1. Peace and Security in West Africa – Any role for the
Commonwealth?
By
Kayode Fayemi,
Centre for Democracy & Development
Introduction
This year‟s hosting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM)
in Nigeria marks a significant watershed for democratisation and development in
West Africa. Eight years ago, in Auckland, New Zealand, Nigeria was the pariah
state in the Commonwealth, and the significant impetus for the establishment of the
Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group(CMAG) and the Millbrook Plan of Action,
came from the flagrant violations of the 1991 post cold-war Harare Declaration by the
ruling dictatorship in Nigeria. By the time of the Edinburgh summit in 1997, the
situation in West Africa had worsened, with two West African States – Nigeria and
Sierra Leone – subject of scrutiny by CMAG. Although Nigeria had begun a journey
towards international rehabilitation by CHOGM 1999 in Durban, South Africa, but
Gambia had joined Sierra Leone and Pakistan in the list of states under scrutiny. So,
it could be argued that CMAG and the Commonwealth Secretariat had always had
cause to address problems of violations of the Harare Declaration in one West Africa
member country or the other (except Ghana) since the establishment of the
Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group.
In spite of its effort to promote the core values of the Harare Declaration in West
Africa and the commitment contained in the Fancourt Commonwealth Declaration on
Globalization and People-Centred Development of November 1999 which committed
member states, in partnership with civil society, to promote processes that help to
prevent or resolve conflicts in a peaceful manner and support measures that help to
stabilize post-conflict situations, and combat terrorism of all kinds, there is every
reason to be sceptical about the Commonwealth in Africa, especially at a time that
African states are keen to pursue local solutions to existing and emerging problems.
First, given the way the Commonwealth works, it is difficult to trace any shift in
thinking or politics to the Association as the significant and/or only player in the
campaign for democratic governance in the last decade. Second, the dominant
influence of its Northern members (Australia, Britain, Canada) is a source of
continuing concern in Africa and Asia, where this unequal power relations is often
seen as a dampener of the Club spirit. Third, the consensual approach of its politics
undermines the utility of punishment and incentives for erring and progressive
member states. This works in favour of State parties to the detriment of the values
1

2. espoused in the Harare Declaration and the yearnings the Commonwealth peoples as a
whole.
Beyond the romanticism of belonging to a club of ex-British colonies in a region
dominated by members of La Francophonie (only four out of sixteen West African
states are ex-British colonies), it is still possible to see the Commonwealth as a
potential and real force for good in the region, not least because 154 of the region‟s
233 million people theoretically belong to the Commonwealth. Without losing sight
of the historical context, the challenge for the Heads of Government and the parallel
Commonwealth Peoples‟ Forum meeting in Abuja is how to make the
Commonwealth relevant not just to the governments but the peoples of West Africa.
How can the Commonwealth help promote values of proper governance, human
security and human development in West Africa? How can it assist the promotion of
regionalism in the global context, in responding to the negative impact of
globalisation and in the quest for fairer trade, debt relief, transparency, accountability
and genuine equality of opportunity? So, the issue for the Commonwealth leaders
meeting in Abuja is not just one of a more nuanced understanding of the challenges of
democratisation and development in West Africa, but also one of concretely making a
difference – deepening West Africa‟s democratisation process in order to promote
development and prevent conflict. These are considerable challenges, but they are not
insurmountable ones and Abuja 2003 offers another chance to at least agree on a
journey with annotated maps.
The Nature of Conflict and Prospects for Peace in West Africa
West Africa‟s story has been one of reversal, stasis as well as progress. The sub-
region has witnessed significant changes in the 1990s decade. Peaceful alternation of
power in Benin, Senegal, Mali, Ghana, and Cape Verde, the emergence of
constitutional governments in Sierra Leone, Niger, and the Gambia and the formal
exit of the military from the political affairs of the region‟s giant, Nigeria provide
justification for optimism.
In spite of the progress made on the civil and political rights front though, West
Africa remains one of the poorest regions in the world and one of the most susceptible
to crisis and violent conflict, placing a huge question mark on the sustainability of the
region‟s electoral democracies. With the re-ignition of conflict in Liberia, continued
instability in Cote d‟Ivoire, Sierra Leone emerging from a decade of civil war with
great uncertainty, Guinea Bissau and Guinea hovering between coup d’etats and cold
peace, not to mention large numbers of refugees and internally displaced population
creating a major humanitarian emergency in West Africa, it is clear that pro-forma
democracies represented by „free and fair‟ elections will not be enough and that the
most paramount tasks facing the region now include finding sustainable solutions to
the current violent conflicts in the Greater Mano River Basin, stemming the ignition
2

3. of potential conflicts by addressing fundamental political, social and economic root
causes of the regional crisis.
Social and Economic Indicators 2002
Country Population GDP GNP per Human Life Adult
(millions) ($bn) Capita($) Devt Index Expectancy literacy (%)
Benin 6.0 2.4 380 147 53.6 39
Burkina 11.0 2.6 230 159 46.1 23
Faso
0.4 0.6 1,330 91 69.4 74
Cape
Verde 16.2 10.5 660 144 47.8 46
Cote 1.3 0.4 330 149 45.9 36
d‟Ivoire
19.0 6.8 350 119 56.6 70
Gambia
7.0 3.3 450 150 47.1 35
Ghana
1.2 0.2 180 156 44.5 38
Guinea
3.1
Guinea-
11.0 2.6 240 153 51.2 40
Bissau
11.0 2.0 180 161 44.8 15
Liberia
127.0 32.8 260 136 51.5 63
Mali
9.3 4.7 500 145 52.9 36
Niger
5.0 0.6 130 162 38.3 32
Nigeria
5.0 1.4 300 128 51.6 56
Senegal
Sierra
Leone
Togo
Total 233.3 70.9 304(av)
Sources: World Development Report 2002 & UNDP Human Development Report 2002.
3

4. By choosing „Development and Democracy‟ as the overriding theme of this year‟s
Summit, it would appear that the Commonwealth understands the nature, causes and
complexity of West Africa‟s dire situation and the inextricable link between
democracy and development in any attempt at addressing these challenges. Even so, it
is important to emphasise this linkage, especially given how post cold war
developments – have brought this into clear relief and how important it is to avoid
simplistic understanding of the problems.
To understand the causes and nature of violent conflict, Commonwealth leaders must
examine in a more nuanced manner the historic roots and contemporary trajectories of
West Africa‟s violent conflicts and move away from simplistic interpretation of
causes based on notions such as „greed‟, „poverty‟, or „ethnicity‟. The
incontrovertible evidence is that West Africa‟s conflicts share a common backdrop of
economic stagnation and faltering democratic rule that undermined state capacity and
legitimacy in the 1980s. Yet each conflict has followed its own trajectory shaped by
political and policy choices partly made by the ruling governments and partly
imposed by the international context. Among the most critical elements in
understanding the new conflict equation arising out of the 1990s political transition in
the region are:
 The shifts in global and geopolitical power relations; in particular the end of
the cold war and the withdrawal of the metropolitan security umbrella which
paved the way for serious challenges to some client regimes in a manner
previously considered impossible;
 With the demise of universalistic ideological battle between socialism and
capitalism, new forms of conflict emerged in the form of identity issues
anchored on religion and ethnicity in particular;
 The withdrawal of assistance by big states also resulted in the search for new
forms of sustenance leading to the exploitation of resources and criminal
activity;
 Increasing availability and privatisation of instruments of violence,
transforming the military balance between the state and society.(A recent
survey indicates that the permanent members of the Security Council were
together responsible for 81% of world arms exports from 1996 – 2000. The G8
nations sold 87% of total arms exports to the entire world.)
 New forms of violent and trans-national crime.
Yet in this context of internal cleavages and external fuelling of conflicts, one could
almost reach the flawed conclusion that the 1980s was a period of unbridled peace.
The truth is however more complex that this. Examined critically, the most important
lesson of the 1990s conflict in West Africa is that the 1980s laid a solid basis for them
- through the severe economic and fiscal compression exemplified by the structural
adjustment shocks of the period. It is no longer in doubt that the erosion of social
4

5. capital, political legitimacy and institutional weakening of many African states can be
directly linked to the policy choices that informed governance during this period. For
example, the State lost its central relevance due to the agenda of Structural
Adjustment Policies, which was the choice of many states in the 1980s. In turn, the
resistance triggered by the SAP sufferings led to State militarism largely driven by the
authoritarian culture so widespread in the 1980s. This laid the basis for the new and
more deadly societal militarism represented by the warlords of the 1990s and the
violent nature of crime.
In short, the nature of conflict and politics in West Africa was in essence redefined by
the peculiar context of the 1990s and the nature of partnership between Africa and its
development partners. Addressing violent conflicts in the region therefore requires
broadening the notions of security and developing multi-faceted responses. Four
pillars of peace and security ought to form the core of this agenda:
1. human security as the bedrock for peace;
2. democracy and open governance;
3. transformation of violent conflicts through political processes; and
4. collective security for all African states and the Commonwealth should be
playing roles in all of the four areas.
At the heart of this conflict prevention agenda is the transformation of Africa‟s
security sector governance. Until recently, the mantra among donors is to emphasise
cost-cutting approach to dealing with security sector problems. However, the
solutions required are first and foremost political in nature and this relates essentially
to the deepening of democracy by ensuring that there is scope for involvement by all
stakeholders in processes of democratisation, both in terms of long term containment
of conflict and in terms of democratic consolidation.
The above approach which places individuals at the centre of the security and
democratisation equation has gained increasing acceptance in Africa, and indeed in
many parts of the world. While protecting the state and its citizens from external
aggression remains a key consideration, the most serious threats facing countries on
the African continent at the beginning of the 21st century tend to be those that either
derive from internal causes or are trans-national and collective in nature. To many in
Africa therefore, a safe and secure environment is a necessary condition for
sustainable democracy and poverty-reducing development. This broader conception
that articulates security and democracy in a manner that the individual, the group as
well as the state may relate to its fundamental objectives of promoting and ensuring
the right to life and livelihood and provision of a safe and secure environment in an
uncertain world underscores the importance of the inextricable link between
democracy and development in Africa and supports human security as the appropriate
framework for achieving proper governance.
5

6. So, if human security provides the framework for achieving democratisation and
development, regionalism is the basic institutional scaffolding that the
Commonwealth ought to pay particular attention to since the gains of a human
security approach are best realised within a regional context. The importance of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) can hardly be
overemphasised in this context and it is hoped that the Commonwealth will spend
some time on discussing the place of regional institutions in accomplishing the twin
goals of development and democracy.
This is not to suggest that these institutions are not without their own challenges.
Indeed, questions abound as to the extent to which regionalism is grounded in reality
and can act as a mechanism for promoting human security. Some of the challengess
often highlighted include amongst others: the enduring legacy of the Westphalian
nation-state, lack of common core values driving the regional project; a perpetual
resource gap hampering progress and implementation of regionalism, the formalism
of the regionalist project which tend to emphasise a wide array of institutions with
little or no capacity to manage them; issues of regionalism as leaderism in which
people to people partnerships take the backseat whilst regionalism is only happening
at the Heads of States‟ level and government realm, issues of regional hegemony – all
of which tend to give the impressions of regionalism as an externally driven agenda,
and not the product of the people‟s lived experiences.
No doubt, regionalism still faces a critical problem of entrenchment in a region where
efforts to build homogenous nation-states on the basis of artificially constructed
boundaries have resulted in forced unity. Since sovereignty of the nation-state is
regarded as sacrosanct, states that have ceased to function as states in the traditional
sense of providing basic needs for the citizens still enjoy support and assistance in
development circles even when it is known that these states are nothing but privatised
entities. Even when regional and sub-regional mechanisms put in place by Africans
have developed autonomous capacity to handle local conflicts – as recently witnessed
in ECOWAS‟ successful efforts in Liberia, Cote d‟Ivoire and Guinea Bissau, the
critical issue remains how best to address the westphalian logic of sovereignty as well
as moving away from the regionalism of leaders in which regional integration is only
recognised as happening at the level of leaders with scant regard paid to the rising
regional consciousness at the level of the citizens. It is only when regionalism is taken
seriously as a response to globalisation that Africans can define a new relationship
with the International community.
Acknowledging the fact that an exclusive focus on the nation state has prevented an
understanding of regional specific determinants in the poverty-security-development
complex might help Commonwealth leaders to address some of the policy issues and
possibilities that can make a difference. Having secured an understanding of the
6

7. nature and context of conflict in the region, what are the prospects for addressing the
challenges and what role is there for the Commonwealth?
Prospects for addressing current challenges to peace and security?
For a start, as we move towards the CHOGM in Abuja, it is important to acknowledge
that West Africa‟s violent conflicts and security problems can only be resolved
through committed regional leadership and genuine global partnership. The decades
of the 1980s and the 1990s were a testament to the dangers of „broad brush‟
approaches, characterised by the external imposition of macro-economic stabilisation
and structural adjustment programmes that were sufficiently inflexible to account for
the diversity of circumstances and need. African leaders now argue for more locally
driven agenda, hence the launch of NEPAD. Yet, developing more „home grown‟
approaches will require donors to relinquish greater responsibility to Africa‟s leaders
and their people. Unfortunately, this is more apparent than real in the NEPAD
programme so far as it would appear that the drivers of NEPAD have hitched its
success to enhanced partnerships with donors, and paid limited attention to home
grown partnerships. Given the different trajectories of democratisation that we have
seen in the region, and indeed, the entire continent, it is important to develop a range
of responses which fit the different typologies of African states in the post cold war
transitions, in order to avoid the failed broad-brush strategies of the past. Given its
knowledge of its member states, the Commonwealth stands a good chance to push this
line of argument with other bi-lateral and multilateral agencies.
For example, in analysing the human security situation in West Africa, at least five
rough categories can be identified, ranging from progress to stasis, and in a few cases
reversal, and requiring different responses from development partners. It is possible to
talk of:
1. States in the process of consolidating their democracy – Benin, Ghana, Mali,
Senegal;
2. States in various stages of transitions to democracy – Cape Verde, Nigeria,
Niger, Gambia, Burkina Faso;
3. States in conflict or emerging out of conflict – Cote d‟Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra
Leone;
4. States in relapse or remilitarisation – Guinea, Guinea Bissau; and,
5. Authoritarian states – Togo and Mauritania.
Without an exception, all the states continue to face various challenges to their human
security situation, and some of the central challenges they face include: poverty,
political and economic governance, education, youth crisis, small arms proliferation
and trafficking, manipulation of religion, citizenship and identity issues, gender,
environmental degradation, migration, health, especially malaria, tuberculosis and
HIV/Aids pandemic.
7

8. While the identified issues above are common to all the states in question, it is
important to respond to them differently. Ultimately, our argument is that given the
“glocal” nature of the conflicts afflicting many of the states, state rebuilding and
consolidation can only be reinforced in the context of regional integration supported
by global partnership. None of the countries in question can respond to these
problems on its own terms. Majority of the states are only sovereign in the juridical
sense, not in terms of making available basic provision to their citizens and the most
realistic way of addressing the problems they confront is by treating them as part of a
regional system. If one were to review the dire figures in the table above and recent
figures provided on aid dependence in West Africa (Afrodad, „The Reality of Aid,
African Edition 2002), it seems evident that to continue to live under the illusion of
juridical sovereignty is not the way to go. Instead, our states must be reinforced
through regional incentives and sanctions.
Support for peace building and reconstruction: For states in conflict or those
emerging out of conflict, State rebuilding after state collapse often requires a strong
support for peace building and reconstruction measures. Peace in this context has
often been interpreted as mere absence of war and state rebuilding is often seen only
in terms of physical reconstruction. While physical reconstruction may be a necessary
departure point for state rebuilding, the defining characteristic of state rebuilding from
a human security approach is the presence of holistic security and a model of conflict
management, which emphasises the fundamentals of military security,
democratisation and consensus building, development, economic reform, human
rights and human dignity for the citizens to engage their rulers.
Therefore, although the conventional wisdom is to ignore it, the security required in
the immediate aftermath of conflict might also require higher rather than lower
security expenditure to enable the state and citizens cope with the impact of conflict –
rehabilitating refugees and the internally displaced, providing for a secure, safe and
enabling environment in which development initiatives can succeed and reintegrating
former combatants into society and economy. In situations where conditions of
poverty prevail after post war conflict, it is reasonable to predict a correlation between
the lack of development opportunities in terms of direct income generation to
survivors and an increase in criminality and conflict.
For policy makers, especially international organisations and donor agencies such as
the Commonwealth, there is always the pressure to construe their role in terms of
immediate restoration of peace and stability, rather than security and development.
Almost to the letter, elections is the top priority in the aftermath of conflict.. The
concentration on elections and elections monitoring, for example by the
Commonwealth in say Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria in the past decade gives the
impression that what mattered most was the election, not democracy nor was there a
recognition that elections are not enough to guarantee democracy and development.
8

9. Experience has since shown that while there are immediate tasks that must be
addressed in terms of peace building and reconstruction in every conflict situation –
disaster relief and management, repatriation and reintegration of refugees and
reduction in the proliferation of small arms and clearance of explosives, these are not
the most critical ingredients of a successful peace building strategy.
To promote sustainable security and peace building strategies therefore – international
organisations such as the Commonwealth must take a comprehensive look at peace
building and reconstruction strategies treating them as a continuum with short term
(relief and emergency aid and creating a secure and enabling environment); medium
term (peace support operations) and long term (reconstruction, democracy &
development) components in an integrated manner. Donor countries should be
encouraged to foster greater coherence amongst their own policies at an inter-agency
level, as well as within their own regional structures (such as EU, OECD, etc). A
good example as we pointed out in the preceding section is the fact that arms sales
from developed countries is often at variance with the emphasis the same countries
place on conflict prevention and security sector governance.
Equally, in this respect, there is a need for stronger cooperation between the
Commonwealth, Bretton Woods institutions, the UN Systems and other multi and bi-
lateral development agencies as well as independent development institutions to
reduce the overzealous focus on achieving fiscal discipline and macro-economic
stability at the expense of efforts to protect social cohesion. Donor responses have
often involved conditionalities relating to automatic decreases in military spending
and reductions of military and other security forces with no attention paid to the
expensive nature of security and the objective security threats that each country faces.
Especially in post conflict situations, this realization should inform international
attitudes towards security sector transformation on the one hand, and post conflict
reconstruction on the other.
Third, it is extremely important that international institutions should seize the
momentum provided by the weak capacity of the state to align external assistance
with local needs and efforts, not an opportunity to impose received wisdom and new
theories of development. This is extremely important in the context of claims that
NEPAD is Africa owned – a claim that is rejected by many Africans. Where state
institutional capacity is weak, an immense burden of responsibility is placed on
international organisations like the Commonwealth, IFIs and development agencies in
which real dialogue with the people and wide consultations underscore whatever
actions are taken. This is a point that the Commonwealth Foundation has emphasised
in the Kampala document following the tri-sectoral dialogues held in 10
Commonwealth countries in the past year.
9

10. Finally, international donors cannot ignore the international context in their response
to peace building and reconstruction efforts. How, for example, has the often
convoluted linkage between trans-national corporations, proliferation of arms and
promotion of neo-liberal globalising trends by the industrial world undermine the
success of security and development reforms in countries emerging out of conflict,
especially within the context of an unstable region in which domino effect is real
rather than imagined. These are some of the issues that are central to any discussion of
the policy lever on peace building and reconstruction efforts and the extent to which
the Commonwealth Heads of Government consider them critically would determine
the possibilities of success that might accompany critical intervention on development
and democracy.
The Challenge of strengthening the territorial state: As has been argued above, this
thinking itself is a product of the state-centric notions of security that dominated
traditional thinking in the cold war era. Since the state is increasingly seen as
unrepresentative and illegitimate, are there conditions under which war might be seen
to be a legitimate means of removing regime types that promote conflicts and in
which leaders have encroached upon common pool resources. To this end, some
questions might suffice in any consideration of complex political situations rather
than focus exclusively on state monopoly of means of coercion. This is not to suggest
that states do not have legitimate needs for security which might necessitate legitimate
procurement and monopoly of means of coercion, but this has to be demonstrated to
ensure that security is treated as common public good, not just regime good. It may
therefore be necessary to consider:
 Under which circumstances, if any, is war necessary to remove bad
governments? That is how do we distinguish between justifiable rebellion and
needless conflict?
 How is regional economic and political co-operation built between and among
states to address the pathology of militarism?
 How can state-centric definitions of security be de-emphasised, and the role of
civil society in peace building increased in the quest for common values?
 How is democratic control of the military to be built in states undergoing
political transition or moving from war to peace – through parliamentary
oversight, effective institutions of governance and genuine interaction between
the military and the rest of society?
Again, two examples from West Africa in recent times have demonstrated the
maturity of the leaders in grappling with this dilemma whilst underlining the
importance of developing an effective regional system. Unlike before when leaders
tended to ignore the internal conditions of states and the repressive edge of their
leaders, West African leaders and the regional body, ECOWAS have demonstrated in
their handling of recent crises in Liberia and Guinea Bissau that it is possible to
10

11. recognise constituted authority and still address genuine yearnings of the people. By
their collective and decisive approach to the removal of President Taylor of Liberia
and encouraging the resignation of President Kumba Yala of Guinea Bissau from
office, regional leaders were espousing the importance of common core values to
which all leaders must subscribe – whilst disabusing the minds of others who often
see regional institutions as clubs of leaders dedicated to patting one another on the
back. Since there is now evidence to suggest that African leaders and their
international partners now accept the argument about broadening the human security
agenda to include the accountability of leaders(Africa Peer Review Mechanism), this
paradigm shift should be encouraged. The fact that the commitment to the mutually
reinforcing interaction between the values of proper governance, democracy, equity
and sustainability still remain subordinate to the core need for macro-economic
stability and integration in the international political economy remains a source of
worry. This is why many are still suspicious of African leaders‟ and their
development partners‟ commitment to a human security approach in spite of the new
rhetoric about local ownership, peer review and social capital promotion.
Promoting social coherence through civil society development and multi-cultural
tolerance
If the Commonwealth takes peace-building as the sum total of activities that will
support peace making and conflict transformation: demobilisation, re-structuring of
the local security system – police and the military; resettlement of refugees and the
internally displaced persons; removal of dangerous weapons – mines and other
unexploded firearms, reconstruction of shattered infrastructure and humanitarian and
disaster relief – very few still advocate that this could be done without the inclusion of
civil society. Indeed, even African leaders and international development agencies
now see civil society as key to the successful implementation of these various aspects
of post-conflict peace building process. In discussing rights based approach to
governance and security sector transformation, local ownership and development of
social capital rests with the civil society, but it is important to place this within the
context of developing institutional mechanisms for the management of diversity and
difference and incorporating international human rights framework into domestic law.
Hence, the rights of the people to their resources should not be compromised at the
altar of encouraging foreign direct investment, especially where this undermines
environmental security.
It was assumed in policy and development circles that support for neo-liberal
democracy will help achieve this objective, hence there was the enthusiasm for
democracy assistance and „good governance‟ in the early 1990s and donor countries
made some efforts to move economic assistance away from former concerns about
stimulating economic growth to an emphasis on political objectives, including support
for processes of democratisation and building of civil society.
11

12. Although the above represented a shift from the days of the super-power ideological
rivalry, even this shift in the leadership‟s thinking and IFIs‟ assistance has
concentrated primarily on the reform of the public sector and involvement of the „civil
society‟ to the extent that it promotes the neo-liberal paradigm, not on an alternative
vision of bottom-up reforms driven by societal consensus. The fact that many of the
transitions of the last decade in Africa now approximate to – at best electoral
democracies and at worst elected dictatorships, has raised new questions on how to
deepen the democratic content of current reforms in a process oriented, participatory
and accountable manner. At every level, the idea of constitutionalising
democratising polities that have largely functioned as „virtual‟ democracies along
multifaceted lines is taking shape.
Today, the fact that the struggle for reconstituting the African state is taking place in
no fewer than twenty African states in Angola, Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Cote
d‟Ivoire, Swaziland and Lesotho, to mention but a few, underscores a paradigmatic
shift from constitutionality to constitutionalism, a situation where constitutions are
now seen as tools for building bridges between the state and civil society, a social
compact based upon a foundation of consensus among the constituent elements within
the polity and between them and the state in the quest for common value systems.
What has to be emphasised however for the purpose of CHOGM and human security
is the importance of an organic link between the constitution as a rule of law
instrument incorporating international human rights framework and primarily
concerned with restraining government excesses, and the constitution as a
legitimisation of power structures and relations based on a broad social consensus and
the values in diverse societies. In short, if CHOGM is to promote the mutually
reinforcing role of development, security and democracy, the task today is largely
between bridging the gap between “juristic constitutionalism” and “political and
socio-economic constitutionalism” in the search for common core values. Although
the Commonwealth has played a significant role in constitutional development within
the Commonwealth, there is a lot more that could be done by the Commonwealth
leaders as highlighted in the significant study by the Commonwealth Human Rights
Initiative.(Ebrahim et-al)
The core issues around values can only be addressed in the context of principles
which all Africans willingly subscribe. Values of representation, ownership,
accessibility to all levels of government, accountability, openness and collective
responsibility. CSSDCA has been doing a lot of work on developing a consensus
driven value systems which is what would be the subject of the peer review
mechanism. NEPAD is also developing a similar parameters and indicators. While
this is welcome by all, the scepticism that has attended the search for common values
to be promoted across Africa has been informed by the anti-democratic and
reprehensible behaviour of some of the leaders who are at the forefront of the NEPAD
campaign and their total contempt for some of the supposed values to which they have
12

13. committed themselves. In spite of this general scepticism, constitutionalism as a
social compact remains the best route for forging the kind of value system and
reorientation that can deepen our democracy in order to prevent conflict and build
peace and the Commonwealth ought to be doing more, not less in this regard.
Building assets that provide security against disasters and economic shocks
Conventionally, most international organisations and development agencies have
promoted the building of assets against disasters and economic shocks by focusing on
macro-economic stability strategies like Structural adjustment reforms, electoral
democracies and support of measures that seek to provide the enabling environment
for foreign direct investment and the global integration of the economy – a mutual
pursuit of political and economic liberalisation. This is the fundamental principle
guiding the NEPAD document. So far, the logic of trickle down economics has failed
to produce an integrated world economy in which all zones are winners. Indeed, as
Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin argue,
In the process of globalisation, the continent (Africa) has quite literally
been left behind in terms of the distribution of the spoils of the process.
The promised advantages of economic restructuring, as hailed by the IMF,
World Bank and individual developed countries, have not been borne out.
Foreign investment fails to flow in; debt burdens continue; commodity
prices fluctuate; environmental degradation proceeds…and
industrialisation fails to occur. (Thomas & Wilkin: 1998).
This clearly contradicts the core assumption of globalisation that wealth would
automatically be created when the free market gains universal acceptance in the
world. By arguing that the way to build assets against shocks is not via the creation of
local self sufficiency, but national economies should concentrate on what they can
contribute to the world economy, globalisation ignores the comparative advantage of
the North, locks African states further into relative powerlessness by creating
conditions for conflict which further weakens the mediatory role of the states. Instead,
it empowers those elites within the state who can form part of the network in business
and government capable of acting independently of the juridical state. The fallout of
this globalising trend is the unregulated trade in mineral resources, proliferation of
arms and narcotics and the illicit trade in banned items all of which ultimately
undermine food security, environmental security and the security of the individual –
factors responsible for conflict today in many African states. It has also helped in
deepening the rural-urban divide, fostered inter-generational strife occasioned by
youth frustration and exacerbated the scourge of refugees and the internally displaced,
13

14. all of which have moved the hapless below the poverty line and moved them closer to
violence and conflict.
In our view therefore, the greatest assets against shocks and disasters ultimately lie
with the development of human resources, better management of natural resource
endowment and respect for local ownership of the reform agenda whether in
determining the role of the State or in arriving at the most effective poverty
eradicating mechanisms. In fairness, the Commonwealth has always paid attention to
this distinction, but only within the context of free and unregulated market. Hence, it
is also useful to examine and analyse individual situations on their merit, rather than
assume that the market is the answer to every problem. This is of course not to
suggest that market has no role in reforming states structures. It is to say that there are
no universal models of the market as providing the best assets against shocks and
disasters, hence Commonwealth leaders and donor agencies must learn from their
own experiences of the market in formulating realistic policies. For example, the
British state cannot be taken railways into public ownership on the basis of the
inadequacies of the market, and still continue to promote unbridled market
fundamentalism in hapless states.
Conclusion: In pursuit of human security and human development in
West Africa
There is definitely a sense in which a deep feeling of disillusionment is widespread in
Africa with the current democratisation and development agenda and this threatens to
undermine the long standing partnerships with institutions like the Commonwealth.
Indeed, many now feel that the hype surrounding democracy is more than what the
eventual product offers. Hence, one can see a major opposition to the current slow
pace of democratic and economic development. Indeed, deepening democratic
development remains an uphill task in several African countries, especially in the
aftermath of the global shock occasioned by the 9/11 tragedy in America. There are
indications that even the enthusiasm that greeted the NEPAD initiative in the G8
countries has been enveloped in another global shift which is now in favour of
despotic peace in place of democratic, even if unsettling, freedom. The greatest
challenge of course is to understand that despite the frustrations and impatience of the
people with this democratic deficit, there is realisation that transitions are inherently
unstable and unpredictable.
It is our hope that the leaders meeting in Abuja in December will bear the above in
mind as they deliberate on this important theme as „Development and Democracy.‟ –
one that secures the world and promote peace. Based on the above analysis of the
peace and security dynamics in West Africa, a number of measures seem to suggest
themselves to us about a role for the Commonwealth, especially in developing a
human security approach that promotes human development:
14

15. 1. There is an urgent need for clarification of values and norms subscribed to by
Africans and adopted in a widespread manner by the citizens. For example, it
would be useful as the Commonwealth finalises its own review to promote
synergy between the Harare Declaration and the ECOWAS Supplementary
Protocol on Democracy & Good Governance with a view to sharing
experiences and learning lessons. The Commonwealth has a lot to offer
ECOWAS in the latter‟s quest to institutionalise best practice.
2. There is a need for conceptual clarity through a comprehensive approach to
peace and security in policy and development circles – one that recognises that
while there is no teleological link between elections and democracy,
deepening democracy offers the best chance of preventing violent conflict and
building durable peace, but this must be accompanied over the long term by
economic development;
3. There Commonwealth must recognise the importance of strengthening
regional integration and promote regional mechanisms that can help sustain
democratic development and consolidation through the adoption of a regional
approach to conflict prevention;
4. The Commonwealth must recognise the need to reconcile economic and social
development and enhance the input of non-state actors – in policy formulation
to enhance social capital rather than entrench the leverage of IFIs and donor
agencies on States;
5. The Commonwealth must promote the recognition of legitimate security needs
of nation-states must be factored into the human security approach through the
promotion of governmental and non-governmental peace-building strategies
6. The Commonwealth must problematise the link between globalisation and
conflict, rather than assume that it is always going to be positive in the
promotion of pro-poor growth in the search for and implementation of
sustainable livelihood and poverty reduction strategies;
7. The Commonwealth must locate the security agenda within the democracy and
development framework and reflect the link between politics and economics,
and between security and opportunities;
8. Human security approach is a process, whose results will not necessarily be
immediate, hence the need for a long term view by interested stakeholders and
anti-poverty strategists.
15

16. REFERENCES
1. AFRODAD, Reality of Aid – African Edition 2002.
2. Buzan, B. et al. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, Colorado:
Lynne Rienner.
3. CODEP, 2000. Report on the outcomes of the consultation on globalisation and conflict for
the White Paper on International Development: Globalisation & Development. London,
June 2000.
4. Commonwealth Foundation, 2003, Kampala Vision: Communiqué of the Pan-
Commonwealth Tri-Sector Conference on Partnerships for Governance, held in Kampala,
Uganda in August 2003
5. DFID, 2000. Security Sector Reform and the Management of Military Expenditure: Risks
for Donors, High Returns for Development, Report on an International Symposium,
February 14-16, 2000.
6. Ebrahim, Hassen, Fayemi Kayode & Loomis Stephanie, 2000, Principles and
Mechanisms of Constitution Making in Commonwealth Africa, Delhi: CHRI
7. Fayemi, J.K. 2000. “Security Challenges in Africa”, Seminar: Indian Journal of
Opinion, Special Issue on African Transitions 490, June 2000.
8. Martin, B. 2000. New Leaf or Fig Leaf? The Challenge of the New Washington Consensus.
Report prepared for Bretton Woods Project and Public Service International.
9. NEPAD Strategy Document – www.mapstrategy.org; www.nepad.org.za
10. Thomas, C. & P. Wilkin (eds.) 1998. Globalisation, Human Security & the African
Experience, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
16