This document discusses building a vibrant legislature in Nigeria to deepen democratic consolidation. It argues that while the performance of government is important, its institutional form also shapes governance and democratic stability. The paper examines the presidential and parliamentary systems of government used in Nigeria and their suitability given the country's political conditions. It asserts that both systems can fail under political stress and that long-term democratic survival depends more on improving citizens' living standards than formal political structures alone. The speaker aims to address which system may prove more durable for Nigeria and how democratic stability can be achieved.

1.
Building a Vibrant Legislature as a means of Deepening Democratic
Consolidation in Nigeria.
By
Dr
Kayode
Fayemi
Governor,
Ekiti
State
1

2.
Being
the
Keynote
Address
at
the
Conference
of
Speakers
of
State
Legislatures
in
Abuja,
November
28,
2011.
2

3.
Introduction
It
is
a
honour
and
indeed
a
privilege
for
me
to
address
this
important
conference
of
Legislative
Heads
from
the
States.
Alexander
Pope,
while
commenting
on
the
content
and
efficacy
of
governance
rather
than
its
form
noted
that
“for
forms
of
governments
let
fools
contest,
what
is
best
administered
is
best”.
Pope’s
predilection
is
certainly
for
the
performance
of
government
rather
than
its
form
or
institutional
structure.
While
the
content
of
governance
is
quite
important,
its
form
cannot
also
be
dismissed.
It
is
the
form
of
governance
and
its
institutional
structure
that
shapes
the
nature
of
the
relationship
between
the
governors
and
the
governed
as
it
determines
the
nature
of
parties,
electoral
processes,
constitutional
order,
issue
of
citizenship
and
rights,
and
other
institutional
mechanisms
that
promote
the
liberties
of
the
citizens,
and
limit
the
arbitrary
tendencies
of
the
state
and
its
managers.
In
other
words,
the
extent
to
which
a
government
is
able
to
realise
the
public
good
will
be
largely
determined
or
at
least
influenced
by
the
kind
of
institutional
structures
that
exist
in
such
system.
Undoubtedly,
other
factors
like
leadership
and
prevailing
political
values
go
a
long
way
in
determining
the
efficacy
or
performance
of
any
government.
In
spite
of
that,
institutions
and
forms
of
government
matter.
Within
the
liberal
democracy
strand,
there
are
two
major
forms
of
governmental
structures
or
arrangements.
These
are
the
presidential
and
parliamentary
systems
of
government.
Both
deal
essentially
with
how
power
is
consummated,
whether
concentrated
or
dispersed,
and
who
wields
what
power
and
how,
especially
at
the
central
level.
As
Arend
lijphart
noted,
“defining
democracy
as
‘government
by
and
for
the
people’
raises
a
fundamental
question:
Who
will
do
the
governing
and
to
whose
interests
should
the
government
be
responsive
when
the
people
are
in
disagreement
and
have
divergent
preferences?1.
The
last
two
democratic
experiments
in
Nigeria
have
been
patterned
along
the
presidential
system
of
government.
These
are
the
second
republic
(1979-­‐1983)
and
the
current
fourth
republic
(May
1999-­‐present).
Even
the
3

4.
stillborn
third
republic
was
of
a
presidential
mode.
In
spite
of
what
appears
to
be
a
settled
question
as
to
what
model
of
liberal
democracy
Nigeria
should
adopt,
there
are
serious
critique
of
the
presidential
system
of
government
and
trenchant
agitation
that
the
country
should
return
back
to
the
parliamentary
system
of
government
that
it
used
in
the
first
republic
(1960-­‐1966).
The
fact
that
both
models
and
experiments
have
failed
in
the
past
suggests
that
they
are
not
foolproof
or
infallible
systems
and
can
collapse
under
enormous
political
stress.
But
which
system
is
more
adaptable
to
the
Nigerian
political
condition
that
may
prove
more
durable
and
enduring?
What
are
the
mediating
factors
or
externalities
that
bear
on
the
durability
or
otherwise
of
these
systems,
and
how
can
the
goal
of
democratic
stability
and
consolidation
be
achieved
in
Nigeria?
These
are
the
issues
addressed
by
the
paper.
The
arguments
of
the
paper
are
twofold.
First
that
both
the
presidential
and
parliamentary
systems
of
government
are
bourgeois
political
crafting,
which
historically
the
ruling
class
in
liberal
democratic
societies
have
used
to
legitimise
their
power,
manage
intra-­‐ruling
class
struggles
and
stabilise
the
political
system.
The
indigenisation
or
local
ownership
and
efficacy
of
any
of
these
systems
will
depend
on
how
the
Nigerian
ruling
class
is
able
to
reproduce
the
context
and
political
culture
of
the
western
ruling
class.
In
other
words,
evolve
and
internalise
the
values,
nuances,
institutions
and
controls
of
those
systems.
Second,
beyond
the
façade
of
formal
political
structures,
the
survival
of
democracy
in
the
long
haul
will
be
determined
by
how
it
improves
the
life
chances
of
the
people
by
providing
them
basic
social
welfare
and
better
conditions
of
living.
Without
this,
the
people
are
likely
to
develop
a
“democracy
fatigue”,
which
may
sooner
than
later
undermine
the
system2
Two
Sides
of
Liberal
Democracy:
The
Presidential
and
Parliamentary
Systems
of
Government.
The
terms
“parliamentary”
and
“presidential”
systems
of
government
derive
essentially
from
where
the
locus
of
power
is
situated
at
the
centre.
A
parliamentary
system
is
a
government
4

5.
under
the
rule
of
the
legislature.
Put
differently,
it
is
a
system
in
which
the
legislature
wields
enormous
powers.
The
executive
derives
its
existence
tenure
and
control
from
the
legislature.
The
president
is
elected
from
the
legislature,
so
are
the
members
of
the
cabinet.
As
Ben
Nwabueze
puts
it
“an
executive
elected
by
the
legislature
owes
its
right
to
govern
to
the
legislature.
This
is
indeed
the
central
feature
of
the
parliamentary
system.
Government
under
the
system
is
the
rule
of
the
legislature,
hence
it
is
called
parliamentary
government”3.
In
some
parliamentary
systems
there
is
usually
a
distinction
between
the
formal
authority
of
the
constitutional
head
of
state
and
the
real
authority
of
the
head
of
government.
The
main
features
of
the
parliamentary
system
are
as
follows:
1. The
executive
is
parliamentary
in
composition.
2. It
consists
of
a
plurality
of
persons
who
as
a
cabinet
constitutes
the
government
3. It
is
made
by
and
responsible
to
the
legislature4.
There
is
the
phenomenon
of
parliamentary
accountability
in
which
the
executive
periodically
gives
account
of
its
stewardship
to
the
parliament.
In
the
event
of
which
the
parliament
passes
a
“vote
of
no
confidence”
on
the
government
or
its
policies,
the
government
has
to
be
dissolved
and
in
most
cases,
the
parliament
will
also
be
dissolved
for
new
parliamentary
elections.
In
the
presidential
system
of
government,
there
is
the
concept
of
a
single
executive.
The
president
is
the
fulcrum
of
executive
power.
He
owes
his
appointment
and
tenure
not
to
the
parliament
but
the
electorate
and
the
constitution.
He
takes
responsibility
for
his
cabinet,
and
has
the
power
to
hire
and
fire
them.
The
cabinet
members
are
seldomly
members
of
the
executive.
In
the
presidential
system
of
government,
the
concept
of
separation
of
powers
is
well
enunciated.
The
three
arms
of
government
are
well
demarcated,
with
specific
spheres
of
responsibility.
These
three
arms
of
government
are
to
serve
as
countervailing
power
on
each
other.
This
is
the
principle
of
checks
and
balances
inherent
in
the
presidential
democracy.
5

6.
There
has
been
argument
in
the
literature
as
to
which
of
this
institutional
arrangement
of
liberal
democracy
is
more
effective
and
durable.
The
urge
has
been
to
identify
the
strength
and
weaknesses
of
those
models.
Parliamentary
system
of
government
is
considered
to
be
more
inclusive,
less
expensive,
and
accountable.
It
encourages
coalition
building
and
the
actual
involvement
of
political
parties
in
the
governmental
system
through
its
role
in
political
bargaining
and
coalition
processes.
Added
to
this
is
that
the
stakes
are
much
higher
in
a
presidential
democracy
than
in
a
parliamentary
system,
as
the
desperation
to
win
the
oval
presidential
office
is
usually
very
high
in
presidential
democracy.
Furthermore,
presidential
democracy
may
also
generate
executive-­‐legislative
stand-­‐off
especially
in
situations
in
which
different
parties
control
the
two
arms
of
government.
In
terms
of
its
weaknesses,
parliamentary
system
of
government
may
create
friction
and
tension
between
the
two
executive
offices,
of
the
constitutional
head
of
state
(president)
and
head
of
government
(Prime
Minister).
Also,
the
doctrine
of
separation
of
powers
is
not
clearly
delineated
in
the
parliamentary
system.
Furthermore,
governmental
activities
are
usually
constrained
by
the
overriding
influence
of
the
parliament
in
executive
operation.
For
the
presidential
system
of
government,
the
major
persuasion
is
that
the
locus
of
executive
power
is
clearly
delineated,
which
may
engender
rapidity
of
actions
and
decisions
and
make
for
executive
responsibility
in
a
clear
and
concise
manner.
As
Victor
Ayeni
noted
the
major
conviction
for
presidential
democracy
is
that
“society
is
best
run
by
a
government
that
is
effectively
organised
under
a
clear
and
definite
authority.
A
plural
authority
situation
often
leads
to
confusion,
unnecessary
conflict
and
inability
to
locate
responsibility”5.
Extant
studies
suggest
that
parliamentary
system
of
government
is
more
durable
than
the
presidential
democracy.
Scholars
like
Joan
Linz6
and
Adam
Przeworski,
Michael
Alvarez,
Jose
Cheibub
and
Fernando
Limongi
7
have
pointed
out
in
different
cross-­‐country
studies
the
basis
of
6

7.
this
and
provided
statistical
data
to
justify
such.
Adam
Przeworski
et.
al.
in
a
study
of
about
one
hundred
and
thirty
five
countries
between
1950
and
1990
noted
that
the
possibility
of
survival
of
parliamentary
system
is
much
higher
than
that
of
the
presidential
system.
Their
finding
is
quite
revealing:
The
Constitution
Drafting
Committee
(CDC),
which
was
saddled
with
the
responsibility
of
drafting
the
1979
constitution
in
Nigeria,
also
made
the
same
submission
in
justifying
the
recommendation
of
a
presidential
system
of
government
for
the
country.
According
to
it,
“the
separation
of
the
head
of
state
from
head
of
government
involves
a
division
between
real
authority
and
formal
authority
(which
is)
meaningless
in
the
light
of
African
political
experience
and
history”13.
Endgame
of
Power:
The
Travails
of
Both
the
Presidential
and
Parliamentary
Systems
of
Government
in
Nigeria.
Independence
in
Nigeria
in
1960
was
heralded
with
pomp
and
pageantry.
The
British
Westminster
model
of
government
was
bequeathed
to
the
nation
at
independence.
There
was
the
office
of
Prime
Minister
and
the
President,
with
the
latter
being
a
ceremonial
head
of
state
and
the
former
the
head
of
government.
There
was
a
central
legislature,
while
there
were
three
major
regions
that
were
relatively
autonomous.
The
expectation
was
that
this
political
arrangement
would
engender
some
form
of
political
interaction
and
bargaining
at
the
centre
amongst
the
regionally
based
political
parties
and
thereby
promotes
consociational
politics.
David
Apter
shortly
after
independence
eulogised
the
Nigerian
experiment
as
a
model
of
consociational
institutional
politics
in
Africa
that
is
worth
being
emulated.
According
to
him,
the
arrangement
is
one
in
which
while
the
constituent
parts
joined
together
in
some
form
of
union,
they
have
not
lost
their
identity.
It
is
a
system
that
accommodates
variety
of
groups
of
divergent
ideas
in
order
to
achieve
unity,
and
in
which
its
corporate
or
collective
leadership
is
7

8.
acceptable
to
all14.
Initially
some
form
of
consociational
politics
was
unfolding
with
the
coalition
of
the
two
parties
that
formed
the
government
at
the
centre-­‐
Northern
Peoples
Congress
(NPC),
and
the
National
Council
for
Nigerian
Citizens
(NCNC).
The
other
party
was
in
opposition
and
was
supposed
to
form
the
shadow
government.
Although
the
decolonisation
process
witnessed
some
tensions
amongst
the
political
parties
as
to
when
and
how
independence
should
be
consummated
and
the
issue
of
numerical
representation
in
political
institutions,
such
was
largely
insignificant
to
undermine
the
system
or
the
processes
leading
to
political
independence.
However
by
1964,
the
signpost
of
systemic
collapse
had
begun
to
manifest
in
the
country.
Political
parties
had
become
quite
desperate
either
to
expand
or
protect
their
base
of
political
and
electoral
support.
In
addition,
some
of
the
weaknesses
of
the
parliamentary
system
had
also
begun
to
show.
Cracks
in
political
coalitions
especially
the
ruling
coalition
of
the
NPC
and
NCNC
was
palpable,
as
some
independent
candidates
switched
to
the
NPC
giving
it
the
needed
majority
to
form
a
government
and
as
such
making
the
NCNC
an
“irrelevant
party”15
in
the
coalition.
This
problem
was
to
threaten
the
stability
of
the
political
system
when
after
the
1964
elections,
which
the
NPC
won,
the
NCNC
leader,
Nnamdi
Azikwe,
who
was
the
president
refused
to
invite
Tafawa
Balewa
as
new
or
re-­‐
elected
Prime
Minister
to
form
a
new
government.
This
left
the
nation
without
a
government
for
three
full
days16.
The
constellation
of
forces
and
events
that
led
to
the
fall
of
the
first
republic
has
been
well
documented17,
it
therefore
need
no
rehash.
The
important
point
to
emphasise
is
that
the
parliamentary
system
of
government
could
not
be
a
safeguard
against
systemic
breakdown.
It
could
not
diffuse
the
internecine
struggles
for
political
power
amongst
the
political
parties
and
its
elite;
prevent
election
rigging
or
construct
relative
autonomy
for
the
state,
which
would
insulate
it
from
being
the
basis
of
primitive
accumulation
of
wealth
by
the
politicians.
8

9.
In
order
to
avoid
what
was
considered
as
the
pitfalls
of
the
first
republic,
there
was
a
deliberate
attempt
towards
an
alternative
model
of
political
engineering
in
the
second
republic.
The
political
transition
programme
(1976-­‐1979)
that
ushered
in
the
new
republic
saw
tremendous
political
reforms,
which
include,
local
government
reforms,
a
new
process
of
constitution
making,
reform
of
the
electoral
body,
and
the
creation
of
states.
The
1979
constitution
was
predicated
on
the
presidential
system
of
government.
As
Alex
Gboyega
noted,
the
distasteful
political
experience
of
the
first
republic
rather
than
any
hopes
of
the
future
informed
the
making
of
the
1979
constitution18.
The
quest
for
a
stabilising
formula
as
Rotimi
Suberu
points
out
was
a
major
driving
force
in
the
making
of
the
1979
constitution19.
Some
of
the
features
of
that
constitution
include
the
presidential
system
in
which
a
clear
focus
of
executive
authority
was
created
in
the
president.
The
president
was
to
be
popularly
elected
un-­‐subordinated
to
the
legislature.
The
president
was
also
to
command
enormous
powers
and
be
a
rallying
point
and
embodiment
of
national
unity.
As
such,
the
constitutional
provision
for
the
election
of
the
president
was
more
than
wining
a
majority
vote,
but
a
vote
with
a
national
spread
of
122/3
of
the
votes
cast
in
the
19
states
of
the
federation.
Some
other
stabilising
measures
in
the
constitution
include
the
entrenchment
of
the
federal
principle
in
the
constitution.
These
include
the
creation
of
19-­‐state
structure,
a
single
tier
local
government
system
that
had
constitutional
recognition
and
specified
functions,
and
a
bi-­‐
cameral
legislature
at
the
centre-­‐Senate
and
House
of
Representatives.
In
addition
the
“federal
character”
principle
was
introduced
into
the
constitution,
which
was
an
ethnic
formulae
for
the
sharing
of
public
goods20.
That
is,
all
parts
of
the
country
were
to
be
represented
in
state
institutions
and
parastatals,
which
include
ministerial
portfolios,
the
bureaucracy,
ambassadorial
appointments,
and
boards
of
public
corporations
and
agencies.
The
essence
was
to
prevent
claims
of
ethnic
domination
and
marginalisation
by
groups
in
the
country.
This
was
to
make
for
group
rights,
fairness
and
social
justice
in
the
country.
9

10.
The
other
stabilising
devices
in
the
constitution
include
the
provision
that
political
parties
must
be
national
in
orientation
and
spread
before
qualifying
for
registration.
This
was
to
prevent
the
emergence
of
ethnic
based
political
parties,
which
was
a
major
bane
of
the
first
republic.
Those
parties
were
to
be
locally
funded
with
the
Federal
Electoral
Commission
(FEDECO)
regulating
the
funding
of
those
parties.
Also,
the
Code
of
Conduct
Bureau
was
established
in
order
to
check
corruption
and
financial
malfeasance
by
public
officials,
while
civil
liberties
were
guaranteed
by
the
constitution21.
However,
in
spite
of
what
seemed
to
be
a
well-­‐crafted
constitution,
the
second
republic
collapsed
barely
four
years
after
its
inception
in
December
1983.
How
can
this
collapse
be
explained?
Billy
Dudley
would
argue
that
poor
political
virtues
or
lack
of
civic
culture
among
the
politicians
led
to
the
collapse
of
the
second
republic
just
as
it
did
for
the
first22.
Samuel
Huntington
would
likely
blame
weak
political
institutions
for
the
nation’s
apparent
political
decay23.
Eghosa
Osaghae
may
likely
direct
our
attention
to
the
problem
of
ethnicity
and
the
need
for
an
appropriate
federal
solution24.
Richard
Joseph
identifies
prebendal
politics
as
the
cause
of
political
failure
in
Nigeria25,
while
Julius
Ihonbvere
and
Toyin
Falola26
focused
on
the
crisis
of
the
Nigerian
political
economy
especially
the
crisis
of
accumulation
as
leading
to
irresponsible
political
behaviour
by
the
political
elite.
Whatever
the
reasons
that
may
be
adduced
for
the
collapse
of
the
second
republic,
what
became
apparent
is
that
Nigeria’s
presidential
system
could
not
safeguard
the
nation’s
second
attempt
at
democratic
rule.
Indeed,
some
have
argued
that
the
presidential
system
of
government
itself
was
part
of
the
problem
rather
the
solution.
The
presidency
because
of
the
enormous
powers
it
commands
became
the
focus
of
inordinate
ambition
as
the
party
or
individual
that
controls
it
has
command
over
“life
and
death”.
As
such,
the
endgame
of
politics
in
the
second
republic
was
to
capture
presidential
power.
The
presidential
system
of
government
could
therefore
not
solve
the
question
of
political
power
in
Nigeria.
This
was
the
context
in
which
the
second
republic
collapsed.
10

11.
The
Obasanjo
Regime
and
the
Politics
of
Presidential
Monarchism-­‐
Babacracy
The
collapse
of
the
second
republic
led
to
fifteen
years
of
military
rule
(1984-­‐1999).
A
brief
period
of
three
months
of
an
un-­‐elected
Interim
National
Government
(ING)
contrived
by
the
military
junta
of
General
Ibrahim
Babangida
was
the
only
interregnum
in
this
period.
This
itself
(ING)
could
be
regarded
as
part
of
the
military
process
since
it
was
installed
by
the
military
and
served
its
purposes.
Successive
military
regimes
during
this
period
took
the
nation
on
circuitous,
but
dubious
political
transition
programmes,
which
did
not
produce
any
civilian
rule27.
It
was
the
brief
Abubakar
regime
(1998-­‐1999)
that
quickly
transferred
political
power
given
the
circumstances
in
which
the
regime
was
born,
and
the
political
pressure
it
came
under28.
Even
when
transferring
political
power
the
regime
itself
was
not
an
uninterested
actor
in
the
process,
and
sought
to
carefully
manage
the
disengagement
agenda.
The
political
context
of
the
disengagement
also
ensured
that
a
particular
geo-­‐political
zone
was
a
beneficiary
of
political
power
at
the
centre29.
The
new
civilian
political
arrangement
was
also
factored
in
a
presidential
mode.
A
new
constitution
was
put
in
place-­‐the
1999
constitution
to
serve
as
legal
framework
for
the
presidential
system.
The
1999
constitution
takes
after
the
1979
one
except
that
the
number
of
states
in
the
country
by
1999
had
increased
to
36
and
over
700
local
government
areas
had
been
created
by
this
period.
The
PDP
won
the
presidential
polls
held
in
February
1999,
with
its
candidate,
General
Olusegun
Obasanjo
emerging
as
president
of
the
country.
The
trend
with
the
Obasanjo
presidency
has
been
the
emergence
of
what
Robert
Fatton
refers
to
as
“presidential
monarchism”30.
According
to
Fatton,
presidential
monarchs
often
dominate
their
political
environment.
He
described
it
in
these
telling
terms:
The
centrality
of
the
presidential
monarch
is
continuously
emphasised
by
the
ideological
apparatuses
of
the
state.
In
an
effort
to
legitimise
his
rule,
these
11

12.
apparatuses
incessantly
nurture
the
cult
of
his
personality,
imparting
to
it
supranatural
power
and
unlimited
knowledge…the
presidential
monarch
has
an
all
encompassing
sphere
of
competence.
His
presence
is
felt
everywhere;
he
is
the
father
of
the
nation
to
whom
filial
respect
is
always
due31.
Fatton
continued
that
the
presidential
monarch
is
the
“the
only
sun
of
the
political
system;
the
courtiers’
radiance
can
only
be
reflection
of
his
rays.
People
must
be
led
to
believe
that
without
him
there
could
be
only
darkness
and
disorder.
Presidential
monarchs
know
that
their
rule
depends
on
their
capacity
to
suppress
alternative
centres
of
authority.
A
ruler
does
seek
to
keep
his
courtiers
at
his
mercy
and
makes
sure
that
they
all
know
it.
He
is
the
ultimate
dispenser
of
favour
and
disfavour,
of
gift
and
confiscation,
of
privilege
and
ruin.
He
places
himself
above
the
law;
indeed,
he
is
the
law”32.
The
point
being
underscored
is
that
the
presidency
in
the
current
democratic
conjuncture
has
assumed
enormous
powers
and
the
entire
political
system
tends
to
revolve
around
the
personality
of
the
president.
There
are
structural
and
behavioural
dimensions
to
this.
The
structural
basis
is
that
the
1999
constitution
grants
enormous
powers
to
the
federal
government
to
be
exercised
by
the
president.
He
appoints
and
controls
his
cabinet,
fill
the
boards
of
parastatals
and
government
agencies,
and
also
appoint
members
to
virtually
all
federal
commissions
including
sensitive
commissions
like
the
Independent
National
Electoral
Commission
(INEC),
and
National
Population
Commission
(NPC)33.
The
federal
government
also
controls
enormous
financial
resources,
which
leaves
other
tiers
of
government
at
the
mercy
of
the
federal
government.
This
reinforces
the
centrality
of
the
position
of
the
president.
The
behavioural
dimension
to
it
has
to
do
with
the
urge
to
consolidate
political
power
by
counteracting
alternative
source(s)
of
political
power
and
contest.
Some
have
adduced
this
to
the
military
and
authoritarian
background
of
the
president,
while
others
argue
that
it
is
a
simply
one
of
deft
political
manoeuvring.
12

13.
Making
Democracy
Work
in
Nigeria:
Beyond
the
Parliamentary
and
Presidential
Systems.
The
foregoing
analysis
clearly
suggests
that
institutional
arrangements
between
the
presidential
and
parliamentary
systems
of
government
have
not
been
a
safeguard
against
the
collapse
of
democracy
in
the
country.
The
feat
of
the
first
republic
was
repeated
in
the
second
and
signposts
in
the
current
political
dispensations
are
not
too
promising.
Intra
and
inter
party
feuds
have
assumed
dangerous
proportions,
politically
inspired
assassinations
are
occurring
and
virtually
all
the
current
elected
officials
have
taken
it
for
granted
that
they
would
be
re-­‐
elected
back
to
power
through
all
means
possible.
This
situation
has
led
some
to
suggest
that
there
is
no
marked
difference
between
the
presidential
and
parliamentary
systems
of
government
on
the
political
fortune
of
the
country.
Rotimi
Suberu
argues
this
quite
poignantly:
The
supposed
advantages
of
the
presidential
system
of
government
over
the
parliamentary
system
are
nebulous
if
not
preposterous.
While
it
has
been
argued
that
the
executive
presidential
system
furnishes
a
clear
focal
point
of
loyalty,
which
not
only
avoids
the
clashes
and
conflicts
inherent
in
the
separation
of
the
head
of
state
from
the
head
of
government
in
the
parliamentary
system,
but
is
also
functional
and
indispensable
for
national
integration,
there
is
indeed
no
a
prior
basis
on
which
to
determine
which
form
of
government,
the
presidential
or
the
Westminster
type
is
more
suitable…
In
a
word,
the
change
from
the
parliamentary
to
the
presidential
system
can
be
seen
as
cosmetic
and
of
no
consequence
in
ensuring
governmental
stability40.
(Emphasis
mine).
Suberu
further
argues
that
the
departure
point
on
government
stability
should
be
the
underlying
social,
economic,
and
cultural
forces
as
the
decisive
factors
influencing
the
dynamics
13

14.
of
political
processes
and
the
prospects
of
stable
and
effective
government41.
Suberu’s
observation
is
quite
relevant.
A
critical
analysis
of
the
issue
of
governmental
stability
and
the
survival
of
democracy
in
the
country
would
turn
our
attention
in
three
directions.
First
is
the
issue
of
federalism.
The
whole
logic
of
federalism
is
about
power
decentralisation.
Nigeria’s
federalism
has
tended
towards
the
concentration
of
power
at
the
centre
such
that
the
challenge
for
politicians
and
their
parties
is
to
seek
to
capture
federal
power.
In
order
to
diffuse
the
internecine
political
struggles
that
characterise
the
centre,
there
is
need
to
devolve
more
powers
and
resources
to
the
sub-­‐national
units
and
make
federal
power
less
attractive
than
it
is.
The
federal
government
ought
to
simply
co-­‐ordinate
things
general
to
the
commonwealth
-­‐
customs,
immigration,
external
defence
and
national
security,
currency
issuance
and
all
other
matters
that
may
be
mutually
agreed
to
by
commonwealth.
It
is
these
issues
about
federalism
that
constitutes
the
crux
of
the
national
question.
Confronting
the
national
question
through
the
federal
idea
may
be
an
easier
but
politically
expedient
way
than
the
convocation
of
a
sovereign
national
conference.
There
should
be
no
illusion
that
adopting
a
much-­‐decentralised
federal
system
will
fully
resolve
the
question
of
political
power
in
the
country.
It
would
not.
What
it
would
have
done
is
to
change
the
site
of
political
contestation
from
the
national
to
the
sub-­‐national
levels.
However,
this
would
have
changed
the
constellation
of
inter-­‐ethnic
group
relations
and
tensions
as
it
currently
manifests
and
produce
patterns
of
political
behaviour
and
negotiation
in
the
different
sub-­‐national
units.
This
is
where
state
Assemblies
become
critical.
The
second
issue
germane
to
the
question
of
democratic
stability
and
consolidation
in
Nigeria
is
that
of
institutions.
Key
state
institutions
need
to
be
reformed
and
restructured
for
them
to
support
the
democratic
process.
This
will
include
the
INEC,
the
judiciary
and
the
security
apparatuses
especially
the
police
force
and
also
the
political
parties.
With
regard
to
INEC
the
major
kind
of
reform
to
be
carried
out
is
in
the
composition
of
the
body.
A
situation
in
which
the
federal
government
appoints
members
of
INEC
is
unacceptable,
which
cannot
make
for
fairness
in
the
electoral
process.
The
composition
of
INEC
should
be
broad
based
representing
14

15.
key
social
interests
and
forces
like
civil
society
groups
of
labour
and
the
human
rights
community,
and
political
parties.
The
second
reform
with
concern
to
INEC
is
about
the
electoral
process.
The
“first
past
the
post”
or
majoritarian
electoral
process
that
the
country
uses
makes
for
a
deadly
contest
for
political
power.
It
is
a
“winner
takes
all”
game.
Those
who
win
do
so
handsomely
and
those
who
lose
are
bad
losers.
There
is
need
to
change
this.
The
proportional
representation
system
may
provide
an
alternative
electoral
model
for
the
country.
The
reform
of
the
judiciary
and
some
other
state
institutions
will
take
the
dimension
of
relative
autonomy
for
them
to
act
independently
of
executive
control
and
to
be
accountable
to
the
people
rather
than
the
executive.
These
institutions
need
to
be
purged
of
corruption,
especially
the
police
force.
The
third
dimension
of
democratic
stability
in
Nigeria
is
the
foundations
of
the
economy.
The
Nigerian
economy
must
one
at
the
same
time
promote
economic
growth,
distribution,
and
social
welfare.
If
this
does
not
happen
politics
will
remain
a
bourgeois
class
project,
social
alienation
would
intensify
and
political
participation
will
continue
to
dwindle.
The
net
result
will
be
the
promotion
of
what
Thandika
Mkandawire
referred
to
as
“choiceless
democracy”.
Conclusion.
The
search
for
democratic
stability
and
consolidation
in
Nigeria
will
go
beyond
the
institutional
differences
between
the
parliamentary
and
the
presidential
systems
of
government.
The
solution
will
also
not
lie
in
a
mixed
model
of
both.
So,
will
the
logic
of
presidential
messianism
take
the
nation
too
far.
What
would
guarantee
democratic
stability
in
Nigeria
will
be
a
confluence
of
three
things.
First
is
re-­‐examining
the
federal
idea
as
presently
practised
in
Nigeria.
In
terms
of
political
and
administrative
management
Nigeria
currently
tends
towards
a
unitary
state.
The
federal
idea
should
be
reclaimed
with
considerable
degree
of
political
and
economic
decentralisation
to
sub-­‐national
units.
The
second
dimension
is
to
begin
to
rebuild
institutions
and
strengthen
them.
The
two
foregoing
issues
will
have
to
be
accomplished
15

16.
through
a
process
of
constitutionalism.
The
third
dimension
of
democratic
stability
has
to
do
with
the
economic
bases
of
society.
The
triple
cord
of
economic
growth,
distribution
and
social
welfare
must
go
hand
in
hand.
Extreme
and
pervasive
poverty
constitutes
a
threat
to
democracy.
It
is
when
this
socio-­‐economic
context
is
re-­‐engineered
can
the
politics
of
consociational
democracy,
which
Arend
Lijphart
talks
about
begin
to
germinate
and
take
firm
root
in
Nigeria.
From
the
foregoing,
you
would
no
less
agree
that
the
Legislature
is
a
crucial
institution
and
one
of
the
pillars
of
government
in
most
advanced
and
transitional
democracies
in
the
world;
and
this
is
largely
due
to
the
frameworks
for
good
governance
which
it
provides
through
the
making
of
popular
laws,
the
control
of
public
funds,
and
its
oversight
and
monitoring
of
other
levels
of
government
in
order
to
promote
transparency
and
accountability
in
the
management
of
public
resources.
Hence,
as
representatives
of
the
people,
you
are
holding
sacred
mandates
as
the
faces
and
voices
of
so
many
constituencies
and
people
whose
sovereignty
you
are
giving
expression
to.
Under
the
Presidential
system,
the
relationship
existing
between
the
Legislature
and
the
Executive
is
defined
through
the
doctrine
of
the
Separation
of
Powers,
which
declares
that
each
branch
of
government
–
whether
the
Executive,
the
Legislature,
or
the
Judiciary
–
has
powers
that
are
unique
and
exclusive
to
it,
and
which
cannot
be
exercised
by
any
other
branch.
As
such,
the
doctrine
ensures
that
the
three
levels
of
government
are
separate
and
check
each
other
from
excesses.
Also,
there
is
a
veto
inserted
in
each
of
the
branches
to
guarantee
against
possible
abuse
by
any
domineering
organ
of
government.
Whilst
the
notion
of
the
separation
of
powers
in
the
Nigerian
Constitution
specifies
distinct
roles
for
the
different
organs
of
government,
the
reality
and
complexity
of
governance
necessitates
increasing
interrelationships
among
the
branches
of
government,
yet
the
critical
challenge
that
has
faced
most
16

17.
presidential
democracies
is
how
the
various
organs,
particularly
the
Legislative
and
the
Executive,
will
be
able
to
work
together
amicably
while
avoiding
a
deterioration
in
their
relationship.
It, therefore, becomes a significant issue for those of us in the Executive to continue to make
efforts to reach out a hand of support and cooperation to you our dear colleagues in our state
Legislatures, as we are essentially partners in progress, with the promotion of the welfare of our
people as the raison d’être for our intervention within the public space. And, we hope that our
honourable members of parliament will take on the gauntlet of being genuine collaborators in
development with us in good faith, because it is only when there is such synergy that our
programmes and policies can enjoy meaningful passage through the Legislature, devoid of
bureaucratic hindrances or bottlenecks. Any Executive worth its salt would understand the
benefits of having vibrant members of the Legislature who can run with its programmes on its
side.
As a country, having just come out of decades of authoritarian rule, this not only eroded
constitutional federalism through the centralisation of power and resources by the military, it also
led to the elevation of a culture of arbitrariness and impunity, the violation of the rights of
citizens, high levels of corruption, etc. And, these and other concerns can only be effectively
reversed through a harmonious working relationship between the Executive and Legislature –
between the policy/legal formulators, implementers, and the monitors; and this will ultimately
enhance the efficiency and transparency of government.
Still, with our various States espousing and making very bold statements about the direction of
progress in which their Executives seek to take the people (such as through the attainment of the
MDGS), and with the larger Nigeria being committed towards the eradication of HIV/AIDS,
illiteracy, etc and the realisation of ascending to become one of the 20 principal economies in the
world in a few years, the achievement of some of these key targets can only be met if strong and
vibrant institutions such as the Legislature are built and continuously nurtured. As such, the
Legislature has an important responsibility in the creation of people-oriented public policy, and
in the monitoring of the implementation of such by the Executive, because it is only when we
17

18.
work in unison, devoid of rancour, that we can attain the greatest possible good
for the greatest number of our people, within the shortest possible time.
Our dear honourable Heads of Parliament from the farther and nearer reaches of this country, I
wish you a very productive engagement as you set about sharing ideas and best practices on how
to build vibrant Legislatures in your home states. Do have rewarding deliberations.
18

19.
Notes
and
References.
1. Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries. (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 1.
2. See, S. Adejumobi and A. Bujra, “Sustaining Liberal Democracy and Good Governance in Africa: The Road
Ahead” in S. Adejumobi and A. Bujra (eds.), Breaking Barriers, Creating New Hopes: Democracy, Civil
Society and Good Governance in Africa. (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 2002),p. 353. Also, Claude
Ake, The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa. (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2000).
3
. Ben Nwabueze, Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa. (London and Enugu: Hurst and Company and
Nwamife Publishers, 1974), p. 28.
4
. Ibid, p37.
5
. Victor Ayeni, “The Executive Presidency as a Concomitant of Multipartism in Africa: An Assessment ” in Omo
Omoruyi et. al. (eds.) Democratisation in Africa: African Perspectives, Vol.1. (Abuja: Centre for Democratic
Studies, 1994), 213.
6
. Joan Linz, “The Perils of Presidentialism”, Journal of Democracy, Vol.1, 1990, pp. 51-69.
7
. Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, “What Makes Democracies Endure? in
Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner Yun-han Chu and Hun-mao Tien (eds.), Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies:
Themes and Perspectives. (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University, 1997), pp. 295-311.
13
. The Constitution Drafting Committee Draft Report cited in Rotimi Suberu “Background and Principles of
Nigeria’s Presidential System” in Victor Ayeni and Kayode Soremekun (eds.) Nigeria’s Second Republic. (Lagos:
Daily Times, 1988), p. 17.
14
. David Apter, The Political Kingdom of Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1961), pp. 24-25.
15
. see, Billy Dudley, An Introduction to Nigerian government and Politics. (London: Macmillan Press, 1982), p.
62.
16
. The constitutional practice is that the President was to appoint the Prime Minister, who should be the leader of
the political party that had the majority in the House of representatives. Rather than do this, Azikwe was quoted as
saying that he “would rather resign than exercise the power to call on a person to form a government”. See, Oyeleye
Oyediran, Nigerian Government and Politics Under military Rule: 1966-1979. (London: Macmillan, 1979), p 19.
17
. See, Billy Dudley, An Introduction to Nigerian government and Politics. (London: Macmillan Press, 1982),
Oyeleye Oyediran, Nigerian Government and Politics Under military Rule: 1966-1979. (London: Macmillan, 1979).
18
. Alex Gboyega, “The Making of the Nigerian Constitution” in Oyeleye Oyediran, Nigerian Government and
Politics Under military Rule: 1966-1979. (London: Macmillan, 1979), p.258.
19
. Rotimi Suberu, “Background and Principles of Nigeria’s Presidential System” in Victor Ayeni and Kayode
Soremekun (eds.) Nigeria’s Second Republic. (Lagos: Daily Times, 1988), p. 17.
19

20.
20
. See, Said Adejumobi, “Citizenship, Rights and the Problem of Conflicts and Civil Wars in Africa”, Human
Rights Quarterly, Vol. 23, No.1, 2001, p. 161.
21
. See, Rotimi Suberu, Op. Cit.
22
. See, Billy Dudley, Billy Dudley, An Introduction to Nigerian government and Politics. (London: Macmillan
Press, 1982). Also, Billy Dudley, Instability and Political Order. (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973).
23
. Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). Also,
Samuel Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay”, World Politics, Vol. XVII, April, 1965.
24
. See, Eghosa Osaghae, “The Federal Solution and the National Question in Nigeria” in S. Adejumobi and A.
Momoh (eds.) The National Question in Nigeria: Comparative Perspectives. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), pp. 217-
244.
25
. Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
26
. Julius Ihonvbere and Toyin Falola, The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic. (London: Zed Books, 1985).
27
. Both the Babangida (1986-1993) and Abacha (1993-1998) military regimes undertook lengthy political transition
programmes which were designed to perpetuate themselves in power. The Babangida Transition was the most costly
and apparently deceitful transition that the nation has ever witnessed. See, Said Adejumobi and A. Momoh, The
Military and the Crisis of Democratic Transition: A Study in the Monopoly of Power. (Lagos: Civil Liberties
Organisation, 1999). Larry Diamond, A. Kirk-Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran (eds.), Transition Without End.
(Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, 1996). Oyeleye Oyediran and Adigun Agbaje (eds.), Nigeria: Politics of Transition
and Governance. (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1999).
28
. The annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election by the Babangida regime, and the subsequent events
that followed, together with the sudden death of both Sanni Abacha and Moshood Abiola in 1998 heigtened political
tension in the country, which made it imperative for the Abubakar regime to organise a short transition programme
of one year and transfer political power to elected civilian regime on May 29, 1999.
29
. All the three registered political parties- the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), All Peoples Party (APP), and the
Alliance for Democracy (AD) agreed to zone the post of the president to the South West as a form of compensation
for the annulment of the June 12 election, and the subsequent events in the country, which was threatening the
political stability of the country.
30
. Robert Fatton, Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa. (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1992).
31
. Ibid, p. 47-48.
32
. Ibid, p. 47-48.
33
. Most of the appointments are however to be approved by the Senate, especially that of the Ministers. The
president has the primary responsibility to choose whom he likes.
40
. Rotimi Suberu, Op.Cit. p. 26.
41
Ibid, p. 28.
20