1. NEEDS, Poverty and Democracy in Nigeria – An assessment1
by
J. ‘ Kayode Fayemi, Ph.D,
Centre for Democracy & Development,
Introduction
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. With an estimated population of 121
million (48% of West Africa) and a GDP of US$41 billion, Nigeria controls a
significant portion of the human and natural resource endowments of the West
African sub-region. Nigeria has the capacity and potential to be the region’s engine
for economic growth with these endowments and, the primary objective of the
country’s recently launched 2003-2005 National Rolling Plan, according to the
President’s Chief Economic Adviser, Dr Magnus Kpakol, was to make ‘Nigeria the
hub of the West African economy and promote sub-regional and regional economic
integration in Africa.’2 Even so, Nigeria’s economy is highly distorted, with oil
accounting for over 40% of GDP, 75% of budget revenues and over 95% of exports.
It is also a heavily mismanaged and highly inefficient economy3. Evidence of
Nigeria’s basic socio-economic indicators bears testimony to this. From a poverty
index of 28.1% of the population living below poverty line in 1980 to over 70% of
Nigerians below poverty line in 2002 (more than two-thirds of its population).4
1
Being Introductory Remarks prepared for the CDD’s National Poverty Forum, Abuja, October 2-3,
2003. .
2
The Guardian (Lagos), January 8, 2003 – www.guardiannewsngr.com/business/article01
3
See Report of the Auditor General of the Federation on Federal Government Expenditure 2001. Also
see interview with World Bank’s Country Director, Dr Mark Tomlinson in Tell Magazine (Lagos), 17
January 2003.
4
Current official poverty statistics should be treated very warily because of their deficiencies and
unreliability. The Federal Office of Statistics (FOS), which is primarily responsible for trends data is
chronically underfunded, hence figures are not regularly updated. The most commonly cited data on
poverty from FOS is six years old and many believe that the poverty situation has grown significantly
worse. Equally, sectoral ministries that have Planning and Research Department hardly produce any
research and data for their policy units and the National Planning Commission with its mandate to
produce economic statistics only do so largely at the instance of donors. This leaves the Central Bank
of Nigeria with the most up to date statistics, but this is also restricted to the formal economy. This
leaves policy makers with a huge dependence on external data and depicts the fundamental
disconnection between research and policy.
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2. While the above socio-economic indicators provide a sense of the deep, widespread
and multi-faceted nature of poverty in Nigeria, it is important to understand the
context within which this deterioration occurred. In our view, poverty is at its root
bred by unequal power relations, the structural and systematic allocation of resources
among different groups in society and their differential access to power and the
political process. The distorted distribution of the nation’s wealth has resulted in the
enrichment of a minority at the expense of an impoverished majority. There is no
doubt that the chronic nature of poverty in Nigeria has a link to historical and
continuing mismanagement of resources, persistent and institutional uncertainty
primarily occasioned by military rule, weak rule of law, decrepit and/or absent
infrastructure, weak institutions of state and monumental corruption. Although there
are external factors like the huge debt burden the country is experiencing, structural
adjustment programme of the 1980s and the negative impact of globalisation, that are
equally culpable, but central to the depth of poverty has been poor governance.
It is precisely because of the role proper governance (or lack of it) plays in the poverty
trap in Nigeria that many believe that deepening democracy and opening up the space
for the involvement of all stakeholders also holds the key to systematically addressing
the problem of poverty. After fifteen years of military and authoritarian rule therefore,
great expectations accompanied the resumption of civilian rule in Nigeria in May
1999. For a country that had suffered severe deterioration in her economy and
politics, the assumption that civilian rule would herald a dawn of peace and a
deepening of democratic values and norms in society, was understandable. However,
almost four years into the tenure of the civilian, democratic dispensation, it seems
clear that this assumption did not take into account the deep-seated divisions inherent
in Nigeria’s body politic, which were not solely the products of military rule, even if
the military had exacerbated them.
Our attempt in this paper is therefore to examine how far these expectations have been
met by assessing the impact of democracy on Nigeria’s poverty situation, looking at
the quantitative and qualitative trends in poverty and inequality over the last 20 years.
The paper also examines other factors slowing down the pace of democratic
consolidation, looking at the nature and character of the Nigerian state, questions of
structure, ethnicity, religion and regionalism as well as the legacy of Nigeria’s
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3. authoritarian past in the quest for deepening democratic development. Finally, the
paper examines the policy implications of this transitional phase and proffer policy
options for pro-poor growth and development in the country.
Trends in Poverty and Inequality in Nigeria
Although there is no agreed definition of what constitutes poverty in Nigeria,
perception is one of a condition that is widespread, complex and multi-dimensional.
The narrow conceptualisation of poverty which is widely shared in official and non-
governmental circles, privileges the economic, especially the income or ‘conjunctural’
dimension of poverty over the structural dimension in Nigeria. The Nigerian National
Policy on Poverty Eradication regard poverty as a condition of: not having enough to
eat, poor drinking water, poor nutrition, unfit housing, a high rate of infant mortality,
low life expectancy, low educational opportunities, inadequate health care, lack of
productive assets, lack of economic infrastructure, inability to actively participate in
decision making, all of which ‘lead to desperation and helplessness and in turn
produce violence, high rate of robbery, theft, thuggery and other deviant human
behaviour.’5
The Voices of the Poor investigations conducted by the World Bank for the World
Development Report 2000/1 demonstrate clearly that the poor have more nuanced
perspectives on poverty. The poor, more than any interlocutor, understand the
uncertainty, insecurity, marginalisation and powerlessness that come with poverty in
society. Across the country, the priority areas for the poor also relate to how best to
reduce the shocks that might upset their security: Lack of potable water; inadequate
access to education; inadequate access to health, lack of rural feeder roads;
unavailability of markets for locally made goods; lack of processing facilities and lack
of agricultural inputs remain on the list of top priority for eradicating poverty. The
Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper draft (I-PRSP) treats poverty as ‘lack of
access to basic needs, combined with impaired access to productive resources.’6 The
basic needs captured in the IPRSP are essentially the same as outlined by the Voices
of the Poor investigations.
5
National Policy on Poverty Eradication, 2000, p.3.
6
I-PRSP, 2001, p.8.
3

4. In terms of its trends, commonly cited figures in Nigeria indicate that the incidence of
poverty has been on the increase since the civilian government came into office in
1999. According to the Human Development Report 2002, no fewer than seventy
percent of the Nigerian population now live below the poverty line. In a recent press
statement, the UNDP Resident Representative in Nigeria, Professor Mbaya Kakwenda
stated that the country’s poverty situation has deteriorated since the inception of this
administration in 1999.7 In the last two decades, the incidence of poverty has
increased from 28.1.per cent in 1980 to 46.3 per cent in 1985, and 65.6 percent in
1996. In absolute terms, the population in poverty were 18.26 million in 1980, 34.7
million in 1985 and 67.1 million in 1996.8 (see Table 1) Recent statistics also indicate
that by 1997, 70.2 percent of the Nigerian population were adjudged poor, on less
than $1 a day, and 90.8 percent were living below $2 a day.9
Table 1 – Poverty Profile in Nigeria (Head Count) 1980 - 1996
Year Poverty Incidence (%) Estimated Population Population in
(million) Poverty (million)
1980 28.1 65 18.26
1985 46.3 75 34.7
1992 42.7 91.5 39.1
1996 65.6 102.3 67.1
Source: Federal Office of Statistics (FOS). “Poverty Profile in Nigeria, 1980-1996”
The same official study by the Federal Office of Statistics further ranks the poor into
qualitative categories of non-poor, moderately poor and core poor between 1980 and
1996, and concludes that the proportion of the core poor has increased from 6.2 per
cent in 1980 to 12.1 per cent in 1985, 13.9 per cent in 1992 and further to 29.3 per
7
The Guardian (Lagos), December 15, 2002
8
I-PRSP, 2001.
9
World Development Indicators, 2002.
4

5. cent in 1996. During the same period, Nigeria’s Human Development Index ranking
deteriorated from 142nd out of 174 countries in 1998 to 148th out of 173 countries by
2002.
Again, examined by sector, official statistics reveal that the majority of Nigeria’s poor
are located in the rural area. Yet, the percentage of the urban poor has also grown
exponentially since the 1980s. For example, the urban poor population was 17.2 per
cent in 1980 and 58.2 per cent by 1996. Indeed, the World Bank painted a more gory
picture when it stated in 1996 that the number of the urban poor in Nigeria rose from
9.7 million in 1985 (31% of an estimated urban population of 31 million), to 11.9
million in 1992 (33% of an estimated urban population of 36 million). The serious
implication of this is telling on the crime rate, corruption and a dramatic change in
rural-urban lifestyle – resulting in child marriages, child labour, multiple modes of
survival, all of which has resulted in a rising drop-out rate in schools and a higher
incidence of illiteracy.
Yet, even this does not tell the whole story, in particular about the regional and gender
disparities that attend the poverty trends in Nigeria. Also, citing official figures, a
recent publication by the Central Bank of Nigeria (1999) classifies the increasing
incidence of poverty across geo-political zones in the following manner:
Table 2 – Incidence of Poverty by Geo-political Zones
Geo-political Zone % % %
1985/6 1992/3 1997
North East 53.2 N/A 68.0
North West 48.4 N/A 62.0
Middle Belt 48.4 N/A 53.0
South East 30.9 N/A 79.5
South West 42.0 N/A 74.1
South South 38.0 N/A 78.6
Nation-wide 43.0 N/A 69.2
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (1999)
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6. What the above indicates is that the condition of the poor in Nigeria is highly
differentiated, rather than homogenous and the responses. There are marked
differences in the depth and incidence of poverty along regional lines. The response
analyses of the poor is also more differentiated and nuanced on geo-political and
sectoral lines when disaggregated. For example, when the Federal Office of
Statistics(1997) examined the regional distribution of poverty along sectoral lines
(using the rankings – extreme poor, moderate poor, non-poor), the results show that
an approximate 39 per cent of the extreme poor (rural and urban indices) are mostly
concentrated in the North. While the North East has the highest percentage of
extreme poor: 22.39%, closely followed by the South West: 19.2%, north west:
16.6%, north central: 16.1%, South-South: 12.4% and South East: -10.9%. The
statitiscs also show that on a state by state basis, the national poverty index average
stood at 65.6 per cent with Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara (all States in the North West
zone) recording the highest incidence of 83.6per cent followed by Bauchi and Gombe
States in the North East Zone with 83.5 per cent.
Niger-Delta Region – The Paradox of Plenty
The Niger Delta, Nigeria’s oil belt, was easily one of the most repressed and deprived
region of Nigeria over the long period of military rule. Statistics on social conditions
in the Niger Delta are dire. Only 27% of households had access to safe drinking water
in 1994, while 30% of households had access to electricity. On both indicators, the
Niger Delta fell below the national average, which stood at about 32% and 34%
respectively. In 1991, the number of population per doctor in the Niger Delta was
estimated at 132,600, nearly 100,000 over the national average of 39,455.(UNDP &
World Bank, 1997). The situation most probably has worsened since then. Yet, the
Niger Delta provides about 80% of all government revenue in Nigeria. On the
political front, during the period of military rule the Niger Delta bore the brunt of
military repression. Extra judicial killings, torture and incarceration were widespread.
In the Ogoni area alone, it was estimated that between May 1994 and the beginning of
1995 at least fifty Ogonis were executed summarily by security forces.
Sources: UNDP, Human Development Report: Nigeria, 1996; Human Rights Watch.
6

7. Gender and Poverty
The heterogeneity of poverty condition however goes beyond geopolitical zones. It
also has a gender dimension to it. As every study of the poverty incidence in Nigeria
clearly demonstrates, women and men experience poverty differently. Indeed,
vulnerability analysis demonstrates conclusively that women, girls and people with
special (dis) abilities are worst hit. The primary reason for this huge disparity is the
power relations between men and women and the limited effort in broader decision-
making beyond the household. Increasingly, women are gaining decision-making
powers in the household due to their rising income, but this has hardly translated into
a significant power base in the community. Social indicators of status in the
community still demonstrate than more boys than girls are enrolled in schools
(although some studies show that more girls than boys are enrolled in the South East),
the overall educational level of males as compared to females are much higher. In
1996, the literacy rate for males was 62 per cent and 39 per cent for females; the
corresponding figures for 1997 were 61% and 47% respectively and 61% and 46%
respectively for 1998. Equally, the average net primary school enrolment in 1996 was
55 per cent for boys and 45 percent for girls, with 57% for boys and 44 per cent for
girls in 1997. Despite the introduction of Universal Basic Education, in 1999, the
situation has not changed fundamentally. Women are mostly plagued by poverty,
ignorance, illiteracy, high fertility, high maternal mortality and a lack of social
recognition. Economically, women are generally poor, underemployed and unfairly
rewarded. Politically, there are insufficient women in public life and positions of
power to advocate for the voices of poor women to be heard.10 Health wise, they are
more at risk to maternal mortality and infection of HIV/Aids, all related to their
powerlessness in making informed choices in a social context in which they are less
regarded.
10
In spite of Nigeria’s commitment to the Beijing Platform’s 30 % minimum presence of women in
public life and the President’s professed gender sensitivity, Nigeria has only four women Ministers out
of 49 ministers, three women in the Upper Chamber of the Legislature out of 109 members, ten women
in the lower chamber of 360 members, generally poor representation in the State Assemblies and Local
Authorities - all due to entrenched discriminatory practices. Yet, in the average household, women’s
role in decision-making has increased as they become significant players in the ‘bread winning’ tasks
on the home front, in the wake of structural adjustment programmes and the inevitable demand for
multiple modes of livelihoods. The incongruity between the public and private spaces occupied by
women is but one further demonstration of the unequal power relations, with deleterious effect on the
poverty complex in the country.
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8. Problems of regional disparities
It is fair to ask why the incidence and depth of poverty in Nigeria is as bad as it is, in
spite of the country’s human and natural resource endowments and the plethora of
schemes aimed at addressing poverty. While Nigeria has become the laboratory for
numerous policy interventions, many of these schemes are hardly thought through by
government officials and development professionals. In the first place, most of the
initiatives were imposed without collective ownership by the poor (due to lack of
consultation) and second, because they were primarily reactive to particular problems,
not designed as a holistic framework for community regeneration. In addition, the
institutions created were temporary palliatives all of which succumbed to undue
political interference without any serious consideration for human development.
To illustrate the above assertions with the Niger-Delta for example which has
experienced more of these institutions than other parts of the country, the 1958 Niger
Delta Development Board and the post-independence Niger Delta Development
Authority were reactive attempts to allay minority fears strongly captured in the
Willinks’ Commission report of 1957. OMPADEC (Oil Minorities Producing and
Development Commission) was largely, albeit not exclusively a reaction to the crisis
in Ogoniland and the growing inequality in the Delta, but it only succeeded in
widening the gap because it was not accountable in any way to the people. The
recently approved Niger Delta Development Commission, under the Obasanjo
administration is itself a reaction to the variegated minority fears in the whole of the
Delta which is seen to threaten the corporate integrity of the nation, not a
comprehensive policy framework for addressing the poverty trap in the Delta.
The same is true of the various poverty alleviation and ‘development’ intervention
schemes at the national level. Department of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructures
(DFRRI,) National Department of Employment (NDE), Peoples’ Bank of Nigeria
(PBN), Federal Economic Advancement Programme (FEAP) and Petroleum Trust
Fund (PTF) - all of which were recently merged into the National Agricultural
Development Bank by the Obasanjo administration represented stop-gap limited
reactions by the Generals Babangida and Abacha regimes to the growing cries of
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9. Nigerians about the need to humanise the Structural Adjustment programmes that had
destroyed the fabric of the society. They were all conceived in a non-participatory
manner with little or no consultation with the target beneficiaries, completely lacking
in accountability and transparency to the communities, and consequently but
inevitably lacking in any legitimacy with the people.
The above explains the lack of importance attached to policy planning in the various
half hearted attempts to address the poverty situation over the years, and underscore
the necessity for effective participatory assessments and planning before any policy is
conceived for and implemented by the State.
There are however other reasons for these distortions beyond the lack of an
overarching comprehensive framework. Chief among these are poor governance and
corruption, ineffective targeting of the poor; institutional rivalries and overlapping
functions leading to uncoordinated sectoral policy initiatives (more on this later),
absence of sustainability mechanisms over the long term, lack of complementarity
from the beneficiaries and lack of involvement by the civil society, poor human
capital development and low productivity, heavy donor influence and unwieldy scope
of poverty programmes often resulting in concentration on low yielding schemes. All
of these factors continue to plague even poverty reduction and eradication policies
even in this dispensation.
Post-military institutional mechanisms for poverty reduction and eradication
While the rhetoric is one of using the ‘new’ democratic space to address poverty,
there is very little evidence to suggest that there has been any change in the politics,
structure and operational processes of responding to the serious poverty situation in
the country. Indeed, the flagship policy on poverty alleviation by the new
administration has not been devoid of political interference, as it did not derive from,
nor was informed by knowledge from consultations with the poor.
On his assumption of office in 1999, President Obasanjo inaugurated the Poverty
Alleviation Programme (PAP), with a promise to distribute ten billion Naira ($80.37
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10. million) from the national budget, to initiatives on job creation and material benefits
to the communities. What PAP turned out to be was a way of keeping political
hangers-on and ‘area boys’ quiet through a regular stipend that asked no questions on
recipients’ long term goals for job creation or skills development. Before long, PAP
became mired in the controversy that it was a facade for settling political debts, not an
effort to reduce poverty through regenerative initiatives. By mid-2000, PAP had
become a recipe for how not to formulate a policy that purports to be in the interest of
the people and the President scrapped it in response to the widespread criticism that
attended its ineffectiveness.
Around the time of PAP’s scrapping, an earlier decision to examine the activities of
the various poverty reduction institutions in the country with a view to ensuring
policy coordination and coherence had resulted in the recommendation in December
1999 that the existing 36 institutions be streamlined to 18, through yet another process
of mergers. Through a variety of government committees11, a blueprint for the
harmonisation of poverty policies emerged in January 2001, leading to the
establishment of an institutional structure, the National Poverty Eradication Council
(NAPEC). Chaired by the President and drawing membership from fourteen
ministries with direct mandate on poverty eradication, NAPEC is the ‘apex body for
policy formulation, coordination, monitoring and review of all poverty eradication
efforts and activities in the country’. (Federal Government Statement) The National
Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) serves as the secretariat for NAPEC with
the primary aim of monitoring and coordinating the implementation of the
programmes of the core poverty eradication ministries.
In addition to the central coordinating body – NAPEP – other institutional
mechanisms directly linked to NAPEP under the auspices of NAPEC include the
National Assessment and Evaluation Committee (NAEC), the National Coordinating
Committee (NCC), State Coordinating Committees (SCC), Local Government
Monitoring Committees (LGMC). At the state level, there is also the State Poverty
Eradication Council, chaired by the State’s Executive Governors, modelled after the
National Council.
11
The Ahmed Joda Panel (1999), the Ango Abdulahi Panel (2000) and the Babalola Borisade Panel
(2000).
10

11. NAPEP’s activities are built around four schemes, namely: the Youth Empowerment
Scheme (YES); Rural Infrastructure and Development Scheme (RIDS), Social
Infrastructure Services Scheme (SOWESS) and the Natural Resources Development
and Conservation Scheme (NRDCS).12
While the above institutional arrangements appear de-personalised and technical, they
have turned out to have been driven mainly by entrenched personal and party politics
and not by the objective conditions of the poor. As noted by a discerning observer,
even the evolution of the three Committees that shaped the eventual structure of
NAPEP was dominated by powerful individuals intent on safeguarding entrenched
institutional interests. The most cited amongst these actors, is the current head of
NAPEP, who was a key figure in the poverty policy circles under the military as
Director of FEAP, subsequently served on the three committees, and eventually
emerged as the Permanent Secretary at the Presidency in charge of NAPEP. It has
been suggested that the reason for the similarities and perhaps return to the traditional
approach to poverty reduction by the Federal Government is not unconnected with the
overwhelming influence of this particular bureaucrat. While it could be argued that
continuity is critical to the desired change, it is also true that the battles in NAPEP
over the past three years has been about control and access to resources, and not about
benefiting from institutional continuities.
The politics of NAPEP is however not limited to the competition over administrative
control, but also relate more to the institutional arrangements between the Federal and
state authorities. While the idea of the State Poverty Eradication Council appears
laudable, in terms of connecting the local to the national and avoiding duplication of
the poverty processes and policies, several state governors, especially those from
opposition parties have accused the Federal Government of using NAPEP as a
political patronage and some, like the Alliance for Democracy Governors in Lagos
and Ekiti states, have vowed not to establish Poverty Eradication Councils in their
States unless the institutional relationships are clarified.
12
Advertisement by NAPEP Secretariat, The Vanguard Newspaper, November 22, 2002.
11

12. To complicate matters, the intra-governmental relationships and control over the
domestic stream of poverty eradication, as represented by NAPEP and the
internationally assisted and donor driven PRSP also represents a regular source of
neuralgia. The National Planning Commission (NPC) launched the process of
drafting the PRSP. In no time, the NPC, the Economic Policy Coordinating Council
(EPCC) and NAPEP engaged in a turf battle over who takes responsibility for the
drafting of the interim PRSP. Eventually, the institutional location for PRSP now
formally moved to the EPCC secretariat, it is evident that NPC and NAPEP have
remained very lukewarm about EPCC’s direction of the PRSP process and these
relationships between differently positioned actors have also triggered different policy
responses to poverty reduction and eradication, evidently lacking in coordination and
coherence, and often undermining the primary objective of poverty eradication.
Almost four years into the current administration’s term of office, it is clear that the
government is still bedevilled with trying to find the most appropriate institutional
approach on poverty reduction and what we have is an expanded replication of the
traditional spaces of poverty policy making, full of appropriate rhetoric but signifying
more motion than movement.
The above, in our view, returns our search to the patterns, texture and quality of
politics that emerged with post-military transition, which in Nigeria’s case reflects a
reconfiguration and reassertion of pre-existing (even if temporarily submerged)
structures of national and local power bases, rather than a fundamental transformation
of the political processes. It also involved, in other cases, the activation of alienated
new strata – especially amongst the youths, reflecting the dangerous ideological
transformations wrought by the combined forces of authoritarianism, economic
decline and social marginalisation in Nigeria. The impression we get now is the
Government is poised to get policies and processes right in this new era, although not
much is still known in the wider society how it intends to do this.
What future for Poverty Reduction and Eradication in Nigeria
While is still very early to pronounce judgement on the Government’s ‘New
Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), since it is apparently
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13. still at a conceptual stage, one hopes that the Government has learned certain lessons
in the last four years. Critical to these lessons is an understanding that poverty
reduction is deeply structural and political, arising out of unequal distribution of
scarce resources. Without addressing the structure of governance on the basis of
contestation and dialogue, it is difficult to utilise democratic deepening as a vehicle
for achieving poverty reduction. But if the structural dimension of the crisis of
governance is successfully addressed, it is possible to begin the journey towards
developmental democracy or ‘democracy in stages or parts.’ Having made this
general point, certain specific conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the trajectories
and challenges of the last four years of civilian democratic dispensation:
1. Nigeria is still experiencing serious shocks in her political economy in the
country’s attempt to deal with its post-military, prolonged authoritarian past. While
electoral politics is key to the consolidation of the democratic process, there are fears
that severe security problems triggered by lack of access to resources might create
deteriorating security challenges. Commentators cite the various ‘resource control’
crises in Nigeria as the touchstone of this issue. Nevertheless, the present government
appears to have a strong appreciation of the place of security and economic
revitalisation in the country’s growth and developmental process. It also displays an
understanding of the holistic approach that is required to deal with the multifaceted
nature of the security challenges it faces, although its responses are often too
personality-driven, rather than institutionally focused, placing democratic governance
at the mercy of the leading players in politics and not on the collective wisdom of the
people. Although the Grand Strategy for National Security released by the
Government in 2001 incorporates this holistic vision of security in a human security
framework, there is very little to suggest that the reality matches the rhetoric since
security sector reform and poverty reduction strategies are still largely focussed on
‘hard’ issues.
2. Government policies to redress poverty and other socio-economic concerns
have been characterised by institutional gridlocks and cosmetic projects, with little or
no impact on the poverty situation. It is unlikely that the full PRSP would see the light
of day and even the ‘home grown’ National Poverty Eradication Programme is still
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14. driven largely by politics, rather than drawing on lessons from past policies.
Although some aspects of the Government’s macro-economic strategies, especially its
public expenditure review framework and its budget monitoring unit have received
commendation from critical constituencies, many are still worried about the feasibility
of timely implementation of laudable initiatives, given the severe capacity constraints
that the Nigerian civil service continues to experience.
3. Clearly, the internal threats that confront Nigeria are potentially dangerous.
Many of them have to do with who lost power, who has gained power and who is
wielding power. In dealing with them, Government has to adopt an institutional
approach that does not paint its actions as patently partisan. There is no doubt that
there were serious concerns within powerful constituencies about the investigations
into past abandoned contracts, human rights violations as well as with the
restructuring within the security sector and the anti-corruption investigations.
Although these are steps that have proved popular with the people, care has to be
taken to ensure that actions do not undermine the human rights and fundamental
freedom of citizens, including accused persons. The danger of a heavy handed
approach to internal security is that the Government risks destroying the very values it
is trying to protect. Yet, there is always the risk of doing little, especially for a
Government often perceived as failing to provide even the minimum security
requirements demanded by citizens.
4. Governance is at the core of all the concerns raised above. The success of
Nigeria’s democratisation and decentralisation programmes, and policies to improve
governance and civil-military relations are as important to the overall performance of
the Government as are the socio-economic performance criteria. Issues of governance
loom large in all discussions of Nigeria’s future, and it ought to take a more serious
form of constant dialogue and consensus building, legislative advocacy and action,
independent awareness-raising through institutions such as the National Human
Rights Commission and the National Orientation Agency etc. All indications point
towards a commitment to good governance even if a coherent strategy is still lacking
and given Nigeria’s role as the Chair of the NEPAD’s Implementation Committee,
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15. the country has a critical role to play in the implementation of the Peer Review
Mechanism. One hopes that with the renewed interest in policy and programmes
monitoring at the highest level of government, we will begin to notice the difference
in regular impact assessment arising out of constant monitoring and evaluation of
government initiatives.
5. Related to the effectiveness of a governance strategy is the question of
capacity. High priority should be placed on redressing the policy expertise and
human resource imbalance that is critically hampering the performance of
government. Although there are competent, middle level technical advisers in
government, they are sometimes too overwhelmed with administrative drudgery and
thus unable to concentrate on crucial thinking on policy review and formulation.
6. All of the above underscore the important point that this is a process and that
there is no teleological link between elections and consolidation of democracy. Yet,
deepening democracy is a core requirement for building an accountable and
transparent State that is answerable to its citizens and guarantee their security and
development.
From the foregoing analysis and conclusions, it seems clear that the future of
democratic consolidation depends on both reforming the institutional and
constitutional basis of governance as well as on the performance of the civilian
administration in the quest for 1) Poverty reduction and provision of basic necessities;
2) Fight against corruption and entrenchment of transparency; 3) macro-economic
stability; 4) provision of basic infrastructure – telecommunication, energy, sanitation
and water; 5) security sector reform, access to justice and reform of the criminal
justice system; 6) Gender equality and 7) ethnic and religious harmony.
Policy Recommendations
Nigeria is now at a critical juncture in her history. Although we seem to have now
overcome the jinx of failed second elections since independence, there are serious
fears about violence truncating the country’s fragile democracy in the wake of
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16. increasing poverty. While there is a sense in which this is exaggerated, the test of the
viability of Nigeria’s democracy and the prospects for its consolidation will depend
on the establishment of a social contract between the rulers and the governed, as a
mechanism for arresting the desertion of the State by its citizens. Consequently, we
believe that the focus in terms of policy recommendations must concentrate on factors
that can help sustain democratic governance over the long term. We have attempted
to outline the most critical of these factors and also provide in the Appendix below
indicators for monitoring these factors and government’s adherence to their
implementation. The factors include:
a) Entrenchment of the Rule of Law and a Culture of Constitutionalism: In spite of
the overwhelming focus that the Nigerian citizens paid to the question of
constitutional reform in the past four years both in terms of redefining the nature
and character of the Nigerian state and in ensuring basic fundamental freedoms for
the citizens, government and parliament have failed to address this issue seriously.
It is evident that a lot more attention will be demanded by campaigners for
citizens’ rights and constitutional reform, from the demand for a sovereign
national conference to the minimum demand for a comprehensive constitutional
review process. Government cannot continue to turn a blind eye, especially given
the link between decentralisation and poverty eradication. Instead, government’s
local government reform agenda has been seen as a further attempt to over-
centralise authority.
b) Enhancing Political Representation and Citizens’ involvement in Politics: With
the registration of thirty political parties, it could be argued that this is being
addressed. Yet, if we believe that freedom of association represents the basic
mode of deepening democratic development and an inclusive political process is
important for this, then the idea of government sponsorship or registration of
political parties is still a misnomer. The modalities for party formation is
unfortunately still driven largely by money and one of the critical issues that will
need to be addressed now that elections are over is the question of political party
financing and its impact on entrenching genuine democratic dispensation.
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17. c) Personal Security & Access to Justice: From our analysis, it is clear that this is an
area that Government, in spite of its best efforts, has failed to satisfy the yearnings
of the people. The extent to which it is able to enhance personal security and
access to justice, seen by most assessments as the key barometer of judging
government’s performance, the more credible and legitimate the government will
be in the eyes of the people. The challenge is to address this within the context of
national restructuring – strengthening the processes of devolution and
decentralisation and defining the powers and responsibilities of security
institutions at the local, state and federal levels in inter-governmental relations.
d) National Security & Conflict Prevention: This is closely linked to the issue of
personal security and access to justice, albeit broader. Given the scope, scale and
intensity of communal, religious and resource driven conflicts in the last four and
a half years, addressing the governance of the security sector and democratic
control of the military remains a critical issue for poverty eradication. Although
government achieved a level of success in its military reform agenda, formal
disengagement of the military has not resulted in demilitarisation of society, nor
reduced the level of societal violence, traceable to the legacy of militarism.
Ownership of the security sector reform processes promises to ensure the
deepening of democracy as a means of preventing conflict.
e) Open and Accountable Government: The need for government structures and
processes that are transparent, decentralised and participatory can hardly be
overemphasised. This is improving and the impact of certain structures within
government is beginning to show, but policy incoherence remains Government
has traditionally been alien to the people, especially during military rule and it is
critical to ensure that the principles of participation, accessibility, ownership and
openness help ensure the legitimacy of the institutions.
f) Effective and equitable provision of basic services: Nigerians generally refer to
this as the democratic dividend expected of civilian rule. It is clear from the
section on poverty above that majority of the Nigerian people are still lacking in
basic services – water, sanitation, electricity, feeder roads for transportation of
farming produce, education and jobs. For those lacking in these basic essentials,
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18. they see a direct correlation between supporting democratic development and
expecting fulfilment of these needs. The fact that most estimates of the poverty
situation suggest that it is worsening in Nigeria underscores why a focus on this
will go a long way in restoring the diminishing faith in the democratisation project
and raising hopes about government’s ability to meet the 2015 Millennium
Development Targets.
g) Facilitative Government for Economic Management and Private Sector
Development: Fundamental to the notion of governance is the ability of the state
to provide efficient and well functioning institutions and infrastructures of
government – legally backed and socially coherent – that together establishes and
maintains an enabling environment in which human security and human
development takes place. Although state capacity has improved significantly
under this administration, the shortage of skilled expertise, trained managers and
civil servants capable of operating within government machineries needs to be
speedily addressed. In the short term, this is being addressed by the employment
of consultants. Government needs to address the incentives base for civil servants
to a level commensurate to what obtains in the private sector. It equally needs to
set up a rapid response, in-country educational and training facility for middle
level, career civil servants, a feature that is currently lacking. In short, there is a
need for a major public sector reform initiative, aimed at enhancing capacity and
effectiveness of the sector.
h) Enhanced Global Partnership for Democratic Governance: Even if Nigeria
were to achieve effectiveness in all of the areas outlined above, the challenge of
operating in the global and regional environments also impinges on the
performance of government, especially one that is heavily dependent on a single
product for its survival. Hence, the ability of the Nigerian State to develop
sustained partnerships on an equitable basis for the benefit of its citizens will have
implications on issues such as debt relief, foreign direct investment, regional
economic integration and world trade negotiations. Nigeria is in an unstable
region that poses a number of direct and indirect threats to her security and
stability. She is also often seen as a peace builder in the region given her
consistent prominent role in peacekeeping and conflict prevention. It is therefore
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19. in her interest to ensure that the region attains stability over the long term. This
provides an explanation for her involvement in regional and global issues, but it is
not an engagement that has produced expected dividends. The challenge is
therefore to ensure that Nigeria’s ability to be a force for change in West Africa,
nay Africa, is further enhanced and not undermined by lack of support from the
international community.
We don’t know if NEEDS is in a position to address all these factors, since we in civil
society know very little about NEEDS beyond the few sketchy remarks in
newspapers. It would have been proper for government to engage critical stakeholders
in the thinking, planning and implementation of NEEDS. If it is to have any chance
of success, the people should be engaged very early in the development of NEEDS,
not when it has become a finished product. It should promote partnership first and
foremost between the rulers and our people, even before it promotes ‘enhanced
partnership’ with the donor community. For NEEDS, charity really must begin at
home. I Thank you.
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