Chevron Refinery in Richmond the largest oil refinery in Northern California. This is an overview of refinery fire in 2012, including event timeline leading to disaster and the aftermath.

1. Chevron Refinery Fire
2012
Jasmine Hinojosa, Heather Melendez, Jonathan Ramos

2. A little background info.
Chevron Refinery in Richmond
Largest oil refinery in Northern California
Nearly 250,000 barrels of crude oil
per day
Transportation fuels i.e. diesel, gasoline,
jet fuel and lubrication oil
Refining process happens in the
Crude unit
The crude oil is cleaned, heated, boiled &
distilled into vapor
The vapor condenses in the
distillation tower into liquid
hydrocarbon gas oil & streams into
separate pipes for further refining

3. Events leading up to the incident
▪ Chevron inspectors knew over the years,
the wall to the #4-sidecut line had thinned
due to sulfidation corrosion
▪ Sulfidation corrosion
– Caused by high temperature-related chemical
reaction between sulfur compounds in crude oil
and iron ore in steel
– This reaction deteriorates the steel pipes
causing the pipe walls to gradually thin over
time

4. Timeline…
▪ 2002-Oct: Sulfidation corrosion identified,
analyzed and replacement upgrade
recommended
▪ 2006-Oct: Recommended upgrade DENIED
as did not meet “Framing Document” work
request requirements
▪ 2007-Feb: Only minimal portions of piping
replaced
▪ 2009-Sept: ETC (chevron Energy
Technology Company) Sulfidation Failure
Prevention initiative developed

5. Timeline… (continue)
▪ 2011-Jan: Recommended upgrade and 100% inspection
DENIED as did not meet “Framing Document” work request
requirements
▪ Previous inspection data for the 4-sidecut piping* indicated the piping
could safely operate through 2016
– (*measurements historically taken on 4-sidecut piping with high-
silicon fittings, not older pipes)
▪ 2011-Oct: Refinery lowered pipe “AlertThickness” without
multi-person review, allowing 4-sidecut line to continue
operating

6. Preventive Action – August 6th, 2012
▪ 3:50 pm Operator performing routine check, noticed a small puddle
near the distillation tower with a leak noted at the 4-sidecut line
▪ 4:07 pm The on-staff Chevron fire department arrived at the leak and
established an incident command
▪ 4:15 pm Management and inspectors arrived to assist in decision
making
▪ There was no shut off valve between the distillation tower and the pipe
▪ The group decided to locate the leak before shutting down the entire
production
▪ 5:00 pm The feed rate of the liquid was reduced and a firefighter used a
pike-pole to pry away some of the pipe insulation
▪ This was determined to be too dangerous as it was moving the pipe

7. Preventive Action
▪ 5:15 pm Additional personnel arrived for a
shift-change. Workers built a scaffolding to
get close and remove the pipe insulation to
find the leak.
▪ 6:27 pm Flash fire occurs during insulation
removal
▪ 6:29 pm Order was made to shut down the
crude unit
▪ 6:31 pm The 4-sidecut pipe line ruptures
releasing toxic vapors
▪ 6:33 pm Process fluid ignites

8. Affected by the incident
▪ 19 employees were affected by the pipe rupture
and explosion
– 18 employees escaped through the vapors before it
ignited
- 1 employee, a Chevron fire fighter was inside the fire
engine when the explosion occurred
* he was wearing his PPE and was able to escape the flames to safety
– Out of the 19 employees, 6 employees suffered minor
injuries

9. Outer radius of explosion
Following Weeks…
▪ About 15,000 people in the
surrounding communities sought
medical attention for:
▪ breathing problems, shortness of
breath, sore throat, and headaches
▪ Twenty people were admitted to
hospitals for treatment
Total # of affected
▪ Approximately ± 15,000 people
were affected, 20 people were
hospitalized, but no serious
injuries or deaths

10. Richmond, CA

11. Aftermath
• Vapor cloud quickly began to
accumulate and light gas ignited
• EPA found dozens of failures to
comply with federal
environmental laws in an
investigation of the 2012 fire in
Richmond, CA
• 49 failures by Chevron to
effectively operate a risk
management plan for the refinery
• EPA’s first action was to send a
letter and violations to Chevron

12. Aftermath…
▪ Chevron had 30 days to reply and explain its plan to correct the
violations
▪ IF failure to respond and correct the failures, EPA would fine the
company $37,500 per violation per day
▪ California’s Occupational Safety and Health division issued nearly
$1million in fines to Chevron due to the blaze
▪ Chevron faced lawsuits by the city of Richmond and hundreds of area
residents due to the fire

13. Company Responsibility?
▪ Chevron ETC, technical experts issued a corporate newsletter that focused
on materials, corrosion, and warnings of potential consequences of
sulfidation failures, and made it accessible to all employees in Chevron
companies
▪ Chevron ETC hosted training sessions for refinery personnel, refinery
inspection staff, refinery engineers, and some operators.
▪ Chevron used a turnaround planning and implementation process initiative
for managing pacesetter turnarounds (IMPACT process) to perform
turnarounds efficiently and effectively only when necessary work is
performed
▪ Online dashboard Operational Excellence and Reliability Intelligence (OERI)
to track 26 different process safety indicators
▪ Stop work authority

14. Chemical of Richmond Refinery Fire
▪ Crude oil sweet a type of petroleum
▪ SDS # 724160
▪ Intended use crude oils, refinery feed
▪ Natural gas condensate can contain minor
amounts of sulfur, nitrogen, and oxygen
containing organic compounds as well as
heavy metals
▪ The term sweet originates from the low
level of sulfur which provides the oil with a
mild sweet taste and pleasant smell
▪ The hazard for crude oil is it is a flammable
liquid. It is ranked as class 3 In the hazard
classification
Component 1CASRN CASRN Concentration2
CrudeOil (Petroleum) 8002-05-9 100
Naphthalene 91-20-3
0-0.9
Benzene 71-43-2
<1
Hydrogen Sulfide
7783-06-4 <0.2
Total Sulfur: < 0.5 wt%
2 All concentrations are percent by weight unless ingredient is a gas. Gas concentrations are in percent by volume.
1CASRN (Chemical Abstract Services Registry Number)

15. Exposure Limits and Monitoring
▪ The same day of the explosion, 12 direct reading samples were used from the
multi-gas monitor
– The data detected low levels of hydrogen sulfide, sulfur dioxide, and carbon monoxide
▪ Tedlar bags were also collected from surrounding cities to observe any effects
– According to the data results, samples resulted well below PELs of Cal OSHA
▪ Furthermore, A day after the explosion, samples were collected again, from a MX6
iBird gas monitor, which resulted in similar results, well below the PELs
▪ Fence-line monitoring gathered from Chevron’s Office Hill, to Castro Street and
Gertrude Street
– Data collected was from point of incident to all clear

16. Exposure Limits Report (8hr)
Cal/OSHA
PEL
Castro Street Office Hall Gertrude Street
H2S(ppb)
Background @ 3 PM
10,000 ppb 3.04 ppb 3.99 ppb 2.09 ppb
H2S(ppb) max 10,000 ppb 3.21 ppb 5.41 ppb 2.51 ppb
SO2(ppm)
background @ 3 PM
2 ppm 0.006 ppm 0.003 ppm 0.002 ppm
SO2(ppm) max 2 ppm 0.007 ppm 0.006 ppm 0.002 ppm

17. Emergency Response Guide
▪ There were liquid flammables
▪ Easily ignited (HIGHLY FLAMMABLE)
▪ Inhalation or contact may irritate
▪ Vapors may cause suffocation
▪ In case of fire, isolate a 800 meter perimeter around site
▪ Eliminate all ignition source
▪ Fresh air for victims

18. Influential Factors
▪ Thin pipe
– Inspection of pipes in the refinery needed to be maintained to ensure substance
can be contained. Failure of maintenance and design.
▪ Poor Inspection
– Pipes were not properly inspected and measured. Did not account for pipe
thinning. Human factor was also key.
▪ Equipment failure
– Once the pipe leaked, vapors immersed in the air and caught fire.

19. Tesoro’s Anacortes Refinery, WA
▪ Similar to Chevron, however, much deadlier.
– 7 workers dead from the incident
▪ Due to rupture of heat exchanger, fire ignited immediately upon
interaction with air
▪ Chevron, had no deaths
▪ Anacortes refinery produced similar material as Richmond refinery
▪ 3 people dead at scene, 4 people hospitalized with severe burns

20. Tesoro’s Refinery Factors
▪ Heat exchanger failed due to long term attack of high temperature
hydrogen
– Making cracks and creating fissures
▪ Every 6 months, the heat exchangers were taken offline to be
cleaned because of accumulation of deposits in the tube.
▪ In order for the tube to work properly, i.e. the flow of heat exchange,
it needed to be cleaned to flow better, like a blood artery.
▪ Middle pipe of heat exchange was so stressed, it created a leak (hiss)
and finally an explosion.
▪ Material inside tube, mixed with air and immediately ignited.

21. Prevention
▪ Proper inspection of equipment and not merely the “it will do”
▪ Proper conveying of information to correct source
▪ Repairing/replacing of equipment
▪ Train employers/ employees to know the material used in production
▪ Notify first responders of the possible chemicals leaked

22. References
Crude Oil, Sweet; SDS No. 724160. (2014, August 13). Retrieved October 24, 2015, from
http://www.conocophillips.com/sustainable-
development/Documents/2014.08.13_724160%20Crude%20Oil,%20Sweet.pdf
Kemsley, Jyllian. (2014, February 4).Tesoro refinery fire caused by weakened steel. Retrieved November 2,
2015, from http://cenblog.org/the-safety-zone/2014/02/tesoro-refinery-fire-caused-by-weakened-steel-
tubing/
Mason, Mark. Alert: Chevron Oil Refinery at Richmond Is on Fire! Digital image. : Alert: Chevron Oil Refinery
at Richmond Is on Fire! Http://sanpablobayepa.blogspot.com/, 12 Aug. 2012.Web. 02 Nov. 2015.
<http://sanpablobayepa.blogspot.com/2012/08/alert-chevron-oil-refinery-at-richmond.html>.
U.S. Chemical Safety And Hazard Investigation Board. (2015). Final investigation report: chevron richmond
refinery pipe rupture and fire (Report No. 2012-03-I-CA). Retrieved from http://www.csb.gov/chevron-
refinery-fire/