1.
Что-то там про
СТОРИТЕЛЛИНГ
Алексей Каптерев
@kapterev

2.
Презентация:
! "
История
Cлайды
Подача

3.
СТОРИТЕЛЛИНГ
storytelling, «рассказывание историй»
1.Жанр искусства

4.
СТОРИТЕЛЛИНГ
storytelling, «рассказывание историй»
1.Жанр искусства
2.Иллюстрация кейсами

5.
СТОРИТЕЛЛИНГ
storytelling, «рассказывание историй»
1.Жанр искусства
2.Иллюстрация байками
3.Нарративная структура

6.
Кино:
# "
Сценарий
Картинка
Игра

7.
ПЕРЕДАТЧИК
ПРИЕМНИК
ПРИЕМНИК
ПРИЕМНИК
ПРИЕМНИК
ПРИЕМНИК
ПРИЕМНИК
ПРИЕМНИК

8.
Чтобы сделать хорошее
кино, нужны всего 3 вещи:
хороший сценарий,
хороший сценарий и
хороший сценарий.

АЛЬФРЕД ХИЧКОК
Режиссер

9.
Проблема №1:
С КУ ЧН О

10.
?
НУ И ЧТО
Вам же платят деньги!

11.
Инвесторы могут быть потрясающими людьми
с впечатляющим технологическим бэкграундом,
но они к тому же очень занятые люди…
Представьте, что вы произносите речь
передумеренно способными девятиклассниками,
чье внимание можно удерживать только очень
короткое время, и у которых нет ни глубоких
знаний, ни интуиции, чтобы понять вашу идею.

ПИТЕР ТИЛЬ
Основатель PayPal

12.
!
ВНИМАНИЕ
ОЧЕ НЬ
легко
ПОТЕРЯТЬ
и все остальное уже не важно

13.
?
ПОЧЕМУ
С КУ ЧН О

14.
?
МОНОТОННО

15.
После презентации инженера:
Зачем ты тратишь мою жизнь?!

ДЖЕФФ БЕЗОС
CEO Amazon.com

16.
В ИСТОРИИ ЕСТЬ
ДИ НА М И К А

17.
ИСТОРИЯ ВКЛЮЧАЕТ
ЭМО ЦИИ

18.
ИСТОРИЯ ПРОРЫВАЕТСЯ
ЧЕРЕЗ «КЛАТТЕР»

19.
?
Что такое
«ИСТОРИЯ»

20.
УМЕР МЕЛЬНИК
1-й СЫН
2-й СЫН
3-й СЫН / КОТ
РУКАВИЦЫ
КОРОЛЬ
КРОЛИК
КУРОПАТКА
ОПЕРАЦИЯ «МК»
«ВОРЫ»
ПРИНЦЕССА
ЖНЕЦЫ
КОСЦЫ
ЛЮДОЕД ЗАМОК
ЛЕВ
МЫШЬ
КОРОЛЬ
3-Й СЫН+ПРИНЦЕССА=$
КОТ

21.
iTunes music
store presentation
Steve Jobs, 2003

22.
Innovate

23.
The most striking thing about the 17-inch PowerBook, after the
screen itself, is how brilliantly Apple managed to shrink the size of
the machine built around that big display.
Sure, the PowerBook is an unusually wide 15.4 inches, but itis only
one inch thick. Yet, it feels solid as a rock. Itis just 10.2 inches deep
and weighs only 6.8 pounds.
To get an idea of how sleek those dimensions are, compare the new
PowerBook with another brand-new laptop, Dell’s Latitude D800.
This model also boasts a widescreen display, measuring 15.4 inches
diagonally. But, even though the Dell has a significantly smaller
screen, it looks like a whale next to the 17-inch PowerBook.
— Walt Mossberg, the Wall Street Journal

24.
Safari

25.
Innovate

26.
Music

27.
RIP
MIX
BURN

28.
Acquire
Manage
Listen

29.
Acquire
Manage
Listen

30.
700,000

31.
#1 MP3 player

32.
Can anyone top that?

33.
New iPods

34.
10Gb
15Gb
30Gb
2500 songs
3700 songs
7500 songs
Dock, Case, Remote
299 $
399 $
499 $

35.
Acquire
Manage
Listen

36.
AAC

37.
Acquire
Manage
Listen

38.
Instant gratification

39.
It’s stealing

40.
1 Vast selection
2 Unlimited CD burning
3 Unlimited MP3 players
4 Unlimited computers
5 Free

41.
6 Unreliable downloads
7 Unreliable encoding
8 No previews
9 No album cover art
10 It’s stealing

42.
No legal alternative

43.
PressPlay
RHAPSODY

44.
PressPlay
“You can play your downloaded songs
as long as your membership is active.”

45.
RHAPSODY
“Only subscribers to the All Access subscription
plan at $9.99 per month will get the ability to
burn tracks for an additional fee per track.”

46.
Subscriptions
The wrong path

47.
Buy downloads
Just like LP’s, cassettes & CDs

48.
Own music
Broad set of personal rights

49.
Music Store
Music downloads done right

50.
1 Vast selection
2 Unlimited CD burning
3 Unlimited MP3 players
4 Unlimited computers
5 Free

51.
“The Big Five”

52.
" The music business is a cruel and shallow
money trench, a long plastic hallway
where thieves and pimps run free, and
good men die like dogs.
There's also a negative side."
— Hunter S. Thompson

53.
Landmark
Deals with all Big Five

54.
200,000

55.
Unlimited CD burns
For personal use

56.
Unlimited iPods
Past, present & future models

57.
Play on 3 Macs
We download to one you do the rest

58.
Use in applications
Soundtrack of your life

59.
99¢
Per song

60.
99¢
No subscription fee!

61.
99¢
= 99¢
99¢

62.
1 Vast selection
200,000 songs
2 Unlimited CD burning
3 Unlimited MP3 players
iPod
4 Unlimited computers
Up to 3 Macs
5 Freeper song
99¢

63.
6 Unreliable downloads
7 Unreliable encoding
8 No previews
9 No album cover art
10 It’s stealing

64.
You never find one song –
you find 50 or 60 songs

65.
The download is slow as paralysis,
then it just craps out halfway through

66.
After 15 minutes you finally succeed
in getting a clean version of the song

67.
You spend an hour to get 4 songs
that cost $3.96 from Apple

68.
You’re working for
under minimum wage

69.
You’re stealing –
it’s best not to mess with Karma

70.
6 Unreliable downloads
7 Unreliable encoding
8 No previews
9 No album cover art
10 It’s stealing

71.
Pristine encoding

72.
AAC at 128 kbps

73.
Free 30-sec previews

74.
Album cover art

75.
6 Unreliable downloads
Fast, reliable downloads
7 Unreliable encoding
Pristine encoding
8 No previews
Preview for every song
9 No album cover art
Album cover art
10 It’s stealing
Good Karma

76.
1 200,000 songs
2 Unlimited CD burning
3 Unlimited iPods players
4 Up to 3 Macs
5 99¢ per song

77.
Beyond

78.
1-Click
One-click shopping

79.
BUY SONG
One-click downloads

80.
BUY ALBUM
One-click downloads

81.
Search

82.
Browse

83.
Exclusive tracks

84.
U2
Eminem
Bob Dylan
Sting
Sheryl Crow
…
20+ artists

85.
iTunes Music Store

86.
Demo
20 minutes

87.
200,000

88.
Unlimited CD burns

89.
Unlimited iPods

90.
Play on 3 Macs

91.
Pristine encoding

92.
Free 30-sec previews

93.
Album cover art

94.
BUY SONG
One-click downloads

95.
Deliver oceans of bits
fast and reliably
Process millions
1-Click
of transactions
Integrate with
popular jukebox
Work seamlessly
with iPods

96.
Only Apple

97.
U.S. Only
To start with…

98.
Today

99.
iTunes.com

100.
Free
software
update

101.
Acquire
Manage
Listen

102.
Buy. Mix. iPod.

103.
Mac only

104.
End of the year

105.
Video & TV ads
15 minutes

106.
AppleMusic.com

107.
UNNOVATIONS
POWERBOOK
SOFTWARE
MUSIC
RIP.MIX.BURN
ITUNES
IPOD
GRAMMY
LISTEN
IPOD
CAN ANYONE TOP THAT?
PRICES
MANAGE
ITUNES
4 THINGS
ACQUIRE
NAPSTER
5 GOOD THINGS
5 BAD THINGS
ITUNES STORE
4+ GOOD THINGS
5 EVEN BETTER THINGS
4 THINGS BETTER STILL
ONLY APPLE
TODAY ETC

108.
Платформы
Цена
XMind
Win, Mac,
Linux
Freemium
MindMeister
Flash
Freemium

109.
Герой
Цель
Проблема / Слабость
Злодей
Решение
Цена
Мораль

110.
МОРАЛЬ
Если вы сделаете Х
то будет Y
иначе будет Z

111.
The U.S. Army
Afghanistan & Iraq
2009

112.
Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan

113.
Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
Support for
Insurgency
Neutral
Populace
COIN operations must accomplish three tasks
simultaneously:
• Influence insurgent-minded individuals to adopt a neutral
disposition.
• Influence neutral-minded individuals to adopt a
supportive disposition.
• Retain supportive individuals.
These operations are conducted in an environment where
tensions and hostilities between groups may destabilize a
society and provide opportunities for insurgents
• This environment may suggest courses of action aimed
at reinforcing or widening seams
Support for HN
Government

114.
• An increase in Coalition funding will influence
economic investment and development.
Coalition
Funding
• A strengthened economy will influence movement
from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups
toward the supportive group.
Economic
Investment
Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
Support for
Insurgency
Neutral
Populace
Economic
Development
Support for HN
Government

115.
Developing and
Restoring Essential
Services
Breakdown of
Essential Services
Essential
Services
Coalition
Funding
Satisfaction with
Essential Services
Economic
Investment
Expectations for
Essential Services
Time to Develop
Essential Services
Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
Support for
Insurgency
• An increase in Coalition funding will significantly
impact the restoration of essential services.
• Improvements in the provision of essential services
will influence movement from the insurgent- and
neutral-minded groups toward the supportive
group.
Neutral
Populace
Economic
Development
Support for HN
Government

116.
Developing and
Restoring Essential
Services
Breakdown of
Essential Services
Expectations for
Essential Services
Essential
Services
Time to Develop
Essential Services
Satisfaction with
Essential Services
Psychological
Operations
Effectiveness
Support for
Insurgency
Governance
Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
• Send a positive, credible message of
success to the populace.
• Provide an environment that enhances
stable employment of the workforce.
• Persuade insurgents and neutrals to
consider becoming supporters.
Economic
Investment
Economic
Development
Neutral
Populace
Support for HN
Government
Available
Workforce
Perceived
Security
A government that is established,
recognized, and that maintains a secure
environment is in a position to
Time to Develop
Governance
Coalition
Funding
External Material
Support
Insurgent Acts
of Violence

117.
Developing and
Restoring Essential
Services
Breakdown of
Essential Services
Psychological
Operations
Effectiveness
Impact of
Illegitimate Actions
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
Individual Competence,
Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis
Insurgent to Force
Density Ratio
significant impacts on
• The
Expectations for restoration of essential services. Economic
Investment
Essential Services
Governance
• The populace’s perception of security.
Essential
Services
Time to Develop
Essential Services
Coalition
An appropriate force mix, and correct operational
Satisfaction with
Funding
Time to Develop
Essential Services
tempo, timing, and synchronization will have very
Governance
Understanding and
Knowledge of Social
Structures
Support for
Insurgency
• The
Potential Government’s and COIN forces’ credibility in
their communications efforts with the populace.
Fractiousness
Economic
of Society
Development
Neutral
Populace
Support for HN
Government
Available
Workforce
Perceived
Security
External Material
Support
Insurgent Acts
of Violence
Total Force
Density
Coalition Force
Density
Information
Time to Develop HN
Security Forces
Host Nation
Security Forces
Host Nation
Force Density

118.
Developing and
Restoring Essential
Services
Time to Develop
Essential Services
Satisfaction with
Essential Services
Breakdown of
Essential Services
Expectations for
Essential Services
Essential
Services
Psychological
Operations
Effectiveness
Impact of
Illegitimate Actions
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
Insurgent to Force
Density Ratio
Understanding and
Knowledge of Social
Structures
Time to Develop
Governance
Economic
Investment
Governance
Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
Support for
Insurgency
Economic
Development
Neutral
Populace
Support for HN
Government
Available
Workforce
Perceived
Security
Individual Competence,
Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis
Coalition
Funding
External Material
Support
Insurgent Acts
of Violence
Total Force
Density
Coalition Force
Density
The Logical Lines of Operations from FM 3-24
Information
Time to Develop HN
Security Forces
Host Nation
Security Forces
Host Nation
Force Density

119.
Developing and
Restoring Essential
Services
Breakdown of
Essential Services
Expectations for
Essential Services
Essential
Services
Time to Develop
Essential Services
Psychological
Operations
Effectiveness
Impact of
Illegitimate Actions
Support for
Insurgency
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
Individual Competence,
Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis
Insurgent to Force
Density Ratio
Satisfaction with
Essential Services
Understanding and
Knowledge of Social
Structures
Time to Develop
Governance
Economic
Investment
Governance
Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
Economic
Development
Neutral
Populace
Support for HN
Government
Available
Workforce
Perceived
Security
External Material
Support
Insurgent Acts
of Violence
Total Force
Density
Coalition Force
Density
The Basic Information Ops Loop
Coalition
Funding
Information
Time to Develop HN
Security Forces
Host Nation
Security Forces
Host Nation
Force Density

120.
Popular Support – Sympathizers and Active Supporters
Relative
Popular
Support/
/Tolerance
Govt vs
Insurgents
Population
Actively
Supporting
Gov’t & SF
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
POPULAR
SUPPORT
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Page 9
Neutral/On
the Fence
Potential
Attractiveness
of Govt vs.
Insurgent Path
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Population
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency

121.
Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures
Perceived Damages/Use
of Force by Insurgents
Perceived Damages/Use
of Force by Gov’t and CF
Perception of Insurgent
Strength and Intent
Fear of Ins.
Attack,
Repercussions
Relative WOM Message
Amplification Gov’t vs Ins
Perception of Coalition
Intent & Commitment
Strength of
Religious
Ideology & Tribal
Structures
Cultural Erosion/
Displacement
Ethnic/Tribal
Rivalry
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Perception of Gov’t
Strength and Intent
Ability to
Reconcile
Religious
Ideology,
Tribal
Structures w/
Gov’t Path
Average
Connectedness
of Population
Satisfaction w/ Gains
in Security, Services &
Employment
Perceived
Security
Page 10
Expectations
for Security,
Services &
Employment
Visible Gains
In Security,
Services &
Employment

122.
Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures
Perceived
Damages &
Use of Force
by Ins.
Perceived
Damages/Use
of Force by
Gov t & Coalition
Perception of
Insurgent
Strength &
Intent
POPULATION
CONDITIONS
& BELIEFS
Fear of Ins.
Attack/
Repercussions
Relative WOM
Message
Amplification
Gov’t vs Ins
Perception of
Coalition Intent
& Commitment
Strength of
Religious
Ideology &
Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/
Displacement
Ethnic/Tribal
Rivalry
Ability to
Reconcile
Religious
Ideology,
Tribal
Structures
w/ Gov’t
Path
Average
Connectedness
of Population
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Perceived
Security
Page 11
Relative
Popular
Support/
/Tolerance
Govt vs
Insurgents
Perception
Of Govt
Strength
& Intent
Population
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
POPULAR
POPULAR
SUPPORT
Satisfaction
w/ Gains in
Security, Services
& Employment Visible Gains
In Security,
Services &
Employment
Expectations
for Security,
Services, &
Employment
Neutral/On
the Fence
Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov t vs.
Insurgent Path
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Population
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency

123.
Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics
Insurgent
Damages &
Casualties
Ins Strategic
Comm/IO &
Affiliation w/
Population
Fear of Gov’t /
ANSF / Coalition
Repercussions
Territory Not
Under Gov’t
Control
Havens /
Ability to
1
Operate
Insurgent
Insurgent Coordination
Leadership
Offensives & Among Ins
Factions
Training, Skill
Presence
& Exper
(Clear & Hold)
Ins Provision
of Gov’t &
Services
Ins Targeted
Attacks on
Progress/
Support for Gov’t
Insurgent
Capacity,
Priorities &
Effectiveness
Ties to
Narcotics
& Other
Criminal
Funding
Feedback Loop Examples:
1. Insurgent expansion: Insurgent factions with havens as base can expand their
presence and influence, further increasing their operating base territory.
(Permissive population contribution to Havens / Ability to Operate input from
separate sector).
2. Alignment of criminal and insurgent interests: Weakly governed / policed
territory may support insurgents, terrorists and criminals alike. Often interests
align and lines blur with criminal activity and funding contributing to insurgent
operations and expansion, further increasing the weakly governed terrority and
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Page 12
Outside
Support /
Enablement
of Ins.
2
Funding &
Material
Support to
Insurgents
Insurgent
Terrain
Advantage
Insurgent
Recruiting,
Retention,
Manpower,
& ISR
Likelihood
of Crime/
Violence/
Ins Support
for Payment
Criminal/
Trafficking
Capability &
Coercion
Narcotics &
Criminal
Activity Levels
Illegit Agric
Production
Trade &
Employment
Terrain
Harshness
& Breadth

124.
Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
OUTSIDE SUPPORT
TO INSURGENT
FACTIONS
Fear of
Gov’ t/ANSF/
Coalition
Repercussions
Havens / Ability to
Operate
Ins.
Offensives &
Presence
(Clear & Hold)
Territory Not
Under Gov’t
Control (Afghan
& Pakistan)
Coordination
Among Ins.
Factions
Ins. Provision
Of Gov’t &
Services
Perceived
Damages &
Use of Force
by Ins.
Ins. Strategic
Commun
/IO
& Affiliation w/
Population
Perceived
Damages/Use
of Force by
Gov t & Coalition
Ins. Targeted
Attacks on
Progress/
Support
for Gov
’t
Fear of Ins.
Attack/
Repercussions
Relative WOM
Message
Amplification
Gov’t vs Ins
Perception of
Coalition Intent
& Commitment
Strength of
Religious
Ideology &
Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/
Displacement
Ethnic/Tribal
Rivalry
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Perception
Of Gov t
Strength
& Intent
Ability to
Reconcile
Religious
Ideology,
Tribal
Structures
w/ Gov’t
Path
Average
Connectedness
of Population
Perceived
Security
Page 13
Insurgent
Capacity,
Priorities &
Effectiveness
Population
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
INSURGENTS
Ties to
Narcotics &
Other Criminal
Funding
Relative
Popular
Support/
/Tolerance
Govt vs
Insurgents
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
POPULAR
POPULAR
SUPPORT
SUPPORT
Satisfaction
w/ Gains in
Security, Services
& Employment Visible Gains
In Security,
Services &
Employment
Expectations
for Security,
Services, &
Employment
Insurgent
Terrain
Insurgent
Advantage
Recruiting,
Retention,
Manpower Criminal/
& ISR
Trafficking
Capability &
Coercion
Ins.
Leadership,
Training, Skill
& Experience
Perception of
Insurgent
Strength &
Intent
POPULATION
POPULATION
CONDITIONS
CONDITIONS
& BELIEFS
& BELIEFS
Outside
Support/
Enablement
of Ins.
Neutral/On
the Fence
Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov t vs.
Insurgent Path
Funding &
Material
Support to
Insurgents
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Terrain
Harshness
& Breadth
NARCOTICS
Likelihood of
Crime/Violence
/Ins. Support
for Payment
Population
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency
Narcotics
& Criminal
Activity
Levels
IllegitAgric
Production,
Trade &
Employment

125.
Infrastructure, Services, & Economy
Feedback Loop Examples:
1. Agricultural production and markets: Investment and spending
enables agricultural production. Production can boost economic
activity and trade which feeds back into private sector re-investment.
(Public policy and investment in infrastructure, workforce, financial
markets, etc helps start / maintain private sector momentum.)
2. Making legit agriculture more attractive: Improved legit agricultural
opportunities may make illegit agricultural options less attractive which
further increases legit agricultural production, trade, and markets.
(Other inputs to decisions related to legit vs illegit from other sectors.)
Legit Agric
Production
2
Private Sector
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Infrastructure
Dev. Adequacy
& Sustainment
Legit Other
Production
& Services
Non-Agric
Fraction of
Workforce
and Agric.
Legit vs Illegit
Population
Basic Needs
Service Levels
& Employment
Civilian
Services
(SWET,
Healthcare,
Education)
Legit vs Illegit
Relative
Economic
Opportunity
1
Infr. Services, Econ,
Policy & Execution/
Perceived Fairness
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Private Sector
Capital Mgmt,
Investment &
Spending
Ability to Move
People &
Goods Rapidly
Page 14
Legit Economic
Activity, Trade &
Employment

126.
Infrastructure, Services, & Economy
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
OUTSIDE SUPPORT
TO INSURGENT
TO INSURGENT
FACTIONS
FACTIONS
Fear of
Gov’ t/ANSF/
Coalition
Repercussions
Havens / Ability to
Operate
Ins.
Offensives &
Presence
(Clear & Hold)
Territory Not
Under Gov’t
Control (Afghan
& Pakistan)
Coordination
Among Ins.
Factions
Ins. Provision
Of Gov’t &
Services
Perceived
Damages &
Use of Force
by Ins.
Ins. Strategic
Commun/IO
& Affiliation w/
Population
Perceived
Damages/Use
of Force by
Gov t & Coalition
Ins. Targeted
Attacks on
Progress/
Support
for Gov’t
Fear of Ins.
Attack/
Repercussions
Relative WOM
Message
Amplification
Gov’t vs Ins
Perception of
Coalition Intent
& Commitment
Strength of
Religious
Ideology &
Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/
Displacement
Ethnic/Tribal
Rivalry
Perception
Of Gov t
Strength
& Intent
Ability to
Reconcile
Religious
Ideology,
Tribal
Structures
w/ Gov’t
Path
Average
Connectedness
of Population
Perceived
Security
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Page 15
INSURGENTS
Ties to
Insurgent
Capacity,
Priorities &
Effectiveness
Narcotics &
Other Criminal
Funding
Funding &
Material
Support to
Insurgents
Relative
Popular
Support/
/Tolerance
Govt vs
Insurgents
Population
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
POPULAR
POPULAR
SUPPORT
SUPPORT
Satisfaction
w/ Gains in
Security, Services
& Employment Visible Gains
In Security,
Services &
Employment
Expectations
for Security,
Services, &
Employment
Infr, Services, Econ.
Policy & Execution
/Perceived Fairness
Insurgent
Terrain
Insurgent
Advantage
Recruiting,
Retention,
Manpower Criminal/
& ISR
Trafficking
Capability &
Coercion
Ins.
Leadership,
Training, Skill
& Experience
Perception of
Insurgent
Strength &
Intent
POPULATION
POPULATION
CONDITIONS
CONDITIONS
& BELIEFS
& BELIEFS
Outside
Support/
Enablement
of Ins.
Infrastructure
Dev. Adequacy
& Sustainment
Neutral/On
the Fence
NARCOTICS
Likelihood of
Crime/Violence
/Ins. Support
for Payment
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov t vs.
Insurgent Path
Population
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency
Narcotics
& Criminal
Activity
Levels
Illegit Agric
Production,
Trade &
Employment
Terrain
Harshness
& Breadth
Legit Agric
Private Sector Production
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Fraction of
Workforce
And Agric.
Legit vs
Illegit
Population
Basic Needs
Service Levels
& Employment
Legit vs.Illegit
Relative
Economic
Opportunity
Civilian
Legit Other
Production Services
(SWET,
& Services
Non- Agric Healthcare,
Education)
INFRASTRUCTURE,
SERVICES &
ECONOMY
Ability to
Move
Private Sector
People
Capital Mgmt.,
& Goods Investment &
Rapidly
Spending
Legit Economic
Activity,
Trade &
Employment

127.
Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement /
Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts
Gov’t Security
Policy Quality
& Investment
Central Gov’t
Institutional
& Execution
Capacity
Gov’t
Funding
Adequacy
Gov’t Training,
Mentoring,
Vetting, and
Hiring
Gov’t
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Gov’t
Professionalism,
Policy Quality &
Fairness
Transparency of
Gov’t Processes
& Investments
Gov’t
Integration of
Local Tribal
Structures
Gov’t / ANSF
StratCom/IO
Relative
Message
Impact
Gov’t vs Ins
’
’
Overall Gov’t
Reach,
Execution,
Capacity &
Investment
Gov’t/Contractor
Corruption &
Tribal Favoritism
Relative
Message
Quality
Gov’t vs Ins
Tax
Revenues
Recognition/
Engagement to
Integrate Tribal
Structures &
Beliefs
Feedback Loop Example:
Informal learning and mentoring: Formal training and vetting (enabled by institutional capacity) can
improve and maintain Government workforce skill and professionalism. However, as you build a
skilled, professional workforce base and culture, informal learning and expectations for behavior is
also very powerful (and can contribute to institutional development as well…another key loop)
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Page 16

128.
Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement /
Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
OUTSIDE SUPPORT
TO INSURGENT
TO INSURGENT
FACTIONS
FACTIONS
Fear of
Gov’ t/ANSF/
Coalition
Repercussions
Havens / Ability to
Operate
Ins.
Offensives &
Presence
(Clear & Hold)
Territory Not
Under Gov’t
Control (Afghan
& Pakistan)
Coordination
Among Ins.
Factions
Ins. Provision
Of Gov’t &
Services
Perceived
Damages &
Use of Force
by Ins.
Ins. Strategic
Commun/IO
& Affiliation w/
Population
Gov't
Security
Policy
Quality &
Investment
Central Gov't
Institutional &
Execution
Capacity
Gov't
Funding
Adequacy
Gov't Training
Mentoring,
Vetting, and
Hiring
Gov't
Workforce
Skill & Avail
OVERALL
GOVERNMENT
CAPACITY
Gov't/ANSF
Strategic
Commun
/
IO
Gov't
Integration of
Local Tribal
Structures
Transparency
of Gov’t
Gov't
Overall Gov't
Processes & Professionalism Reach,
Investments
Policy Quality Execution
& Fairness
Capacity &
Investment
Gov't/
Contractor
Corruption &
Tribal Favoritism
Relative
Message
Quality
Gov’t ’ Ins.
vs
Tax
Revenues
POPULATION
POPULATION
CONDITIONS
CONDITIONS
& BELIEFS
& BELIEFS
Fear of Ins.
Attack/
Repercussions
Relative WOM
Message
Amplification
Gov’t vs Ins
Strength of
Religious
Ideology &
Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/
Displacement
Ethnic/Tribal
Rivalry
Perception
Of Gov t
Strength
& Intent
Ability to
Reconcile
Religious
Ideology,
Tribal
Structures
w/ Gov’t
Path
Average
Connectedness
of Population
Perceived
Security
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Page 17
INSURGENTS
Ties to
Insurgent
Capacity,
Priorities &
Effectiveness
Narcotics &
Other Criminal
Funding
Funding &
Material
Support to
Insurgents
Relative
Popular
Support/
/Tolerance
Govt vs
Insurgents
Population
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
POPULAR
POPULAR
SUPPORT
SUPPORT
Satisfaction
w/ Gains in
Security, Services
& Employment Visible Gains
In Security,
Services &
Employment
Expectations
for Security,
Services, &
Employment
Infr, Services, Econ.
Policy & Execution
/Perceived Fairness
Insurgent
Terrain
Insurgent
Advantage
Recruiting,
Retention,
Manpower Criminal/
& ISR
Trafficking
Capability &
Coercion
Ins.
Leadership,
Training, Skill
& Experience
Perception of
Insurgent
Strength &
Intent
Perception of
Coalition Intent
& Commitment
TRIBAL
GOVERNANCE
Recognition/
Engagement to
Integrate
Tribal
Structures&
Beliefs
Relative
Message
Impact Gov’t
vs Ins
Perceived
Damages/Use
of Force by
Gov t & Coalition
Ins. Targeted
Attacks on
Progress/
Support
for Gov’t
Outside
Support/
Enablement
of Ins.
Infrastructure
Dev. Adequacy
& Sustainment
Neutral/On
the Fence
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov t vs.
Insurgent Path
Illegit Agric
Production,
Trade &
Employment
Fraction of
Workforce
And Agric.
Legit vs
Illegit
Legit Agric
Production
Population
Basic Needs
Service Levels
& Employment
Legit vs. Illegit
Relative
Economic
Opportunity
Civilian
Services
(SWET,
Healthcare,
Education)
INFRASTRUCTURE,
SERVICES & &
SERVICES
ECONOMY
ECONOMY
Ability to
Move
People
& Goods
Rapidly
Population
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency
Narcotics
& Criminal
Activity
Levels
Terrain
Harshness
& Breadth
Private Sector
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Legit Other
Production
& Services
Non- Agric
NARCOTICS
Likelihood of
Crime/Violence
/Ins. Support
for Payment
Private Sector
Capital Mgmt.,
Investment &
Spending
Legit Economic
Activity,
Trade &
Employment

129.
Coalition Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Support
Coalition
Knowledge &
Understanding
of Social
Structures
Duration of
Operation
Coalition
COIN Support
Strategy &
Unity
Coalition
Appropriate
Balance of
Effort & Force
Coalition
Avg COIN
Experienc
e & Skill
Coalition
Execution
Capacity &
Priorities
Resource
Levels (Mil. &
Civ. Forces
and Levels)
Coalition
StratComm/IO
US Domestic
Perceived
Cost/Benefit
& Support
US Gov’t
Support for Breadth of
Operation Coalition
& Support
Coalition Dev.
Ops-ANSF
Advisory &
Aid
Coalition Dev.
Ops-Gov’t
Advisory &
Aid
Coalition
Visibility to
Population
Western
Affiliation
Backlash
Coalition/Homeland
Acceptance of
Afghan Methods
US Domestic/
Int’l StratComm
& Diplomacy
Media
Sensationalism
Bias
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Coalition
Adjustment
of Approach
to Fit Afghan
Coalition Dev. OpsInfrastructure,
Services, Econ
Advisory & Aid
Page 18
Provide
Humanitarian
Relief

130.
Coalition Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Support
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
Coalition
Knowledge
& Underst
of Social
Structures
Duration of
Operation
Coalition
COIN
Support
Strategy &
Unity
Coalition
Appropriate
Balance of
Effort &
Force
Coalition
Adjustment
of Approach
to Fit Afghan
Central Gov't
Institutional &
Execution
Capacity
Gov't Training
Mentoring,
Vetting, and
Hiring
Transparency
of Gov’t
Processes &
Investments
US Domestic/
Int'l Strategic
Commun
.
& Diplomacy
COALITION
Media
Sensationalism
Bias
DOMESTIC
SUPPORT
Coalition
Dev.OpsInfrastructure,
Services,
Econ.
Advisory
& Aid
Gov't
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Gov't
Security
Policy
Quality &
Investment
Relative
Message
Quality
Gov’ t ’vs Ins.
OVERALL
OVERALL
GOVERNMENT
CAPACITY
CAPACITY
Gov't/ANSF
Strategic
Commun/
IO
Gov't
Integration of
Local Tribal
Structures
Gov't
Overall Gov't
Professionalism
Reach,
Policy Quality
Execution
& Fairness
Capacity &
Investment
Gov't/
Contractor
Corruption &
Tribal Favoritism
Perceived
Damages &
Use of Force
by Ins.
Ins. Strategic
Commun/IO
& Affiliation w/
Population
Coalition
Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland
Acceptance of
Gov’t
Advisory Afghan Methods
& Aid
Breadth of
US Domestic Coalition &
Support
Perceived
Cost/Benefit
& Support
Relative
Message
Impact Gov’t
vs Ins
Western
Affiliation
Backlash
Strength of
Religious
Ideology &
Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/
Displacement
TRIBAL
TRIBAL
GOVERNANCE
Recognition/
Engagement to
Integrate
Tribal
Structures&
Beliefs
Ethnic/Tribal
Rivalry
Perceived
Damages/Use
of Force by
Gov t & Coalition
Fear of Ins.
Attack/
Repercussions
Perception of
Coalition Intent
& Commitment
Perception
Of Gov t
Strength
& Intent
Ability to
Reconcile
Religious
Ideology,
Tribal
Structures
w/ Gov’t
Path
Perceived
Security
Page 19
Insurgent
Terrain
Insurgent
Advantage
Recruiting,
Retention,
Manpower Criminal/
& ISR
Trafficking
Capability &
Coercion
INSURGENTS
Ties to
Insurgent
Capacity,
Priorities &
Effectiveness
Narcotics &
Other Criminal
Funding
Funding &
Material
Support to
Insurgents
Relative
Popular
Support/
/Tolerance
Govt vs
Insurgents
Population
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
POPULAR
POPULAR
SUPPORT
SUPPORT
Satisfaction
w/ Gains in
Security, Services
& Employment Visible Gains
In Security,
Services &
Employment
Expectations
for Security,
Services, &
Employment
Infr, Services, Econ.
Policy & Execution
/Perceived Fairness
Outside
Support/
Enablement
of Ins.
Ins.
Leadership,
Training, Skill
& Experience
Perception of
Insurgent
Strength &
Intent
Relative WOM
Message
Amplification
Gov’t vs Ins
Average
Connectedness
of Population
Tax
Revenues
Ins. Targeted
Attacks on
Progress/
Support
for Gov’t
POPULATION
POPULATION
CONDITIONS
CONDITIONS
& BELIEFS
& BELIEFS
Provide
Humanitarian
Relief
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Coordination
Among Ins.
Factions
Ins. Provision
Of Gov’t &
Services
Coalition
Visibility to
Population
Gov't
Funding
Adequacy
Ins.
Offensives &
Presence
(Clear & Hold)
Territory Not
Under Gov’t
Control (Afghan
& Pakistan)
Coalition
Dev. OpsANSF
Advisory
& Aid
COALITION
CAPACITY &
PRIORITIES
US Gov't
Support for
Operation
Fear of
Gov’ t/ANSF/
Coalition
Repercussions
Havens / Ability to
Operate
Coalition
Coalition
Avg COIN
Experience Execution
Capacity &
& Skill
Priorities
Resource Coalition
Levels
Strategic
(Mil. & Civ. Commun
./IO
Forces,
Aid Levels)
OUTSIDE SUPPORT
TO INSURGENT
TO INSURGENT
FACTIONS
FACTIONS
Infrastructure
Dev. Adequacy
& Sustainment
Neutral/On
the Fence
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov t vs.
Insurgent Path
Illegit Agric
Production,
Trade &
Employment
Duration
of
Operation
Fraction of
Workforce
And Agric.
Legit vs
Illegit
Legit Agric
Production
Population
Basic Needs
Service Levels
& Employment
Legit vs. Illegit
Relative
Economic
Opportunity
Civilian
Services
(SWET,
Healthcare,
Education)
INFRASTRUCTURE,
SERVICES & &
SERVICES
ECONOMY
ECONOMY
Ability to
Move
People
& Goods
Rapidly
Population
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency
Narcotics
& Criminal
Activity
Levels
Terrain
Harshness
& Breadth
Private Sector
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Legit Other
Production
& Services
Non- Agric
NARCOTICS
Likelihood of
Crime/Violence
/Ins. Support
for Payment
Private Sector
Capital Mgmt.,
Investment &
Spending
Legit Economic
Activity,
Trade &
Employment

131.
ANSF Development, Capacity & Impacts – Tactical & Institutional
ANSF &
Coalition
Damages/
Casualties
ISR / Open
Source Ops
ANSF &
Manpower
Recruiting &
Retention
ANSF
Institutional
& Execution
Capacity
1
ANSF Unit
Leadership
& Tactical
Capacity
ANSF
Training &
Mentoring
ANSF
Funding
Adequacy
2
1
Total Security
Force Capacity
& focus
ANSF Unit
Capacity,
Priorities &
Effectiveness
Targeted
Strikes
Sweep Ops
(Clear)
Policing &
Security
Ops (Hold)
ANSF Avg
Professionalism,
Skill, Discipline
& Morale
ANSF
Appropriate
Use of Force
ANSF
Corruption
& Tribal
Favoritism
R.O.L. Policy,
Execution &
Perceived
Fairness
Feedback Loop Examples:
1. ANSF success and informal momentum: ANSF professionalism and skill contributes to
tactical capacity which enables effective operations. Success and experience feeds back into
professionalism, skill and morale which further reinforces both leadership & tactical capacity
and recruiting / retention.
2. ANSF institutional capacity: Institutional capacity and processes enable manpower, formal
training, logistics, planning & budgeting, etc that reinforce informal gains support ANSF
capacity over time.
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Page 20
Counter Narcotics
/Crime Ops

132.
ANSF Development, Capacity & Impacts – Tactical & Institutional
ANSF &
Coalition
Damages/
Casualties
ANSF
TACTICAL
Coalition
Knowledge
& Underst
of Social
Structures
Duration of
Operation
Coalition
Avg COIN
Experience
& Skill
Coalition
COIN
Support
Strategy &
Unity
Coalition
Appropriate
Balance of
Effort &
Force
Coalition
Adjustment
of Approach
to Fit Afghan
COALITION
COALITION
CAPACITY &
CAPACITY &
PRIORITIES
PRIORITIES
Resource Coalition
Levels
Strategic
(Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO
Forces,
Aid Levels)
US Domestic
Perceived
Cost/Benefit
& Support
ANSF
Coalition
Funding
Visibility to Adequacy
Population
Coalition
Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland
Acceptance of
Gov’t
Advisory Afghan Methods
& Aid
Central Gov't
Institutional &
Execution
Capacity
US Gov't
Support for
Operation
Gov't
Funding
Adequacy
Breadth of
Coalition &
Support
Gov't Training
Mentoring,
Vetting, and
Hiring
Transparency
of Gov’t
Processes &
Investments
US Domestic/
Int'l Strategic
Commun.
& Diplomacy
Infrastructure,
Services,
Econ.
Advisory
& Aid
Gov't
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Total
Security
Force
Capacity &
Focus
Sweep Ops
(Clear)
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
Policing &
Security Ops
(Hold)
ANSF Avg.
Professionalism
Skill, Discipline,
& Morale
ANSF
Training &
Mentoring
Targeted
Strikes
ANSF
Capacity,
Priorities &
Effectiveness
ANSF
Corruption &
Tribal
Favoritism
Gov't
Security
Policy
Quality &
Investment
OVERALL
OVERALL
GOVERNMENT
CAPACITY
CAPACITY
Gov't/ANSF
Strategic
Commun/
IO
Gov't
Integration of
Local Tribal
Structures
Western
Affiliation
Backlash
Relative
Message
Impact Gov’t
vs Ins
Strength of
Religious
Ideology &
Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/
Displacement
TRIBAL
TRIBAL
GOVERNANCE
Recognition/
Engagement to
Integrate
Tribal
Structures&
Beliefs
Ethnic/Tribal
Rivalry
Perceived
Damages &
Use of Force
by Ins.
Perceived
Damages/Use
of Force by
Gov t & Coalition
Fear of Ins.
Attack/
Repercussions
Perception of
Coalition Intent
& Commitment
Perception
Of Gov t
Strength
& Intent
Ability to
Reconcile
Religious
Ideology,
Tribal
Structures
w/ Gov’t
Path
Perceived
Security
Page 21
Outside
Support/
Enablement
of Ins.
Insurgent
Terrain
Insurgent
Advantage
Recruiting,
Retention,
Manpower Criminal/
& ISR
Trafficking
Capability &
Coercion
INSURGENTS
Ties to
Insurgent
Capacity,
Priorities &
Effectiveness
Narcotics &
Other Criminal
Funding
Funding &
Material
Support to
Insurgents
Relative
Popular
Support/
/Tolerance
Govt vs
Insurgents
Population
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
POPULAR
POPULAR
SUPPORT
SUPPORT
Satisfaction
w/ Gains in
Security, Services
& Employment Visible Gains
In Security,
Services &
Employment
Expectations
for Security,
Services, &
Employment
Infr, Services, Econ.
Policy & Execution
/Perceived Fairness
Counter Narcotics/
Crime Ops
Ins.
Leadership,
Training, Skill
& Experience
Perception of
Insurgent
Strength &
Intent
Relative WOM
Message
Amplification
Gov’t vs Ins
Provide
Humanitarian
Relief
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Coordination
Among Ins.
Factions
Ins. Targeted
Attacks on
Progress/
Support
for Gov’t
POPULATION
POPULATION
CONDITIONS
CONDITIONS
& BELIEFS
& BELIEFS
Average
Connectedness
of Population
Tax
Revenues
Ins.
Offensives &
Presence
(Clear & Hold)
Ins. Provision
Of Gov’t &
Services
Ins. Strategic
Commun/IO
& Affiliation w/
Population
Relative
Message
Quality
Gov’ t ’vs Ins.
Fear of
Gov’ t/ANSF/
Coalition
Repercussions
Territory Not
Under Gov’t
Control (Afghan
& Pakistan)
ANSF
Appropriate
Use of Force
R.O.L. Policy,
Execution &
Perceived
Fairness
OUTSIDE SUPPORT
OUTSIDE SUPPORT
TOTO INSURGENT
INSURGENT
FACTIONS
FACTIONS
Havens / Ability to
Operate
ANSF
INSTITUTIONAL
Gov't
Overall Gov't
Professionalism
Reach,
Policy Quality
Execution
& Fairness
Capacity &
Investment
COALITION
DOMESTIC Gov't/
Contractor
SUPPORT Corruption &
Coalition
SUPPORT Tribal Favoritism
Dev.Ops-
Media
Sensationalism
Bias
ANSF Unit
Leadership
& Tactical
Capacity
ANSF
Manpower
Recruiting &
Retention
ANSF
Institutional &
Execution
Coalition Capacity
Dev. OpsANSF
Advisory
& Aid
Coalition
Execution
Capacity &
Priorities
ISR / Open
Source Ops
Infrastructure
Dev. Adequacy
& Sustainment
Neutral/On
the Fence
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov t vs.
Insurgent Path
Illegit Agric
Production,
Trade &
Employment
Duration
of
Operation
Fraction of
Workforce
And Agric.
Legit vs
Illegit
Legit Agric
Production
Population
Basic Needs
Service Levels
& Employment
Legit vs. Illegit
Relative
Economic
Opportunity
Civilian
Services
(SWET,
Healthcare,
Education)
INFRASTRUCTURE,
SERVICES & &
SERVICES
ECONOMY
ECONOMY
Ability to
Move
People
& Goods
Rapidly
Population
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency
Narcotics
& Criminal
Activity
Levels
Terrain
Harshness
& Breadth
Private Sector
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Legit Other
Production
& Services
Non- Agric
NARCOTICS
Likelihood of
Crime/Violence
/Ins. Support
for Payment
Private Sector
Capital Mgmt.,
Investment &
Spending
Legit Economic
Activity,
Trade &
Employment

133.
Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics
=
ANSF &
Coalition
Damages/
Casualties
ANSF
TACTICAL
Coalition
Knowledge
& Underst
.
of Social
Structures
Duration of
Operation
Coalition
‘COIN
Support
’
Strategy &
Unity
Coalition
Appropriate
Balance of
Effort &
Force
Coalition
Adjustment
of Approach
to Fit Afghan
COALITION
CAPACITY &
PRIORITIES
Resource Coalition
Levels
Strategic
(Mil. & Civ. Commun
./IO
Forces,
Aid Levels)
ANSF
Training &
Mentoring
ANSF
Coalition Funding
Visibility to Adequacy
Population
CENTRAL
Gov't
GOV’T
Funding
Central Gov't
Institutional &
Execution
Capacity
Adequacy
Gov't Training
Mentoring,
Vetting, and
Hiring
Breadth of
US Domestic Coalition &
Support
Perceived
Cost/Benefit
& Support
Gov't
Workforce
Skill & Avail
COALITION
Media
Sensationalism
Bias
DOMESTIC
SUPPORT
Coalition
Dev.OpsInfrastructure,
Services,
Econ.
Advisory
& Aid
Gov't/
Contractor
Corruption &
Tribal Favoritism
Targeted
Strikes
Sweep Ops
(Clear)
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
Havens / Ability to
Operate
ANSF
Appropriate
Use of Force
Gov't
Security
Policy
Quality &
Investment
Relative
Message
Quality
Gov’t ’ Ins.
vs
OVERALL
GOVERNMENT
CAPACITY
Gov't/ANSF
Strategic
Commun
/
IO
Gov't
Integration of
Local Tribal
Structures
Ins. Provision
Of Gov’t &
Services
Perceived
Damages &
Use of Force
Ins. Targeted
by Ins.
Attacks on
Progress/
Support
for Gov
’t
Ins. Strategic
Commun
/IO
& Affiliation w/
Population
R.O.L. Policy,
Execution &
Perceived
Fairness
Relative
Message
Impact Gov’t
vs Ins
Western
Affiliation
Backlash
Strength of
Religious
Ideology &
Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/
Displacement
Recognition/
TRIBAL
Engagement to
Integrate
Rivalry
GOVERNANCE Ethnic/Tribal
Tribal
Structures&
Beliefs
Perceived
Damages/Use
of Force by
Gov’ t & Coalition
Tax
Revenues
Fear of Ins.
Attack/
Repercussions
Relative WOM
Message
Amplification
Gov’t vs Ins
Perception of
Coalition Intent
& Commitment
Insurgent
Terrain
Insurgent
Advantage
Recruiting,
Retention,
Manpower Criminal/
& ISR
Trafficking
Capability &
Coercion
Narcotics &
Other Criminal
Funding
Funding &
Material
Support to
Insurgents
Relative
Popular
Support/
/Tolerance
Gov vs
’t
Insurgents
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
POPULAR
SUPPORT
Neutral/On
the Fence
NARCOTICS
Likelihood of
Crime/Violence
/Ins. Support
for Payment
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov vs.
’t
Insurgent Path
Perceived
Security
Satisfaction
w/ Gains in
Infrastructure
Dev. Adequacy
Security, Services
& Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment
In Security,
Services &
Employment
Expectations
for Security,
Services, &
Employment
Infr, Services, Econ.
Policy & Execution
/Perceived Fairness
Narcotics
& Criminal
Activity
Levels
Population
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency IllegitAgric
Production,
Trade &
Employment
Terrain
Harshness
& Breadth
Duration
of
Operation
Perception
Of Gov’t
Strength
& Intent
Ability to
Reconcile
Religious
Ideology,
Tribal
Structures
w/ Gov’t
Path
Provide
Humanitarian
Relief
Outside
Support/
Enablement
of Ins.
INSURGENTS
Ties to
Insurgent
Capacity,
Priorities &
Effectiveness
Population
Actively
Supporting
Gov’t & SF
Counter Narcotics/
Crime Ops
Ins.
Leadership,
Training, Skill
& Experience
Perception of
Insurgent
Strength &
Intent
POPULATION
CONDITIONS
& BELIEFS
Average
Connectedness
of Population
Coordination
Among Ins.
Factions
Ins.
Offensives &
Presence
(Clear & Hold)
Territory Not
Under Gov’t
Control (Afghan
& Pakistan)
ANSF
INSTITUTIONAL
ANSF
Corruption &
Tribal
Favoritism
OUTSIDE SUPPORT
TO INSURGENT
FACTIONS
Fear of
Gov’ t/ANSF/
Coalition
Repercussions
Policing &
Security Ops
(Hold)
ANSF
Capacity,
Priorities &
Effectiveness
Transparency
of Gov’t
Gov't
Overall Gov't
Processes & Professionalism Reach,
Investments
Policy Quality Execution
& Fairness
Capacity &
Investment
US Domestic/
Int'l Strategic
Commun
.
& Diplomacy
Total
Security
Force
Capacity &
Focus
ANSF Avg.
Professionalism
Skill, Discipline,
& Morale
Coalition
Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland
Acceptance of
Gov’t
Advisory Afghan Methods
& Aid
US Gov't
Support for
Operation
ANSF Unit
Leadership
& Tactical
Capacity
ANSF
Manpower
Recruiting &
Retention
ANSF
Institutional &
Execution
Coalition Capacity
Dev. OpsANSF
Advisory
& Aid
Coalition
Coalition
Avg COIN
Experience Execution
Capacity &
& Skill
Priorities
ISR / Open
Source Ops
Population/Popular Support
Infrastructure, Economy, & Services
Government
Afghanistan Security Forces
Insurgents
Crime and Narcotics
Coalition Forces & Actions
Physical Environment
Significant
Delay
Legit Agric
Private Sector Production
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Fraction of
Workforce
And Agric.
Legit vs
Illegit
Population
Basic Needs
Service Levels
& Employment
Legit vs.Illegit
Relative
Economic
Opportunity
Civilian
Legit Other
Production Services
(SWET,
& Services
Non- Agric Healthcare,
Education)
INFRASTRUCTURE,
SERVICES &
ECONOMY
Ability to
Move
Private Sector
People
Capital Mgmt.,
& Goods Investment &
Rapidly
Spending
Legit Economic
Activity,
Trade &
Employment
WORKING DRAFT – V3
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Page 22

134.
Key Feedback Loop: Securing and Empowering the Population
ANSF &
Coalition
Damages/
Casualties
ISR / Open
Source Ops
1
2
ANSF Unit
Leadership
& Tactical
Capacity
Coalition
Adjustment
of Approach
to Fit Afghan
ANSF
Manpower
Recruiting &
Retention
ANSF
Institutional &
Execution
Coalition Capacity
Dev. OpsANSF
Advisory
& Aid
ANSF
Coalition
Funding
Visibility to Adequacy
Population
alition
Ops- Coalition/Homeland
Acceptance of
ov’t
visory Afghan Methods
Aid
Total
Security
Force
Capacity &
Focus
ANSF
Capacity,
Priorities &
Effectiveness
ANSF Avg.
Professionalism
Skill, Discipline,
& Morale
ANSF
Training &
Mentoring
ANSF
Corruption &
Tribal
Favoritism
Gov't
Security
Policy
Quality &
Investment
R.O.L. Policy,
Execution &
Perceived
Fairness
Targeted
Strikes
Sweep Ops
(Clear)
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
Policing &
Security Ops
(Hold)
Havens / Ability to
Operate
Territory Not
Under Gov
’t
Control (Afghan
& Pakistan)
ANSF
Appropriate
Use of Force
Perceived
Damages &
Use of Force
by Ins.
Perceived
Damages/Use
of Force by
Gov’ t & Coalition
Fear is a key mechanism for insurgent factions to prevent the
population from engaging and Gov't/ANSF supporting the
actively
Strategic
Central Gov't
Commun/
Government.
Institutional &
IO
Execution
Relative WOM
Securing populated territory (clear and hold ops) can reduce
Capacity
Message
Relative
t
Amplification
insurgent ability to target and intimidateMessagepopulation such
the
ng
Gov’t vs Ins
Impact Gov’t
Gov't
acy
that Gov’t sympathizersofare willing to be vs Ins
active supporters.
Integration
Gov't Training
Western
Local Tribal
Mentoring,
HUMINT: The population will beAffiliation willing to provide intel
more
Structures
Gov't
Perception of
Vetting, and
Backlash
Workforce
Coalition Intent
Hiring
if they Skill &not fear insurgent repercussions.
do Avail
& Commitment
ANA & ANP Development: ANSF recruiting and development
sparency
Gov’t
Gov't
Overall Gov't
facilitated Reach,the expansion Strength of
by
of secure regions. (ANA and
cesses & isProfessionalism
Religious
stments ANP leaders, families, facilities, etc less likely to be targeted or
Policy Quality
Execution
Ideology &
& Fairness
Capacity &
Tribal
overrun. Investment
Ability to
Structures Cultural Erosion/
Displacement
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Coordination
Among Ins.
Factions
Ins.
Offensives &
Presence
(Clear & Hold)
Ins. Provision
Of Gov’t &
Services
Ins. Strategic
Commun/IO
& Affiliation w/
Population
Relative
Message
Quality
Gov’t ’vs Ins.
Fear of
Gov’ t/ANSF/
Coalition
Repercussions
Reconcile
Page 23
Ins. Targeted
Attacks on
Progress/
Support
for Gov
’t
Ins.
Leadership,
Training, Skill
& Experience
Insurgent
Capacity,
Priorities &
Effectiveness
Ties to
Narcotics &
Other Criminal
Funding
Relative
Popular
Support/
/Tolerance
Gov’t vs
Insurgents
Perception of
Insurgent
Strength &
Intent
Fear of Ins.
Attack/
Repercussions
Population
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
Outside
Support/
Enablement
of Ins.
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
Neutral/On
the Fence
S
w
Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov’t vs.
Insurgent Path
Perception
Of Gov’t
Strength
& Intent
Satisfaction
w/ Gains in
Security Services
Infrastructure
Dev Adequacy
Private
Workf
Skill &

135.
Key Feedback Loop: Government Engagement and Integration of Tribal Governance
han
ANSF
Institutional &
Execution
tion Capacity
OpsSF
sory
Aid
Appropriate
Use of Force
ANSF
Training &
Mentoring
ANSF
Corruption &
Tribal
Favoritism
Ins. Provision
Of Gov’t &
Services
Perceived
Damages &
Use of Force
by Ins.
Ins. Strategic
Commun/IO
& Affiliation w/
Population
R.O.L. Policy,
Execution &
Perceived
Fairness
Training, Skill
& Experience
& Pakistan)
Ins. Targeted
Attacks on
Progress/
Support
for Gov’t
Critical for the Government to recognize andPerceived the
make
Gov't
Damages/Use
of
effort toSecurity
engage existing tribal Relative
structures andForce by
Policy
Gov’ t & Coalition
Perception of
Quality &
Message
Insurgent
Governance if they are to be accepted by the population.
Investment
Quality
Strength &
alition/Homeland
Gov’t ’vs Ins.
Acceptance of
Ties to local governance can gain popular support and Intent
fghan Methods
rapidly expand the Government’s overall capacity and
Gov't/ANSF
Strategic
‘reach’ which further increases their capacity and ability
Central Gov't
Commun/
Institutional &
IO
to engage the population.
Execution
Fear of Ins.
Relative WOM
ANSF
Coalition
Funding
sibility to Adequacy
opulation
Capacity
Training
oring,
g, and
ring
Gov't
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Gov't
Integration of
Local Tribal
Structures
Gov't
Overall Gov't
Professionalism
Reach,
Policy Quality Execution
& Fairness
Capacity &
Investment
Recognition/
Engagement to
Integrate
Tribal
Structures&
Beliefs
v't/
ractor
ption &
avoritism
Western
Affiliation
Backlash
Relative
Message
Impact Gov’t
vs Ins
Strength of
Religious
Ideology &
Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/
Displacement
Ethnic/Tribal
Rivalry
Provide
Humanitarian
Relief
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Population
Actively
Supporting
Gov’t & SF
Ties to
Narcotics &
Other Criminal
Funding
Perception of
Coalition Intent
& Commitment
Funding &
Material
Support to
Insurgents
Relative
Popular
Support/
/Tolerance
Gov’t vs
Insurgents
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
Attack/
Repercussions
Message
Amplification
Gov’t vs Ins
Neutral/On
the Fence
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov’t vs.
Insurgent Path
Criminal/
Trafficking
Capability &
Coercion
Likelihood of
Crime/Violence
/Ins. Support
for Payment
Population
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency
Perceived
Security
Satisfaction
w/ Gains in
Security, Services
& Employment Visible Gains
In Security,
Services &
Employment
Expectations
for Security,
Services, &
Employment
Infr, Services, Econ.
Policy & Execution
/Perceived Fairness
Page 24
Infrastructure
Dev. Adequacy
& Sustainment
Private Sector
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Legit Other
Production
& Services
Non- Agric
Ability to
Move
People
& Goods
Rapidly
N
&
Illegit A
Produc
Trad
Employ
Terrain
Harshness
& Breadth
Perception
Of Gov’t
Strength
& Intent
Ability to
Reconcile
Religious
Ideology,
Tribal
Structures
w/ Gov
’t
Path
Average
Connectedness
of Population
Tax
Revenues
Insurgent
Capacity,
Priorities &
Effectiveness
Retention,
Manpower
& ISR
Fraction of
Workforce
And Agric.
Legit vs
Illegit
Legit Agric
Production
Population
Basic Needs
Service Levels
& Employment
Legit vs
Rela
Econo
Opport
Civilian
Services
(SWET,
Healthcare,
Education)
Private Sector
Capital Mgmt.,
Investment &
Spending
Legit Economic
Activity,
Trade &
Employment

136.
Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – SECURITY
Population/Popular Support
Infrastructure, Economy, & Services
Government
Afghanistan Security Forces
Insurgents
Crime and Narcotics
Coalition Forces & Actions
Physical Environment
ANSF &
Coalition
Damages/
Casualties
ISR / Open
Source Ops
Coalition
Knowledge
& Underst.
of Social
Structures
Duration of
Operation
Coalition
Avg COIN
Experience
& Skill
Coalition
‘ COIN
Support’
Strategy &
Unity
Coalition
Appropriate
Balance of
Effort &
Force
ANSF Unit
Leadership
& Tactical
Capacity
Coalition
Adjustment
of Approach
to Fit Afghan
ANSF
Manpower
Recruiting &
Retention
ANSF
Institutional &
Execution
Coalition Capacity
Dev. OpsANSF
Advisory
& Aid
Coalition
Execution
Capacity &
Priorities
ANSF
Coalition
Funding
Visibility to Adequacy
Population
Resource Coalition
Levels
Strategic
(Military Commun./IO
Forces,
Civilian
Forces,
Aid Levels)
Coalition
Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland
Acceptance of
Gov’t
Advisory Afghan Methods
& Aid
US Domestic
Perceived
Cost/Benefit
& Support
Gov't
Funding
Adequacy
Gov't Training
Mentoring,
Vetting, and
Hiring
Breadth of
Coalition &
Support
Transparency
of Gov’t
Processes &
Investments
US Domestic/
Int'l Strategic
Commun.
& Diplomacy
Media
Sensationalism
Bias
Coalition
Dev.OpsInfrastructure,
Services,
Econ.
Advisory
& Aid
Fear of
Gov’ t/ANSF/
Coalition
Repercussions
Havens / Ability to
Operate
Territory Not
Under Gov’t
Control (Afghan
& Pakistan)
Perceived
Damages &
Use of Force
by Ins.
Ins. Strategic
Commun/IO
& Affiliation w/
Population
R.O.L. Policy,
Execution &
Perceived
Fairness
Relative
Message
Quality
Gov’ t ’vs Ins.
Perceived
Damages/Use
of Force by
Gov’ t & Coalition
Ins. Targeted
Attacks on
Progress/
Support
for Gov’t
Western
Affiliation
Backlash
Relative
Message
Impact Gov’t
vs Ins
Strength of
Religious
Ideology &
Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/
Displacement
Recognition/
Engagement to
Integrate
Tribal
Structures&
Beliefs
Ethnic/Tribal
Rivalry
Fear of Ins.
Attack/
Repercussions
Relative WOM
Message
Amplification
Gov’t vs Ins
Perception of
Coalition Intent
& Commitment
Insurgent
Terrain
Insurgent
Advantage
Recruiting,
Retention,
Manpower Criminal/
& ISR
Trafficking
Capability &
Coercion
Ties to
Narcotics &
Other Criminal
Funding
Funding &
Material
Support to
Insurgents
Relative
Popular
Support/
Tolerance
Gov’t vs
Insurgents
Neutral/On
the Fence
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov’t vs.
Insurgent Path
Likelihood of
Active Ins.
Support for
Payment
Population
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency
Perceived
Security
Satisfaction
w/ Gains in
Security, Services
& Employment Visible Gains
In Security,
Services &
Employment
Expectations
for Security,
Services, &
Employment
Infr., Services, Econ.
Policy & Execution
/Perceived Fairness
Provide
Humanitarian
Relief
Infrastructure
Dev. Adequacy
& Sustainment
Private Sector
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Legit Other
Production
& Services
Non- Agric
Ability to
Move
People
& Goods
Rapidly
Narcotics
& Criminal
Activity
Levels
Illegit Agric
Production,
Trade &
Employment
Terrain
Harshness
& Breadth
Duration
of
Operation
Perception
Of Gov’t
Strength
& Intent
Ability to
Reconcile
Religious
Ideology,
Tribal
Structures
w/ Gov’t
Path
Average
Connectedness
of Population
Tax
Revenues
Insurgent
Capacity,
Priorities &
Effectiveness
Population
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
Outside
Support/
Enablement
of Ins.
Ins.
Leadership,
Training, Skill
& Experience
Perception of
Insurgent
Strength &
Intent
Gov't/ANSF
Strategic
Commun/
IO
Gov't
Integration of
Local Tribal
Structures
Coordination
Among Ins.
Factions
Ins.
Offensives &
Presence
(Clear & Hold)
Ins. Provision
Of Gov’t &
Services
Gov't
Security
Policy
Quality &
Investment
Gov't
Overall Gov't
Professionalism
Reach,
Policy Quality
Execution
& Fairness
Capacity &
Investment
Gov't/
Contractor
Corruption &
Tribal Favoritism
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
ANSF
Appropriate
Use of Force
ANSF
Training &
Mentoring
ANSF
Corruption &
Tribal
Favoritism
Counter- Narcotics/
Crime Ops
Policing &
Security Ops
(Hold)
ANSF Avg.
Professionalism
Skill, Discipline,
& Morale
Gov't
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Targeted
Strikes
Sweep Ops
(Clear)
ANSF
Capacity &
Priorities
Central Gov't
Institutional &
Execution
Capacity
US Gov't
Support for
Operation
Total
Security
Force
Capacity &
Focus
Fraction of
Workforce
And Agric.
Legit vs
Illegit
Legit Agric
Production
Population
Basic Needs
Service Levels
& Employment
Legit vs. Illegit
Relative
Economic
Opportunity
Civilian
Services
(SWET,
Healthcare,
Education)
Private Sector
Capital
Management,
Investment &
Spending
Legit Economic
Activity,
Trade &
Employment
WORKING DRAFT
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Page 26

137.
Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – GOVERNANCE
Population/Popular Support
Infrastructure, Economy, & Services
Government
Afghanistan Security Forces
Insurgents
Crime and Narcotics
Coalition Forces & Actions
Physical Environment
ANSF &
Coalition
Damages/
Casualties
ISR / Open
Source Ops
Coalition
Knowledge
& Underst.
of Social
Structures
Duration of
Operation
Coalition
Avg COIN
Experience
& Skill
Coalition
‘ COIN
Support’
Strategy &
Unity
Coalition
Appropriate
Balance of
Effort &
Force
ANSF Unit
Leadership
& Tactical
Capacity
Coalition
Adjustment
of Approach
to Fit Afghan
ANSF
Manpower
Recruiting &
Retention
ANSF
Institutional &
Execution
Coalition Capacity
Dev. OpsANSF
Advisory
& Aid
Coalition
Execution
Capacity &
Priorities
ANSF
Coalition
Funding
Visibility to Adequacy
Population
Resource Coalition
Levels
Strategic
(Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO
Forces,
Aid Levels)
Coalition
Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland
Acceptance of
Gov’t
Advisory Afghan Methods
& Aid
US Domestic
Perceived
Cost/Benefit
& Support
Gov't
Funding
Adequacy
Gov't Training
Mentoring,
Vetting, and
Hiring
Breadth of
Coalition &
Support
Transparency
of Gov’t
Processes &
Investments
US Domestic/
Int'l Strategic
Commun.
& Diplomacy
Media
Sensationalism
Bias
Coalition
Dev.OpsInfrastructure,
Services,
Econ.
Advisory
& Aid
Gov't
Workforce
Skill & Avail
WORKING DRAFT
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
Territory Not
Under Gov’t
Control (Afghan
& Pakistan)
Perceived
Damages &
Use of Force
by Ins.
Ins. Strategic
Commun/IO
& Affiliation w/
Population
R.O.L. Policy,
Execution &
Perceived
Fairness
Gov't
Security
Policy
Quality &
Investment
Relative
Message
Quality
Gov’ t ’vs Ins.
Perceived
Damages/Use
of Force by
Gov’ t & Coalition
Ins. Targeted
Attacks on
Progress/
Support
for Gov’t
Western
Affiliation
Backlash
Relative
Message
Impact Gov’t
vs Ins
Strength of
Religious
Ideology &
Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/
Displacement
Recognition/
Engagement to
Integrate
Tribal
Structures&
Beliefs
Ethnic/Tribal
Rivalry
Tax
Revenues
Fear of Ins.
Attack/
Repercussions
Relative WOM
Message
Amplification
Gov’t vs Ins
Perception of
Coalition Intent
& Commitment
Insurgent
Terrain
Insurgent
Advantage
Recruiting,
Retention,
Manpower Criminal/
& ISR
Trafficking
Capability &
Coercion
Ties to
Narcotics &
Other Criminal
Funding
Funding &
Material
Support to
Insurgents
Relative
Popular
Support/
/Tolerance
Gov’t vs
Insurgents
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
Neutral/On
the Fence
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov’t vs.
Insurgent Path
Likelihood of
Crime/Violence
/Ins. Support
for Payment
Population
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency
Perceived
Security
Satisfaction
w/ Gains in
Security, Services
& Employment Visible Gains
In Security,
Services &
Employment
Expectations
for Security,
Services, &
Employment
Infr., Services, Econ.
Policy & Execution
/Perceived Fairness
Provide
Humanitarian
Relief
Page 27
Infrastructure
Dev. Adequacy
& Sustainment
Private Sector
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Legit Other
Production
& Services
Non- Agric
Ability to
Move
People
& Goods
Rapidly
Narcotics
& Criminal
Activity
Levels
Illegit Agric
Production,
Trade &
Employment
Terrain
Harshness
& Breadth
Duration
of
Operation
Perception
Of Gov’t
Strength
& Intent
Ability to
Reconcile
Religious
Ideology,
Tribal
Structures
w/ Gov’t
Path
Average
Connectedness
of Population
Insurgent
Capacity,
Priorities &
Effectiveness
Population
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
Outside
Support/
Enablement
of Ins.
Ins.
Leadership,
Training, Skill
& Experience
Perception of
Insurgent
Strength &
Intent
Gov't/ANSF
Strategic
Commun/
IO
Gov't
Integration of
Local Tribal
Structures
Coordination
Among Ins.
Factions
Ins.
Offensives &
Presence
(Clear & Hold)
Ins. Provision
Of Gov’t &
Services
Reconciliation
Effectiveness
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Fear of
Gov’ t/ANSF/
Coalition
Repercussions
Havens / Ability to
Operate
ANSF
Appropriate
Use of Force
ANSF
Training &
Mentoring
ANSF
Corruption &
Tribal
Favoritism
Counter- Narcotics/
Crime Ops
Policing &
Security Ops
(Hold)
ANSF Avg.
Professionalism
Skill, Discipline,
& Morale
Gov't
Overall Gov't
Professionalism
Reach,
Policy Quality
Execution
& Fairness
Capacity &
Investment
Gov't/
Contractor
Corruption &
Tribal Favoritism
Targeted
Strikes
Sweep Ops
(Clear)
ANSF
Capacity &
Priorities
Central Gov't
Institutional &
Execution
Capacity
US Gov't
Support for
Operation
Total
Security
Force
Capacity &
Focus
Fraction of
Workforce
And Agric.
Legit vs
Illegit
Legit Agric
Production
Population
Basic Needs
Service Levels
& Employment
Legit vs. Illegit
Relative
Economic
Opportunity
Civilian
Services
(SWET,
Healthcare,
Education)
Private Sector
Capital Mgmt.,
Investment &
Spending
Legit Economic
Activity,
Trade &
Employment

138.
Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – DEVELOPMENT
Population/Popular Support
Infrastructure, Economy, & Services
Government
Afghanistan Security Forces
Insurgents
Crime and Narcotics
Coalition Forces & Actions
Physical Environment
ANSF &
Coalition
Damages/
Casualties
ISR / Open
Source Ops
Coalition
Knowledge
& Underst.
of Social
Structures
Duration of
Operation
Coalition
Avg COIN
Experience
& Skill
Coalition
‘ COIN
Support’
Strategy &
Unity
Coalition
Appropriate
Balance of
Effort &
Force
ANSF Unit
Leadership
& Tactical
Capacity
Coalition
Adjustment
of Approach
to Fit Afghan
ANSF
Manpower
Recruiting &
Retention
ANSF
Institutional &
Execution
Coalition Capacity
Dev. OpsANSF
Advisory
& Aid
Coalition
Execution
Capacity &
Priorities
ANSF
Coalition
Funding
Visibility to Adequacy
Population
Resource Coalition
Levels
Strategic
(Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO
Forces,
Aid Levels)
Coalition
Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland
Acceptance of
Gov’t
Advisory Afghan Methods
& Aid
US Domestic
Perceived
Cost/Benefit
& Support
Gov't
Funding
Adequacy
Breadth of
Coalition &
Support
Gov't Training
Mentoring,
Vetting, and
Hiring
Transparency
of Gov’t
Processes &
Investments
US Domestic/
Int'l Strategic
Commun.
& Diplomacy
Media
Sensationalism
Bias
Coalition
Dev.OpsInfrastructure,
Services,
Econ.
Advisory
& Aid
Gov't
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
Fear of
Gov’ t/ANSF/
Coalition
Repercussions
Havens / Ability to
Operate
Territory Not
Under Gov’t
Control (Afghan
& Pakistan)
ANSF
Appropriate
Use of Force
ANSF
Training &
Mentoring
ANSF
Corruption &
Tribal
Favoritism
Counter- Narcotics/
Crime Ops
Policing &
Security Ops
(Hold)
ANSF Avg.
Professionalism
Skill, Discipline,
& Morale
Perceived
Damages &
Use of Force
by Ins.
Ins. Strategic
Commun/IO
& Affiliation w/
Population
R.O.L. Policy,
Execution &
Perceived
Fairness
Relative
Message
Quality
Gov’ t ’vs Ins.
Perceived
Damages/Use
of Force by
Gov’ t & Coalition
Western
Affiliation
Backlash
Relative
Message
Impact Gov’t
vs Ins
Strength of
Religious
Ideology &
Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/
Displacement
Recognition/
Engagement to
Integrate
Tribal
Structures&
Beliefs
Ethnic/Tribal
Rivalry
Fear of Ins.
Attack/
Repercussions
Relative WOM
Message
Amplification
Gov’t vs Ins
Perception of
Coalition Intent
& Commitment
Insurgent
Capacity,
Priorities &
Effectiveness
Population
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
Insurgent
Terrain
Insurgent
Advantage
Recruiting,
Retention,
Manpower Criminal/
& ISR
Trafficking
Capability &
Coercion
Ties to
Narcotics &
Other Criminal
Funding
Funding &
Material
Support to
Insurgents
Relative
Popular
Support/
/Tolerance
Gov’t vs
Insurgents
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
Neutral/On
the Fence
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov’t vs.
Insurgent Path
Likelihood of
Crime/Violence
/Ins. Support
for Payment
Population
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency
Perceived
Security
Satisfaction
w/ Gains in
Security, Services
& Employment Visible Gains
In Security,
Services &
Employment
Expectations
for Security,
Services, &
Employment
Infr., Services, Econ.
Policy & Execution
/Perceived Fairness
Provide
Humanitarian
Relief
Infrastructure
Dev. Adequacy
& Sustainment
Private Sector
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Legit Other
Production
& Services
Non- Agric
Ability to
Move
People
& Goods
Rapidly
Narcotics
& Criminal
Activity
Levels
Illegit Agric
Production,
Trade &
Employment
Terrain
Harshness
& Breadth
Duration
of
Operation
Perception
Of Gov’t
Strength
& Intent
Ability to
Reconcile
Religious
Ideology,
Tribal
Structures
w/ Gov’t
Path
Average
Connectedness
of Population
Tax
Revenues
Ins. Targeted
Attacks on
Progress/
Support
for Gov’t
Outside
Support/
Enablement
of Ins.
Ins.
Leadership,
Training, Skill
& Experience
Perception of
Insurgent
Strength &
Intent
Gov't/ANSF
Strategic
Commun/
IO
Gov't
Integration of
Local Tribal
Structures
Coordination
Among Ins.
Factions
Ins.
Offensives &
Presence
(Clear & Hold)
Ins. Provision
Of Gov’t &
Services
Gov't
Security
Policy
Quality &
Investment
Gov't
Overall Gov't
Professionalism
Reach,
Policy Quality
Execution
& Fairness
Capacity &
Investment
Gov't/
Contractor
Corruption &
Tribal Favoritism
Targeted
Strikes
Sweep Ops
(Clear)
ANSF
Capacity &
Priorities
Central Gov't
Institutional &
Execution
Capacity
US Gov't
Support for
Operation
Total
Security
Force
Capacity &
Focus
Fraction of
Workforce
And Agric.
Legit vs
Illegit
Legit Agric
Production
Population
Basic Needs
Service Levels
& Employment
Legit vs. Illegit
Relative
Economic
Opportunity
Civilian
Services
(SWET,
Healthcare,
Education)
Private Sector
Capital Mgmt.,
Investment &
Spending
Legit Economic
Activity,
Trade &
Employment
WORKING DRAFT
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Page 28

139.
Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics
– Claim the Information Initiative
Message availability is constrained by low “average connectedness” (rural
populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and
most message propagation / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). WOM
Counter- Narcotics/
Targeted
Crime
Strikes
tends to Damages negative messages more strongly than positive, but also Ops
tends to
Ins. amplify Fear of
Sweep Ops
& Casualties
Gov’ t/ANSF/
(Clear)
be biased towards current sentiments.
Coalition
ANSF &
Coalition
Damages/
Casualties
ISR / Open
Source Ops
Coalition
Knowledge
& Underst.
of Social
Structures
Duration of
Operation
Coalition
Avg COIN
Experience
& Skill
Coalition
‘ COIN
Support’
Strategy &
Unity
Coalition
Appropriate
Balance of
Effort &
Force
ANSF Unit
Leadership
& Tactical
Capacity
Coalition
Adjustment
of Approach
to Fit Afghan
ANSF
Manpower
Recruiting &
Retention
ANSF
Institutional &
Execution
Coalition Capacity
Dev. OpsANSF
Advisory
& Aid
Coalition
Execution
Capacity &
Priorities
ANSF
Coalition
Funding
Visibility to Adequacy
Population
Resource Coalition
Levels
Strategic
(Military Commun./IO
Forces,
Civilian
Forces,
Aid Levels)
Coalition
Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland
Acceptance of
Gov’t
Advisory Afghan Methods
& Aid
US Domestic
Perceived
Cost/Benefit
& Support
Gov't
Funding
Adequacy
Gov't Training
Mentoring,
Vetting, and
Hiring
Breadth of
Coalition &
Support
Transparency
of Gov’t
Processes &
Investments
US Domestic/
Int'l Strategic
Commun.
& Diplomacy
Media
Sensationalism
Bias
Coalition
Dev.OpsInfrastructure,
Services,
Econ.
Advisory
& Aid
Repercussions
Outside
Havens / Government
Support/
“Western affiliation backlash” may undermineAbility to Enablement messages if they are
Operate
of Ins.
seen as puppets who lack the strength to deliver progress or have taken an
Coordination
Ins.
Among Ins.
Offensives &
Insurgent
overly Western Not
Territory posture
Factions
Presence
Terrain
Ins.
Insurgent
Under Gov’t
Control (Afghan
& Pakistan)
(Clear & Hold)
Perceived
Damages &
Use of Force
by Ins.
Ins. Strategic
Commun/IO
& Affiliation w/
Population
R.O.L. Policy,
Execution &
Perceived
Fairness
Relative
Message
Quality
Gov’ t ’vs Ins.
Perceived
Damages/Use
of Force by
Gov’ t & Coalition
Gov't
Integration of
Local Tribal
Structures
Western
Affiliation
Backlash
Relative
Message
Impact Gov’t
vs Ins
Strength of
Religious
Ideology &
Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/
Displacement
Recognition/
Engagement to
Integrate
Tribal
Structures&
Beliefs
Ethnic/Tribal
Rivalry
Fear of Ins.
Attack/
Repercussions
Relative WOM
Message
Amplification
Gov’t vs Ins
Perception of
Coalition Intent
& Commitment
Perceived
Security
Population
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
Satisfaction
w/ Gains in
Security, Services
& Employment Visible Gains
In Security,
Services &
Employment
Expectations
for Security,
Services, &
Employment
Infr., Services, Econ.
Policy & Execution
/Perceived Fairness
Provide
Humanitarian
Relief
=
Ties to
Narcotics &
Other Criminal
Funding
Funding &
Material
Support to
Insurgents
Relative
Popular
Support/
Tolerance
Gov’t vs
Insurgents
Neutral/On
the Fence
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov’t vs.
Insurgent Path
Likelihood of
Active Ins.
Support for
Payment
Population
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency
Infrastructure
Dev. Adequacy
& Sustainment
Private Sector
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Legit Other
Production
& Services
Non- Agric
Ability to
Move
People
& Goods
Rapidly
Narcotics
& Criminal
Activity
Levels
Illegit Agric
Production,
Trade &
Employment
Terrain
Harshness
& Breadth
Duration
of
Operation
Perception
Of Gov’t
Strength
& Intent
Ability to
Reconcile
Religious
Ideology,
Tribal
Structures
w/ Gov’t
Path
Average
Connectedness
of Population
Tax
Revenues
Ins. Targeted
Attacks on
Progress/
Support
for Gov’t
Insurgent
Capacity,
Priorities &
Effectiveness
Perception of
Insurgent
Strength &
Intent
Gov't/ANSF
Strategic
Commun/
IO
Advantage
Recruiting,
Retention,
Manpower Criminal/
& ISR
Trafficking
Capability &
Coercion
Leadership,
Training, Skill
& Experience
Ins. Provision
Of Gov’t &
Services
Gov't
Security
Policy
Quality &
Investment
Gov't
Overall Gov't
Professionalism
Reach,
Policy Quality
Execution
& Fairness
Capacity &
Investment
Population/Popular Support
Infrastructure, Economy, & Services
Government
Afghanistan Security Forces
Insurgents
Crime and Narcotics
Coalition Forces & Actions
Physical Environment
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
ANSF
Appropriate
Use of Force
ANSF
Training &
Mentoring
Gov't
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Gov't/
Contractor
Corruption &
Tribal Favoritism
Policing &
Security Ops
(Hold)
ANSF Avg.
Professionalism
Skill, Discipline,
& Morale
Central Gov't
Institutional &
Execution
Capacity
US Gov't
Support for
Operation
Total
Security
Force
Capacity &
Focus
ANSF
Capacity &
Priorities
ANSF
Corruption &
Tribal
Favoritism
Claim the Information Initiative: “Message” quality and availability impact who
is relatively more effective in influencing the population. Government message
quality has been stronger relative to insurgent factions (who have typically not
made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian beliefs), but lack of
progress has undermined message credibility.
Fraction of
Workforce
And Agric.
Legit vs
Illegit
Legit Agric
Production
Population
Basic Needs
Service Levels
& Employment
Legit vs. Illegit
Relative
Economic
Opportunity
Civilian
Services
(SWET,
Healthcare,
Education)
Private Sector
Capital
Management,
Investment &
Spending
Legit Economic
Activity,
Trade &
Employment
WORKING DRAFT
Significant
Delay
Page 29

140.
Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics
– Claim the Information Initiative
& Morale
h
n
ANSF
Institutional &
Execution
n Capacity
s-
ANSF
Training &
Mentoring
ANSF
Corruption &
Tribal
Favoritism
y
ANSF
alition
Funding
bility to Adequacy
ulation
on/Homeland
ceptance of
an Methods
Gov't
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Gov't
Integration of
Local Tribal
Structures
Western
Affiliation
Backlash
Relative
Message
Impact Gov’t
vs Ins
Strength of
Religious
Ideology &
Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/
Displacement
Recognition/
Engagement to
Integrate
Tribal
Structures&
Beliefs
Ethnic/Tribal
Rivalry
Perceived
Damages &
Use of Force
by Ins.
Perceived
Damages/Use
of Force by
Gov’ t & Coalition
Provide
Humanitarian
Relief
Ins. Targeted
Attacks on
Progress/
Support
for Gov’t
Perception of
Coalition Intent
& Commitment
Insurgent
Capacity,
Priorities &
Effectiveness
Population
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
Ties to
Narcotics &
Other Criminal
Funding
Relative
Popular
Support/
Tolerance
Gov’t vs
Insurgents
Perception of
Insurgent
Strength &
Intent
Fear of Ins.
Attack/
Repercussions
Relative WOM
Message
Amplification
Gov’t vs Ins
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
Neutral/On
the Fence
Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov’t vs.
Insurgent Path
Fun
Ma
Sup
Insu
Popu
Sympa
w/ Insu
T
Ha
&
Perception
Of Gov’t
Strength
& Intent
Ability to
Reconcile
Religious
Ideology,
Tribal
Structures
w/ Gov’t
Path
Average
Connectedness
of Population
Tax
Revenues
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Ins. Provision
Of Gov’t &
Services
Gov't/ANSF
Strategic
Commun/
IO
Gov't
Overall Gov't
Professionalism
Reach,
Policy Quality
Execution
& Fairness
Capacity &
Investment
tor
on &
oritism
Relative
Message
Quality
Gov’ t ’vs Ins.
Leadership,
Training, Skill
& Experience
Control (Afghan
& Pakistan)
Ins. Strategic
Commun/IO
& Affiliation w/
Population
R.O.L. Policy,
Execution &
Perceived
Fairness
Gov't
Security
Policy
Quality &
Investment
Central Gov't
Institutional &
Execution
Capacity
ining
ng,
and
g
ANSF
Appropriate
Use of Force
Claim the Information Initiative: “Message” quality and
Private Sector
Satisfaction
availability impact who is relatively more effective in influencing
Workforce
w/ Gains in
Infrastructure
Skill & Avail
the population. Government message quality has been
Security, Services
Dev. Adequacy
& relative
strongerEmploymentto Visible Gains factions (who have typically not
insurgent & Sustainment
In Security,
made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian
Services &
Employment
beliefs), but lack of progress has undermined message
Expectations
Civilia
Legit Other
credibility.
for Security,
Servic
Production
Services, &
& Services
(SWE
Employment
Non- Agric
Message availability is constrained by low “average Healthc
Perceived
Educat
Security
connectedness” (rural populations spread across harsh terrain,
low literacy rates, limited radio) and most to Private Sector
Ability message propagation
Capital
Move
/ amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). WOM tends to
Management,
People
Infr., Services, Econ. negative messages more strongly than positive, but
amplify
& Goods Investment &
Spending
Policy & Execution
Rapidly
/Perceivedalso tends to be biased towards current sentiments.
Fairness
“Western affiliation backlash” may undermine Government
messages if they are seen as puppets who lack the strength to
deliver progress or have taken an overly Western posture
Page 30

141.
Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics
– Population Security
p
cal
ty
ANSF
Capacity &
Priorities
ANSF Avg.
Professionalism
Skill, Discipline,
& Morale
ANSF
Corruption &
Tribal
Favoritism
g
Security Ops
(Hold)
p
Havens / Ability to
Operate
Territory Not
Under Gov’t
Control (Afghan
& Pakistan)
ANSF
Appropriate
Use of Force
R.O.L. Policy,
Execution &
Perceived
Fairness
ty
y
&
ent
Ins. Provision
Of Gov’t &
Services
Perceived
Damages &
Use of Force
by Ins.
Ins. Strategic
Commun/IO
& Affiliation w/
Population
Relative
Message
Quality
Gov’ t ’vs Ins.
Perceived
Damages/Use
of Force by
Gov’ t & Coalition
forces impact perceived security.
Insurgents rely targeted “attacks on progress”Strength of
to generate fear
and intimidation to limit sympathizers moving towards active
Religious
Ideology &
supporters. They often threaten or target civilian and security force
Tribal
individuals who are visibly supporting the government – the Cultural Erosion/
Structures fear this
Displacement
generates is powerful in slowing or reversing positive momentum.
ecognition/
gagement to
In addition to near term security concerns, the population is
Ethnic/Tribal
Rivalry
assessing ‘who will win’ over the Integrate
long term by comparing
Tribal
tructures&
perception of Insurgent strength to perception of Government
Beliefs
strength and also considering perceived Coalition commitment. (A
key input to perceived strength is how much of the population lives
in region secured by the Government.) They will hesitate to actively
support the government if they feel they will fail, particularly if they
have been witness to “clear and leave” operations.
Fear of Ins.
Attack/
Repercussions
Relative WOM
Message
Amplification
Gov’t vs Ins
Perception of
Coalition Intent
& Commitment
Page 31
Population
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
Satisfaction
w/ Gains in
Security, Services
& Employment Visible Gains
In Security,
Services &
Employment
Expectations
for Security,
Services, &
Employment
Perceived
Security
I f
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Insurgent
Capacity,
Priorities &
Effectiveness
Ties to
Narcotics &
Other Criminal
Funding
Relative
Popular
Support/
Tolerance
Gov’t vs
Insurgents
Neutral/On
the Fence
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
Potential
Attractivenes
of Gov’t vs.
Insurgent Pa
Perception
Of Gov’t
Strength
& Intent
Ability to
Reconcile
Religious
Ideology,
Tribal
Structures
w/ Gov’t
Path
Average
Connectedness
of Population
Ins. Targeted
Attacks on
Progress/
Support
for Gov’t
Ins.
Leadership,
Training, Skill
& Experience
Perception of
Insurgent
Strength &
Intent
Gov't/ANSF
Strategic
Commun/
IO
Relative
Message
Impact Gov’t
Population Security: Security is a function of day to day conditions
Gov't
vs Ins
and also perception of ‘who will win’tegrationlonger term: Western
over of
ocal Tribal
Affiliation
Structures
Actual damages by both the Insurgents and ANSF /Backlash
Coalition
Coordination
Among Ins.
Factions
Ins.
Offensives &
Presence
(Clear & Hold)
Outsid
Suppor
Enablem
of Ins.
S
i
E
Infrastructure
Dev. Adequacy
& Sustainment
Priv
W
Ski
Legit Other
Production
& Services
Non-Agric
Ability to
Move
People
Private Se
Capita
Managem
Investme

142.
How to win in Al Anbar

143.
How to Win the War in Al Anbar
by CPT Trav
HI!
This is an American Soldier. We'll call him Joe. Joe wants to win in Al Anbar
But sometimes it seems like other people don't share that idea.
How can Joe win in Al Anbar? By fighting the insurgents?

144.
Герой
Цель
Проблема / Слабость
Злодей
Решение
Цена
Мораль

145.
Debugging UIWebViews and
Websites on iOS
Session 600
Timothy Hatcher
Safari and WebKit Engineer
These are confidential sessions—please refrain from streaming, blogging, or taking pictures

146.
?

147.
≠

148.
FPO

149.
FPO

150.
What You’ll Learn
• Web Inspector overview
• Inspection and tweaking
• Performance analysis
• Debugging issues

151.
What You’ll Learn
• Web Inspector overview
• Inspection and tweaking
• Performance analysis
• Debugging issues

152.
Web Inspector Overview

153.
Navigation Sidebar

154.
Navigation Sidebar

155.
Resource Navigator (⌃1)
• Frames and resources
• Extra scripts
• Anonymous scripts

156.
Storage Navigator (⌃2)
• Cookies
• Local and session storage
• Databases and tables
• Application cache