Statistical discrimination offers a compelling story to understand gender wage gaps, at least during the early stages of the career. Employers believe that women will get pregnant with a positive probability, which leads to potential losses, eg. costs associated with finding substitutes, potential losses in customers, etc. Employers then have an incentive to offer women lower wages, in order to discount for future losses. If that is the case, lower and delayed fertility should imply lower discount in wages, and consequently reductions in the gender pay gap among entrants.
In order to test for this hypothesis, we collect individual level data from European countries dating back to the early 1990. Having compiled these data, we compute the adjusted gender wage gap for workers at the early stages of their career, that is for those aged 25 to 29. These adjuste differences are obtained using the non-parametric approach pioneered by Nopo. We then regress these measures on macro data on fertility changes. If the statistical discrimination hypothesis is correct, we should expect that the secular decline in fertility observed in Europe over the last 30 years is correlated with lower estimates of the gender wage gap. Our estimates suggest that this is indeed the case. Using the age at first birth as a proxy for fertility, we find that postponing childbirth by an additional year leads to a reduction of .18 in the adjusted gap.
One caveat with this result is that fertility can be endogeneous to wages. If women were to receive higher wages, they might choose to postpone childbirths. To address this issue, we instrument our measure of fertility with the number of years since the introduction of the pill in the country. This measures varies across countries and over time, while at the same time it is fairly exogeneous, as the introduction of the pill occurred several generations back, normally in the mid-60 and 70s. First stage regressions reveal that the instrument correlates well with mean age at first birth. Second stage estimates are still significant, though they are smaller in magnitude. We conclude that recent changes in fertility helped to reduce the gender wage gap among women entering to the labor market.
Statistical gender discrimination: evidence from young workers across four de...GRAPE
Statistical discrimination offers a compelling narrative on gender wage gaps among younger workers. Employers could discount women's wages to adjust for probable costs linked to childbearing. Given trends towards lower and delayed fertility one should observe a lower discount in wages and a reduction in the gender wage gap among entrants. We test this conjecture using estimates of adjusted gender wage gap among young workers from 56 countries. We find that postponing childbirth by a year reduces the adjusted gap by two percentage points (15%). We further benchmark the implied gender inequality with the help of time-use data.
Delayed fertility and statistical discrimination against womenGRAPE
Statistical discrimination offers a compelling narrative on gender wage gaps during the early stages of the career. Expecting absences related to child-bearing and child-rearing, the employers discount productivity to adjust for the probable losses such as costs associated with finding substitutes, leaving customers, etc. If that is the case, lower and delayed fertility should imply lower discount in wages, and consequently reductions in the gender pay gap among entrants. We put this conjecture to test against the data. We provide a novel set of estimates of adjusted gender wage gaps among youth for 56 countries spanning four decades. We estimate that postponing childbirth by a year reduce the adjusted gap 2 percentage points (15%). We show that this estimate is consistent with statistical discrimination, but for some countries the estimates of AGWG imply that either statistical discrimination is not accurate or taste-based mechanisms are also at play.
Statistical discrimination at young age: new evidence from four decades of in...GRAPE
Statistical discrimination offers a compelling narrative on gender wage gaps during the early stages of the career. Expecting absences related to child-bearing and child-rearing, the employers discount productivity to adjust for the probable losses such as costs associated with finding substitutes, leaving customers, etc. If that is the case, lower and delayed fertility should imply lower discount in wages, and consequently reductions in the gender pay gap among entrants. We put this conjecture to test against the data. We provide a novel set of estimates of adjusted gender wage gaps among youth for 56 countries spanning four decades. We estimate that postponing childbirth by a year reduce the adjusted gap 2 percentage points (15%). We show that this estimate is consistent with statistical discrimination, but for some countries the estimates of AGWG imply that either statistical discrimination is not accurate or taste-based mechanisms are also at play.
Statistical discrimination is a possible, rational motive behind the persistent differences in earnings between men and women. Employers could women to bear a larger share of the burden associated with having children, and subsequently discount that on wages. We test the empirical validity of this claim using data from over 50 countries and 40 years. Using IV we find causal evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Postponing birth by one year leads to large falls in the adjusted gender wage gap.
We study the relationship between gender inequality among youth and fertility timing. We show that postponing fertility by one year leads to a substantial reduction of gender inequality. This finding is consistent with a simple statistical discrimination model, where employers offer lower wages when they anticipated costs related to fertility, and that these costs are higher for female employees.
Pushed into necessity? Gender gaps in the labor market and entrepreneurship o...GRAPE
Theoretical literature on entrepreneurship hints that labor market inequality may constitute a relevant push factor for necessity self-employment, as opposed to aspirational self-employment. Drawing on empirical confirmation, this insight is used in many policy recommendations. We provide a new approach to test and quantify the link between labor market inequality and self-employment. We exploit rich and diverse international data on patterns of self-employment from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. We focus on measures of labor market inequality for women, utilizing estimates of adjusted gender wage and gender employment gap, comparable for a large selection of countries and years. Our results show that greater gender disparities in access to and in compensation for wage employment are associated with necessity self-employment, but the effect is small. We find no link for the aspirational self-employment.
Pushed into necessity? Gender gaps in the labor market and entrepreneurship o...GRAPE
Robust evidence for link between GEG/GWG and necessity self-employment among women
Weak or no evidence for aspirations
Previous results were due to country specificity (no macro effects once accounting for country fixed effects)
Statistical gender discrimination: evidence from young workers across four de...GRAPE
Statistical discrimination offers a compelling narrative on gender wage gaps among younger workers. Employers could discount women's wages to adjust for probable costs linked to childbearing. Given trends towards lower and delayed fertility one should observe a lower discount in wages and a reduction in the gender wage gap among entrants. We test this conjecture using estimates of adjusted gender wage gap among young workers from 56 countries. We find that postponing childbirth by a year reduces the adjusted gap by two percentage points (15%). We further benchmark the implied gender inequality with the help of time-use data.
Delayed fertility and statistical discrimination against womenGRAPE
Statistical discrimination offers a compelling narrative on gender wage gaps during the early stages of the career. Expecting absences related to child-bearing and child-rearing, the employers discount productivity to adjust for the probable losses such as costs associated with finding substitutes, leaving customers, etc. If that is the case, lower and delayed fertility should imply lower discount in wages, and consequently reductions in the gender pay gap among entrants. We put this conjecture to test against the data. We provide a novel set of estimates of adjusted gender wage gaps among youth for 56 countries spanning four decades. We estimate that postponing childbirth by a year reduce the adjusted gap 2 percentage points (15%). We show that this estimate is consistent with statistical discrimination, but for some countries the estimates of AGWG imply that either statistical discrimination is not accurate or taste-based mechanisms are also at play.
Statistical discrimination at young age: new evidence from four decades of in...GRAPE
Statistical discrimination offers a compelling narrative on gender wage gaps during the early stages of the career. Expecting absences related to child-bearing and child-rearing, the employers discount productivity to adjust for the probable losses such as costs associated with finding substitutes, leaving customers, etc. If that is the case, lower and delayed fertility should imply lower discount in wages, and consequently reductions in the gender pay gap among entrants. We put this conjecture to test against the data. We provide a novel set of estimates of adjusted gender wage gaps among youth for 56 countries spanning four decades. We estimate that postponing childbirth by a year reduce the adjusted gap 2 percentage points (15%). We show that this estimate is consistent with statistical discrimination, but for some countries the estimates of AGWG imply that either statistical discrimination is not accurate or taste-based mechanisms are also at play.
Statistical discrimination is a possible, rational motive behind the persistent differences in earnings between men and women. Employers could women to bear a larger share of the burden associated with having children, and subsequently discount that on wages. We test the empirical validity of this claim using data from over 50 countries and 40 years. Using IV we find causal evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Postponing birth by one year leads to large falls in the adjusted gender wage gap.
We study the relationship between gender inequality among youth and fertility timing. We show that postponing fertility by one year leads to a substantial reduction of gender inequality. This finding is consistent with a simple statistical discrimination model, where employers offer lower wages when they anticipated costs related to fertility, and that these costs are higher for female employees.
Pushed into necessity? Gender gaps in the labor market and entrepreneurship o...GRAPE
Theoretical literature on entrepreneurship hints that labor market inequality may constitute a relevant push factor for necessity self-employment, as opposed to aspirational self-employment. Drawing on empirical confirmation, this insight is used in many policy recommendations. We provide a new approach to test and quantify the link between labor market inequality and self-employment. We exploit rich and diverse international data on patterns of self-employment from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. We focus on measures of labor market inequality for women, utilizing estimates of adjusted gender wage and gender employment gap, comparable for a large selection of countries and years. Our results show that greater gender disparities in access to and in compensation for wage employment are associated with necessity self-employment, but the effect is small. We find no link for the aspirational self-employment.
Pushed into necessity? Gender gaps in the labor market and entrepreneurship o...GRAPE
Robust evidence for link between GEG/GWG and necessity self-employment among women
Weak or no evidence for aspirations
Previous results were due to country specificity (no macro effects once accounting for country fixed effects)
When hiring employees, an employer might use information from the group to these employees belong as a proxy for productivity related unobserved variables, such as the probability of becoming a parent. We put this conjecture to test by collecting data from over 50 countries and 40 years. We find that delaying fertility leads to a fall in gender inequality, a finding that is consistent with statistical discrimination.
We provide causal evidence that delaying fertility leads to a decrease in the adjusted gender wage gap. To avoid possible reverse causality, we employ an instrumental variable approach. We introduce several instruments, among them a novel one: international variation in the introduction of the contraceptive pill. Our estimates are large: a one-year delay in fertility leads to a 12% fall in the gender wage gap
Childbearing and attitudes towards gender normsGRAPE
The research studies whether major life events affect the perception of social norms. Specifically, I focus on how giving birth to a first child affects attitudes towards gender norms. I find that after childbirth people become more likely to agree with traditional division of household chores. Effects are contingent on country and demographic characteristics
Fertility, contraceptives and gender inequalityGRAPE
Our analysis shows that increasing the age at first birth is associated with a substantial decline in gender wage gaps: postponing first birth by a year reduces the gap by around 15%. In order to establish causality, we propose a novel instrument that exploits international variation in approval of oral contraceptives (the pill). Our estimates are consistent with a model of statistical discrimination where employers offer lower wages to women to hedge the expected costs associated with childbearing and childrearing.
After couples have their first child, parents become more likely to agree with statements showing traditional gender norms. In this research I study how common this finding is across countries,and whether differences across countries can shed light on the reasons
Does childbearing makes us more conservative?GRAPE
The research shows that upon becoming parents, mothers (and fathers) embrace more traditional norms in a number of domains. They are more likely to put a higher value on family that before, and they would even conform to a male breadwinner model. The change in attitudes is more pronounced in Central and Eastern European countries, and almost negligible elsewhere. I further show that this is related to a series of characteristics of those countries. Noteworthy, changes are more frequent in countries where women receive less support during motherhood from the state, and where differences in norms across genders are more marked.
Estimating gender wage gap in the presence of efficiency wagesGRAPE
Gender wage gap (adjusted for individual characteristics) as a phenomenon means that women are paid unjustifiably less than men, i.e. below their productivity. Meanwhile, efficiency wages as a phenomenon mean that a group of workers is paid in excess of productivity. However, productivity is typically unobservable, hence it is proxied by some observable characteristics. If efficiency wages are effective only in selected occupations and/or industries, and these happen to be dominated by men, measures of adjusted gender wage gaps will confound (possibly) below productivity compensating of women with above productivity efficiency wage prevalence. We propose to utilize endogenous switching models to estimate adjusted gender wage gaps. We find that without correction for the prevalence of efficiency wages, the estimates of the adjusted gender wage gaps tend to be substantially inflated.
Tone at the top: the effects of gender board diversity on gender wage inequal...GRAPE
We address the gender wage gap in Europe, focusing on the impact of female representation in executive and non-executive boards. We use a novel dataset to identify gender board diversity across European firms, which covers a comprehensive sample of private firms in addition to publicly listed ones. Our study spans three waves of the Structure of Earnings Survey, covering 26 countries and multiple industries. Despite low prevalence of female representation and the complex nature of gender wage inequality, our findings reveal a robust causal link: increased gender diversity significantly decreases the adjusted gender wage gap. We also demonstrate that to meaningfully impact gender wage gaps, the presence of a single female representative in leadership is insufficient.
(Gender) tone at the top: the effect of board diversity on gender inequalityGRAPE
The research explores to what extent the presence of women on board affects gender inequality downstream. We find that increasing presence reduces gender inequality. To avoid reverse causality, we propose a new instrument: the share of household consumption in total output. We extend the analysis to recover the effect of a single woman on board (tokenism(
HLEG thematic workshop on "Multidimensional Subjective Well-being", Andrew ClarkStatsCommunications
Presentation at the HLEG thematic workshop on "Multidimensional Subjective Well-being", 30-31 October 2014, Turin, Italy, http://oe.cd/HLEG-workshop-subjective-wb-2014
Smarter social protection? Impacts of Ethiopia's
Productive Safety Net on Child Cognitive Outcomes
Marta Favara, Catherine Porter, Tassew Woldehanna
Young Lives Conference
catherine.porter@hw.ac.uk
September 8th, 2016
Na zaproszenie Pani Profesor Elżbiety Gołaty, prorektora Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Poznaniu Paweł Strzelecki przedstawił zebranym specjalistom zajmującym się statystyką i demografią wyniki symulacji efektów różnych scenariuszy wzrostu dzietności za pomocą modelu makroekonomicznego nakładających się pokoleń (OLG). Szczególnie ożywioną dyskusję wzbudziła możliwość kwantyfikacji dobrobytowych skutków polityki prorodzinnej oraz efekty makroekonomiczne w dłuższym terminie. Dyskusja dotyczyła także możliwości pomiaru stanu zdrowia ludności za pomocą dostępnych danych. Bardzo dziękujemy za możliwość podzielania się wynikami badań oraz bardzo ciekawe uwagi.
We conduct a frame experiment in an online survey. Our results show that Respondents were presented with additional finding of how working from home affected productivity and life satisfaction. People exposed to the treatment showed higher willingness to work from home and had a better assessment of their productivity during lockdown.
Statistical discrimination at young age (the poster)GRAPE
During the last 30 years, women started giving birth at higher ages. While in 1990 the average age at first birth was 26, in 2019 this number was already 29. Given this trend, we ask whether the decision to postpone fertility helped to close the gender wage gap. Our results show that yes. Postponing fertility by a year lead to a fall in the gender wage gap by 2 percent, or approximately 12% of the average gap.
Within occupation wage dispersion and the task content of jobsGRAPE
We test the relation between wage dispersion and the tasks performed by workers within occupations. Using EU data, I find a significant and positive relation between the importance of routine tasks and wage dispersion. Results are robust to several checks.
Child-related transfers: is there a room for welfare improvement?GRAPE
How does income risk affect the optimal size of the child-related transfer system? I answer this question in an overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility and PAYG social security. I show that the optimal size of the child-related transfer is increasing in income risk.
First, in the stylized model, I provide the intuition behind this result. Second, I quantify the size of welfare gains due to child-related transfer reform in a full-fledged model calibrated to the US economy.
Expansion of child-related transfer yields to welfare gain even with constant income dispersion. In a scenario with higher income dispersion, welfare gains increase from 1.08% to 1.2% of lifetime consumption.
Third, I show that in a scenario with high-income dispersion, even higher welfare gains may be obtained if the child-related transfer system has a more redistributive nature.
Unionization and dispersion of earned income GRAPE
Long standing debate on unionization
* may raise wage dispersion (members vs non-members)
* may reduce prevalence of extremely low wages (and thus wage dispersion)
Empirical evidence mixed (+ causality issues)
Machin 1997; Lemieux 1998; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Card 2001, Card et al. 2004; Checchi and Pagani 2005; Autor et
al. 2008; Western and Rosenfeld 2011
Challenges
* Within country studies have problem with finding credible identification
Checchi and Pagani 2005; Autor et al. 2008; Scheve and Stasavage 2009
* And external validity is questionable
−> Exploit exogenous shock called “transition”
Question: with substantial decline in unionization can we relate changes in wage dispersion?
This last year, the extent of poverty and socio-economic crises in some African countries, particularly in Côte d’Ivoire have favoured child labour. Thus, despite the political fight against this phenomenon, it’s remains a concern. This research therefore aims to identify the determinants of child labour in Côte d’Ivoire, using 2005 data from the national survey on child labour with 5,571 children. The descriptive statistic showed that 1,509 (27.09%) were in child labour category: 743 boys (27.04%) and 766 girls (27.14%). The estimated multinomial logit presented that household poverty and low level of parent’s education remains a determinant of child labour. In addition, the permanent employment of the household in agriculture reduces child labour. Thus, policy makers can modernize agriculture. This strategy will allow the use of modern technology inaccessible to children and improve agricultural productivity. With a guaranteed minimum price for agricultural production poor households will earn higher incomes. In addition, targeted free schooling is required.
Evaluating welfare and economic effects of raised fertilityJoanna Tyrowicz
JRC in Ispra
In the context of the second demographic transition, many countries consider rising fertility through pro-family polices as a potentially viable solution to the fiscal pressure stemming from longevity. However, an increased number of births implies private and immediate costs, whereas the gains are not likely to surface until later and appear via internalizing the public benefits of younger and larger population. Hence, quantification of the net effects remains a challenge. We propose using an overlapping generations model with a rich family structure to quantify the effects of increased birth rates. We analyze the overall macroeconomic and welfare effects as well as the distribution of these effects across cohorts and study the sensitivity of the final effects to the assumed target value and path of increased fertility. We find that fiscal effects are positive but, even in the case of relatively large fertility increase, they are small. The sign and the size of both welfare and fiscal effects depend substantially on the patterns of increased fertility: if increased fertility occurs via lower childlessness, the fiscal effects are smaller and welfare effects are more likely to be negative than in the case of the intensive margin adjustments.
Evaluating welfare and economic effects of raised fertilityGRAPE
JRC in Ispra
In the context of the second demographic transition, many countries consider rising fertility through pro-family polices as a potentially viable solution to the fiscal pressure stemming from longevity. However, an increased number of births implies private and immediate costs, whereas the gains are not likely to surface until later and appear via internalizing the public benefits of younger and larger population. Hence, quantification of the net effects remains a challenge. We propose using an overlapping generations model with a rich family structure to quantify the effects of increased birth rates. We analyze the overall macroeconomic and welfare effects as well as the distribution of these effects across cohorts and study the sensitivity of the final effects to the assumed target value and path of increased fertility. We find that fiscal effects are positive but, even in the case of relatively large fertility increase, they are small. The sign and the size of both welfare and fiscal effects depend substantially on the patterns of increased fertility: if increased fertility occurs via lower childlessness, the fiscal effects are smaller and welfare effects are more likely to be negative than in the case of the intensive margin adjustments.
Seminar: Gender Board Diversity through Ownership NetworksGRAPE
Seminar on gender diversity spillovers through ownership networks at FAME|GRAPE. Presenting novel research. Studies in economics and management using econometrics methods.
The European Unemployment Puzzle: implications from population agingGRAPE
We study the link between the evolving age structure of the working population and unemployment. We build a large new Keynesian OLG model with a realistic age structure, labor market frictions, sticky prices, and aggregate shocks. Once calibrated to the European economy, we quantify the extent to which demographic changes over the last three decades have contributed to the decline of the unemployment rate. Our findings yield important implications for the future evolution of unemployment given the anticipated further aging of the working population in Europe. We also quantify the implications for optimal monetary policy: lowering inflation volatility becomes less costly in terms of GDP and unemployment volatility, which hints that optimal monetary policy may be more hawkish in an aging society. Finally, our results also propose a partial reversal of the European-US unemployment puzzle due to the fact that the share of young workers is expected to remain robust in the US.
When hiring employees, an employer might use information from the group to these employees belong as a proxy for productivity related unobserved variables, such as the probability of becoming a parent. We put this conjecture to test by collecting data from over 50 countries and 40 years. We find that delaying fertility leads to a fall in gender inequality, a finding that is consistent with statistical discrimination.
We provide causal evidence that delaying fertility leads to a decrease in the adjusted gender wage gap. To avoid possible reverse causality, we employ an instrumental variable approach. We introduce several instruments, among them a novel one: international variation in the introduction of the contraceptive pill. Our estimates are large: a one-year delay in fertility leads to a 12% fall in the gender wage gap
Childbearing and attitudes towards gender normsGRAPE
The research studies whether major life events affect the perception of social norms. Specifically, I focus on how giving birth to a first child affects attitudes towards gender norms. I find that after childbirth people become more likely to agree with traditional division of household chores. Effects are contingent on country and demographic characteristics
Fertility, contraceptives and gender inequalityGRAPE
Our analysis shows that increasing the age at first birth is associated with a substantial decline in gender wage gaps: postponing first birth by a year reduces the gap by around 15%. In order to establish causality, we propose a novel instrument that exploits international variation in approval of oral contraceptives (the pill). Our estimates are consistent with a model of statistical discrimination where employers offer lower wages to women to hedge the expected costs associated with childbearing and childrearing.
After couples have their first child, parents become more likely to agree with statements showing traditional gender norms. In this research I study how common this finding is across countries,and whether differences across countries can shed light on the reasons
Does childbearing makes us more conservative?GRAPE
The research shows that upon becoming parents, mothers (and fathers) embrace more traditional norms in a number of domains. They are more likely to put a higher value on family that before, and they would even conform to a male breadwinner model. The change in attitudes is more pronounced in Central and Eastern European countries, and almost negligible elsewhere. I further show that this is related to a series of characteristics of those countries. Noteworthy, changes are more frequent in countries where women receive less support during motherhood from the state, and where differences in norms across genders are more marked.
Estimating gender wage gap in the presence of efficiency wagesGRAPE
Gender wage gap (adjusted for individual characteristics) as a phenomenon means that women are paid unjustifiably less than men, i.e. below their productivity. Meanwhile, efficiency wages as a phenomenon mean that a group of workers is paid in excess of productivity. However, productivity is typically unobservable, hence it is proxied by some observable characteristics. If efficiency wages are effective only in selected occupations and/or industries, and these happen to be dominated by men, measures of adjusted gender wage gaps will confound (possibly) below productivity compensating of women with above productivity efficiency wage prevalence. We propose to utilize endogenous switching models to estimate adjusted gender wage gaps. We find that without correction for the prevalence of efficiency wages, the estimates of the adjusted gender wage gaps tend to be substantially inflated.
Tone at the top: the effects of gender board diversity on gender wage inequal...GRAPE
We address the gender wage gap in Europe, focusing on the impact of female representation in executive and non-executive boards. We use a novel dataset to identify gender board diversity across European firms, which covers a comprehensive sample of private firms in addition to publicly listed ones. Our study spans three waves of the Structure of Earnings Survey, covering 26 countries and multiple industries. Despite low prevalence of female representation and the complex nature of gender wage inequality, our findings reveal a robust causal link: increased gender diversity significantly decreases the adjusted gender wage gap. We also demonstrate that to meaningfully impact gender wage gaps, the presence of a single female representative in leadership is insufficient.
(Gender) tone at the top: the effect of board diversity on gender inequalityGRAPE
The research explores to what extent the presence of women on board affects gender inequality downstream. We find that increasing presence reduces gender inequality. To avoid reverse causality, we propose a new instrument: the share of household consumption in total output. We extend the analysis to recover the effect of a single woman on board (tokenism(
HLEG thematic workshop on "Multidimensional Subjective Well-being", Andrew ClarkStatsCommunications
Presentation at the HLEG thematic workshop on "Multidimensional Subjective Well-being", 30-31 October 2014, Turin, Italy, http://oe.cd/HLEG-workshop-subjective-wb-2014
Smarter social protection? Impacts of Ethiopia's
Productive Safety Net on Child Cognitive Outcomes
Marta Favara, Catherine Porter, Tassew Woldehanna
Young Lives Conference
catherine.porter@hw.ac.uk
September 8th, 2016
Na zaproszenie Pani Profesor Elżbiety Gołaty, prorektora Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Poznaniu Paweł Strzelecki przedstawił zebranym specjalistom zajmującym się statystyką i demografią wyniki symulacji efektów różnych scenariuszy wzrostu dzietności za pomocą modelu makroekonomicznego nakładających się pokoleń (OLG). Szczególnie ożywioną dyskusję wzbudziła możliwość kwantyfikacji dobrobytowych skutków polityki prorodzinnej oraz efekty makroekonomiczne w dłuższym terminie. Dyskusja dotyczyła także możliwości pomiaru stanu zdrowia ludności za pomocą dostępnych danych. Bardzo dziękujemy za możliwość podzielania się wynikami badań oraz bardzo ciekawe uwagi.
We conduct a frame experiment in an online survey. Our results show that Respondents were presented with additional finding of how working from home affected productivity and life satisfaction. People exposed to the treatment showed higher willingness to work from home and had a better assessment of their productivity during lockdown.
Statistical discrimination at young age (the poster)GRAPE
During the last 30 years, women started giving birth at higher ages. While in 1990 the average age at first birth was 26, in 2019 this number was already 29. Given this trend, we ask whether the decision to postpone fertility helped to close the gender wage gap. Our results show that yes. Postponing fertility by a year lead to a fall in the gender wage gap by 2 percent, or approximately 12% of the average gap.
Within occupation wage dispersion and the task content of jobsGRAPE
We test the relation between wage dispersion and the tasks performed by workers within occupations. Using EU data, I find a significant and positive relation between the importance of routine tasks and wage dispersion. Results are robust to several checks.
Child-related transfers: is there a room for welfare improvement?GRAPE
How does income risk affect the optimal size of the child-related transfer system? I answer this question in an overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility and PAYG social security. I show that the optimal size of the child-related transfer is increasing in income risk.
First, in the stylized model, I provide the intuition behind this result. Second, I quantify the size of welfare gains due to child-related transfer reform in a full-fledged model calibrated to the US economy.
Expansion of child-related transfer yields to welfare gain even with constant income dispersion. In a scenario with higher income dispersion, welfare gains increase from 1.08% to 1.2% of lifetime consumption.
Third, I show that in a scenario with high-income dispersion, even higher welfare gains may be obtained if the child-related transfer system has a more redistributive nature.
Unionization and dispersion of earned income GRAPE
Long standing debate on unionization
* may raise wage dispersion (members vs non-members)
* may reduce prevalence of extremely low wages (and thus wage dispersion)
Empirical evidence mixed (+ causality issues)
Machin 1997; Lemieux 1998; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Card 2001, Card et al. 2004; Checchi and Pagani 2005; Autor et
al. 2008; Western and Rosenfeld 2011
Challenges
* Within country studies have problem with finding credible identification
Checchi and Pagani 2005; Autor et al. 2008; Scheve and Stasavage 2009
* And external validity is questionable
−> Exploit exogenous shock called “transition”
Question: with substantial decline in unionization can we relate changes in wage dispersion?
This last year, the extent of poverty and socio-economic crises in some African countries, particularly in Côte d’Ivoire have favoured child labour. Thus, despite the political fight against this phenomenon, it’s remains a concern. This research therefore aims to identify the determinants of child labour in Côte d’Ivoire, using 2005 data from the national survey on child labour with 5,571 children. The descriptive statistic showed that 1,509 (27.09%) were in child labour category: 743 boys (27.04%) and 766 girls (27.14%). The estimated multinomial logit presented that household poverty and low level of parent’s education remains a determinant of child labour. In addition, the permanent employment of the household in agriculture reduces child labour. Thus, policy makers can modernize agriculture. This strategy will allow the use of modern technology inaccessible to children and improve agricultural productivity. With a guaranteed minimum price for agricultural production poor households will earn higher incomes. In addition, targeted free schooling is required.
Evaluating welfare and economic effects of raised fertilityJoanna Tyrowicz
JRC in Ispra
In the context of the second demographic transition, many countries consider rising fertility through pro-family polices as a potentially viable solution to the fiscal pressure stemming from longevity. However, an increased number of births implies private and immediate costs, whereas the gains are not likely to surface until later and appear via internalizing the public benefits of younger and larger population. Hence, quantification of the net effects remains a challenge. We propose using an overlapping generations model with a rich family structure to quantify the effects of increased birth rates. We analyze the overall macroeconomic and welfare effects as well as the distribution of these effects across cohorts and study the sensitivity of the final effects to the assumed target value and path of increased fertility. We find that fiscal effects are positive but, even in the case of relatively large fertility increase, they are small. The sign and the size of both welfare and fiscal effects depend substantially on the patterns of increased fertility: if increased fertility occurs via lower childlessness, the fiscal effects are smaller and welfare effects are more likely to be negative than in the case of the intensive margin adjustments.
Evaluating welfare and economic effects of raised fertilityGRAPE
JRC in Ispra
In the context of the second demographic transition, many countries consider rising fertility through pro-family polices as a potentially viable solution to the fiscal pressure stemming from longevity. However, an increased number of births implies private and immediate costs, whereas the gains are not likely to surface until later and appear via internalizing the public benefits of younger and larger population. Hence, quantification of the net effects remains a challenge. We propose using an overlapping generations model with a rich family structure to quantify the effects of increased birth rates. We analyze the overall macroeconomic and welfare effects as well as the distribution of these effects across cohorts and study the sensitivity of the final effects to the assumed target value and path of increased fertility. We find that fiscal effects are positive but, even in the case of relatively large fertility increase, they are small. The sign and the size of both welfare and fiscal effects depend substantially on the patterns of increased fertility: if increased fertility occurs via lower childlessness, the fiscal effects are smaller and welfare effects are more likely to be negative than in the case of the intensive margin adjustments.
Similar to Fertility changes and gender wage gaps (20)
Seminar: Gender Board Diversity through Ownership NetworksGRAPE
Seminar on gender diversity spillovers through ownership networks at FAME|GRAPE. Presenting novel research. Studies in economics and management using econometrics methods.
The European Unemployment Puzzle: implications from population agingGRAPE
We study the link between the evolving age structure of the working population and unemployment. We build a large new Keynesian OLG model with a realistic age structure, labor market frictions, sticky prices, and aggregate shocks. Once calibrated to the European economy, we quantify the extent to which demographic changes over the last three decades have contributed to the decline of the unemployment rate. Our findings yield important implications for the future evolution of unemployment given the anticipated further aging of the working population in Europe. We also quantify the implications for optimal monetary policy: lowering inflation volatility becomes less costly in terms of GDP and unemployment volatility, which hints that optimal monetary policy may be more hawkish in an aging society. Finally, our results also propose a partial reversal of the European-US unemployment puzzle due to the fact that the share of young workers is expected to remain robust in the US.
Revisiting gender board diversity and firm performanceGRAPE
Cel: oszacować wpływ inkluzywności władz spółek na ich wyniki.
Co wiemy?
• Większość firm nie ma równosci płci w organach (ILO, 2015)
• Większość firm nie ma w ogóle kobiet we władzach
Demographic transition and the rise of wealth inequalityGRAPE
We study the contribution of rising longevity to the rise of wealth inequality in the U.S. over the last seventy years. We construct an OLG model with multiple sources of inequality, closely calibrated to the data. Our main finding is that improvements in old-age longevity explain about 30% of the observed rise in wealth inequality. This magnitude is similar to previously emphasized channels associated with income inequality and the tax system. The contribution of demographics is bound to raise wealth inequality further in the decades to come.
Gender board diversity spillovers and the public eyeGRAPE
A range of policy recommendations mandating gender board quotas is based on the idea that "women help women". We analyze potential gender diversity spillovers from supervisory to top managerial positions over three decades in Europe. Contrary to previous studies which worked with stock listed firms or were region locked, we use a large data base of roughly 2 000 000 firms. We find evidence that women do not help women in corporate Europe, unless the firm is stock listed. Only within public firms, going from no woman to at least one woman on supervisory position is associated with a 10-15% higher probability of appointing at least one woman to the executive position. This pattern aligns with various managerial theories, suggesting that external visibility influences corporate gender diversity practices. The study implies that diversity policies, while impactful in public firms, have limited
effectiveness in promoting gender diversity in corporate Europe.
Gender board diversity spillovers and the public eyeGRAPE
A range of policy recommendations mandating gender board quotas is based on the idea that "women help women". We analyze potential gender diversity spillovers from supervisory to top managerial positions over three decades in Europe. Contrary to previous studies which worked with stock listed firms or were region locked, we use a large data base of roughly 2 000 000 firms. We find evidence that women do not help women in corporate Europe, unless the firm is stock listed. Only within public firms, going from no woman to at least one woman on supervisory position is associated with a 10-15\% higher probability of appointing at least one woman to the executive position. This pattern aligns with the Public Eye Managerial Theory, suggesting that external visibility influences corporate gender diversity practices. The study implies that diversity policies, while impactful in public firms, have limited effectiveness in promoting gender diversity in corporate Europe.
The European Unemployment Puzzle: implications from population agingGRAPE
We study the link between the evolving age structure of the working population and unemployment. We build a large New Keynesian OLG model with a realistic age structure, labor market frictions, sticky prices, and aggregate shocks. Once calibrated to the European economies, we use this model to provide comparative statics across past and contemporaneous age structures of the working population. Thus, we quantify the extent to which the response of labor markets to adverse TFP shocks and monetary policy shocks becomes muted with the aging of the working population. Our findings have important policy implications for European labor markets and beyond. For example, the working population is expected to further age in Europe, whereas the share of young workers will remain robust in the US. Our results suggest a partial reversal of the European-US unemployment puzzle. Furthermore, with the aging population, lowering inflation volatility is less costly in terms of higher unemployment volatility. It suggests that optimal monetary policy should be more hawkish in the older society.
Evidence concerning inequality in ability to realize aspirations is prevalent: overall, in specialized segments of the labor market, in self-employment and high-aspirations environments. Empirical literature and public debate are full of case studies and comprehensive empirical studies documenting the paramount gap between successful individuals (typically ethnic majority men) and those who are less likely to “make it” (typically ethnic minority and women). So far the drivers of these disparities and their consequences have been studied much less intensively, due to methodological constraints and shortage of appropriate data. This project proposes significant innovations to overcome both types of barriers and push the frontier of the research agenda on equality in reaching aspirations.
Overall, project is interdisciplinary, combining four fields: management, economics, quantitative methods and psychology. An important feature of this project is that it offers a diversified methodological perspective, combining applied microeconometrics, as well as experimental methods.
The secret way to sell pi coins effortlessly.DOT TECH
Well as we all know pi isn't launched yet. But you can still sell your pi coins effortlessly because some whales in China are interested in holding massive pi coins. And they are willing to pay good money for it. If you are interested in selling I will leave a contact for you. Just telegram this number below. I sold about 3000 pi coins to him and he paid me immediately.
Telegram: @Pi_vendor_247
Financial Assets: Debit vs Equity Securities.pptxWrito-Finance
financial assets represent claim for future benefit or cash. Financial assets are formed by establishing contracts between participants. These financial assets are used for collection of huge amounts of money for business purposes.
Two major Types: Debt Securities and Equity Securities.
Debt Securities are Also known as fixed-income securities or instruments. The type of assets is formed by establishing contracts between investor and issuer of the asset.
• The first type of Debit securities is BONDS. Bonds are issued by corporations and government (both local and national government).
• The second important type of Debit security is NOTES. Apart from similarities associated with notes and bonds, notes have shorter term maturity.
• The 3rd important type of Debit security is TRESURY BILLS. These securities have short-term ranging from three months, six months, and one year. Issuer of such securities are governments.
• Above discussed debit securities are mostly issued by governments and corporations. CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSITS CDs are issued by Banks and Financial Institutions. Risk factor associated with CDs gets reduced when issued by reputable institutions or Banks.
Following are the risk attached with debt securities: Credit risk, interest rate risk and currency risk
There are no fixed maturity dates in such securities, and asset’s value is determined by company’s performance. There are two major types of equity securities: common stock and preferred stock.
Common Stock: These are simple equity securities and bear no complexities which the preferred stock bears. Holders of such securities or instrument have the voting rights when it comes to select the company’s board of director or the business decisions to be made.
Preferred Stock: Preferred stocks are sometime referred to as hybrid securities, because it contains elements of both debit security and equity security. Preferred stock confers ownership rights to security holder that is why it is equity instrument
<a href="https://www.writofinance.com/equity-securities-features-types-risk/" >Equity securities </a> as a whole is used for capital funding for companies. Companies have multiple expenses to cover. Potential growth of company is required in competitive market. So, these securities are used for capital generation, and then uses it for company’s growth.
Concluding remarks
Both are employed in business. Businesses are often established through debit securities, then what is the need for equity securities. Companies have to cover multiple expenses and expansion of business. They can also use equity instruments for repayment of debits. So, there are multiple uses for securities. As an investor, you need tools for analysis. Investment decisions are made by carefully analyzing the market. For better analysis of the stock market, investors often employ financial analysis of companies.
where can I find a legit pi merchant onlineDOT TECH
Yes. This is very easy what you need is a recommendation from someone who has successfully traded pi coins before with a merchant.
Who is a pi merchant?
A pi merchant is someone who buys pi network coins and resell them to Investors looking forward to hold thousands of pi coins before the open mainnet.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant to trade with
@Pi_vendor_247
What website can I sell pi coins securely.DOT TECH
Currently there are no website or exchange that allow buying or selling of pi coins..
But you can still easily sell pi coins, by reselling it to exchanges/crypto whales interested in holding thousands of pi coins before the mainnet launch.
Who is a pi merchant?
A pi merchant is someone who buys pi coins from miners and resell to these crypto whales and holders of pi..
This is because pi network is not doing any pre-sale. The only way exchanges can get pi is by buying from miners and pi merchants stands in between the miners and the exchanges.
How can I sell my pi coins?
Selling pi coins is really easy, but first you need to migrate to mainnet wallet before you can do that. I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant to trade with.
Tele-gram.
@Pi_vendor_247
5 Tips for Creating Standard Financial ReportsEasyReports
Well-crafted financial reports serve as vital tools for decision-making and transparency within an organization. By following the undermentioned tips, you can create standardized financial reports that effectively communicate your company's financial health and performance to stakeholders.
How to get verified on Coinbase Account?_.docxBuy bitget
t's important to note that buying verified Coinbase accounts is not recommended and may violate Coinbase's terms of service. Instead of searching to "buy verified Coinbase accounts," follow the proper steps to verify your own account to ensure compliance and security.
Yes of course, you can easily start mining pi network coin today and sell to legit pi vendors in the United States.
Here the telegram contact of my personal vendor.
@Pi_vendor_247
#pi network #pi coins #legit #passive income
#US
BYD SWOT Analysis and In-Depth Insights 2024.pptxmikemetalprod
Indepth analysis of the BYD 2024
BYD (Build Your Dreams) is a Chinese automaker and battery manufacturer that has snowballed over the past two decades to become a significant player in electric vehicles and global clean energy technology.
This SWOT analysis examines BYD's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats as it competes in the fast-changing automotive and energy storage industries.
Founded in 1995 and headquartered in Shenzhen, BYD started as a battery company before expanding into automobiles in the early 2000s.
Initially manufacturing gasoline-powered vehicles, BYD focused on plug-in hybrid and fully electric vehicles, leveraging its expertise in battery technology.
Today, BYD is the world’s largest electric vehicle manufacturer, delivering over 1.2 million electric cars globally. The company also produces electric buses, trucks, forklifts, and rail transit.
On the energy side, BYD is a major supplier of rechargeable batteries for cell phones, laptops, electric vehicles, and energy storage systems.
1. Elemental Economics - Introduction to mining.pdfNeal Brewster
After this first you should: Understand the nature of mining; have an awareness of the industry’s boundaries, corporate structure and size; appreciation the complex motivations and objectives of the industries’ various participants; know how mineral reserves are defined and estimated, and how they evolve over time.
1. Elemental Economics - Introduction to mining.pdf
Fertility changes and gender wage gaps
1. Can I have my kids now?
Can I have my kids now?
Fertility and gender wage gaps
Nuria Rodriguez-Planas [CUNY & IZA]
Joanna Tyrowicz [FAME|GRAPE, IAAEU, IZA & University of Warsaw]
Lucas van der Velde [FAME|GRAPE & Warsaw School of Economics]
Prague Workshop on Gender and Family in the Labor Market
May 2019
2. Can I have my kids now?
Introduction
Motivation – textbook case for statistical discrimination
Fertility (-related absences) as premise for gender inequality
fertility plans → hiring decisions
(Becker et al., 2019)
child bearing → wage loss among mothers (not fathers)
(Landais & Kleven, 2019; Cukrowska-Torzewska & Matysiak, 2017; Pertold-Gebicka, 2014)
3. Can I have my kids now?
Introduction
Motivation – textbook case for statistical discrimination
Fertility (-related absences) as premise for gender inequality
fertility plans → hiring decisions
(Becker et al., 2019)
child bearing → wage loss among mothers (not fathers)
(Landais & Kleven, 2019; Cukrowska-Torzewska & Matysiak, 2017; Pertold-Gebicka, 2014)
Demographic trends: ↑ age at first birth and ↓ # of births
⇒ less reasons for statistical discrimination
4. Can I have my kids now?
Introduction
Motivation – textbook case for statistical discrimination
Fertility (-related absences) as premise for gender inequality
fertility plans → hiring decisions
(Becker et al., 2019)
child bearing → wage loss among mothers (not fathers)
(Landais & Kleven, 2019; Cukrowska-Torzewska & Matysiak, 2017; Pertold-Gebicka, 2014)
Demographic trends: ↑ age at first birth and ↓ # of births
⇒ less reasons for statistical discrimination
Why look at entrants?
most of the “action”
entry wage as benchmark for raises → future earnings
(Blau and Ferber, 2011; Reuben et al., 2013)
5. Can I have my kids now?
Introduction
Our contribution
Test the link from fertility to (adjusted) gender wage gaps
6. Can I have my kids now?
Introduction
Our contribution
Test the link from fertility to (adjusted) gender wage gaps
Causal evidence
New IV: international variation in “pill” admission
(in the US: Goldin & Katz, 2002; Bailey, 2006; Oltmans-Ananat & Hungerman, 2012)
Link between “pill” and fertility is causal
(Bailey, 2009)
7. Can I have my kids now?
Introduction
Our contribution
Test the link from fertility to (adjusted) gender wage gaps
Causal evidence
New IV: international variation in “pill” admission
(in the US: Goldin & Katz, 2002; Bailey, 2006; Oltmans-Ananat & Hungerman, 2012)
Link between “pill” and fertility is causal
(Bailey, 2009)
Earlier studies: directly affected cohorts ↔ this study: current cohort
8. Can I have my kids now?
Introduction
Our contribution
Test the link from fertility to (adjusted) gender wage gaps
Causal evidence
New IV: international variation in “pill” admission
(in the US: Goldin & Katz, 2002; Bailey, 2006; Oltmans-Ananat & Hungerman, 2012)
Link between “pill” and fertility is causal
(Bailey, 2009)
Earlier studies: directly affected cohorts ↔ this study: current cohort
Comparable measures of AGWG (across c & t) for entrants
Study time trends in GWG and AGWG across countries
Document substantial heterogeneity in trends
9. Can I have my kids now?
Introduction
Table of contents
1 Introduction
2 Toy model
3 Method and data
4 Results
5 Summary
6 Appendix
10. Can I have my kids now?
Toy model
A toy model of statistical discrimination
Variation of the ideas presented by Phelps (1972)
Set up
Two types of workers: parents (π ) and non-parents (1 − π)
Same productivity h , but there are costs (c) associated with
parenthood
c is borne mostly by women.
Employer cannot know whether a worker is (will be) a parent
Wages reflect the expected productivity
W = E(h) = h ∗ (1 − π) + (h − c) ∗ (π)
11. Can I have my kids now?
Toy model
A toy model of statistical discrimination (II)
The Adjusted GWG is then:
E(Wm|h) − E(Ww |h)) = h − (h ∗ (1 − π) + (h − c) ∗ (π) = c · π
In this very stylized partial equilibrium framework, adjusted GWG
Increases with the additional costs of childbearing (c)
Increases with the probability of being a parent (π)
If employers are rational: ↓ π ⇒↓ gender wage gap
12. Can I have my kids now?
Method and data
Implementation
We would like to estimate the following regression
AGWGi,t = βi + β × Fertilityi,t + γXi,t + i,t
13. Can I have my kids now?
Method and data
Implementation
We would like to estimate the following regression
AGWGi,t = βi + β × Fertilityi,t + γXi,t + i,t
But
Fertility as in TFR is noisy → we want the “risk” by employers
No directly observable inequality → adjust raw GWG
Fertility decisions endogenous to AGWG
14. Can I have my kids now?
Method and data
Instrument: admission of contraceptive pill
A little bit of history
Pill was admitted in US in 1960
Heterogeneity in Europe: admission timing & forms
Many European countries admitted immediately
Some (e.g. Portugal and Spain) lagged behind (late 60’s and 70’s)
Some delayed admission (e.g. Norway)
15. Can I have my kids now?
Method and data
Instrument: admission of contraceptive pill
A little bit of history
Pill was admitted in US in 1960
Heterogeneity in Europe: admission timing & forms
Many European countries admitted immediately
Some (e.g. Portugal and Spain) lagged behind (late 60’s and 70’s)
Some delayed admission (e.g. Norway)
Admission = availability (→ timing)
E.g. former socialist countries: admitted but unavailable
Prescriptions vs otc
...
16. Can I have my kids now?
Method and data
Our instruments
We use variation in pill admission
1 Time since admission of the pill: year - year when admitted
Variation across countries and over time.
2 Additionally: differences in national legislation
Where can pills be bought? Any shop vs. drugstores/ pharmacies
Is prescription required to buy pills?
In our sample, variation only across countries.
17. Can I have my kids now?
Method and data
A note on the estimation procedure
We use 2SLS for panel data as in Baltagi and coauthors (1981, 1992, 2000)
It is a random effects model (FGLS)
but... instrumentation in first stage is different
within component ˜xi,j = xi,j − ˆθ ¯xi
between component ¯xi
Additional instruments are redundant in White sense
→ More precise than RE
Standard errors are adjusted to unbalanced panels
18. Can I have my kids now?
Method and data
Measuring the adjusted gender wage gap
Nopo decomposition
A Flexible non-parametric approach based on perfect matching
Reliable even when even when small set of covariates
(perfect matching)
Reliable even when cannot correct for selection bias
(GWG within common support)
Adjusting for: age (5-year categories) ; education (3 levels) ; marital
status (2 levels) ; urban setting (2 levels)
Not adjusting for household composition (kids)
19. Can I have my kids now?
Method and data
Data
Estimation of the gender wage gap:
1 ECHP: EU 15 (1994 - 2001)
2 EU-SES: Enlarged EU, every four years between 2002 and 2014
3 Labor Force Survey when available (UK, France, Poland) from early
1990’s till 2014
4 Panel data: SOEP (Germany 1991-2014), BHPS (UK, 1991-2008).
The pill data: Finlay, Canning and Po (2012)
Country level data:
Fertility related variables: Eurostat
Other variables: World Bank
20. Can I have my kids now?
Results
Evolution of the RAW gender wage gap−.20.2.4
Gap
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
ECHP EUSES Others
Evolution of the raw gender wage gap
Notes:Adjusted gender wage gap obtain using Nopo (2008) decomposition. Average equals 0.05. Line
represents fitted values from a regression that also includes source FE
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Results
Evolution of the ADJUSTED gender wage gap−.20.2.4
Gap
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
ECHP EUSES Others
Evolution of the adjusted gender wage gap
Notes:Adjusted gender wage gap obtain using Nopo (2008) decomposition. Average (all sample) is
.09., in 2014 ∼ 0.12. Line represents fitted values from a regression that also includes source FE
22. Can I have my kids now?
Results
Fertility and gender wage gap−.20.2.4
Gap
24 26 28 30 32
Mean age at first birth
Raw GWG
−.20.2.4
Gap
24 26 28 30 32
Mean age at first birth
Adjusted GWG
Notes: Raw and adjusted gender wage gap obtain using Nopo (2008) decomposition. Linear relation
and 95% CI from a simple regression with no additional controls.
Alternative measure of fertility
23. Can I have my kids now?
Results
IV results
Adjusted GWGi,t = β + β1 × Mean age at first child birthi,t + γXi,t + i,t
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Mean age at birth -0.0175 -0.0398 -0.0360 -0.0279 -0.023
p-value (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.13)
N 244 244 244 230 230
Year Y Y Y Y
Education Y Y
Log(GDP pc) Y Y
R2
overall 0.313 0.337 0.373 0.334 0.366
R2
between 0.361 0.386 0.425 0.385 0.418
R2
within 0.010 0.005 0.015 0.008 0.018
Notes: All regressions estimated using Baltagi’s RE estimator. All regressions include source FE.
Estimates of the adjusted gender wage gap at the mean obtained using Nopo decomposition. Robust
standard errors used to compute p-values against a two-sided alternative.
Raw GWG
24. Can I have my kids now?
Results
First stage results: Are our instruments good predictors?
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Time since (w) 0.125 0.253 0.153 0.282 0.315
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)
Time since (b) -0.026 -0.032 -0.035 -0.037 -0.040
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Availability (b) 0.636 0.692 0.762 0.496 0.523
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.13) (0.22)
No prescription (b) -0.732 -0.695 -0.798 -0.167 -0.183
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.44) (0.51)
Year Y Y Y Y
Education Y Y
Log(GDP pc) Y Y
Notes: Table presents first stage of Baltagi’s RE estimator. Robust standard errors used to compute
p-values against a two-sided alternative. All estimations include source FE
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Results
Alternative specifications
HT GWG+ Time FE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Mean age at birth -0.020 -0.027 -0.023 -0.020 -0.018
P-value (0.068) (0.021) (0.228) (0.042) (0.201)
Log(GDP pc) Y Y Y
Notes:
HT include prescription and shop availabiity as time invariant exog. covariates together with
country FE P-value Hausman test: 0.42 → RE is prefered
GWG Added controls for industry, firm size and occupation in GWG estimation. We kept only obs.
with +50% of men and women in common support. N dropped to ∼ 1/2 of previous.
REV FE for year. Control for time trends in the data.
26. Can I have my kids now?
Summary
Summary
Do employers discriminate statistically?
If so, lower fertility among youth →↓ GWG
Results are consistent with a model of statistical discrimination
IV estimates ∼ −0.02
Adjusted GWG = .12 (on average)
Delaying 1st
birth by a year cuts Adjusted GWG by almost 20%
Estimates were stable and robust across model specifications
Possible extensions
Can we extend results to developing countries?
Does lower fertility reduce Adjusted GWG over the life-cycle?
27. Can I have my kids now?
Summary
Questions or suggestions?
Thank you!
w: grape.org.pl
t: grape org
f: grape.org
e: l.vandervelde@uw.edu.pl
28. Can I have my kids now?
Appendix
Demographic trends2224262830
Meanageatfirstbirth
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Mean age at first birth
11.522.5
Fertilityrate
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Fertility rate
Source: EUROSTAT. Lines indicate the fitted values and a 95% CI of a regression of the fertility
measure on time.
Back
29. Can I have my kids now?
Appendix
Is c mostly bourne by women?
Contribution to household production by gender
Households were both partners work 35+ hours with kids < 6 y.o.
Data cover 20 EU countries (EST, LUX, MLT, ROM missing)
0.2.4.6.8
Laundry Repairs Caring Shopping Cleaning Cooking
Mostly women About equal Mostly men
30. Can I have my kids now?
Appendix
Is c mostly bourne by women?
Contribution to household production by gender
Households were both partners work 35+ hours with kids < 6 y.o.
Data cover 20 EU countries (EST, LUX, MLT, ROM missing)
0.2.4.6.8
Laundry Repairs Caring Shopping Cleaning Cooking
Mostly women About equal Mostly men
Surprisingly, 54% of men in sample declare to perform a fair share of tasks
Back
31. Can I have my kids now?
Appendix
Fertility rate and gender wage gap−.20.2.4
Gap
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Fertility rate
Raw GWG
−.20.2.4
Gap
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Fertility rate
Adjusted GWG
Back
32. Can I have my kids now?
Appendix
IV results: Raw gender wage gap
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Mean age at birth -0.0241 -0.0337 -0.0315 -0.0299 -0.0222
p-value (0.00) (0.07) (0.05) (0.11) (0.14)
Year Y Y Y Y
Education Y Y
GDP pc Y Y
R2
overall 0.277 0.258 0.298 0.299 0.354
R2
between 0.215 0.196 0.231 0.254 0.324
R2
within 0.054 0.044 0.053 0.063 0.063
Notes: All regressions estimated using Baltagi’s RE estimator. All regressions include source FE.
Estimates of the adjusted gender wage gap at the mean obtained using Nopo decomposition. Robust
standard errors used to compute p-values against a two-sided alternative.
Back