6. • Rasmussen, et al. (1975-10). "Reactor safety study. An
assessment of accident risks in U. S. commercial nuclear power
plants. Executive Summary." WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014).
http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/product.biblio.jsp?query_id=6
&page=0&osti_id=7134131. Retrieved 2009-10-31.
• Harold Lewis (1978).Risk Assessment Review Group Report to
the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/6489792-
nii8Km/6489792.pdf
7.
8. The report concluded that the risks to the
individual posed by nuclear power stations
were acceptably small, compared with
other tolerable risks. Specifically, the
report concluded, using the methods and
resources and knowledge available at the
time, that the probability of a complete
core meltdown is about 1 in 20,000 per
reactor per year.
10. 確率計算に多数のソースを見出した。There are many sources of
both conservatism and nonconvatism in WASH-1400 … 確率評価の
相対的な大きさが正しいかどうか判断する方法を持たない。たとえ
ば
事故時の人間の適応力は定量化できない。 conservatism
共通原因による失敗(Common cause failure)の扱い方が
不適当である。 nonconvatism
11. Extremely rare event –core melt- in a system of
great complexity. (not simple as coin)
No direct experimental data!
Break down into its components sub-system,
and probabilities of failure are generated for
these.
Assumption: the independence of events
and sub-systems.
The common cause failure are treated
separately.
23. APSの組織する科学者グループが、死者数の評価が事故発生から24時間に限っている
ことを批判。
関連する科学者組合が批判レポートを発表。
エネルギー環境下院分科会が専門家のヒアリングを実施。NRCはレビューグループを
つくって検証することを決定。
1978年Lewis Committeeは、WASH-1400は過酷事故の確率の不確実さが過小に見積も
られていると結論。
NRCはLewis Committeeの結論を受け入れる政策文書を公表し executive summaryの支
持を撤回することを発表した。
In 1979, The NRC was forced to issue a policy statement in which it accepted
numerous criticisms of WASH-1400 raised by the Lewis Committee, and it
withdrew any endorsement of the executive summary.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WASH-1400