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Quantum Cryptography and Possible Attacks
15 de Jun de 2013•0 recomendaciones•1,676 vistas
Denunciar
Tecnología
Educación
Course: Information Security
UPC - Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya
A forgotten presentation we did last year.
Just found it thanks to Arinto Murdopo :) http://www.slideshare.net/arinto
3. Quantum Cryptography
- How it came up
● Cryptography => Secure Communication
=> Secure Data Transmission
● Two techniques
○ Symmetric - key encryption (shared key)
■ Key - distribution problem
○ Asymmetric - key encryption (pair of public&secret keys)
■ Success based on hardware limitations, absence of
good algorithms and non-use of quantum computers.
Quantum Cryptography!
4. Quantum Cryptography
● Quantum Cryptography is
○ the use of laws of quantum physics, to:
■ perform cryptographic functionalities
■ break cryptographic systems
● Examples:
○ Quantum Key Distribution (next section)
○ Quantum Computers to break existing protocols
7. Quantum Key Distribution - BB84
● First quantum cryptography protocol
● Goal: describe a scheme of two users who want to
communicate and exchange data securely.
● Idea: distribute a key securely, based on the laws of
physics.
● Security proofs:
○ If someone reads the state of photon -> state changes
○ Not possible to copy the photon in order to encode it with
all possible ways (basis)
9. Quantum Key Distribution - BB84
Step 1
● Alice has two choices, key (a) & basis (b), chosen
randomly
● Combine bits of a and b, 1-1,
● Four different states of qubit (photon polarization)
● Sent through public quantum channels:
○ Optical Fiber
○ Free Space
Photon Source
10. Quantum Key Distribution - BB84
Step 2
● Bob receives qubit from Alice
● Bob measures it by choosing random basis using
Beam Splitter (BS), practically it could be 50/50 mirror
● PBS sends qubit to certain detector using some rules
11. Quantum Key Distribution - BB84
Step 2
How PBS of a specific basis works
● Let photon that polarized on that basis to pass through to
the correct detector
● Otherwise, the photon can head randomly to any of the
wrong detectors
13. Quantum Key Distribution - BB84
Step 3
● 1st communication between Alice and Bob in public
channel
● They compare the basis used to encode and measure
the qubit
● If Bob.basis == Alice.basis
○ Keep the bit!
● Else
○ Discard the bit
● The length of the initial key is reduced to half of its length
because the probability of Bob choosing the same basis
as Alice is 50%
14. Quantum Key Distribution - BB84
Step 4
● Check if someone has intruded the communication or if
some imperfection of the devices or channel has
introduced noise that distort the outcome
● If Eve has intruded the communication, she will
DEFINITELY left some traces due to Heisenberg
Uncertainty Principle (HUP) and non cloning theorem
15. Quantum Key Distribution - BB84
Step 4
● Alice and Bob performs MANY parity-checks
● In this way, they can find out whether Eve has intruded
the communication
● Very simple example:
○ Calculate parity of blocks of 4-bits
● Alice sends the parities of her blocks and Bob checks them
16. Quantum Key Distribution - BB84
Step 5
● Now Alice and Bob have the same keys, all the bits are
same
● The problem is, in Step 4, Eve manages to find out some
portions of their key
● Privacy Amplification comes into the rescue!
17. Quantum Key Distribution - BB84
Step 5
● Alice and Bob apply Hash function to compress the key
into the final one. And they should use the same Hash
function.
18. Vulnerabilities - Photon number attack
● Sending more than one photon for each bit leads to photon
number attack.
○ Eve can steal extra photons to extract the
stolen photons information.
● Ensure photon spitter only sends exactly ONE photon each
time.
● Single photon ensures quantum mechanic laws are
satisfied.
19. Vulnerabilities - Spectral attack
● If photons are created by four DIFFERENT laser photo
diodes, they have different spectral characteristics.
● Eve performs spectral attack by measuring COLOR, and not
polarization.
20. Vulnerabilities - Random numbers
● Are our random numbers really "Random"?
● Bob side, randomness is determined by BS.
● Alice side, randomness if a bit stream cannot be proven
mathematically
○ Algorithms generate "random" sequences by following
specific patterns => NOT that random!
○ Eve can use same algorithm to extract information.
Entangled Photon Pairs comes to the rescue!
25. Faked-state attack
Practical Implementation - Fake Stated Generator
● Blind Bob's detector
○ Insensitive to photon
● Forces Bob's detectors to have same "click" as what Eve
has measured
○ Bob and Eve have same information
27. Faked-state attack
Single Photo Avalanche Diode
● Has two modes
○ Geiger Mode
○ Linear Mode
Hence, SPAD in Linear Mode can be considered as
blind-to-photon.
29. Faked-state attack
Single Photo Avalanche Diode
● SPAD in Linear Mode
● Bright illumination causes the capacitor has not enough time
to recharge and re-balance the voltage value at point 2
● SPAD's bias voltage below VBreakdown -> Linear Mode
31. Faked-state attack
Practical Implementation - Force Bob's detector to click
● Blinding Bob's detector is not enough
● Eve needs to force specific Bob's detector to "click"
according to the measurement result in Eve's detector
32. Faked-state attack
Practical Implementation - Force Bob's detector to click
● SPAD in linear mode ("blind SPAD) -> easily forced to
create a "click"
● Sending pulse of light with intensity power "I0"