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Hit by a Cyberattack: lesson
learned
How are we hacked and what to do when it happens
IFE – 8 december 2015
Jan Guldentops ( j@ba.be )
BA N.V. ( http://www.ba.be )
Wie ben ik ?

Jan Guldentops (°1973)
• This year I'll be designing, building and securing server
and network infrastructure for 20 years.
• Founder of ULYSSIS (°1994), Better Access (°1996) en
BA (°2003)
• Open Source Fundamentalist (after hours )
• Strong practical, background in ICT security.
➢
Security consultant by accident
➢
1996 beroepskrediet

Pass a lot of my time in the lab ( R&D)
In Short:
COMMON SENSE
AS A SERVICE
(CAAS)
The question is not if you're
going to be hacked but
when...
So what goes wrong ?
How do you get hacked ?
The human factor
● Stupidity, laziness and ignorance
Amateurisme
● The successful hack implies that the current network setup and / or procedures at
DigiNotar are not sufficiently secure to prevent this kind of attack.
● The most critical servers contain malicious software that can normally be
detected by anti-virus software. The separation of critical components was not
functioning or was not in place. We have strong indications that the CA-servers,
although physically very securely placed in a tempest proof environment, were
accessible over the network from the management LAN.
● The network has been severely breached. All CA servers were members of one
Windows domain, which made it possible to access them all using one obtained
user/password combination. The password was not very strong and could
easily be brute-forced.
● The software installed on the public web servers was outdated and not patched.
● No antivirus protection was present on the investigated servers.
● An intrusion prevention system is operational. It is not clear at the moment why it
didn't block some of the outside web server attacks. No secure central network
logging is in place.
Social engineering
● If you want to know something,
just ask !
● People talk to much
● Your organization is leaking info :
– Google is your friend
– Stupid leaks : leaking confidential info
in references, etc.
● Key employees who are
passionate about their work often
tell you everything
Phishing
● You are thinking about :
● Blond, Ukrainian ladies who can tell from your e-
mail address you are the man of their live.
● Badly written or translated
● So obvious
● But what if a phishing expedion was custom
made to push your buttons ?
Spear Phishing
● Sinterklaas
● A custom built phishing
expedition :
– Surprise from Sinterklaas ;
– Well written e-mail
– Perfect house style
– Official url with a registered
certificate
● Send to 200+ it people
– 35% tried to fill in their
userid/password.
– Before the security-team blocked
the URL
I am not who I am
● We still use userid/password for authentication
● Bad passwords
● Badly managed password
● Unrealistic password policies
● One password for everything ;
● Clear text storage of passwords
● No one centralised user and role management
Tunnels
● Dozens of ways to set up
a return tunnel from the
inside of an organisation
● Openvpn, ssh, iodine ( ip-
over-dns), httptunnel, etc.
● Teamviewer, N-Able,
Logmein, etc.
● Hard to detect
● Usually accidents waiting
to happen
Others
● Bad software ;
● No structured updates ;
● Security bolton instead of by design ;
● Stuck in perimeter-security ;
● Bad system management
● Mobilization ;
● Bring your own device ;
The stakes have changed
● Globalization
● Cyberpunks versus mob
● Speed, damage
● Target :
● 70.000.000 personal data
● Exit security officer, CIO,
CEO
● Ashley Madison
So how do you know you are
hacked ?
● Obvious hacker :
● Defaces your website ;
● Send all your contacts stupid spam ;
● Uses all your cpu to mine bitcoins ;
● Attacks the whole world directly from your systems ;
● The discrete hacker ;
● Compromises your system and collects information
● Eg Belgacom hack
– Compromised since at least 2007 !
So how do you find these ?
● Integrity checks
● Host-based IDS
● Honeypot
● Network-based IDS
● Analyze your logs
● SIEM
● Monitor your infrastructure
What to do when you find
something strange ?
Don't panic!
● You're not the first to be hacked and certainly
not the last.
● Focus on analyzing the problems and securing
your environment.
● At least you know you are compromised...
● That's a good sign !
Handle the situation
● Collect a team to handle the security situation.
● These days there are cyber insurances
● AIG, Cyber contract, ADD, etc.
● This can be made up of internal staff and or
external consultants
● Draft a plan
● Execute it
Isolate or offline
● Get the compromised applications, machines,
account, data isolated and preferably offline.
● Take care no other parts of your environment
are infected.
● Literally or virtually pulling the etherne tcable or
power plug.
● Preserve as much data as you can
● Secure backups !
Collect data
● Collect as much data as you can :
● Log files ;
● Network traffic ;
● Forensic copies of compromised systems ;
– e.g Kali Linux
● You'll need this to analyze what happened,
what they took and who did it.
● Also legally important.
Find out what happened
● Analyze the attack, find out what happened
● Check what data and systems are
compromised
● Presume everything is compromised until you know
● Try to understand what happened
● Find out what the consequences are...
Disclose and communicate
● Disclose what
happened in a
structured, complete
way:
● To law enforcement ;
● To partners ;
● To employees ;
● To customers ;
Learn and adapt
● Learn from your mistakes :
● Change your security policy and procedures
● Learn from the hack and how your organization
responded to it
● Adapt
● It will happen again, so get more ready for it
Thank You
Contact us
016/29.80.45
016/29.80.46
www.ba.be / Twitter: batweets
Remy Toren
Vaartdijk 3/501
B-3018 Wijgmaal
j@ba.be
Twitter: JanGuldentops
http://be.linkedin.com/in/janguldentops/

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Hit by a Cyberattack: lesson learned

  • 1. Hit by a Cyberattack: lesson learned How are we hacked and what to do when it happens IFE – 8 december 2015 Jan Guldentops ( j@ba.be ) BA N.V. ( http://www.ba.be )
  • 2. Wie ben ik ?  Jan Guldentops (°1973) • This year I'll be designing, building and securing server and network infrastructure for 20 years. • Founder of ULYSSIS (°1994), Better Access (°1996) en BA (°2003) • Open Source Fundamentalist (after hours ) • Strong practical, background in ICT security. ➢ Security consultant by accident ➢ 1996 beroepskrediet  Pass a lot of my time in the lab ( R&D)
  • 3.
  • 4. In Short: COMMON SENSE AS A SERVICE (CAAS)
  • 5. The question is not if you're going to be hacked but when...
  • 6. So what goes wrong ? How do you get hacked ?
  • 7. The human factor ● Stupidity, laziness and ignorance
  • 8.
  • 9. Amateurisme ● The successful hack implies that the current network setup and / or procedures at DigiNotar are not sufficiently secure to prevent this kind of attack. ● The most critical servers contain malicious software that can normally be detected by anti-virus software. The separation of critical components was not functioning or was not in place. We have strong indications that the CA-servers, although physically very securely placed in a tempest proof environment, were accessible over the network from the management LAN. ● The network has been severely breached. All CA servers were members of one Windows domain, which made it possible to access them all using one obtained user/password combination. The password was not very strong and could easily be brute-forced. ● The software installed on the public web servers was outdated and not patched. ● No antivirus protection was present on the investigated servers. ● An intrusion prevention system is operational. It is not clear at the moment why it didn't block some of the outside web server attacks. No secure central network logging is in place.
  • 10. Social engineering ● If you want to know something, just ask ! ● People talk to much ● Your organization is leaking info : – Google is your friend – Stupid leaks : leaking confidential info in references, etc. ● Key employees who are passionate about their work often tell you everything
  • 11. Phishing ● You are thinking about : ● Blond, Ukrainian ladies who can tell from your e- mail address you are the man of their live. ● Badly written or translated ● So obvious ● But what if a phishing expedion was custom made to push your buttons ?
  • 12. Spear Phishing ● Sinterklaas ● A custom built phishing expedition : – Surprise from Sinterklaas ; – Well written e-mail – Perfect house style – Official url with a registered certificate ● Send to 200+ it people – 35% tried to fill in their userid/password. – Before the security-team blocked the URL
  • 13. I am not who I am ● We still use userid/password for authentication ● Bad passwords ● Badly managed password ● Unrealistic password policies ● One password for everything ; ● Clear text storage of passwords ● No one centralised user and role management
  • 14. Tunnels ● Dozens of ways to set up a return tunnel from the inside of an organisation ● Openvpn, ssh, iodine ( ip- over-dns), httptunnel, etc. ● Teamviewer, N-Able, Logmein, etc. ● Hard to detect ● Usually accidents waiting to happen
  • 15. Others ● Bad software ; ● No structured updates ; ● Security bolton instead of by design ; ● Stuck in perimeter-security ; ● Bad system management ● Mobilization ; ● Bring your own device ;
  • 16. The stakes have changed ● Globalization ● Cyberpunks versus mob ● Speed, damage ● Target : ● 70.000.000 personal data ● Exit security officer, CIO, CEO ● Ashley Madison
  • 17. So how do you know you are hacked ? ● Obvious hacker : ● Defaces your website ; ● Send all your contacts stupid spam ; ● Uses all your cpu to mine bitcoins ; ● Attacks the whole world directly from your systems ; ● The discrete hacker ; ● Compromises your system and collects information ● Eg Belgacom hack – Compromised since at least 2007 !
  • 18. So how do you find these ? ● Integrity checks ● Host-based IDS ● Honeypot ● Network-based IDS ● Analyze your logs ● SIEM ● Monitor your infrastructure
  • 19. What to do when you find something strange ?
  • 20. Don't panic! ● You're not the first to be hacked and certainly not the last. ● Focus on analyzing the problems and securing your environment. ● At least you know you are compromised... ● That's a good sign !
  • 21. Handle the situation ● Collect a team to handle the security situation. ● These days there are cyber insurances ● AIG, Cyber contract, ADD, etc. ● This can be made up of internal staff and or external consultants ● Draft a plan ● Execute it
  • 22. Isolate or offline ● Get the compromised applications, machines, account, data isolated and preferably offline. ● Take care no other parts of your environment are infected. ● Literally or virtually pulling the etherne tcable or power plug. ● Preserve as much data as you can ● Secure backups !
  • 23. Collect data ● Collect as much data as you can : ● Log files ; ● Network traffic ; ● Forensic copies of compromised systems ; – e.g Kali Linux ● You'll need this to analyze what happened, what they took and who did it. ● Also legally important.
  • 24. Find out what happened ● Analyze the attack, find out what happened ● Check what data and systems are compromised ● Presume everything is compromised until you know ● Try to understand what happened ● Find out what the consequences are...
  • 25. Disclose and communicate ● Disclose what happened in a structured, complete way: ● To law enforcement ; ● To partners ; ● To employees ; ● To customers ;
  • 26. Learn and adapt ● Learn from your mistakes : ● Change your security policy and procedures ● Learn from the hack and how your organization responded to it ● Adapt ● It will happen again, so get more ready for it
  • 27. Thank You Contact us 016/29.80.45 016/29.80.46 www.ba.be / Twitter: batweets Remy Toren Vaartdijk 3/501 B-3018 Wijgmaal j@ba.be Twitter: JanGuldentops http://be.linkedin.com/in/janguldentops/

Editor's Notes

  1. Belangrijk om te onthouden : 2 manieren waarop wij werken met lokale besturen : Leveren van volledige oplossingen Leveren van huurlingen : consultants die tijdelijk de kennis van de ict-manager aanvullen Leveren van technische ondersteuning en troubleshooting Leveren oplossingen aan lokale besturen sinds 1996