Best practices

The Implementation of Best Practices:
Process and Performance Effects
Bjørge Timenes Laugen and Harry Boer
Much has been written about best practices and world class manufacturing in recent years.
Various practices and improvement programmes have been suggested as best practices,
assuming that their adoption would to lead to higher performance. The implementation
process of these practices is, however, often neglected in the literature and, hence, relatively
poorly understood. The purpose of this article is to provide insight into that process and how
different implementation approaches influence performance. An analysis of the implementa-
tion of a range of manufacturing action programmes in two companies showed that a broad
and incremental implementation approach initially leads to reduced performance followed by
a gradual improvement as larger parts of the programmes are institutionalized. A ‘big bang’
implementation approach does not seem to lead to deterioration in performance.
Introduction and Research
Questions
Today’s firms operate in increasingly
complex and rapidly changing environ-
ments, and the ability to change and inno-
vate is becoming more and more important.
New players start competing in established
markets, new technologies emerge, and new
business models strive for dominance even in
mature markets.
There is considerable evidence that estab-
lished companies struggle to adapt to major
changes in the environment. Studies by,
for example, Christensen (1997), Francis and
Bessant (2005), Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) and
Lant and Mezias (1990) all suggest that estab-
lished players often fail to respond to changes
in the environment when new technologies,
actors or markets emerge. Thus, it is important
for managers and academia to develop useful,
usable and robust knowledge, methods, tools
and techniques allowing established compa-
nies to cope better with major changes in the
environment.
Both industry and academia have been con-
cerned with developing and searching for best
practices for decades. Best practices have been
argued to underpin high or even world-class
performance (e.g., Schonberger, 1986; Flynn
et al., 1997; Voss, Åhlström & Blackmon, 1997)
and should therefore play a dominant role in
manufacturing strategy (Voss, 1995).
The implementation process of new prac-
tices is critical for the success of these pro-
grammes. Bessant and Francis (1999) and
Savolainen (1999) even argue that it may not be
the concept itself, but the way it is imple-
mented that is essential for success. Further-
more, Davies and Kochhar (2002) suggest that
the performance benefits of implemented
practices increases the nearer they reach full
implementation.
Many studies have been carried out to
better understand the implementation of best
practices in manufacturing. Among the topics
investigated in such studies are:
• differences between small and large compa-
nies in the implementation of continuous
improvement (Chapman & Sloan, 1999)
• differences between advanced and develop-
ing countries in the implementation of
enterprise resource planning (ERP) (Huang
& Palvia, 2001)
• success factors in ERP implementation
(Nah, Lau & Kuang, 2001)
• use of internet technology in implement-
ing business process re-engineering (BPR)
(Wells, 2000)
• team learning and implementation of tech-
nology (Edmondson, Bohmer & Pisano,
2001)
IMPLEMENTATION OF BEST PRACTICES 397
Volume 16 Number 4 2007
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8691.2007.00453.x
© 2007 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing

• implementation of total quality manage-
ment (TQM) in the service industry (Huq,
2006)
• implementation and persistence of TQM
(Beer, 2003).
Despite the considerable amount of imple-
mentation studies, they do not provide a com-
plete understanding of the implementation
process of (best) practices and the challenges
and results of the implementation phase. Most
studies assess implementation success in
terms of, for example, how much of the pro-
gramme has been adopted in the organization,
rather than the performance effects of the pro-
gramme itself.
A problem with measuring performance
effects is that there is often a time lag from
beginning of implementation until perfor-
mance effects are visible. Some authors, e.g.,
Gertsen (2001) and Pettigrew et al. (2003),
even find that performance deteriorates
during the early phases of the implementation
of new concepts before performance gradually
improves. It is not clear exactly why this
happens, but one explanation could be that
implementing a new practice requires the
organization to learn. The time and cost
involved in that go at the expense of opera-
tional and/or business performance.
To address some of the problems addressed
above, the research presented in this article
aims to investigate the following questions:
• How do best performing companies imple-
ment new practices?
• Does the way such companies approach the
implementation process affect performance
and, if so, how?
The first question stems from the observation
that ‘best practice is what the best companies
do’ (Laugen et al., 2005). In today’s market and
competitive environment, the best companies
are the ones that excel in terms of exploration
(innovation, change) and exploitation (produce
and deliver, improve) (Stacey, 1992; March,
1995; Boer & Gertsen, 2003). The second ques-
tion investigates whether and, then, how
implementation approach makes a difference
in terms of performance effects.
In addressing these questions we will
regard the implementation of improvement
programmes as a process. Hence, we are inter-
ested in investigating how the companies
approach (e.g., ‘big bang’/turnkey or small
steps), resource and manage this process, and
how these choices affect the operational per-
formance of firms. We focus on the implemen-
tation of improvement programmes within the
new product development and manufacturing
functions, or programmes in which these func-
tions are involved.
Methodology
As the research questions call for exploratory
research, a case study presented the most suit-
able methodology. We decided to perform two
case studies which we selected using two
criteria.
First, we aim to investigate high performers,
measured in terms of sustained outstanding
financial performance and market leadership.
Second, since the scope of this research is on
continuous innovation, it is important that the
case companies perform product development
and production activities, carry out improve-
ment activities of these functions on-site, and
have done so successfully during the last 10–15
years. This is because a major part of the chal-
lenge of continuous innovation is the balance
and coordination between stability and
change, between production and product
innovation, and between exploitation and
exploration. Furthermore, as most of our
research is focused on medium-sized and
large manufacturing and assembly companies
(ISIC 28-35) in Denmark and Norway, we
found it most convenient to select our cases in
these industries.
Two companies, one in Denmark and one in
Norway, met our criteria. Both companies are
market leaders in their respective segments,
have been financially successful over the last
several years, and have an excellent track
record in new product development (explora-
tion) as well as production and delivery
(exploitation). The case narratives provide
further details.
Data was generated through interviews with
three managers in each company. In total, 11
semi-structured interviews were conducted
during the winter 2004/2005, spring and
summer 2005. In Company A, the new product
development (NPD) (once), new product intro-
duction (NPI) (once) and production (twice)
managers were interviewed. In Company B, the
NPD (once), the product (twice) and manu-
facturing (four times) managers were inter-
viewed. The interviews were conducted on-site
following a semi-structured interview guide.
The duration of the interviews varied from 45
minutes to more than two hours. Six of the
eleven interviews were audio-taped and then
transcribed in full-length for data analysis pur-
poses. Thorough notes were written from the
other five interviews. We performed, tran-
scribed and analysed all interviews ourselves,
in order to reduce the risk of misunderstand-
ings and to benefit from the information rich-
398 CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT
© 2007 The Authors

ness an interview context provides. In addition,
reports and documents from the companies
were analysed in order to crosscheck informa-
tion from the interviews and get additional
information. The data were structured in tables
similar to the checklist matrix, as suggested by
Miles and Huberman (1994).
To validate the case studies, analyses and
findings, the case narratives, cross-case analy-
sis and discussion were sent to all the six man-
agers for review. In addition, the findings and
interpretations were also presented to and dis-
cussed with one of the managers. The feedback
we received was taken into account and the
manuscript changed accordingly. The sug-
gested modifications from the managers were
few and minor, though.
For reasons of anonymity, the case compa-
nies are labelled Company A and Company B.
The two companies are briefly described
below.
Case Company A
Company A, located in Denmark, is a large
and established manufacturer of technologi-
cally moderately advanced products. It can be
classified as an ISIC 28 manufacturer of metal
products. The company operates in a business-
to-business environment and primarily deliv-
ers products to the high end of the market.
Quality is the most important order winner,
followed by technological features and price.
NPD and manufacturing are carried out at the
same location and are integrated through a
new product introduction process. Company
A is ISO 9001, 9002, 14001 and 18001 certified,
and has received a large number of awards
and prizes for operational excellence over the
years.
Most products are mass manufactured to
stock. Only two percent is manufactured to
order. However, the plant is moving towards
production to customer order.
The company has been high performing for
a number of years, is worldwide market leader
in its market segment and is well reputed.
There are only four major competitors in the
European market.
Case Company B
Company B, located in Norway, is a medium-
sized/large manufacturer of technologically
advanced products. It can be classified as an
ISIC 29 manufacturer of machinery and equip-
ment. The products are sold in a business-to-
business environment. Company B’s primary
focus is on product quality and, to a lesser
extent, delivery and cost. This performance
focus is widely communicated throughout the
organization. NPD and manufacturing are
located in the same building.
All products are manufactured or
assembled to order, and a considerable albeit
declining part is designed to order. During
recent years, Company B has outsourced parts
of its production activities, but is still doing a
considerable part of the component manufac-
turing in-house. The target is to outsource
most of the manufacturing tasks and to keep
only final assembly and testing in-house.
The company has performed very well
financially for many years. Its market share
worldwide is approximately 25–30 percent. In
Europe the market share is around 40–45
percent. Company B’s products have an out-
standing performance and are well reputed.
Findings
Action Programmes Currently Implemented
in the Case Companies
The two case companies perform a wide range
of action programmes in order to improve
their manufacturing performance (see Table 1
for an overview). The two companies are con-
scious of the need to implement different
action programmes that reinforce each other,
in order to achieve a higher level of perfor-
mance improvement. The production man-
agers in both companies argue that
implementing single action programmes
would have considerably lower performance
effects, compared to when configurations of
programmes are implemented.
In Company A, 6 sigma, TPM (total produc-
tive maintenance), SMED (single minute
exchange of die) and process leadership are
implemented together in order to support the
company’s ambition to achieve lean produc-
tion. The production manager argues that it is
absolutely necessary to see the programmes as
a configuration, and that individual pro-
grammes will lead to a lower level of improve-
ment than when they are supported by other
programmes. In addition, various other pro-
grammes support the implementation of the
other programmes. The company is currently
reviewing its manufacturing strategy and per-
forming a competence mapping process in
relation to this. Further, Company A has been
running a TQM programme for approximately
ten years, which, according to the managers
interviewed, has developed a culture for
change and improvements in the organization.
Finally, reviewing and improving the flow and
processes through the implementation of CFM
(continuous flow manufacturing) and SAP
R/3 are again supporting the lean production
programme.
© 2007 The Authors

In Company B, lean production has been
introduced in order to reduce lead time by 50
percent and increase productivity by 50
percent. However, the company realized that
these development targets could not be rea-
ched without ensuring that the information
and material coming into production from the
development department and external suppli-
ers had the right quality and were delivered
on time. Consequently, they started up an
improvement activity parallel to the lean activ-
ity, aimed at improving the quality, specifica-
tions and delivery reliability of raw materials.
So, Company B uses several other pro-
grammes, including 5S, kaizen and flow man-
agement, to support and reinforce its lean
ambitions. In addition, Company B also uses
programmes in order to improve visual man-
agement and control, and prototyping in rela-
tion to lean production. Supporting the lean
production, more general programmes are
also implemented, more specifically organiza-
tion design, internal communication, training
employees in lean thinking, and project
management.
Implementation in Company A
For most action programmes, Company A
uses a broad and incremental implementation
approach. The production manager argues that
the incremental approach is more successful
than a ‘big bang’ approach, which Company A
has experienced to be too overwhelming. An
exception is the SAP R/3 programme, which
was rolled-out full scale in the whole organi-
zation at the date of the launch.
Regarding depth of implementation, in
order to achieve their potential benefits,
Company A normally implements all parts of
the programmes they start. In addition, the
company does not normally have problems
continuing the implementation of the pro-
grammes even though the expected results are
not immediately apparent. The production
manager argues that persistence is very impor-
tant when it comes to the implementation of
large improvement activities. Top manage-
ment is committed to and supports this strat-
egy. Furthermore, he claims Company A is
very good at allocating resources to imple-
menting improvement activities. The produc-
tion personnel get dedicated time to work
on the implementation process as well as
improvement activities. The production
manager stresses the importance not only of
educating people in the various activities, but
also of allocating a considerable amount of
time to spend on implementation. For
example, the operators on the shopfloor have
days available to work with TQM and evaluate
the implications of this programme for their
daily work.
The level of detail with which the imple-
mentation of the different programmes is
planned varies. For example, the SAP R/3
implementation was planned in great detail,
and had an accurate date for when the imple-
mentation should be completed and launched
within the organization. For the other pro-
grammes, the implementation was planned
more loosely, and the driving forces of these
programmes were overall goals and targets,
often long term. The production manager finds
it difficult, and has no intention, to set an end
date for the implementation of lean manufac-
turing or to plan in great detail the implemen-
tation towards this end date. Instead, the
various programmes have different targets
and the planning of the implementation
Table 1. Current Action Programmes in the Manufacturing Activities of Companies A and B
Company A Company B
SAP R/3 Visual management
Continuous flow manufacturing (CFM) Prototyping
6 sigma Kaizen
Total productive maintenance (TPM) Total productive maintenance (TPM)
Process management Flow management
TQM Organizational (re-)design
SMED Communication
Manufacturing strategy Training
Strategic competence mapping Project management
Product specifications
Material quality
Reliable deliveries (from suppliers)
© 2007 The Authors

process is reviewed continuously based on
experiences from phases completed so far and
progress made.
Performance Effects
As Table 2 indicates, none of the selected per-
formance indicators reached their targets for
2004. One reason for this is that several of the
targets were justified in 2004, based on a
general improvement in performance from
2002 to 2003. However, even compared with
2003, the performance on all indicators but one
(absence) deteriorated in 2004. To understand
the figures, it is important to mention that
annual turnover was significantly higher than
expected in both 2002 (13.3%) and 2004
(34.8%), while on budget in 2003. This caused
man efficiency to drop as temporary employ-
ees or personnel from other departments had
to be used, who were insufficiently experi-
enced in the tasks to be accomplished. The
company’s profit before tax improved signifi-
cantly in 2004 compared with 2003 despite
poorer operational performance.
The performance figures for 2005 produce a
more promising picture. Absence, machine
efficiency (productivity) and scrap improved
compared to 2004, although only machine effi-
ciency exceeded target. Only the figures for
delivery performance deteriorated in 2005
compared with 2004. However, when investi-
gating the figures more carefully, the perfor-
mance for most of the year 2005 (January–
May) is around or above target, while in June
the delivery to shipment performance fell to
below 70 percent. According to the production
manager, the reason for this is that after imple-
menting SAP R3 in June, they have had prob-
lems gathering data that fit into the new
measurement system. So, the decrease in the
figures is not a consequence of poor perfor-
mance, but primarily due to problems with
measuring and fitting the data into SAP R3. In
other words, Company A’s performance in
general improved in 2005 compared with 2004.
Implementation in Company B
A project group with a full-time project
manager leads the implementation of the ‘lean
production’ programme. The project manager
used to be foreman in the production depart-
ment and has considerable experience within
the company. Even though a project group
runs the programme, there is broad involve-
ment from the rest of the organization. This is
partly achieved by the ‘lean production’ pro-
gramme moving through production and
gradually rebuilding existing production cells
into production lines, and partly through
informing and training the workers. So far, 90
employees have been trained in (elements of)
lean thinking.
Regarding time resources, most of the
activities in the ‘lean production’ programme
are carried out in addition to the normal work-
load. Both the NPD and the production
manager indicate this causes the implementa-
tion of ‘lean production’ to be set aside in
periods with peak production. According to
the production manager, this is not a major
Table 2. Scorecard for Operational and Financial Performance of the Component Manufacturing Depart-
ment in Company A for the Period 2002–2005 (Achieved) and the Year 2005 (Target)
Performance indicators 2002 2003 August 2004 2004 August 2005 Target 2005
Delivery to shipment 92.3% 93.8% 90.3% 91.3% 91.1% 95.6%
Delivery to internal
customers
94.6% 94.3% 91.3% 92.8% 90.7% 95.6%
Delivery reliability
supplier
90.9% 93.6% 90.8% 91.7% NA NA
Absence 7.6% 6% 5.4% 5.7% 5.6% 4.5%
Accidents per million
working hours
30 20 39.2 35.9 NA NA
Machine efficiency
(increase)
3.9% 4.8% 1.9% 0.2% 5.8% 7.0%
Man efficiency (increase) 3.8% 5.6% -1.2% -1.0% NA NA
Scrap (ppm) 10313 8253 9728 10118 9347 8500
Profit before tax 5.4% 2.3% 7.4% NA NA
Note: NA = not available.
© 2007 The Authors

problem since the transformation and rebuild-
ing of production happen gradually and do
not involve many people simultaneously.
With the focus on and effort put into a sig-
nificant number of relatively large and chal-
lenging programmes, Company B is currently
going through a radical change of its produc-
tion system. The production manager argues
that this is a consequence of too little improve-
ment efforts over recent years. However, he
foresees that these activities will create an
understanding and culture for performing
improvement activities on a more continuous
basis.
The production manager says that the
implementation of the action programmes has
created many positive spin-offs. The most
important concerns increased cross-functional
understanding that coordinated improvement
activities are necessary to improve overall
company performance. One element in this
is more careful control of the delivery and
quality performance of suppliers and compo-
nent production in order to improve lead time.
Another is the understanding that product
management and NPD must provide more
complete specifications in order for final
assembly to reach the overall performance
targets.
If problems occur during the implementa-
tion phase and/or the results are disappoint-
ing, Company B will continue the process. The
production manager says that consistency and
persistence are important, and he believes that
the targets pursued will pull the programmes
through. The product manager argues that the
implementation of the programmes will con-
tinue after the scheduled end date if the
expected results are not achieved. In other
words, the targets of the programmes are
fixed, and Company B intends to achieve these
targets, even if the duration of the pro-
grammes has to be extended.
According to the three managers, the four
improvement programmes are deliberately
implemented together because they are related
and fit quite well together. In addition, the
programmes partly supply conditions for each
other. One example is that ‘start right’ will lay
the foundation for ‘lean production’ by pro-
viding high-quality raw material and product
specifications. Furthermore, increased product
standardization through ‘GO 80’ will increase
the benefit of ‘lean production’.
The three managers also agree in their belief
that the organization is capable of performing
these four large programmes simultaneously.
The organization is quite willing to change,
and they feel this is an important quality in
order to succeed in the implementation of the
improvement activities.
Performance Effects
On-time delivery (OTD) deteriorated slightly
from the end of 2003, from a level where
around 90 percent of products were delivered
on time, until around August 2004, after which
it stabilized at a level of around 78 percent
delivered on time. According to the produc-
tion manager, the main reason for the negative
trend was increased focus on quality, delivery
and cost (Q-D-C). Previously, delivery was
considered more important than quality and
cost. Despite being a secondary priority com-
pared to delivery, quality performance was not
particularly poor. However, delivery often
went at the expense of cost performance.
Because of the repositioning of quality and
cost relative to delivery, delivery performance
has decreased somewhat during the last two
years, but is expected to increase again as the
implementation of the various action pro-
grammes progresses.
In addition to the slightly negative trend,
there are a couple of periods with very poor
OTD performance during the period January
2003–June 2005. According to the production
manager, this was due to the relatively high
number of orders that required customization
or even design-to-order, and the specification
of these projects arrived relatively late in the
assembly process. This required a lot of
rework, so that the products were not deliv-
ered according to plan.
As mentioned previously, one of the over-
all targets of the action programmes is a 50
percent productivity increase by the end of
2006. Productivity had increased by 2.5
percent by December 2004 and by approxi-
mately 10 percent by June 2005, both relative to
January 2004. The target for December 2005 is
a further increase of 12.5 percent. According to
the production manager, Company B is pro-
gressing according to plan in order to achieve
this target.
The main reason for improved productivity
is reduced use of temporary employees,
meaning that the same amount of work has to
be done with fewer resources. In addition, the
visual management activity emphasizes fre-
quent revision of the performance figures,
which encourages and motivates managers
and shopfloor workers to improve these
figures continuously.
The 50 percent productivity increase by
December 2006 is an ambitious target. The
largest part of this increase will take place
during 2006 after the rebuilding of the produc-
tion facility, and productivity is expected to
increase gradually when larger parts of the
‘lean production’ programme are imple-
mented. Despite the ambitious target, the
© 2007 The Authors

production manager is convinced that Com-
pany B will achieve it.
Cross-Case Analysis
This section analyses and discusses how
the action programmes are implemented in
the two case companies. The focus is on the
implementation approach, the allocation of
resources and performance effects.
Small Steps Versus the ‘Big Bang’ Approach
Operational performance in Company A dete-
riorated from 2003 to 2004. Moreover, the
target was not reached for any of the reported
performance indicators in 2004. The disap-
pointing performance effects might be due to
the fact that Company A uses (a) a broad and
incremental implementation approach of (b)
essentially company-wide programmes. This
means that it takes a while for the programmes
to be implemented and for the transformation
of the (entire) organization to fall into place.
In 2005, most performance figures started
to improve, which indicates that the imple-
mented programmes in Company A have now
started to pay off.
In Company B, there is some variation in
implementation approach. Some of the pro-
grammes are introduced following a ‘big
bang’ approach, e.g., the lean implementation
programme, a complete restructuring of the
production, which is scheduled for completion
in one and a half years. On the other hand, the
implementation of TPM is introduced in small
steps, starting with 5S. It is still too early to say
anything regarding the performance effects of
the lean programme, since the rebuilding of
the factory started in the autumn of 2005.
Delivery performance deteriorated somewhat
during 2004 due to the higher focus on costs
and quality going at the expense of delivery.
From late 2004 and during 2005, delivery per-
formance stabilized. This is probably due to
the ‘start right’ programme, which is starting
to gain effect through more reliable deliveries
from suppliers and better quality of incoming
materials.
The lack of performance improvement in
2004 for Company A is also visible for those
programmes in Company B that are imple-
mented incrementally. As an example, both
companies started with 5S as their approach to
TPM. 5S is a suitable step-up to train workers
in and prepare the organization for more chal-
lenging elements of TPM while they produce
immediately visible results (good housekeep-
ing). The effects on operational performance,
however, are limited. The main reason for this
is that the company spends resources in train-
ing people in 5S, and sets aside time for the
personnel to work on the action programme
instead of focusing solely on their ordinary
tasks. Achieving broad involvement of all
workers within the organization also takes
time and, hence, the performance effects do
not appear immediately.
According to the production manager, the
reason for the small-step approach in
Company A is that the company has had
bad experiences with previous ‘big bang’
approaches. In their experience, such an
approach is too much for an organization to
cope with, while it is easier to succeed with a
small-step approach.
In contrast, the lean implementation in
Company B can be classified as a ‘big bang’
project. According to the production manager,
the decision to restructure the production
radically now is due to two aspects. First, there
have been relatively few improvement activi-
ties in recent years; hence there is a need for a
step change. Second, cost aspects are becom-
ing more important – competitors have started
to produce affordable high-quality products
too. Furthermore, the company has problems
keeping its export volume high due to
currency fluctuations. As mentioned earlier,
Company B plans to complete the lean imple-
mentation at the end of 2006. After this step
change, Company B intends to have ongoing
improvement activities in order to maintain
and gradually improve the performance of the
plant. To achieve this, a more incremental
approach will be chosen.
Resource Allocation
Another reason for poor performance in the
early phases of implementation in Company A
is related to the balance between, and alloca-
tion of resources to, improvement and day-to-
day activities. Company A performs a wide
range of action programmes, many of which
are company-wide and involve a lot of people.
Especially in production, this can take the
focus away from the day-to-day operations.
According to the production manager, the
improvement activities have high priority and
are followed up, monitored and supported by
top management. The production person-
nel are given dedicated time to work on the
improvement activities. Consequently, a
decrease in productivity and other perfor-
mance criteria is probably unavoidable. This,
however, is not the case in NPD, where the
action programmes are performed in addition
to normal activities. In NPD, however, it is too
early to say anything regarding the effects on
performance. As the process/flow manage-
© 2007 The Authors

ment programme, which is the dominant
action in NPD, has started with a mapping
of the internal processes during 2004, the
changes and improvement of the processes
were not due to be effectuated until the end of
2005.
The implementation of action programmes
in Company B is also in addition to the
workers’ ordinary tasks. Consequently, the
implementation of improvement activities
might be delayed in periods with more cus-
tomer orders than usual. Company B has expe-
rienced this during the spring of 2005, where it
has been necessary to put the improvement
activities aside in order to maintain consis-
tency in the strategic priorities (quality-
delivery-cost). In such situations, delivery
(short-term priorities) gets priority over
improvement activities (long-term priorities).
Company B has experienced an increase in
productivity in 2004 and during spring and
summer 2005. However, with the number of
action programmes currently under way, it
would be reasonable to expect a decrease in
productivity, similar to what we saw in
Company A. This did not happen in Company
B, which is probably because the workers do
the implementation in addition to their ordi-
nary tasks. Therefore, the improvement activi-
ties do not greatly influence the day-to-day
activities. Rather, the influence is the other way
around, i.e., there is a risk that the focus on
day-to-day activities leads to a delay in the
implementation of action programmes in
Company B.
At first sight, Company B’s way to allocate
the resources, on top of normal tasks, seems to
be the more successful of the two approaches.
The question, however, is whether this
approach is also successful and sustainable in
the long term. Greater pressure on the employ-
ees is unavoidable, and it is questionable
whether the organization can maintain the
implementation of action programmes for a
long period under such conditions.
Performance Development during
Implementation
There is a clear time lag between the (start of
the) implementation and performance effects
in both companies. Both production managers
are aware of that and stress the importance of
persistence, of not stopping the implementa-
tion even if the programmes do not pay off in
the short term. The findings indicate that both
case companies are now starting to gain posi-
tive performance effects of the implemented
action programmes.
In Company A, most operational measures
are stabilizing or improving after a period of
deterioration. There are two probable reasons
for this. First, the programmes are being insti-
tutionalized and a part of the day-to-day activi-
ties in the firm, and new processes and ways of
working are being established in the organiza-
tion. Second, in later phases of the implemen-
tation more elements of the programmes are
institutionalized, and, hence, more influential
on performance. Most programmes really start
to pay off when they are fully implemented
(Bessant & Francis, 1999; Davies & Kochhar,
2002).
In Company B, delivery performance has
stabilized after slightly deteriorating during
the earlier phases of the implementation of the
programmes. In contrast, lead-time perfor-
mance and productivity gradually increased
during the same period, indicating that the
implemented programmes have started to pay
off more or less from the start.
Discussion
There is little theory on performance effects
during the implementation of (configurations
of) action programmes. One of the few publi-
cations addressing this question is Gertsen
(2001), who reports that firms experienced
in continuous improvement perform better
than firms which have just started the imple-
mentation of a continuous improvement
programme. Medium experienced firms,
however, are performing lower than both
inexperienced and experienced firms. This is
in line with Pettigrew et al. (2003), who argue
that substantial time, patience and persistence
are necessary for complementary changes to
take effect. These authors report that perfor-
mance effects follow J-curves, i.e., deteriora-
tion during the first part of the implementation
of the programmes followed by gradual
improvement to a level higher than before the
implementation started.
We find elements of the same development
of performance throughout the implementa-
tion in our study. While the authors referred to
above do not explain the performance effects
they observed, our analysis suggests a strong
link with implementation approach. We iden-
tified four approaches (see Table 3).
The first approach, adopted in both compa-
nies, is an incremental, small-step, implemen-
tation process, with widespread employee
involvement. The implementation activities
are a formal part of the employees’ day-to-day
work. This approach leads to disappointing
performance effects in the early phases of
the programme in terms of productivity/
efficiency, delivery and quality. The most likely
explanation for this is that the early steps tie up
© 2007 The Authors

resources rather than produce results. Once a
single action programme or a configuration of
programmes takes shape and the new work
routines are institutionalized, performance
improvements begin to show. Thus, as there is
a considerable time lag before the perfor-
mance effects are visible, persistence in the
implementation process is critical for the
success of the programme.
The second mode is a ‘big bang’ approach
where the workers, led by a full-time dedi-
cated project manager, carry out the improve-
ment programmes in addition to their normal
tasks. Adopted to implement most production
improvement programmes in Company B, this
approach leads to gradual performance
improvements throughout the implementa-
tion phase. However, operational performance
is considered most important. So, in times of
high customer demand, the implementation
and improvement activities are less empha-
sized or put on hold for some time. Although it
seems beneficial in the short term, it is ques-
tionable whether the ‘big bang’ approach
without dedicated time to perform the pro-
grammes is sustainable in the longer term.
In the third approach, the programme is
implemented incrementally and performed on
top of the day-to-day activities. Company A’s
experience with this approach suggests it
might be possible to reduce the time lag from
start of implementation to performance effects,
and to reduce the deterioration in performance
during the early implementation phases.
Finally, we also observed a ‘big bang’
approach, where resources are dedicated to
perform the improvement activities as part of
the day-to-day activities. Company A adopted
this approach to implement SAP R3 and expe-
rienced that such an approach increases the
intensity of the implementation, and hence
reduces the duration of the implementation
phase. However, this goes at the expense of
operational performance, at least initially.
Conclusion
The research questions addressed in this
article are:
• How do the best performing companies
implement new practices?
• How does the way such companies
approach the implementation process affect
performance?
We investigated these questions through
case studies in two high-performing manu-
facturing firms, in which we studied the im-
plementation approach, resource allocation,
persistence and performance effects of the
action programmes adopted.
In both case companies, top management
usually initiates the improvement activities.
However, there is considerable room for the
different functions to adapt and fit the
programmes to their specific needs. More
Table 3. Different Approaches to Implementation of Action Programmes in the Two Case Companies
Part of the job Add-on to the job
Incremental Company A (most manufacturing
programmes); Company B (TPM
programme)
᭿ ‘hockey stick’ effect on operational
performance
᭿ unpredictable project lead-time –
learning has priority over
operational performance
Company A: process streamlining/
management in new product
development
᭿ difficult to maintain focus on
implementation of programme
‘Big-bang’ Company A: SAP R/3 programme
᭿ decrease in delivery performance
after launch, but rapidly increasing,
and much less decrease/troubles
than other similar companies
experience after SAP R/3 launch
Company B (most manufacturing
programmes)
᭿ positive effects on operational
performance (delivery and
productivity)
᭿ unpredictable project lead-time –
operational performance has
priority over project
implementation
© 2007 The Authors

important, however, is top management com-
mitment throughout the implementation
process.
An incremental, small-step approach
appears to have negative effects on the perfor-
mance in the early stages of implementation
compared with an approach through which
programmes are implemented in large steps
(‘big bang’). The most likely reason for this is
that resources are spent on parts of the pro-
gramme that do not lead to performance
improvement in the short term, e.g., 5S in early
phases of TPM implementation. However, the
small-step approach might well be more sus-
tainable in the long term because it is easier to
secure and keep the commitment of the
workers, while it spreads the changes out in
time and into smaller and more digestible
pieces of work. Persistence is a prerequisite for
this approach to work. Quitting the implemen-
tation too early because of disappointing per-
formance effects only means that considerable
amounts of resources have been spent to no
avail and, more importantly, the company is
losing in terms of exploitation performance,
exploration performance, or both.
When resources are allocated so that the
workers have dedicated time to be involved in
the implementation and perform improve-
ment activities, performance, especially pro-
ductivity, appears to decline in the first phases
of implementation. If, in contrast, improve-
ment activities are performed as an add-on
to day-to-day activities, productivity perfor-
mance is maintained or improved. However,
the implementation process itself may suffer
from this and take more time than planned,
especially if short-term operational problems
get priority. Furthermore, it is questionable
whether the ‘add-on’ strategy is sustainable.
The main reason for this concern is related to
whether the workers’ overtime can be exposed
to the usually high operational pressure while
they are also expected to put considerable
effort into implementation activities at the
same time.
So, implementation approach seems to
make a difference in terms of:
• short-term and long-term performance
effects
• operational versus implementation perfor-
mance
• management commitment, involvement
and especially persistence required
• pressure on employees involved in imple-
mentation and improvement activities.
This study contributes significantly to the
theory of implementation and organizational
change, by explaining important relationships
between different implementation approaches
and their performance effects. The study also
adds to the field of continuous innovation by
providing empirical evidence on how firms
actually can manage to remain high perform-
ing while carrying out large and company-
wide improvement activities simultaneously.
For managers this study also brings up
important aspects for the management of
change. First, realizing that performance effect
of improvement activities may take time to
be realized, persistence in implementation is
crucial for the programmes to become a
success. Second, the allocation of resources,
approach and involvement have considerable
influence on the outcome of the improvement
activities, and must be taken into consider-
ation when such activities are designed and
performed.
Further research is needed to identify
whether the findings reported here also hold
beyond the case studies presented in this
article. We suggest survey-based research
spanning a wider range of contingencies, in
particular industry type, company size,
culture, and types, mix and innovativeness of
action programmes. By doing this we have the
possibility to verify whether the findings
reported in this article also hold in a broader
setting.
Another important area concerns longitudi-
nality. Considering there is a time lag from
start of implementation to effects on perfor-
mance, and as this study also shows a possible
deterioration in performance in the early
phases, it is important to take a long-term per-
spective on the study of change processes in
order to get a more complete understanding of
the factors at play. Following authors such as
Pettigrew, Woodman and Cameron (2001), we
suggest long-term case-based research where
high-performing organizations are followed
throughout the implementation of improve-
ment programmes, so that the effects of the
programmes on performance can be evaluated
through time.
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Bjørge Timenes Laugen is Associate Profes-
sor of strategy, innovation and operations
management at Department of Business
Administration at the University of Sta-
vanger, Stavanger, Norway. He received his
MSc in engineering in 2000, and his PhD in
innovation management in 2006, both from
Aalborg University, Denmark. His main
research interest is the link between new
product development, production, strategy,
organizational development and continu-
ous innovation. Dr. Laugen is a board
member of CINet (Continuous Innovation
Network), a global network set up to bring
together researchers and industrialists
working in the area of continuous
innovation.
Harry Boer is Professor of Organizational
Design and Change at the Center for Indus-
trial Production at Aalborg University. He
holds a BSc in Applied Mathematics and an
MSc and PhD both in Management Engi-
neering. He has (co-)authored numerous
articles and several books on subjects such
as organization theory, ﬂexible automation,
manufacturing strategy, and continuous
improvement/innovation. His current
research interest is in continuous innova-
tion, the effective interaction between day-
to-day operations, incremental change and
radical innovation.
© 2007 The Authors

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