg ● save 4
  • 5. Resource files ● $ ./msfconsole -r foo.rc ● msf> resource foo.rc ● ~/.msf3/msfconsole.rc ● Loaded on startup 5
  • 6. Example Resource File setg RHOSTS 10.1.1.1-254 setg USERNAME Administrator setg PASSWORD password use auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_login run use auxiliary/scanner/telnet/telnet_login run 6
  • 8. Scanning ● Have to find servers before you can exploit them ● Metasploit has several ways to do this ● Run nmap and nexpose directly from the console Israeli Orbiter, surveillance UAV ● Import other tools‟ output ● MSF built-in scanners (auxiliary/scanner/*) 8
  • 9. nmap ● Two options: ● Run nmap normally with -oX and use db_import to store the results ● db_nmap command will run nmap and handle the import for you ● Either way, results get stored in the database 9
  • 10. nexpose_scan ● db_import ● If you have a Community license (free), limited to 32 IP addresses at a time ● Msf will scan the whole range in 32-address chunks 10
  • 11. Nexpose ● Also stores vulnerability references ● CVE, BID, … ● Without these, figuring out which exploits to run can be more difficult ● Can be used to launch exploits as well 11
  • 12. MSF Built-in Scanning ● Implemented as auxiliary modules ● Aux is like an exploit without a payload ● Usage similar to exploits FanWing Surveillance Platform ● Can go through meterpreter routes 12
  • 13. Faster Setup ● RHOSTS can be nmap-notation or “file:<filename>” ● File should contain nmap-notation address ranges ● e.g.: 10.1.1.2,5,7-254 10.2.2.* 10.3.3.0/24 13
  • 14. Faster Scanning ● set THREADS 256 ● Windows freaks out after 16 threads ● Cygwin doesn‟t handle more than about 200 ● Linux? Go to town. ● Caveat: tunneling through meterpreter 14
  • 15. Selected Scanners ● Informational ● Pwnage ● smb_version ● smb_login ● netbios/nbname ● telnet_login ● mssql_login ● vnc_none_auth 15
  • 16. Server Exploits ● The bulk of msf's exploit modules ● 385 as of Jan 9 ● Many protocols implemented in an exploit- friendly way ● smtp, imap, http, smb, dcerpc, sunrpc, ftp, … ● Wide range of protocol-level IDS evasions 16
  • 17. Automatically Exploiting Servers ● db_autopwn ● NeXpose plugin 17
  • 18. db_autopwn ● Need to have targets stored in the db ● If vulnerability references are available, can cross-reference against specific hosts ● Can just use matching ports if you don't have refs ● Checks global MinimumRank to limit exploits to a particular safety level 18
  • 19. NeXpose ● Scan, detect, exploit all in one command ● nexpose_scan -x <host range> 1. Populates the db with hosts, services, vulns 2. Cross-references vulns and exploits 3. Throws exploits at vulnerable servers ● Has the potential to give you tons of shells ● Can take a long time for lots of hosts ● Uses MinimumRank as well 19
  • 21. Client Fingerprinting ● User Agent ● Easy to spoof ● Easy to change in a proxy ● Some third-party software changes it ● Less often changed in JavaScript 21
  • 22. Fingerprinting the Client ● Various JS objects only exist in one browser ● window.opera, Array.every ● Some only exist in certain versions ● window.createPopup, Array.every, window.Iterator ● Rendering differences and parser bugs ● IE's conditional comments 22
  • 23. Internet Explorer ● Parser bugs, conditional comments ● Reliable, but not precise ● ScriptEngine*Version() ● Almost unique across all combinations of client and OS, including service pack ● ClientCaps 23
  • 24. Opera ● window.opera.version() ● Includes minor version, e.g. “9.61” ● window.opera.buildNumber() ● Different on each platform for a given version ● e.g.: “8501” == Windows ● Not precise, only gives platform, no version or service pack 24
  • 25. Hybrid Approach for FF ● Existence of document.getElementsByClassName means Firefox 3.0 ● If UA says IE6, go with FF 3.0 ● If UA says FF 3.0.8, it's probably not lying, so use the more specific value 25
  • 26. Firefox OS Detection ● Most of the objects used in standard detection scripts are affected by the User-Agent ● E.g., when spoofing as iPhone, navigator.platform = “iPhone” ● navigator.oscpu is not ● “Linux i686” ● “Windows NT 6.0” 26
  • 27. Safari / Webkit ● Infuriatingly standards compliant in JS ● Can detect its existence easily ● window.WebkitPoint, many others ● Most Safari-specific stuff has been around since 1.2, so not useful for version detection 27
  • 28. Chrome / Webkit ● Same javascript engine as Safari ● So far, no easy way to change UA ● navigator.vendor is always “Google Inc.” 28
  • 29. Client Exploits in MSF ● Extensive HTTP support ● Heapspray in two lines of code ● Sotirov's .NET DLL, heap feng shui ● Wide range of protocol-level IDS evasion ● Simple exploit in ~10 lines of code 29
  • 30. Automatically Exploiting Clients ● Browser Autopwn Auxiliary module ● I spoke about this at Defcon in 2009 ● Fingerprints a client ● Stores detection in the database ● Determines what exploits might work ● Uses MinimumRank, too ● Tries the ones most likely to succeed 30
  • 31. Advantages of Browser Autopwn ● OS and client detection is client-side, more reliable in presence of spoofed or broken UA ● Detection results automatically stored in the database ● Not written in PHP ● PHP sucks 31
  • 32. Browser Autopwn Usage msf> use auxiliary/server/browser_autopwn msf (browser_autopwn)> set URIPATH / msf (browser_autopwn)> set EXCLUDE opera msf (browser_autopwn)> set MATCH .* msf (browser_autopwn)> run [*] Starting exploit modules on host 10.1.1.1... [*] --- 32
  • 33. Automating Users ● Browser Autopwn automates the exploits but how do we get users to come to our evil web server? 33
  • 34. Karmetasploit ● Wireless Access Point of Doom ● Using aircrack-ng, appears to be every access point that anybody probes for ● “Why, yes, I am Office_WiFi, please connect” ● Lets you control the route, the DNS, everything ● “Yup, I'm your internal web server. And your email server. And your file server. And...” 34
  • 35. More on Karma ● Actually about 5 years old ● It still works amazingly well ● More info about getting it working is on our wiki: http://www.metasploit.com/redmine/projects/framework/wiki/Karmetasploit 35
  • 36. Assagai ● Complete phishing framework ● Uses Metasploit exploits and payloads ● Gathers other statistics ● Has common email templates 36
  • 37. 37
  • 38. 38
  • 39. 39
  • 40. Metaphish ● Use the target‟s public information against them ● See valsmith, Colin, and dkerb‟s talk from BH USA 2009 40
  • 41. Automating Post-exploitation ● Meterpreter scripts ● set AutoRunScript <script name> ● Plugins ● Can be auto loaded at startup with resource files 41
  • 42. Meterpreter scripts ● Just a ruby script ● Easy to write, lots of flexibility ● Access to Meterpreter API 42
  • 43. Meterpreter API ● Core + Extensions ● Core is basic, mostly useful for loading extensions ● Current extensions: ● Stdapi ● Priv, Incognito ● Espia ● Sniffer 43
  • 44. Meterpreter Stdapi: process ● client.sys.process ● Acts like a Hash, where keys are image names and values are process IDs ● client.sys.process[„explorer.exe‟] ● => 1408 44
  • 45. Meterpreter Stdapi: memory p= client.sys.process.open(pid,PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS) addr = p.memory.allocate(length) p.memory.write(addr, “stuff”) p.thread.create(addr) 45
  • 46. Meterpreter Stdapi: filesystem ● client.fs.file.upload_file(dest, source) ● client.fs.file.download_file(dest, source) ● client.fs.file.expand_path(“%TEMP%”) 46
  • 47. Priv and Incognito ● Stuff that requires privileges, SYSTEM preferred ● Priv ● Dump hashes, alter file MACE ● Incognito ● list impersonation/delegation tokens 47
  • 48. Espia ● client.espia.espia_image_get_dev_screen ● Returns a bitmap as a String ● From commandline, „screenshot‟ stores to file ● client.espia.espia_audio_get_dev_audio ● No command for this yet, only available from API 48
  • 49. Meterpreter Sniffer ● client.sniffer.capture_start ● Starts capturing ● client.sniffer.capture_dump ● Puts the captured packets into a buffer we can read ● client.sniffer.capture_dump_read ● Reads from the buffer 49
  • 50. Sniffer caveat ● The packet format isn‟t standard, so we have to convert it to PCAP to be useful ● Console command does it for you 50
  • 51. Some Nifty Existing Scripts ● vnc -- Uploads a VNC server to the target and tunnels traffic through the current TCP connection or a new connect-back ● packetrecorder -- Starts a sniffer on the target and retrieves packets every <interval> seconds ● persistence -- Builds a meterpreter.exe that connects back every <interval> seconds ● killav -- Runs through a list of known Anti-Virus process names and kills anything that matches 51
  • 52. Colin and Dave‟s talk ● Don‟t miss it ● Right after lunch ● About using meterpreter‟s memory API for doing all kinds of crazy stuff 52
  • 53. MSF Plugins ● Can extend or replace parts of the framework ● Full access to Rex and Msf APIs ● Can add callbacks for various events, add commands to the console, anything you can think of 53
  • 54. Hooking sessions from a plugin include SessionEvent def on_session_open(session) # Do something with the session end def initialize(framework, opts) framework.events.add_session_subscriber(self) end 54
  • 55. Some notable events ● on_session_open ● on_module_run ● on_exploit_success 55
  • 56. Some Nifty Existing Plugins ● db_credcollect – automatically retrieves hashes from new meterpreter sessions, stores them in the database ● pcap_log – just like running tcpdump in the background ● session_tagger – creates a directory on new sessions as proof of compromise 56
  • 58. Conclusions ● Lots of automation available that requires no programming skills ● A little bit of ruby gives you lots of power and flexibility ● Don‟t type any more than you have to ● Carpal Tunnel Syndrome sucks 58
  • 59. Download it ● svn co http://metasploit.com/svn/framework3/trunk ● Submit patches to msfdev@metasploit.com 59