Nigeria: Crisis of Nationhood

PARLIAMENTARY HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP JUNE
1996

NIGERIA:
Crisis

of

Nationhood

by
Kayode
Fayemi

Parliamentary
Human
Rights
Group

June
1996

NIGERIA: CRISIS OF NATIONHOOD II 1

1996

Contents

Introduction

3

Transition
without
end

5

Human
Rights
Situation
in
Nigeria,
1995-‐1996
10

The
Role
of
the
International
Community

30

Conclusion

34

Recommendations

35

Appendices

37

INTRODUCTION


1996

In many respects, the Nigerian crisis has worsened since the
publication of The Crisis of Nationhood 1, the Parliamentary Human Rights
Group’s last report of June 1995. Several of the cases to which the 1995
report drew attention and on the basis of which the Group urged the
international community to take decisive actions received less than adequate
attention from the international community. Of the numerous violations
highlighted in that earlier report, the unfair trial and extra-judicial execution of
Ken Saro Wiwa, the author and environmental campaigner and eight other
Ogoni activists exercised world’s conscience the most and catapulted the
Nigerian crisis of the last three years to the international media’s front pages.
Even so, the opprobrium sufferred by the regime only lasted a few
months. The Commonwealth organisation [which, rather belatedly, took the
most decisive action by suspending Nigeria from the body at the Auckland
summit] had found its position undermined by conflicting views within the
Ministerial Action Group charged with responsibility to recommend
appropriate measures on the Nigerian question - between those in favour of
comprehensive sanctions against the junta, notably Canada, New Zealand
and Jamaica and those against led by Britain ably supported by Ghana.
Through a game of carrots and stick diplomacy, the military junta preyed on
the desperation of other international organisations angling for relevance
outside of the Commonwealth and tried successfully in luring the United
Nations and the Organisation of Africa Unity to dissociate themselves from
the worldwide sanctions campaign against the military junta.1 In the event,
even unilateral actions by countries with sufficient mettle to make the junta
buckle suffered as the United States and the European Union refrained from
imposing any serious measures under the pretext of searching for
comprehensive multilateral arrangement. Even the few measures imposed
became subject to different interpretations giving countries sufficient excuse
for not implementing them.
Meanwhile, there is little evidence to show that the regime has been
honest even in its dealings with individuals, countries and organisations who
chose to invest in it some measure of confidence. Nor has the human rights
conditions in the country improved in spite of the various facades put in place
since last year’s report. If anything, the efforts to appease through
“constructive engagement” and not transform through decisive measures
underlines why the regime gets hardened by the day. But it also explains why
the attempt to manage rather than overhaul the nation-state project is now in
severe jeopardy in Nigeria. While most Nigerians are still in favour of a truly
federal country, many Nigerians of unimpeachable nationalist credentials
have started to question the viability of the nation-state if it is left in the hands
of a unitarist military junta. The most worrying dimension of this drift from
nationalism to balkanisation is the loss of hope in due process, and the
growing resort to violence, as all avenues for legitimate and peaceful
challenge to the illegalities of the military regime remain blocked. Following a
spate of arson attacks and assasinations of vocal opponents of the regime,
there is repeated allegation of state sponsored terrorism. Equally, bomb
attacks on military and other institutions of state have led discerning analysts
to conclude that the absence of decisive international intervention may have
given the “militarist” wing of the opposition an edge over peaceful, and

1
In the wake of the judicial murder, opposition groups and human rights organisations launched a
report, The Oil Weapon: The Case for Sanctions against the Nigerian military regime. Present at the
launch was the Shadow Foreign Minister, Tony Lloyd MP who informed the audience that a future
Labour government will implement a comprehensive trade embargo, targetting oil in particular if the
situation remained unchanged.


1996

democratic means of resolving the Nigerian crisis. It may be the case that
Nigerians do not want a violent resolution of the crisis after going through one
bloody civil war but there is a clear groundswell against continued military
rule. The issue remains how to achieve the latter peacefully on the basis of
the people’s expressed wishes.
This year’s report confirms the fact that Nigeria’s military dictatorship
requires a systematic abuse of fundamental human rights to maintain its
increased centralisation of political power since legitimacy is denied it by the
people’s free will. The report catalogues various human rights violations
ranging from the violation of the rights of citizens to choose their rulers to
extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions of politicians, human
rights workers and pro-democracy activists to harassment of journalists, and
intimidation of independent media. It underlines the lack of freedom of
movement, association and expression. It also highlights the increasing flight
of respected opposition figures into exile to indiscriminate arrests of relatives
in place of wanted critics.
The report examines the role of the international community in the
light of the recently published findings of the United Nations Fact Finding
team that visited Nigeria between March 29 and April 10, 1996. In particular,
it highlights the independent UN mission’s confirmation of the following
human rights violations documented in last year’s Parliamentary Human
Rights Group’s report on Nigeria: the abolition of habeas corpus in Nigeria,
the military junta’s regular flouting of court orders, decisions and judgements;
harassment of the media, including detention of journalists without trial,
proscription of newspapers and radio stations for criticising the regime or
publishing materials critical of the government; the military’s seizure of control
of labour unions and professional associations, abolition of due process, the
undermining of the judiciary’s impartiality and the right of appeal; widespread
detention of citizens without charges and without trial.
Within this context, the role of the United Kingdom is specifically
addressed not only as the immediate constituency of the Parliamentary group
but also as Nigeria’s former colonial master. In the light of this historical
antecedents, the report looks into the extent of Britain’s fulfillment of the
expectation of the world community. Also examined are the steps taken by
the Commonwealth since its justified outrage which led to Nigeria’s
suspension after the Ogoni nine were executed. The report expresses doubt
about the military regime’s stated intention to return the country to democratic
dispensation and makes specific recommendations to the Nigerian
government and the international community on the most appropriate
mechanisms for resolving Nigeria’s crisis of nationhood.

‘Transition Without End’2: Arbitrary violation of the rights of
citizens to choose their rulers
Of the several arguments used by the current military regime - it is the
one about its stated commitment to return the country to democracy that its
2
“Politics of Transition without end” is the title of a forthcoming book on Nigeria’s failed democratic
experiment of the last eight years edited by Oye Oyediran, Larry Diamond and Anthony Kirk-Greene.


1996

legitimacy is hinged. On October 1, 1995 following relentless pressure on the
regime to relinquish office since it overthrew the quasi-military interim regime
headed by Chief Shonekan in November 1993, General Abacha announced a
three year plan to install democracy in October 1998. In the National day
speech, he spoke about combating corruption, accepted the principles of
derivation and rotational presidency and promised to create more states in a
country where only two of the 30-states are economically viable. He
announced a military appointed Transition Implementation Committee, a
National Electoral Commission and a State Creation, Local Government and
Boundary Adjustment Committee. To buttress this stated commitment, the
regime and its officials cite the holding of the local government election on a
non-party basis in March 1996 as evidence of its firm and irrevocable
commitment to handover power to a democratically elected civilian
administration. Indeed, according to its High Commissioner in the United
Kingdom, the success of the local government elections led the Leader of
United States’ Observers, to say “the people have demonstrated their
acceptance of the political transition programme of the Federal government”3
The irony of the United States Embassy’s denial that it had no observer team
at the election was completely lost on the regime’s spokesman in the UK.
The fact that the team of observers also turned out to be paid agents of the
regime’s foreign lobbyists in the United States was discounted in the High
Commisioner’s judgement. Obviously, the contradiction of an unelected
regime imposing democracy on its victims is completely lost on General
Abacha.
Taken on its face value and based on the evidence of the regime’s
transition programme so far, it seems improbable that General Abacha
intends to leave office. Indeed, it will be no exaggeration to conclude that he
intends to succeed himself either directly or through surrogate forces.
Generally, discerning observers have noted that the Transition programme
announced by General Abacha on October 1, 1995 is in several respects a
copy of the one imposed on Nigerians by his military predecessor, General
Ibrahim Babangida in 1987.[see Appendix 1 for the two programmes] Indeed,
many have argued that the October 1 speech is remarkably similar to a
transition postponement address to the Nation by General Babangida on
November 17, 1992, exactly a year before General Abacha seized power.
The above apart, independent political analysts have also suggested
that the March 1996 local election on a non-party basis provides the first
concrete evidence of the regime’s determination to violate Nigerians’ right to
choose their democratic leaders. Not only were those elections riven by
‘mass banning, rigging and outright intimidation of credible candidates, giving
room to the junta’s lackeys to claim “victory”4, the similarities in the methods
used to that of the erstwhile military regime is exemplified by the various
decrees promulgated. For example, Section 45(1) of Decree No.6 of 1996
which empowers the Head of State to remove from office a council chairman
or an elected councillor if he is found “compromising his ‘non-partisan’
political standing or to be using public funds to advance the cause of a
political party or association” bore remarkable resemblance to General
Babangida’s infamous Section 34 of Decree 15 of 1989 which empowered the
then Head of State to remove elected representatives at will.

3
Acting High Commissioner’s letter to Lord Avebury, Chairman, Parliamentary Human Rights Group,
ref.BA.55/5, 11 April 1996.
4
Ike Okonta, “An election that never held,” Nigeria Now (London) Volume 5, Nos.3 & 4, (April-May
1996), p.8.


1996

Furthermore, in the effort to legitimise its own version of democratic
transition, the regime betrayed its hidden intentions by ignoring one of the
fundamental planks of democratic change: divergence of views and tolerance
of critical opinion. Although General Abacha in his speech on October 1, 1995
unbanned three major national newspaper groups hitherto proscribed since
June 1994 - [The Punch, Concord and the Guardian groups whose cases
were highlighted in last years’ report,] freedom of expression especially on
political rights remained a rare commodity. Indeed, Section 6 of the Transition
Decree No.1 of 1996 prescribes fines and imprisonment for those who
criticise the regime’s transition programme. Not only will the regime not brook
any critical view of its transition programme, as Nigerians soon found out in
the case of nationalist icon and Leader of the National Democratic Coalition
[NADECO], Chief Anthony Enahoro, its operatives were ready to use any
means in silencing the vocal opposition.
For suggesting to the country that General Abacha subject his own
three year transition programme alongside NADECO’s proposal of a one year
transition programme to a ‘military controlled’ referendum [see appendix II for
Chief Enahoro’s call for referendum], the elder statesman was forced to take
“evasive action”5 after a visit by unknown gunmen to his Sheraton Hotel base
in Ikeja, South West Nigeria. After remaining underground for a lengthy period
of time, he finally managed to flee the country in May 1996(See section on
Human rights situation). Prior to and since his flight abroad, other prominent
and vocal opponents of the regime have lost their lives in mysterious
circumstances described by some analysts as state sponsored terrorism. The
assassination of the wife of the detained winner of the 1993 election, Mrs
Kudirat Abiola on June 4, 1996 has underlined the rapid deterioriation in the
violation of human and political rights. Although who is killing who remains
unclear, the climate of terror that has been created by the regime since it
seized power cannot go uncited in the spate of attacks on individuals with well
known political views in particular and the increasing threat to life and
property in the country, in general. Perhaps this is what led the United
States’ Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Democracy, Mr John
Shattuck to tell the Cable News Network [CNN] after a recent visit to Nigeria,
“There is a reign of terror in the land...There is the equivalent in Nigeria of a
Russian Gulag.”
With the society so atomised by fear and willed into being by the
desperate authoritarian hands of state, it would seem that the hope of the
ruling junta is that Nigerians will become permanently beholden to its political
machinations and military machismo. Perhaps more crucial to the erosion of
the rights of Nigerians to decide their political fate is the ominous message
contained in these seemingly disparate but inextricably intertwined political
actions. The increasing desire to clamp down on the vocal opposition under
the slightest excuse negates the very principles of democracy the current
regime espouses. As this report went to press, three elder statesmen and
prominent leaders of NADECO, Chief Solanke Onasanya (80), Senator
Abraham Adesanya (76) and Chief Olu Adebanjo (73) have been taken into
custody ostensibly under the pretext of ‘routine interrogation’ in connection
with the killing of Mrs Abiola.
As the process of engineering consent takes shape in the civil society,
sterner measures are being put in place in the barracks. With the recent
retirements in the military, General Abacha is believed to have raised the
stakes in the struggle for the control of the military constituency which is
crucial to the control of the entire political establishment. It is this complete

5
David Pallister, “Abiola relatives held ‘to help murder inquiry”, The Guardian(London) 15 June 1996.


1996

personalisation of political power and the total abandonment of the erstwhile
facade of a collegial military regime whose strength is drawn from a wider
military constituency that is being seen as the strongest evidence of the
General Abacha’s quest for succeeding himself in office. Skeptics insist that
this abandonment of a supposedly institutional project to the rule of the
individual autocrat completely dents any hope of a military that will not stay in
power “ a day longer than necessary” and reinforces the perception now
known as “Military politricks” in academic and activists circles.6
Devoid of any superior arguments to that of its political opponents, the
regime increasingly resorts to diversionary measures to legitimise itself.
Given the fact that public opinion is tired of military adventurism and is
permanently desirous of exercising its rights to have a civilian democratic
government, the attempt to cast mainstream politics as the threat to the
people’s free will has met with a resounding failure. While politicians may be
discredited for their lack of principles, Nigerians are increasingly of the view
that however imperfect the process of conciliating naturally different interests
is, it is still incomparable to tyranny, oligarchy, dictatorship and despotism
which has been their lot for at least twenty seven out of Nigeria’s thirty six
years of political independence. It is for the above reason that Nigerians
continue to argue that a flawed democracy is better than the most benevolent
military regime, not to mention a military regime which has even failed to
confer on them any of the modernising characteristics like discipline, honesty,
frugality and honour with which some cases of military intervention have been
justified in other parts of the world.
Even in the area of anti-corruption crusades where General Sani
Abacha’s regime has earned some kudos from analysts and political
commentators, it is too early to say what the regime’s real intentions are. It is
clear however that there is more to this crusade than meets the ordinary
eyes. Three crucial points about its variegated nature ought to be made,
namely - the lack of due process in the work of the Failed Bank’s Tribunal
now trying corrupt bankers especially with regard to arrests and detention of
alleged suspects, the substantially skewed nature of arrests which leaves out
those with military connections and the superficial measures adopted which
are only tough on bank corruption and not on the causes of the banks’ failure.
Observers have argued that the role played for instance by the regime in
which General Abacha was defacto deputy in foisting the bank deregulation
programme on the country also needs to come under critical scrutiny.7
Given its determination to erode the rights of Nigerians to decide how
they will be governed of their own free will, the politics of transition without
end has taken on a wider manipulation strategy, even as the pressure for the
military to quit assumed a new vigour in the local and international
community. While there may be some variations in the current regime’s plans
to distinguish itself from the previous military regime, the evidence suggests

6
Kayode Fayemi, “Nigeria’s Military Politricks”, Nigeria Now (London), Vol.5, Nos.3 &4, (April-May
1996), pp.4-7.
7
For a comprehensive analysis of the regime’s anti-corruption crusade, see Kayode Fayemi, “The truth
behind General Abacha’s anti-corruption crusade”, Nigeria Now (London) Volume 5, No.6, June 1996.
Also see report of the Savannah Bank of Nigeria’s conference on Bank Fraud in West Africa
Magazine, 1-7 July, 1996


1996

that this can only be in form rather than substance.8 Just like the Babangida
regime, it is prepared to feed the international community with the usual
weasel words that it can continuously renege on with yet more convoluted
logic. Backed with the machinery of repression inside the country, its record
of human rights violation since the publication of Crisis of Nationhood 1 last
year gives little confidence that this is a regime willing to put in place a
pluralist democratic dispensation were it possible for such an undemocratic
force to do this.
Beyond the vagaries of the current experiment however, one myth the
current transition programme seeks to perpetuate is that the main event that
brought the country to this near state of collapse - the annulled June 12
presidential election should be forgotten because it is irrelevant to the
Nigerian body politic. Although this is the position the regime and its officials
are selling to the world9, it would seem not to be the views of the fourteen
million Nigerians who voted in that election. Indeed, perhaps no other issue
exemplifies their belief of the military regime’s desperation to violate their
fundamental rights to choose their democratic leaders than this particularly
unfortunate incident in the life of the precarious nation state. Unlike most
things in the country, the strength of views on the annuled election seem not
to have been caught in collective amnesia unless with regime apologists. If
anything, the general view remains that no political resolution is possible in
Nigeria without the events of June 1993 serving as a departure point.
Even as there exists no consensus among the supporters of the
mandate on how best to actualise it amid doubts, despair and tactical
differences, there is still a very strong conviction that a future democratic state
can only be built on the foundation of restoring the truncated mandate of June
12 1993. However, the call by the democratic opposition for a sovereign
national conference recognises the fact that the June 12 election is not an
end in itself but a way of creating and consolidating the democratic space
toward ensuring the full democratisation of the country.
The current regime and its officials believe that the June 12 mandate
can be wished away and every means is being applied to make this a reality.
Through a mixed bag of terror tactics and conciliatory gestures the regime
continues to confuse less discerning observers about its intentions. On the
one hand, the regime would have the world believe that its transition
programme is on course as the junta’s representatives recently tried to
bamboozle the Commonwealth Ministerial Group in London. According to
these parallel diplomats of the Nigerian dictatorship, parties are being formed.
freedom of association, of movement and of expression flourish in an
uninhibited manner. On the other hand, the same advocates of international
understanding and constructive engagement tend not to vouch completely for
the commitment of the regime to relinquishing power in 1998 as promised.
The best one gets from them is the hope that the regime “does what it
promises to do.”
Aside from these make-believe scenarios sold to outsiders as the
regime’s unique advantage, the reality is that the state security apparatuses
continue to arrest citizens at will, stop peaceful assemblies and blocks

8
In one significant respect, there is a strong suggestion that the military may abandon any explicit
disavowal of political involvement. or any notion of the military in governance as an abberration. Some
political actors believe that while several parties (up to eight) may be registered in the current
scenario, including one opposition grouping, the ultimate outcome will see the success of a military or
military backed party with General Abacha as its candidate. It is believed in pro-military circles that
the Rawlings example of 1992 in Ghana can be replicated in Nigeria.
9
For the latest example of the regime’s effort at rewriting the June 12 election history, please see “June
12 and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria, (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1996)


1996

freedom of movement by incessant seizure of travelling passports. [see
section on human rights situation]. What may not be immediately apparent to
the less discerning outsider is the form and content of party formation and the
inherent booby traps placed within the registration regulations. For example,
the regime’s National Electoral Commission guidelines unlike what is
applicable in every civilised countries legislate on how parties should run their
organisations, disallow independent candidates from running if they wish; and
prefers open ballot to secret ballot. Besides, only with at least 40,000
“authenticated passport photographs of members in every state will be eligible
for registration.” The last condition may seem ordinary to outsiders but it is
almost impossible in Nigeria given the logistical problems likely to be
encountered. All these guidelines are themselves guided by provisions of a
constitution purportedly in existence but which no party or individual has seen.
It does not exist and has not been signed into law. Even by the junta’s
standard disregard for anything legal, their advisers ought to know that
provisions can not be made on the basis of law that is non-existent.
What seems clear in the interim is that these booby traps are aimed at
blocking those perceived to be “enemies” of the regime’s attempt to decide
who rules Nigeria in particular, and a general attempt to decide its successors
by open manipulation and remote control. Interestingly, these tactics are still
backed by arbitrary arrests and harassment of political opponents, refusal of
the right to peaceful assembly, intimidation of journalists and human rights
activists, closure of independent newspapers which question the logic of the
current transition, violation of rule of law and international covenants to which
Nigeria is a signatory, and, increasingly resorts to extra-judicial measures
against real and perceived enemies of the state. All these violations are
detailed in the next section of this report.

HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN NIGERIA, 1995 - 96


1996

Since the publication of Crisis of Nationhood 1, the plethora of reports
and fact finding missions to Nigeria10 for the purpose of investigating human
rights abuse underlines the ever worsening scale of human rights violations
under the current military regime. At no time in the history of Nigeria has so
much attention been focussed on any regime’s human rights record than now.
This unusual attention by the international community should have been
unnecessary if the regime has not gone to several lengths to trample on the
freedom and rights of the Nigerian people.
Ironically, General Abacha cannot see the point of the concerns
expressed by the broad spectrum of the international community. The
General and other regime officials continue to insist that the regime is a
respecter of human rights, upholder of justice and the rule of law whose
efforts are only aimed at restoring democracy and ensuring the safety and
security of its citizens. To buttress this assertion, the regime cites a variety of
steps taken in recent times such as its recent inauguration of the Nigerian
Human Rights Commission - whose handpicked members are described as
independent11, its exemption of armed forces personnel from Judicial
Tribunals and the recent abrogation of Decree No.14 of 1994 which removed
court powers to order that persons held under Decree 2 of 1987 be produced
in court.12 These were not steps voluntary taken by the regime, neither are
they far reaching in reality. Human rights and democracy activists in the
country have in fact described them as “cosmetic steps...deceptive
smokescreen calculated to impress the international community.” Coming in
the wake of the severe indictment in the report of the United Nations’ Fact
Finding mission to the country in March 1996 and just days before its
representatives were to meet Commonwealth officials, it is difficult to
conclude otherwise.
In substantive terms, what these concessions amounted to is the
culpability of the regime for the murder committed against the Ogoni nine
without a corresponding admission of that guilt. The fact that the regime has
now granted convicted persons the right of appeal against tribunal’s decisions
can not explain why such rights were not honoured in the Ogoni nine case.
Besides, not many in the human rights and political community believe that
anything has changed with these obnoxious decrees. First, the most
notorious one, Decree No.2 of 1984 is still in the military statute books. As
many in the human rights community continue to insist, the regime has

10
See for example, Michael Birnbaum QC, Nigeria: Fundamental Rights Denied: Report of the Trial of
Ken Saro Wiwa, published by Article 19 in association with the Bar Human Rights Committee of
England and Wales and the Law Society of England and Wales; CHRI, Nigeria: Stolen by Generals -
Abuja after the Harare Commonwealth Declaration, Report of a Mission by the non-governmental
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, September 1995; Final Communique of the 2nd Extra-
Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peopls’ Rights, 18th - 19th December
1995 Kampala, Uganda; US Department of State: Country Report on Human Rights Practices for
1995, Washington, February 1996; Final Communique of the meeting of the Commonwealth
Ministerial Action Group Meeting, London 23-24 April 1996 and Report of the United Nations’ Fact
Finding Mission to Nigeria, June 23 1996.
11
In one dramatic reaction to the inclusion of one of its members, the respected Civil Liberties
Organisation, issued a statement dissociating its members’ involvement in a body set up by a regime
“actively assaulting every single human rights guaranteed to Nigerians under their constitution..” It
continued, .we wish to make it clear that the CLO will not, and can never be a party to a charade
called the National Human Rights Commission under an oppressive and dictatorial regime such as
the Abacha led military junta”, the statement concluded.
12
The two new decrees promulgated are - the Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) Amendment Decree
of 1996, which removes military personnel from physically serving on Special Tribunals and grants an
appellate right to accused persons. The second decree is the State Security (Detention of Persons
Repeal) Decree of 1996.

NIGERIA: CRISIS OF NATIONHOOD II
10

1996

remained silent on whether it would repeal Decree No.12 (Supremacy and
Enforcement of Powers) of 1994 which gives supremacy to whatever action
the government takes while section 4 of Decree 2, the State Security
(Detention of Persons) of 1984 which ousts the jurisdiction of the courts from
questioning anything done under the decree has not been repealed. Second,
judges are still tied to the apron strings of the military generals and those
among them who dispense justice without any regard to the regime’s
positions end up giving orders, decisions and judgements which are regularly
flouted or simply ignored by regime officials.

More importantly, the recent steps taken may mean a change in the
tactics of repression by the regime. In fact, some within the vocal opposition
see in it the beginnings of South African style “third force”, the notorious
combination of security forces and civilian rogue elements who were
responsible for fomenting violence in apartheid South Africa in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. It is difficult to know the truth behind these allegations, but
there has been a history of alliances between law enforcement agents and
criminals. Police officers have been known to supply weapons to criminals for
a fee. In recent times, there is a strong circumstantial evidence that political
assasinations and extra-judicial murders have become a permanent feature of
Nigeria’s unstable political terrain and it is not unlikely that the pattern of the
recent killings betrays a sinister dimension that is more than criminal intent.
The fact that most of the victims have also been vocal critics of the regime
has raised a few eyebrows in the human rights community.Extra-Judicial
killings, arson and torture

Extra-judicial killings, arson and torture

a) Extra-judicial killings

As the 1995 report highlighted, the crisis that engulfed oil-rich Ogoniland
presents the most gory example of extra-judicial killings in the last three
years. On November 10, 1995 this culminated in the state hanging of nine
minority rights activists of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People
[MOSOP], including their president, celebrated writer and activist, Ken Saro
Wiwa. Barinem Kiobel, Baribor Bera, John Kpuniem, Paul Levura,
Saturday Dorbee, Felix Nwate, Nordu Earwo and Daniel Gbokoo were
also victims of what the regime has now indirectly accepted as extra-judicial
murders. Both the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative mission report of
September 1995 and the United States Country report on Nigeria’s human
rights 1996 highlighted other extra-judicial murders related to robbery.
Indeed, Nigerian newspapers regularly report on bodies dumped in cemetries
without any explanation by government officials. There have been various
speculations as to whether these were soldiers feared dead in the Liberian
peacekeeping missions or victims of the extra-judicial murders in Ogoniland.
[see appendix III ]

11

1996

Even in the cases of extra-judicial killings of alleged armed robbers
which is generally seen as less deserving of any sympathy, it is important to
place it wthin its socio-economic context. In the face of severe economic and
social deprivation, armed robbery has become a rampant problem in the
urban parts of the country. This material fact has led however to
indiscriminate killings of those suspected to be involved in robbery even when
unarmed. In August 1995, the Lagos State Commissioner of Police, Mr
James Danbaba boasted of his men killing 30 suspected armed robbers in a
series of raids in July 1995. This type of indiscriminate killings is replicated in
other parts of the country including the rural areas where armed vigilantes
roam the streets and sometimes kill and maim. Even though this has been a
feature of the Nigerian nation prior to the seizure of power by the Abacha led
junta, this violation of fundamental human rights of an accused person to be
charged and tried in accordance to the due processes of law and justice
exemplifies the regime’s distaste for the rule of law and proper procedures.
So intense is this distaste that most criminal offences had been taken out of
the jurisdiction of the courts to tribunals managed, controlled and sometimes
directed by soldiers. Yet what is lost in due process has not produced any
tangible gains in efficiency or crime reduction. Neither has it served as a
deterrent to armed robbers, many of who are said to be unemployed
graduates forced into this unenviable lifestyle as a way of survival. If
anything, the “shoot at sight” policy of the armed forces and the police has
only succeeded in militarising the society. This is now reflected in the
incidence of assassinations which is made more poignant by the all pervasive
climate of fear in the country.
The assassination for example on October 7, 1995, of Pa Alfred
Rewane, elder statesman and well known critic of the military dictatorship
gave the first worrying signal of the existence of a shadowy assassination
squad. Pa Rewane was at the time of his assassination a major financier and
stalwart of the umbrella opposition grouping -National Democratic Coalition
[NADECO]. He was drowned in a hail of bullets inside his Lagos apartment.
Although the police claimed it arrested some suspects in connection with the
murder, human rights workers in the country have insisted that the police
ought to have followed up the strange coincidence of a certain “Committee of
friends” taking advertisements in the Nigerian newspapers against Pa
Rewane just before his untimely death. In one of their adverts titled, “Rewane,
IBB and Public Accountability”, the Committee of Friends warned Rewane to
desist from accusing ex-military Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida of
corruption. The advert ended with an ominous warning that “he should take
this as Number One.” Yet, law enforcement agencies refused to look at any
other options apart from seeing every murder case as the handiwork of
“hoodlums and armed robbers”.

12

1996

By June 4, 1996, even those who had hitherto given credence to
police stories that the spate of assassinations were indeed the handiwork of
hoodlums started to think otherwise. On that day, the outspoken wife of the
detained winner of the 1993 election, Mrs Kudirat Olayinka Abiola was
murdered in broad daylight, a few meters away from a police checkpoint.
Nothing was stolen by those the police immediately referred to as “hoodlums.”
Again, because of the focus of international attention on the assassination of
a woman who had become the most vocal symbol of the June 12 mandate in
the Abiola household, police investigators quickly changed their initial
asessment accepting the possibility that it could be an assassination. To
justify their change of heart however, several members of the Abiola family
including Chief Abiola’s first son and business manager, Kola who was still in
detention at the time this report went to press, were arrested. Equally
detained for interrogation are prominent National Democratic Coalition’s
leaders, 80 year old Chief Solanke Onasanya, Senator Abraham Adesanya,
Chief Ayo Adebanjo, and Chief Ganiyu Dawodu. Several others including
lawyers, friends of the deceased and casual aquaintances have not escaped
the interrogators’ subpoena. As the octogenerian leader of NADECO, Chief
Adekunle Ajasin argued, “it is unreasonable to link Kudirat’s death with any
NADECO member because she was a friend of the association.” Discerning
observers have also argued that these arrests would appear to be purely
diversionary especially in the wake of the regime’s offer of reward for
information with regard to this particular assassination. Many wonder why the
tentacles of the interrogators busy arresting friends, family members and
close political associates of the murdered woman have refused to wander in
the direction of her well known enemies.
There is credible evidence that the security service had been on Mrs
Abiola’s trail for two months prior to her death. There is also evidence that
she was arrested, detained and charged to court for being in possession of
“seditious material” in May, just a month before her killing. That the regime
saw Mrs Abiola as the stumbling block against their effort to obtain the family
support in exchange for the release of the detained election winner has also
never been in doubt. In fact, Nigerian newspapers were regularly awash with
statements by people who profess their closeness to the regime asserting that
her ‘obduracy’ was primarily responsible for the delay in her husband’s
release from detention. This eventually led to some family schisms between
those regarded as moderates and ready to let go the electoral mandate given
Chief Abiola and those who insist that it must be actualised. Hence, in the
absence of any concrete evidence yet of state sponsored terrorism (and many
don’t believe the one track direction of police investigations will produce any),
Kudirat’s death is generally being interpreted as a message from those who
are seeking to convey in the most violent terms possible the fact that they will
not tolerate opposition, protest or change.
The climate for this message had been created earlier with the
attempted assassination of Mr Alex Ibru, the publisher of the liberal
newspaper, The Guardian and the murder in broad daylight of Rear Admiral
Eddy Omotehinwa, a retired naval officer known to be close to one of
NADECO’s chieftains in exile - retired General Alani Akinrinade in May.
There is evidence that the upward spiral of political assassinations may not
abate in the coming months. It is even possible to conjecture a backlash from
within the ranks of the opposition where peaceful agitators are being sidelined
by those who argue that their diplomatic and non-violent strategies have
failed.

13

1996

b) Arson
Since the nationwide strike of July to September 1994, arson has
become a regular weapon used against opponents of the military junta. On
August 26 1994, Chief Gani Fawehinmi and retired Air-Commodore Dan
Suleiman, prominent leaders of the pro-democracy movement both suffered
arson attacks on their residences. The State organised terrorists left an
ominous message with Chief Fawehinmi’s house guards, “we will kill you, we
will kill your boss because he is an opponent of this government.” Since then,
several newspapers, interestingly always those critical of the military, had
experienced arson attacks in mysterious circumstances (see section on
press). In May 1996, the Lagos residence of retired General Alani Akinrinade
was fire bombed by “unknown hoodlums” and his son barely escaped being
burnt alive. Although regime officials regularly deny any knowledge of these
attacks, there has always been an uncanny link to government operatives.
Prior to the attack on retired General Akinrinade’s house in May 1996, a
military panel had secretly accused him and other retired officers - Brigadier-
General David Mark and Colonel Sambo Dasuki of responsibility for the
sporadic attacks on military installations in the country.13 The arson attack
occurred around the same time relatives of Brigadier-General David Mark
were assaulted in Lagos by “unknown persons” who warned that they should
take that as “number one”. It also coincided with the deposition of Colonel
Sambo Dasuki’s father the supreme caliph in the north - the Sultan of Sokoto.
These seemingly disparate incidences would appear inextricably intertwined
and controlled from a single source. The most probable source would appear
to be the ruling military junta and/or its agents.
c) Torture
In the period covered by this report, July 1995 - June 1996, torture
remained a regular tool of the law enforcement agencies and other security
apparatuses. It is no secret that police, armed forces and environmental task
force officials regularly beat, torture and sometimes kill their victims due to
excessive use of force. Although this is also consistently denied by the
regime, eye witness accounts and all the recently published independent
human rights reports have cited the increasing tendency of security officials to
“take the laws into their hands”. Political prisoners, including the detained
winner of the presidential election, Chief MKO Abiola, have been victims of
torture and severe beatings. Before his release after one year of incarceration
since January 1995, the Campaign for Democracy’s Secretary-General,
Sylvester Odion-Akhaine was reportedly beaten and thrown out of a moving
truck on his release from jail. Before then, letters smuggled out of prison cells
by military officers and civilians arraigned before the Brigadier-General Aziza
panel for the alleged coup plot of March 1995 confirmed human rights bodies’
allegations regarding torture of the accused by military intelligence officers.14
There were claims, not denied by government that Colonel Lawan Gwadabe,
Colonel R.S.B.Fadile and Major Akinyemi had to undergo physiotherapy from
injuries sustained from incessant torture. Another convicted human rights
activist and Chairman of the Campaign for Democracy, Dr Beko Ransome

13
Report of the Inquiry on Attacks on Military Installations by Brigadier General Oladayo Popoola to
GOCs, Corps Commanders, etc, April 29, 1996., (Lagos. Army Headquaters)
14
For detailed information on the torture of victims, see Nigeria Now, “Human Rights Monitor -Nigeria’s
House of Torture”, Volume 4, No.6, November/December 1995.

14

1996

Kuti actually referred to a certain Assistant Commissioner of Police, Alhaji Biu
as the Chief Torturer at Alagbon Police Detention Camp in Lagos.15

Arbitrary Arrests, Unlawful Detention, Unfair Trials, and Flight
to Exile

a) Arbitrary arrests and unlawful detention
It is often difficult to estimate the number of political detainees
arbitrarily arrested and unlawfully detained in Nigeria.[see appendix IV for
latest estimates] According to the US State Department Country Report
1995, “most often the authorities did not charge detainees with any crime,
held them for only brief periods and questioned them about their activities and
statements.”16 However, because it is often not known why several
thousands of Nigerians held in jail, it is no exaggeration when the United
States’ Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, Labour and
Democracy, Mr John Shattuck claimed Nigerian jails contain “thousands of
political prisoners.” While most figures of people detained without charges
are hotly disputed by human rights organisations and government agencies,
what is not disputed by prison authorities is the large presence of illegally
detained citizens. Nigeria’s leading human rights organisation, the Civil
Liberties Organisation estimates that 50,000 of Nigeria’s estimated prison
population of 65,000 are held in jail without any charge proferred against
them. The Minister of Internal Affairs, Alhaji Baba Kingibe admits to a lower
figure: According to him, 25,000 of 50,000 prisoners in jail, have never had
charges brought against them but the government is trying to rectify the
situation.17 Even if one accepts the Ministers’ figures, it seems improbable
that a regime that claims to be a great respecter of human rights would allow
this to happen in its domain especially when some of those detained without
charges were children. The CHRI report referred to earlier detailed the
appalling conditions under which children were held.18 The only reason why
the cases of these often arbitrarily arrested and unlawfully detained people
has not been highlighted is due to the fact that they are relatively unknown
unlike the more prominent leaders of the human rights and democracy
movement.
Since the tone of arbitrary arrests and unlawful detention is however
set by the number of prominent people arrested and kept behind bars, the
government continued the pattern of arrests reflected in last year’s report in
the period covered. In the month of July, prominent lawyer and human rights
activist, Gani Fawehinmi was arrested and detained for two weeks without
any charge. Also arrested in the same month were Chima Ubani, Secretary
of the Democratic Alternative, Osagie Obayuwana, one of the Campaign for
Democracy’s[CD] vice national chairmen, Abdul Oroh, Executive Director of

15
Personal communication from Dr Beko Kuti while still in detention in Lagos, June 1995.
16
US State Dept, Human Rights Report, Country Report on Nigeria, op-cit.
17
Mr Babagana Kingibe admitted this in a BBC World Service interview, May 22, 1996.
18
CHRI, Nigeria: Stolen by the Generals, op-cit.

15

1996

the Civil Liberties Organisation, Dr Tunji Abayomi, President, Human Rights
Africa and General Obasanjo’s defence lawyer. Gani Fawehinmi had been
picked up twice after the July arrest, once in September for three days along
with three other members of his National Conscience Party. They were all
charged for unlawful assembly. He was arrested again on 31st January just
before addressing a Students rally at the University of Lagos and has been
held since in Bauchi prisons despite his failing health. Prior to their arrests
and detention, Chima Ubani, Abdul Oroh and Tunji Abayomi have also been
detained without charges proferred against them since June 1995. As this
report went to press, there were unconfirmed reports that Messrs Abdul Oroh
and Tunji Abayomi had regained their freedom. Also believed to have been
released in a cosmetic gesture presaging the meeting of the Commonwealth
Ministerial Action Group with representatives of the Nigerian junta, included
two student leaders - Hilary Ojukwu and Charles Titiloye and Matthew
Popoola a human rights worker. Conditions attached to their freedom are
unknown. All of them were held under the notorious Decree No.2 of 1984
which the regime now claims to have amended. Still in detention without
charge or trial are Chief Gani Fawehinmi, National Coordinator of the National
Conscience Party currently detained in Bauchi, Barrister Femi Falana,
President of the National Association of Democratic Lawyers[NADL] arrested
at his Ikeja office on February 13, 1996 and Mr Femi Aborishade,
Fawehinmi’s deputy in the National Conscience Party arrested on February
14, 1996. Messrs Falana and Aborishade are believed to be held in Hadeija
prisons near the northern city of Kano.
Several other activists in the pro-democracy, human rights and labour
movements arrested since the national strike in 1994 remained in detention.
Frank Kokori, Secretary-General of NUPENG., John Adoga and Milton Dabibi,
Secretary-General of PENGASSAN detained without trial since January 24th
1996. Some leading democracy activists detained without charges since
1994 also regained their freedom in January 1996. Prominent among them
were Mr Demola Adeniji-Adele, the local government Chairman of Lagos
Island before the military seized power, Sylvester Odion-Akhaine, the
Campaign for Democracy’s Secretary-General, Mr Olu Akerele, an aide to
Chief M.K.O.Abiola, Mr Wale Oshun, Acting Secretary-General of NADECO,
R.Addo, ex-president of the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff
Association [PENGASSAN] and Peter Aidelomon, a branch chairman of
PENGASSAN. Also, as this report went to press, unconfirmed reports claim
that NADECO Secretary, Mr Ayo Opadokun and Chief Abiola’s personal
assistant, Mr Fred Eno have been released. It is not clear if they are asked to
report to the police for a period of time as a condition of release.
In Ogoniland, citizens continued to be subjected to arbitrary arrests
and detention by the Rivers State Internal Security Unit now under a new
officer, Major Paul Omahi after the exit of notorious Lt.Colonel Okuntimo who
dubbed himself a killing machine on British television. In August, there were
credible reports of the arrests of four MOSOP activists, Messrs Lekue Lah
Loolo, Baton Mittee, Meshack Karanwi and a cameraman. During the trial
and since the execution of the Ogoni nine, regime agents continued to
harass, arrests and detain several MOSOP activists in Ogoniland. Others like
Dr Owens Wiwa, brother of Ken Saro Wiwa went underground until they were
safe to flee for their lives.
In spite of pretensions to the contrary, the regime repeatedly detained
anyone perceived as unfriendly, including human rights workers, democracy
activists, politicians and journalists who point out the instances of executive

16

1996

lawlessness. Foreign observers were not spared this regular spectacle of
such daylight violations of peoples and human rights. For example, some
NADECO leaders were arrested during the United Nations Fact Finding
mission’s visit to the country between March 29 and April 10. In Lagos, it took
a special appeal from a member of the UN mission to secure the release of Dr
Frederick Fasheun, a NADECO leader who was arrested just before the
meeting with the UN mission at the Sheraton hotel, Lagos. Equally, on the
eve of the UN’ team’s visit to Ogoniland, there were credible reports that
many family members, MOSOP members and aides to the executed Saro
Wiwa were bundled away, and for a short period, the whereabout of Saro
Wiwa’s aged parents were unknown after a raid on the house by Major Paul
Omahi’s Internal Security Task Force. At least eighteen others including
Anyakwee Nsirimonvu, executive director of the Institute of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law [IHRHL] based in Port Harcourt were detained for several
days in late March and early April.
Such arbitrary arrests and detentions were to continue throughout the
period of the report. The arbitrary arrests and detention in May of 13 year old
British citizen, John Paul Mokuolu detained in place of his wanted father and
17 year old Bose Lijadu, daughter of Campaign for Democracy’s Ogun State
Chairman, brought into clear relief the extent the authorities would go in
violating the fundamental human rights of citizens’, including children and
minors. The fact that the combined efforts of the British High Commission in
Nigeria and several human rights bodies failed to secure an unconditional
release for Mokuolu confirms the long held view of human rights groups that
anyone related to an activist is a target of the junta’s repressive laws. It also
laid to rest the unusual assertion by the British’ Home Office that relatives of
political targets are not in danger of being used as human shield by State
security officials. There is no reason to believe that the pattern is going to
change in the near future, the few instances of political prisoners regaining
their freedom notwithstanding.
b.) Unfair trials
If arbitrary arrests and unlawful detention were a permanent feature of
this period, unfair trial was often the consequence in cases where detainees
were charged. In the period covered in this report, three cases marked this
out. The unending saga of the detained President elect, Chief Moshood
Abiola who has now been in jail for more than two years. While the regime
continues to claim that “Chief Abiola is in police custody under judicial order
awaiting trial”, as they told the visiting UN mission, court orders sanctioning
the release of the detained politician had been regularly flouted by the
authorities. In November 1994, a Kaduna Federal Court of Appeal ordered
Chief Abiola’s release although the same court later overruled itself. In May
1995, eight supreme court justices withdrew from hearing Chief Abiola’s case
because of a libel suit involving the justices against the Concord Newspapers
group owned by Chief Abiola. This effectively truncated any hope of hearing
Chief Abiola’s case at the Supreme Court as the regime is not in a hurry to
appoint a full complement of new supreme court justices. On the other hand,
the regime has suspended the phantom treason trial it had been pursuing
against Chief Abiola indefinitely. Despite repeated calls to release Chief
Abiola whose health has deteriorated in jail, the regime continues to ignore
both international and local appeals for his release. Not even the loss of his
most senior wife in an attack that smacked more of regime culpability than
armed robbery, has persuaded the authorities to release Chief Abiola.

17

1996

As if this did not represent enough travesty of justice, the regime
announced on July 14 that it had convicted 40 of the 51 persons interrogated
in connection with the so called coup plot of March 1995. They were given
various jail terms ranging from life to six months for treason, conspiracy,
concealment of treason and accessory to treason. Some were declared
wanted for their roles19, seven were released and one was cleared of charges
but kept in prison for undisclosed reasons. Among those convicted following
the trumped up charges included ex- Head of State, retired General Olusegun
Obasanjo, his ex-deputy, retired Major -General Shehu Yar’adua, Chairman
of the Campaign for Democracy, Dr Beko Kuti and one of his National Vice
Chairs, Malam Shehu Sanni who both received twenty five years jail terms
later communted to fifteen years imprisonment. Others included General
Abacha’s former Principal Staff Officer, Colonel Lawan Gwadabe and former
Army Director of Legal Services, Colonel RSB Fadile. Even journalists were
not spared in this onslaught against the perceived ‘enemies of the regime.
Kunle Ajibade of TheNews, Ben-Charles Obi of Weekend Classique, George
Mbah of Tell Magazine and Ms. Chris Anyanwu of TSM [see the section on
press freedom violations] were also jailed. As the 1995 report extensively
detailed, the coup plot was widely seen as nothing but a figment of the
regime’s imagination. Credible reports insist that the whole coup story was a
carefully designed ploy by the military regime to perpetuate a myth of
invincibility by picking on the most vocal section of the opposition within and
outside the military in order to silence the rest of the populace [see Appendix
V for a full list of those affected and their sentences]
Of all the unfair trials during this period, the Ogoni minority leaders trial
and execution stood out. The 1995 report presciently noted that “in spite of
legal orchestrations, it is believed that the trial is a prosection of a political
agenda aimed at brutally aborting the Ogoni struggles which are encouraging
other oil producing communities in the Niger Delta to protest the status quo of
political marginalisation and environmental degradation.” We further went on
to state that, “even though Ken Saro Wiwa has always maintained that their
struggle was a non-violent one, the regime in connivance with Shell
Petroleum are insistent on making him a scapegoat.”20
The above was precisely what happened on November 10, 1995 as
Commonwealth Heads of State gathered in Auckland, New Zealand for their
bi-ennial summit. As the United Nations mission which visited Nigeria to
investigate the trial concluded, the constitution of the special tribunal, the lack
of an investigative panel as a prelude to the tribunals’ work and the “overall
procedures actually followed in the course of the trial were not fair.”21 The
mission then pointed out in greater detail what it considered as critical
elements of the trial’s unfairness. Namely, the accused’ lack of access to
lawyers prior to the start, and during the trials, inhumane treatment between
detention time on 21 May 1994 till the time the trial began in 6 February 1995;
access to counsel limited by the inhuman conditions in the prisons thus
precluding attorney/client confidentiality; involvement of the military junta in all
phases of the trial; harassment of defence counsels by police and internal
security task force, refusal of materials critical to the defence of the accused
persons, prosecution’s reception of witnesses’ evidence under duress and
19
Retired Colonels Tony Nyiam and Sambo Dasuki and Mr Great Ogboru were declared wanted in
connection with the alleged coup plot.
20
See “Nigeria: The Crisis of Nationhood I: An historical perspective on the state of human rights and
democracy”, (London: Parliamentary Human Rights Group) June 1995, p.14.
21
Report of the United Nations mission to Nigeria, New York: United Nations Publications Divison, June
23, 1996

18

1996

finally the tribunal’s refusal to stay proceedings despite a request from the
Appeal court to so do.22
Although the regime had acceded to some of the mission’s requests
for the removal of military men from special tribunals, it continued to argue
that the Special Tribunals decree preceded this regime’s seizure of power.
This argument, self serving as it is, obfuscates more than it explains. The fact
that an arbitrary law has been in existence and used before does not make it
a good law, only that those operating it are as bad if not worse than those
who used it in the past. In effect, what is needed is not cosmetic accessions
to the requests made by the United Nations but a fundamental overhaul of the
entire system that has made it possible to trample on the rights of ordinary
citizens.
c) Flight into exile
One major effect of the Ogoni extra-judicial murders was the external
flight to safety that resulted. Internal flight from the army of occupation in
Ogoniland has always been a feature of the crisis in the region. But despite
international outcry over its execution of the Ogoni leaders, the regime is
insisting on sentencing more Ogoni activists to death by hanging “if found
guilty”. No fewer than 19 are already charged for complicity in the murders for
which Ken Saro Wiwa and the others were hanged last November. Virtually
turned into an army camp where every body is in open air prison and faced
with repeated intimidation and torture, the Ogoni’s started their flight into exile.
By 29 March 1996, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees in Geneva confirmed that “about 1,000 refugees have arrived in
neighbouring Benin”23. Eye witness accounts in Benin republic have since
confirmed the desperate conditions under which these refugees exist in the
camp near Cotonou, Benin republic.
Flight into exile is however not restricted to the Ogonis. Since
repression under this military regime recognises no tribe, other prominent
leaders of the democracy and human rights movement like Chief Anthony
Enahoro have had to flee for dear life into exile. Although there remains little
evidence of forcible exile in Nigeria, the climate of terror and fear for which the
Abacha regime is responsible is at the root of the flight into exile by prominent
pro-democracy activists. The fact that their counterparts who had stayed
back in the country either ended up in the morgue or in jail vindicates the
decision of many to go into exile. At the time of going to press, many of the
prominent and otherwise unknown opposition activists and leaders are on
their way out of the country. Their desperation to leave is further heightened
by the rumoured hit list of members of the democracy movement in the
country. According to authoritative intelligence sources, the list is said to
feature leaders of the democracy movement. Among those who managed to
escape in the last three months include, Chief Enahoro, co-leader of
NADECO, his Acting Secretary, Mr Wale Oshun, and Chief Cornelius
Adebayo. They join the swelling ranks of democracy movement leaders in
exile.
Even so, many in the opposition still fear that the regime’s reach is
unlimited. On a few occasions, prominent leaders of the opposition have
been monitored and trailed by unknown persons believed to be working for
the Nigerian junta. Although it seems highly improbable for the regime to

22
ibid.
23
The Times of London, “Opposition Ogonis flee to Benin”, March 30, 1996.

19

1996

succeed in abducting or even causing opposition figures to disappear, this will
not stop efforts in this direction. After all, the Nigerian military has a history of
abducting its perceived enemies outside its shores. The case of Alhaji
Dikko’s attempted abduction in 1984 reminds keen observers that this
phenomenon cannot be discounted.

Attacks on Freedom of Movement and Violations of Freedom
of Association

a) Attacks on Freedom of movement

Since the publication of the last report, freedom of movement has
been under severe restriction in Nigeria. On a general scale, the government
has made the cost of owning travel documents unnecesarily prohibitive under
this regime. The cost of owning a passport has increased from its earlier
equivalent cost of £20 to £150 in a country where the per capita income
hovers between $250 and $300. This dramatic escalation in cost of obtaining
a passport has been accompanied by the recently announced proposal of exit
visa for people travelling out of the country without which they would be
refused the freedom to travel. Although this measure is yet to come into
effect, tickets of prospective Nigerian travellers outside the country are now
subject to reproduction by security and airport officials. No convincing
explanation has been given for this new measure but it is thought to be
another way of blocking perceived ‘enemies’ from travelling abroad especially
now when the regime see behind every failed move the unseen hands of
foreign manipulators.
Human rights activists, politicians and journalists are always subjected
to severe interrogation anytime they are travelling outside the country.
Prominent members of the human rights, pro-democracy movement and the
media have had their passports seized by the authorities on several
occasions. In September 1995, several prominent women activists including
Ms Glory Afi Kilanko, the National Coordinating Secretary of the Women in
Nigeria and Ms Bilkisu Yusuf, Executive Editor of Citizens Magazine, were
prevented from attending the Fourth United Nations’ Women’s Conference in
Beijing, China. On April 10, 1996, the travelling passports of Mr Olisa
Agbakoba, the former president of the Civil Liberties Organisation, that of his
successor, Ms Ayo Obe and Mr Tunde Olugboji, Project Officer for the
Constitutional Rights Project were seized on their way out to an International
conference in London. In the intervening months, several others lost their
passports to the security agencies. In March 1996, the passport of retired
Major General Ishola Williams, a fearless critic of military misrule was seized
by the State security operatives on orders from ‘above’ The same month,
Association of Nigerian Authors’ president and TheNews magazine columnist,
Mr Odia Ofeimun was prevented from travelling to Europe. Several others
like Chief Sobo Sowemimo, Senator Abraham Adesanya, Chief G.O.K.Ajayi
and Mr Alao Aka Bashorun have had their passports seized at various times
by the military junta.
The pattern of seizure of travel documents has continued. The
regime’s paranoia has even extended to the borders of Nigeria with her
neighbours. A suggestion to mine the borders has even been discussed at

20

1996

the highest level of government following repeated escape of prominent pro-
democracy and human rights activists through the country’s numerous porous
borders.

b) Continuing violations of freedom of professional and political
associations.
The Labour movement has come under serious attack since the
inception of the Abacha administration. Following the role played by trade
unions and professional associations in the struggle to enthrone democracy in
the country prior to June 12, 1993, in the wake of that election’s annulment,
throughout the pro-democracy agitation which followed that annulment in
1993, and its spearheading of the national strike in 1994, they have continued
to be key targets for total annihilation or at the very least, control by the
military junta.
The Abacha regime intensified this plan with the promulgation of
Decree No.9 of 1994 through which it dissolved the Nigerian Labour
Congress by fiat and placed it under a handpicked administrator and
Secretary appointed by the Labour Minister. Decree 10 - NUPENG and
PENGASSAN (Dissolution of Executive Councils) of 1994 dissolved the
executive councils of the two trade unions that had played a frontline role in
the national strikes of July to September 1994. This was after several of its
leaders were arrested and detained without trial, some are still held for close
to two years now. (see section on Unlawful arrests and detention above)
Human rights organisations have argued that by promulgating these decrees,
the military regime violated Articles 3 and 4 of the International Labour
Organisation convention concerning Freedom of Association, and Protection
of the right to organise.24
To further weaken the powers of the trade unions to organise, the
regime promulgated The Trade Union(Amedment) Decree No.4 of 1996.
Ostensibly amended to effect a reduction in the number of trade unions
through merger, it is widely believed the intention behind the decree was to
cripple the unions and undermine their independence from state apparatuses.
All sections of the amended decree are reflective of the government’s
determination to interfere in the conduct and organisation of the unions. This
attempt by the government through the Labour minister to control the labour
movement led to the resignation of the Minister’s Special Adviser, Mallam
Salisu Mohammed, who raised the alarm that the Minister was planning to
arrest labour leaders. Not too long after his resignation, the erstwhile Deputy
president of the Labour Congress and a known radical candidate for the union
leadership in the forthcoming elections, Mr Adams Oshiomole of the Textile
Union was arrested and detained on the orders of the Minister.
There is no better evidence of the regime’s intention to control the
labour movement than the way Comrade Billy Oro was manipulated out of the
Maritime Union leadership even though he was the sole candidate at the
election. The union conference was reportedly stalemated through an
injunction obtained by one Malam Aliyu Sabo Abubakar, who later owned up
to being used by the Minister of Labour. Even when the injunction was
declared null and void in court, the Minister unilaterally changed the venue of

24
Civil Liberties Organisation, “Continuing violations of Labour Rights by the Federal Military
Government of Nigeria”, Presentation of the Civil Liberties Organisation(CLO) to the United Nations
Fact Finding Mission to Nigeria: 12 April 1996.

21

1996

the conference and the election’s returning officer just to ensure that a certain
Mr Okamuna, the ministerial candidate for the presidency emerged the
winner.This tactic had been used to great effect in the past in professional
associations and trade unions perceived to be anti-government because of
their uncompromising stance in defence of workers rights. Professional
associations like the Nigerian Bar Association and the Nigerian Union of
Journalists and even the National Association of Nigerian Students[NANS]
now splintered into pro-government and pro-students factions, have all fallen
prey to this deliberate orchestration of internal schisms by the government
and its agents.
However, associations that have proved resilient to these obviously
desperate tactics do not necessarily escape the regime’s noose. - they are
simply banned. The case of the Academic Staff Union of Universities [ASUU]
remains the classic example. Rather than address the grievances of the
university teachers in terms of poor and universally incomparable pay, the
gradual deterioration of the educational standards due to lack of facilities
occasioned by bad governance and the structural adjustment programme’s
insistence on removal of education subsidy, the government resorts to
banning the lecturers’ union and threatening to dismiss its members.
University teachers have been on strike since April 29 without any serious
hope of an amicable settlement. Already, the government has resorted to the
old tactic of reneging on agreements and then proscribing the affected union.
Even newly formed political associations and socio-philantrophic
organisations have been victims of the violation of the right to freely associate
and assemble. There are credible reports that rallies and party meetings are
now subjected to repeated stoppages on the grounds that they are “unlawful
assemblies” or in “breach of peace” in a country where there is no ban on
formation of political movements.
It would appear that this elaborate effort to control the trade union
movement and regulate the freedom of associations is part of the control
mechanism put in place in the civil society. Given the critical role that
professional associations and labour have always played in every progressive
cause, including funding projects for the mass enlightenment of the masses,
it is not surprising that the regime perceives labour as a major threat to
achieving its ultimate objective of succeeding itself in office. Indeed the
Minister, Alhaji Uba Ahmed had gone on record, according to human rights
workers to say that “trade unions cannot be independent of government
because the members are citizens requiring government protection.” 25 It is
not difficult to conclude that the level of interference in the affairs of the trade
union would continue as long as the regime insists on forcing its will on the
citizens.

Violation of Freedom of Expression: Arrests, Arsons,
Proscriptions and Indirect Censorship

Of the several institutions at the receiving end of state repression, the
media has been the most hit. On seizing power in November 1993, General
Sani Abacha tried to endear his regime to the media, aware as he was of their
critical role in the demise of his predecessors . In his maiden speech, he
expressed his belief in the freedom of speech. He said his regime wanted to

25
ibid.

22

1996

maintain a “track record of not muzzling the press or impairing its ability to
perform its duties”. As we highlighted in the Parliamentary Human Rights
Report in 1995, the honeymoon with the press for want of a better word was
over barely three months after the regime seized power.

a) Physical violence and arson attacks

The first evidence of the regime’s renewed but fiercer onslaught on
Nigeria’s defiant and indomitable press came with the arrests of journalists
alongside so called coup plotters in May 1995. At this point, it became
apparent that the regime would stop at nothing in the agenda to scuttle
independent publications believed to be connected to the pro-democracy
campaign, impose its will on the media and the people of the land. Although
the country had witnessed continuing arrests of journalists from the strongly
critical section of the press, TheNews, Tell Magazine, TSM, Tempo, AM and
PM News have been targets of various military intelligence raids, they have
remained undaunted by these onslaughts.
This pattern of torture and arrest culminated in the conviction and
sentencing of journalists to several years in jail for reporting events as they
saw it. Kunle Ajibade of TheNews, Ben Charles Obi of Classique, George
Mbah of Tell Magazine and Chris Anyanwu of TSM are now langushing
behind bars as accessories to treason, for a coup plot allegation that many
believed to be largely unfounded. Other independent and inside military
sources reached the same conclusions about the alleged coup d’etat. It was
clear that the regime needed to send a message in the clearest of terms to
journalists who are insistent on pursuing the truth behind every action of the
military junta. Some, like Kunle Ajibade and Chris Anyanwu for example, who
were not even involved in writing the stories in their papers found themselves
implicated in this grand plan to unnerve opponents of military regime.
The four journalists implicated in the coup plot eventually got life jail. It
took a huge international outcry against the regime’s blatant miscarraige of
justice before their sentence was reduced to 15 years. Even this reduction of
prison terms have not saved them from been treated like criminals, subjected
to severe psychological torture and poor diet, and at least one, Mrs Chris
Anyanwu is believed to have been physically assaulted in jail. Even this has
not restrained the fascistic tactics employed by agents of the government. In
the intervening period, several journalists were harassed, arrested and
detained without charge. Among them were Chido Unoma of PM News
arrested in June 1995, Babafemi Ojudu, editor of the AM News and his news
editor, Lekan Otufodunrin were also detained in June. Osa Director, the
Norther bureau chief of the award winning magazine, Tell was arrested in
August 1995, harassed and tortured before his release on bail on October 6.
Others detained in the period leading to and after the execution of the Ogoni
9 included The Week’s magazine’s Managing editor, Chris Mammah and his
General editor, Godwin Agbroko who were both arrested and released in
September 1995. The spate of arrests intensified in the wake of the ‘judicial
murder’ of Ogoni minority rights activists, including celebrated writer and
environmentalist, Ken Saro Wiwa. On November 27, Chuks Ehirim and Tayo
Lukula both of The News Magazine stable were declared wanted for reports
on the trial and possible execution of the Ogoni activists. On December 10
1995, a 10 man squad of the State Security Services laid seige to the
premises of AM News. The following day in Port Harcourt, Tayo Lukula, the
correspondent of its sister magazine, TheNews had his wife and eight month

23

1996

daughter detained and later released because the security operatives could
not reach him.
In December, Dejo Adebisi, Manager (Adverts and Promotions) for
Tell magazine, Yemi Olowolabi, a reporter and two other members of staff, Iyi
Isaac and Emmanuel Piper were all harassed and detained briefly when the
State Security Services laid seige on Tell Magazine. Other victims of physical
harassment and torture in December were veteran photo-journalists, Peter
Obe and Bayo Ewuoso of AM News, Segun Olakitan of Tell and Abiodun
Ajala of This Day newspaper. On December 10, the December 18 edition of
Tell Magazine was confiscated from the printers. Since then, four consecutive
editions of the magazine had been confiscated, totalling over 250,000 copies
and resulting in huge circulation and advertisement losses. That same day,
18 December, the Rutam House headquarters of the recently deproscribed
Guardian group was set on fire in suspicious circumstances. Prior to this
incident, an anonymous fax had been sent to the publication editor, Eluem
Emeka Izeze, warning him to stop his ‘anti-regime’ stories or else they were
going to come after him. This can only be a euphemism for personal attack on
the editor, and this was how he interpreted it even if undaunted by the threat.
On 23 December, Nosa Igiebor, the indefatigable editor of the critically
acclaimed weekly, Tell Magazine, was accosted by 12 armed policemen
outside his gate, and dumped in a waiting van straight into the detention
centre. He was moved into an unknown destination outside Lagos. As this
report went to press, there were unconfirmed reports that he had been
released after twenty seven weeks in solitary confinement.
On the eve of the New Year, it was the turn of The News and Tempo
Headquarters to be touched by arsonists in suspicious circumstances. The
motive for these arson attacks is yet to be determined in a country where
police investigation takes ages, if at all, and refuses to come up with anything
conclusive in the end. Besides, there have been cases of collaboration
between government agents and freelance criminals, and nothing can be
ruled out in these brutal acts of forcing the media to succumb to the whims of
the ruling junta especially in the wake of recent political asssassinations.

b) Indirect forms of censorship

These acts of physical violence, intimidation, and harassment have
however gone on, pari passu, with other forms of censorship aimed at
achieving the same objective of wiping out “unpatriotic” publications, or those
referred to as foreign agents. For a government that recognises the
usefulness of making a show of tolerance and in a desperation to improve its
international image, subtler forms of censorship allow them to distort, stem or
completely stop the flow of information from reputable journalists without the
risk of being accused of violating their fundamental human rights. In effect,
simple measures of economic strangulation, media monopoly and advert
starvation and faking copies of critical newspapers are steps considered to be
in the right direction in achieving this aim.
Several issues of prominent independent newspapers like Tell,
Tempo, TheNews, Dateline and TSM were faked. When the issuers of these
counterfeit copies however discovered that its effect in distorting the entire
outlook of these publications was limited, other measures were thought of.
The first had to do with advertisement deprivation. Very few newspaper
houses survive on circulation proceeds alone. In most cases they use
advertisement and supplement resources to shore their revenue up. In
Nigeria, the biggest advertiser remains the central government, state
governments and its agencies which are often involved in various public

24

1996

enlightenment campaigns, and. Not only are clear instructions issued that
some publications should not be patronised, private companies which handle
government contracts are dissuaded from advertising in these papers. As the
regime’s information Minister, Dr Walter Ofonagoro recently told a gathering
of advertising agents in 1995, “it is because you support these media with
advert patronage that they continue to exist”. He urged the agencies to help
the regime by imposing an advert freeze on so called anti-government
newspapers.

As if this was not enough, the regime embarked on other measures to
tighten the noose around independent publications, on the famished road to
news starvation. Cut off from government adverts and private patronage,
independent publications only had to depend on sales. Aware of the print
media dependence on imported newsprint and other paper products for
survival, one of the key areas government worked on was to create artificial
scarcity of newsprint. Although newsprint and paper products were free of
custom tariff in the past, the military regime imposed it, and a tonne of
newsprints sold in 1994 for N12,000 now sells at around N120,000 at the end
of mid-1996. Prices of other paper products also went up in the inflation
ridden economy. Inevitably, some independent publications foundered and
those left behind were forced to increase their cover price to meet escalating
overheads and pay workers’ salaries. For example, cover price rose from
N30 in 1994 to N70 for most weekly magazines by 1995. Yet over 90% of
this cover price went on newsprint and other paper products. In a
traumatised economy such as Nigeria’s, the government may have
succeeded in reducing the readership of these publications and, thus their
circulation, as very few people can afford to buy newspapers or magazines at
such prohibitive costs.
To ensure that the objective of muzzling the press was firmly in place,
the regime then descended on newsagents found selling any of the ‘offensive’
publications. Several cases of Tempo, Tell, The News and TSM magazines’
newsagents were arraigned before the courts for selling these independent
publications abound all over the country. A typical example was the case of
Lagos vendor, Olabisi Akintoye, arrested for possession of “unpatriotic
magazines”. Akintoye was found selling Tell and Tempo magazines.
Akintoye only regained his freedom after parting ways with N5,000 (US$61)
Even with this retinue of insidious measures, the regime was not done in its
use of indirect mechanisms to inflict permanent damage on the independent
press and destroy freedom of expression. The latest act in this retinue came
when the regime’s Information Minister, Dr Walter Ofonagoro recently
exhumed a 1993 still born decree, which among many other restrictions,
imposes a non-refundable annual registration fee of N250,000, submission of
advanced copies of the publication to the Information Minister, and the
establishment of an office in Abuja, when most newspapers are based in
Lagos and Kaduna. Although newspapers usually have stringers or offices in
the administrative capital, for reasons of safety, they often choose not to
publicise these offices. Besides, the added cost of registration and office
establishment can only compound the escalating burden of newspaper
running.
The regime also extended its tentacles farther afield, to sensitive
centres, like London and New York, where security operatives embarked on a
policy of purchasing bulk copies of independent publications that found their
way abroad as a mechanism for damage limitation to the image of the junta.
But indirect censorship was not limited to the above steps - critical as they
have become in the government’s control of the thought process.

25

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