Relators in False Claim lawsuits quite often also incorporate the retaliation complaint. Gurumruthy Kalyanaram presents the decisions by various Courts on many FCA anti-retaliation lawsuits.

1. Gurumurthy Kalyanaram on False Claim ActAnti-Retaliation Provision
http://kalyanaramgurumurthy.weebly.com/
Relators in False Claim lawsuits quite often also incorporate the retaliation
complaint. Gurumruthy Kalyanaram presents the decisions by various Courts
on many FCA anti-retaliation lawsuits.
Employee reports of government fraud being committed by employers are a
critical source of information. For this reason, the False Claims Act provides
broad protection for employees from retaliation for any activities “in furtherance
of” a possible FCA claim. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). The statute is interpreted broadly,
to cover any investigations and inquiries where the relator‟s purpose was aimed at
exposing a fraud upon the government, whether or not the relator has a winning
claim or ever files a claim. The public interest should be preserved over the
private interests of both employees and employers.
“In crafting whistle-blower protections, Congress aimed to make employees
feel more secure in reporting fraud to the United States. Employees who
investigate and supply information concerning the fraudulent practices of an
employer are protected from retaliation, whether the employee or the government
brings suit against the employer.”
Cell Therapeutics Inc. v. Lash Group Inc., 586 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir.
2010) “Congress intended to protect employees from retaliation while they are
collecting information about a possible fraud, before they have put all the pieces of
the puzzle together.” Fanslow v. Chic. Mfg. Ctr., Inc., 384 F.3d 469, 481 (7th Cir.
2004) (citing Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 33 F.3d 860, 863 (7th Cir. 1994) and U.S. ex
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2. rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); U.S. ex rel.
Holmes v. Consumer Ins. Group, 318 F.3d 1199, 1212-1215 (10th Cir. 2003).
“The Committee believes that the amendments . . . which allow and
encourage assistance from the private citizenry can make a significant impact on
bolstering the Government‟s fraud enforcement effort. . . . [T]he Committee seeks
to halt companies . . . from using the threat of economic retaliation to silence
„whistleblowers‟, as well as assure those who may be considering exposing fraud
that they are legally protected from retaliatory acts. . . Protected activity should
therefore be interpreted broadly.” Sen. Rpt. 99-345, at 8, 34 (1986), reprinted,
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273, and 5299.
These precedents should provide a framework for analysis of lawsuits in this
domain.
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