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Codebits 2011

  1. 1. Paranoid crypto citizen A story of Estonian eID, OpenSC and FUD
  2. 2. Topics • Estonian ID-card history • Client software evolution & OpenSC • Misc uses for the card and some “hacks” • Generic PKI-paranoia mixed with FUD
  3. 3. # id • Martin Paljak, ~30 • From periphery of Estonia • ID-card user/hacker since 2003 • Wearing my (invisible) tinfoil hat today
  4. 4. Estonian ID-card • Introduced in 2002 (conceived in ~1999) • Currently ~1.1million cards (~1.35 million citizens) • ~400000 active electronic users • 4th generation of card in circulation + Mobile-ID • Non/pre-standard on-card structures
  5. 5. What can it do? • Authentication (certificate) • Legally binding signatures (certificate) • Visual ID (electronic ID as well) • Decryption (for data in motion)
  6. 6. In the beginning ...
  7. 7. SOFTWARE • Initially no client drivers procured with cards • Windows-only binary effort by the (commercial) CA • Signature is THE product for the CA • CA makes money from signatures (OCSP)
  8. 8. Say WHAT? • €€€ for one of the pillars of PKI (OCSP)? • Paranoia alert: binary only software? • FUD alert: if I sell my car, how do I know that I’m not selling my home instead?
  9. 9. “Das Bundestrojaner” anyone?
  10. 10. Volunteers to the rescue! • “Open Source is about scratching your own itch” • I haz Debian • Create card driver with open source • I buy Mac • Y U NO MAKE MAC SOFTWAREZ ?
  11. 11. No real documentation
  12. 12. Y U NO GIVE DOCS ?
  13. 13. Extreme measures • People smashing the chip with a hammer • Cryptographers disabling their certificates • “I did not generate those keys!” • Tinfoil envelopes (and hats!) • But no ICAO/RFID on the card... • Knowledgeable people writing satire...
  14. 14. OpenSC • Started by a Finn named JuhaYrjölä in ~2001 • Open source smart card middleware • Includes support for several cryptographic smart cards (national eID-s,“blank” cards, etc) • Not necessarily the cutest piece of software • It uses OpenSSL ;)
  15. 15. Born from desperation ... of not having any software ...
  16. 16. OpenSC the software • First custom Linux code & PKCS#11 • Then OS X - Tokend • Now deprecated from 10.7+ • Now slowly Windows code - MiniDriver • Extra cruft to support not a single card but many cards with common goals • A framework, sort of
  17. 17. Purpose “Implement API-s and platform modules used by real life applications, to provide those applications access to on-card capabilities”
  18. 18. Avoid “NASCAR effect”
  19. 19. OpenSC the project • Not to be confused with, a trojan forum • Not to be confused with opensc-vdr, some SAT-TV card-sharing thing (also illegal) • An umbrella for people, code and projects with one goal: use various cryptographic hardware.With open source. Especially smart cards. • New goal: reduce fragmentation in Linux and improve interoperability between libraries (OpenSSL, NSS, GnuTLS etc) with PKCS#11
  20. 20. Back to Estonia ...
  21. 21. 2007 • Government finally opens a tender for eID middleware software • Based on existing open source code ;) • Official E-voting happened in 2005 without official middleware to use the card on “other” platforms... • New, slightly different version of the card
  22. 22. 2007 • Campaign to increase electronic users of the PKI system to 400000 in 3 years • Cheap (6€) OmniKey card readers subsidized by government made available • Mobile-ID (WPKI) for driverless operation introduced
  23. 23. 2010 • eID usage has increased tremendously • People depend on it for online lifestyle • “Temporary-ID” card introduced (incompatible with original card), to have a backup card if needed. Electronic use only. • Software procurement failed, a fork of forked open source code is created.
  24. 24. 2011 • A new (incompatible) card is introduced, with 2048 bit RSA keys. • There is finally “official software” available to everyone, with real support. Open source. Uses OpenSC for some parts. • Smartphones make Mobile-ID an interesting subject • I get to plant paranoia on Codebits :)
  25. 25. What has changed?
  26. 26. IMPORTANT • Smart card authentication != PIN verification!!! • Presenting your ID-card without the security guy doing a face<>card check != ID verification. •Identification •Authentication •Authorization
  27. 27. Door lock with ID+PIN • Enter your ID card • Type the PIN on keypad • Simsalabim, door opens • Remember EMV “CHIP+PIN” ?
  28. 28. In Bigger cities of Estonia • Pay money to a company for credit • Present your ID-card to public transport workers when asked • Checked from database, if your ID-code has a ticket. • But municipal workers are not border guards ;)
  29. 29. A Public Library • Pay money to secretary for credit • Insert ID-card at copy machine • Machine does: • database_lookup(id_code_on_card)->credit--; • You do: • A card that “looks” like your roommates card • TIP: always do cryptographic verification!
  30. 30. Common patterns • Actually abusing the system • Developing a “database nation” • For the government, your identity becomes just a primary key in the database ...
  31. 31. PARANOIA ALERT! “One Card to rule them all, One Card to find them, One Card to bring them all and in the darkness bind them.”
  32. 32. E-voting • You encrypt your vote with the e-voting system’s public key (anonymous) • You sign the encrypted vote and send it over the internet to the “ballot collector” • Ballot box checks your eligibility to vote, removes your signature and forwards the encrypted vote to the “ballot box” • Anonymous votes get decrypted and counted offline
  33. 33. Things to consider • Vote-forging it not tied to ID-card • Don’t care (but authentication is) • Things are heavily monitored • Don’t care (police will knock on door) • ZEUS trojan has a smart card module • Don’t care (but precautions are taken) • Haters gonna hate.
  34. 34. Trust? “It is OK to use card you don’t trust to interact with a government you don’t trust”
  35. 35. Use and abuse • “Automatically select certificate” • Identification of visitors, for fun or profit • Remove your card if not using it! • Trojans steal PIN codes and send to ... • Use pinpad readers! • Secure pinpad readers coming to market.
  36. 36. The good, the bad, the awful • Biggest issue: fault in infrastructure • The basic “SSL/PKI” complaints apply • No breach from systematic failure has happened, AFAIK. • DON’T PANIC! • Do business from anywhere, like Sintra!
  37. 37. Transparency FTW • ... helps to fight FUD • ... helps to fight paranoia • ... helps to keep things auditable • Use open source software • Use public documentation • If it is hackable, it will be hacked anyway.
  38. 38. Thanks for listening! Questions? See you at FOSDEM 2012 Security/Crypto devroom!