1. QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE OF MUNICIPAL SERVICE
DELIVERY PROTESTS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA
Zacheus Matebesi
Department of Sociology
Paper presented at the 2nd
European Conference:
Qualitative Research for Policy
Making
26 & 27 May 2011, Belfast,
United Kingdom
May 26, 2011

2. OUTLINE
1. Background
2. Research methods
3. Findings
4. Recommendations

3. AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE…
“Social control is a continuing function of every social system. When
the mechanisms of control [both formal and informal] weaken,
people may lose confidence in the existing system and try to
reform it through collective behaviour… Social control can
breakdown when the formal agents of control fail to perform
their roles adequately.”
Turner & Kilian, 1987)

4. 1 BACKGROUND – LOCAL GOVERNMENT
• South Africa has three tiers of government:
– National
– Provincial
– Local (municipalities)
• Local Government (LG) - distinctive sphere of government, which is
interdependent, and inter-related with national and provincial
spheres of government.
•

5. 1. BACKGROUND – SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS
• Apartheid-era - social protests against the political system used to be
widespread
• But, 17 years after the new political dispensation….
• “it might appear as if the rolling mass action of the end-of-apartheid
period had simply continued into the dawn of a democratic government
in South Africa”

6. 1 BACKGROUND – SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS

7. METHODS (1)
• Presentation is based on four case studies:
1. Phumelela (Free State Province)
2. Phomolong (Free State Province)
3. Port Elizabeth (Eastern Cape Province)
4. Khutsong (Gauteng Province)
• Gauteng case study differs – primarily about provincial boundary
demarcation

8. METHODS (2)
• Literature and media scan
• Secondary analysis –i.e. census figures
• In-depth interviews (100):
– current and previous councilors
– current and previous officials
– business owners
– security services personnel
– provincial officials
– community leaders
• Focus Groups (300 community members):
– Protestors and non-protestors

9. FINDINGS: REASONS FOR THE PROTESTS
FREE STATE (FS) & EASTERN CAPE (EC) CASE STUDIES
1. Poor governance
• FS - no council meetings
• EC – IDP accepted after 4 years
2. Political in-fighting
3. Deficient client-interface
4. Ineffective management
5. Poor housing administration & management

10. REASONS FOR THE PROTESTS
FREE STATE (FS) & EASTERN CAPE (EC) CASE STUDIES
• No coherent systems in place to measure service delivery or the
quality of the client interface
• An interviewee in Phumelela sums this up:
• “If I had to rate the municipality by means of the guidelines used to rate
the hospitality industry, I would give it ½ a star for water and
electricity, and a 0 star for sanitation before the unrest. With the slight
improvements since then, I can give it 1½ for water and electricity, and
a ‘minus 5’ star, whatever that means, for sanitation.”

11. GAUTENG CASE STUDY – PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY
DEMARCATION
1. First 2 government notices – North West Province
2. Submissions to Demarcation Board – Gauteng Province
3. Gauteng Local Gov. Portfolio Committee – Gauteng Province
4. Gauteng Legislature – North West Province
5. Municipal Demarcation Board – North West Province
6. Municipal Demarcation Board - Gauteng Province
7. Parliament Portfolio Committee – Gauteng Province
8. National Council of Provinces & Minister of Loc. Government –
North West Province
9. Constitutional Court - a political solutions should be found
10. ANC (March 2009) – Gauteng Province

12. GAUTENG CASE STUDY
SOCIAL UNREST
CROSS-BORDER MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS
Inadequate Lack of Political
community appropriate inter- opportunism
engagement governmental
relations
HISTORY OF UNCERTAIN HUMAN SETTLEMENT
POOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

13. SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROTESTS
Eroding
social capital
•3 persons Deteriorating
• Education killed Dented levels of
• Councilors • Hundreds relations mutual trust
chased out injured between between
of Khutsong • Many lost officials and community
jobs politicians members

14. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PROTESTS
• Damage to infrastructure
• Public infrastructure = estimated USD 35 million
• Private property = USD 5 million
• Service payments dropped from 50% (2007) to 20% (2009)
• Payment levels to Eskom dropped from 86% to 43%
• Municipality spent USD 8,301.51 a month on relocated councillors (2007-
2009)

15. POLICY IMPLICATIONS – LESSONS LEARNED
EARLY WARNING SIGNALS
• Councilors & ward committees are in a better position to detect early
warning signs
• Difficult to be picked up by intelligence systems of local police

16. SOME EARLY WARNING SIGNALS INCLUDED…
1. High levels of non-payment and municipal cash flow problems
2. Absence of regular ward committee meetings – record keeping is
essential
3. Continuous complaints about general service delivery
4. Ongoing gripes about certain individuals within a specific community

17. IN CONCLUSION…
1. Correct process alone would have avoided the unrest
2. Some opportunities for compromise not explored
3. Institutionalize mediation to defuse tension
4. Role of the media should be noted
5. Political or legal coercion DOES NOT minimize conflict
6. Understand; local in-migration patterns
7. Rethink development approaches in small towns

18. THANK YOU!