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Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
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Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Publicidad
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Publicidad
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Publicidad
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
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Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
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Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
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Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
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Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
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Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
Unit 4 ­ Individual ProjectAssignment DetailsAssignment D.docx
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  1. Unit 4 - Individual Project Assignment Details Assignment Description Key Assignment Draft The objective of this assignment is to enable you to demonstrate your ability to develop a court management policy proposal that addresses the key factors that should be considered to ensure that legal requirements and best practices in management are observed. You will craft a policy proposal designed to address problems of case backlog and excessive delay in calendaring of hearings that have resulted from the growing workload in state courts. You will select the U.S. state court system of your choosing as opposed to a hypothetical or generic state court in an effort to make this deliverable more realistic and to enable the use of information for your research that may be available through actual court administration offices (e.g., via their Web sites or publicly available research reports). The environment in which this policy proposal is being generated is one characterized by several realities: State budgets for managing necessary services are shrinking. The political environment is somewhat unstable because of lack of consensus on how to address various types of social problems, including crime. Property-related crime is on the rise, including collateral offenses against persons. Court systems are so overwhelmed that there is growing public perception that public access to timely dispute resolution has become severely constrained. Correctional facilities are
  2. over-crowded, and problems of recidivism have accelerated. Plea bargaining and out-of court settlement of cases has increased in part as a way to side-step lengthy and expensive court trials. Certain alternative dispute resolution programs have been operating successfully in many circumstances and jurisdictions. You will produce a policy proposal from the perspective that you are a senior policy analyst employed by a state’s Administrative Office of the Courts. In this role as a senior policy analyst, you have been assigned to draft a proposal for the court administrator recommending viable options based on the legislature’s interests and objectives. The background information that you have been given by your employer is that the Judicial Committee of the State Legislature is very interested in a policy proposal that weighs options for new programs and/or approaches to dispute resolution designed to satisfy the legislature’s stated objectives to do the following: Reduce case backlog Shorten the average time for court hearings to be calendared and for decisions to be rendered Avoid the expense of expanding the number of court houses, judges, and associated court staff and/or detention facilities and associated staff Minimize the need for funding of new programs Consider the viability of “community burden­sharing” through partnerships with private (where private includes both profit and nonprofit) organizations and resources In addition, the judicial committee has specified that it would like to look at a policy proposal that focuses on dispute resolution options related to juvenile offenders that address the legislature’s objectives as a “pilot test” of new approaches to managing court-related services in the existing environment. Thus, the court administrator has asked that the policy proposal be narrowly focused on the juvenile justice division of the state court system.
  3. The policy proposal should exclude considerations of whether any proposed new programs or expansions of existing programs meet existing statutory requirements. For purposes of this project, you are to assume that once the proposal is presented to the Judicial Committee of the State Legislature, that committee will charge the Office of Legislative General Counsel to determine what, if any, statutory changes would be necessary. Questions the proposal would need to address include the following: Would it cost the state less to implement a victim offender mediation (VOM) program for juvenile offenders than it would to expand the courts and corrections staff and facility infrastructure? Would it take the state less time to implement a program such as this than it would to expand the courts and corrections staff and facility infrastructure? To what extent could a VOM program reduce court case backlog and thereby shorten the average time between arrest and case disposition? What is the “track record” of one or more comparable VOM program(s)? What are the social benefits and social costs of a VOM program for juvenile offenders both to the offenders themselves and to the larger community? Are there particular types of cases that are appropriate, as opposed to others that the legislature might want to exclude? What are the major challenges that will be faced by the Administrative Office of the Courts in implementing this proposed policy in terms of the following: Program development Training and credentialing of mediators “Selling” it to potentially supportive community resources that could become partners with the state in this effort Case flow
  4. and records management Security issues related to cases being mediated outside of court facilities Please submit your assignment. For assistance with your assignment, please use your text, Web resources, and all course materials. PUB 503 ML:Theories, Principles, & Practice of Public Administration Exam Questions 1. What is a closed model is as relates to an open model of an organization? Identify at least five principal features of each design and how do they fit in to the day-today operations of a public organization? Give at least three examples. 2. What is Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs? Explain each step and give examples of each. 3. What is Fredrick Herzberg’s motivation-hygiene theory? Explain and give at least two examples of what is an “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” dimension of this theory. 4. What engages workers? What disengages workers? Give at least two examples of each. 5. What is the fabric that keeps the organization together? Explain how data, information, and knowledge keeps the organization together. Give at least two examples of each. 6. What is the difference between position power and personal power? As a leader in a public organization which one would you prefer? Explain
  5. The Fabric of Organizations: Forces 1 1 How do organizations adapt to the fury of forces that roil in them and in the society surrounding them? To answer this question, we need to weave the threads of theory into a fabric. Sometimes they weave a tapestry, other times a drop cloth. 2 Data, Information, And Organizational Knowledge Information is processed data. The accumulation of information is knowledge. Knowledge that means something to us is what reinforces our behavior or it’s what changes us. Organizational knowledge, or organizational intelligence, is not only the process of collecting yet one more datum to complete a puzzle, but, it is also a process of interpreting data to solve mysteries. Despite the fact that todays organizations have many times more data, Americans are any more knowledgeable about public affairs than they were in 1950. 3
  6. Dealing with the Uncertainty of Knowledge One of the more intriguing ways in which organizations distort knowledge is called uncertainty absorption, whereby information that initially is regarded as uncertain and “soft” by the people who collect it becomes increasingly certain and “hard” as it is sent up through the decision-making hierarchy. In closed, centralized organizations, information distortion often is intertwined with personal power. Folks, like everyone else is afraid to tell the leader the truth. Even when people trust each other and are working as a team, both of which are emblematic of the open, decentralized organization, information still may fail to reach the people who need it and can act on it. In decentralized organizations, the pathology appears to be less one of fear and more one of fumbling. 4 Information and the Hierarchy If knowledge changes us, then it is disconcerting to know that organizations change knowledge. It also creates “turf wars” It appears that bureaucratic jealousies seems to be particularly present in public organizations, whether centralized or decentralized, concerns “turf,” or agency rivalries that revolve around the control of areas of responsibility. Unfortunately their is no panacea for curing pathologies of organizational information. We do know, however, that there is a model of hierarchical
  7. distortion: the more hierarchical layers there are, the more organizational subunits that are charged with similar responsibilities, and the more that information is “handled” as it is passed up, down, and around the bureaucracy, the more likely it is that the information will be delayed and distorted, and the less likely that it will reach someone who can intelligently act on it. 5 Organizational Knowledge and Strategic Decision Making All of us are inundated by data and we often are unable to salvage from this flood the knowledge that we need to make good decisions. In psychology, decision-making is regarded as the cognitive process resulting in the selection of a belief or a course of action among several alternative possibilities. Decision-making is the process of identifying and choosing alternatives based on the values, preferences and beliefs of the decision-maker. In reality no one person could ever have enough information to make rational strategic decisions. It appears that market and other environmental forces provided the best information for decision making. 6 Information as Symbol “The acts of seeking and using information in decisions have important symbolic value” because they cloak their actors with legitimacy, “a necessary property of effective decisions.” Hence, the “conspicuous consumption of information,” whether done consciously or not, “is a sensible strategy for decision
  8. makers” because their decisions not only are more readily implemented, but organizations with elaborate information systems also house more effective decision makers than those without them. The symbolism syndrome seems to be particularly present in public administration; the consumption of information is “more conspicuous in policy making than in engineering, more conspicuous in the public sector than in the private, more conspicuous at the top of an organization than at the bottom.” 7 Strategic Decision Making In Organizations Research on how information is used in decision making implies that the process is less than rational. And, to an extraordinary extent, it is not rational. The principal reason underlying this darker side of decision making is that the people who make decisions, like all people, are often less than logical. All human beings make decisions on the basis of their decision premises, or the unique values and viewpoints held by each organizational member, and on which he or she bases every decision he or she makes regarding the organization. For example: The values of profitability, competitiveness, and customer orientation have a greater influence on business decisions; in public organizations, values such as legitimacy, lawfulness, accountability, and impartiality play a larger role.” Note: Every decision maker is boxed in by mental and social bounds it can lead to a form of Dysrationalia or the inability to think and behave rationally despite adequate intelligence.
  9. 8 Bounded Rationality It appears that the human species is beset by bounded rationality; that is, the reasoning powers of the human mind are bound to a small and simple plot compared with the vastness and complexity of the territory spanned by the problems that human minds are expected to comprehend and solve. Research buttresses the reality of the bounded brain. The human mind can distinguish a maximum of just seven categories of phenomena at a time, but beyond that number loses track. Emotion colors decision making. A decision is first made as an emotional response to one’s environment, and this is especially the case when there have been recent and dramatic events in it; consequently, decision makers often misstate the problem to be solved. If anger is among the decision maker’s emotional responses, the likelihood of unethical decisions increases, but if fear or little emotion are present, then ethical decisions become more possible. Although this emotional phase is sometimes criticized as an impediment to rational decision making, emotion is central to decision making; people who cannot process emotions also struggle to make decisions. 9 Bounded Rationality and “Satisficing” Decisions More rational responses to environmental events overlay the
  10. initial emotional ones. When this phase is reached, decision makers usually are overcautious, favoring stability over change, and tend to prefer information that protects them against anticipated losses over information that they can use to make gains. “Bounded rationality results in suboptimal or what can be called “satisficing” decisions. If not optimal, then, what are they? It’s those choices that tend to satisfied the makers of decisions and sufficed enough for the organization to get by. Many decision makers typically use heuristic thinking (or “rules of thumb”), which is invariably flawed, and base their decisions on their perception of the status quo, rather than on an objective comparison of known variables. Options that provide quick returns generally are preferred to those that delay them, even though delay may bring superior returns. “In short, our brains are naturally lazy.” 10 Victims of Groupthink Regrettably, in addition to their own bounded minds, decision makers are limited by other factors as well. Because stress accompanies decision making, avoidance and denial are frequently the handmaidens of the decision process. When stressed decision makers are making decisions within the context of a tightly knit in-group, “groupthink” is the consequence. Groupthink is an over-conformity among decision makers that displaces critical thinking, and “is likely to result in irrational and dehumanizing actions directed against out-groups.” 11 The Making of Good Decisions
  11. Vigilant Decision Making Vigilant decision making consists of employing ways to encourage the group to participate more effectively in making good decisions and to minimize groupthink. These group-improving means include: employing a large number of techniques to encourage dissent; bringing in “representatives of people in the organization with different points of view,” rather than relying solely on “trusted staff”; critically assessing the costs and risks of each choice; and plumbing diverse sources of knowledge. Fast Decision Making Not only do good decision makers gather more data and counsel more extensively than poor decision makers when making decisions, they also develop more alternatives to solve problems. Counter-intuitively, even though these activities are time consuming, they nevertheless make their decisions more rapidly than do those who do not engage in them. These unexpected patterns of information-sensitive, advice- seeking, option-generating—yet speedy—decision making lead to “superior performance” by executives. 12 Thinking Dispositions Thinking dispositions are rational, psychological, decision- making touchstones that, surprisingly, do not correlate, or, at best, only weakly so, with cognitive ability. They include: a capacity for thoughtful reflection; digging out information before deciding; trying to match one’s degree of certainty with the strength of the evidence; examining one’s biases and correcting for them; a willingness to wait until good solutions become apparent; and consciously countering confirmation bias, or the
  12. regrettable reality that first impressions “are remarkably perseverant and unresponsive to new input, even when such input logically negates the original bias of the impressions.” As one ages the likelihood of one using thinking dispositions lessens, and they are partially replaced by a greater reliance on bias and irrationality; the consequence is riskier decisions. Note: Those public administrators who have established reputations for excellence when confronted with making a particular type of tough decision were much less likely to consult any advisers and to engage in any “information- gathering of some sort. 13 The Bounds of Organizational Rationality Just as the rationality of organizational members is bounded, so is the rationality of organizations themselves. Types of Organizational Decision Making How an organization makes decisions depends on whether its stakeholders agree or disagree about what their organization should do (that is, its goals), and agree or disagree about what causes the attainment of those goals. Efficiency and Analytical Decision Making In organizations in which everyone agrees on organizational objectives and how to fulfill them, efficiency is readily apparent. Because efficiency is obvious in businesses, analytical decision making is dominant; there is little or no debate about cause and effect, and decisions are made on the basis of shared perceptions. Effectiveness and Judgmental Decision Making In many public and non-profit organizations efficiency is very difficult to determine. Effectiveness, or an organization’s ability to fully complete its
  13. tasks, however, is usually easier to assess. Note: In organizations, in which members still agree about goals but are uncertain about how to achieve them, decisions are made judgmentally. 14 Compromising, or Bargaining, Decision Making In those organizations in which members believe that they know what causes what, but who disagree about organizational goals, neither efficiency nor effectiveness is clear. So what is a decider to do? Under these conditions, compromising, or bargaining, decision making is in order. The classic example is when any legislative decision maker agrees that a proposed law will cause certain outcomes, but disagree about the desirability of those outcomes. Inspirational and/or Authoritarian Decision Making What sort of strategies can an organization use when its decision makers disagree about both goals and causality? In some organizations in the third sector seem to exemplify this combination, and their members are not merely uncertain about whether or not they are achieving their goals; they are uncertain even about what those goals are. Under these circumstances, inspirational decision making, or authoritarian decision making, or both, are favored. Inspirational and authoritarian decision making are employed in these organizations because the alternative could be chaos; when decision makers are unable to discern efficiency and effectiveness, rational (i.e., analytical), or even partially rational (i.e., judgmental), decision-making “strategies” simply are not possible. “Inspiring” the organization, and/or cracking down on dissidents are the only decision-making options left. Mismatching Organizations and Decision Making Unfortunately, in nearly six out of ten strategic decisions,
  14. decision makers select a strategy that is inappropriate to the kinds of bounds that constrain their organization. 15 Organized Anarchies and the Garbage Can of Decision Making The messiest forms of decision making—that is, judgmental, compromising, inspirational, and authoritarian decision making—all associate with public or nonprofit organizations. These messy methods characterize organized anarchies, which are composed of a “loose collection of ideas” in which participants do not define their preferences very precisely and do not fully understand what their organization actually does. Organized anarchies use an erratic, irrational decision-making process that is a figurative “garbage can.” In making decisions, the organized anarchy “bumbles along, and discovers preferences through action more than it acts on the basis of preferences,” resulting in decisions that are “a collection of choices looking for problems … solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work.” 16 Organized Anarchies The messiest forms of decision making—that is, judgmental, compromising, inspirational, and authoritarian decision making— all associate with public or nonprofit organizations. These messy methods characterize organized anarchies, which are composed of a “loose collection of ideas” in which participants do not define their preferences very precisely and do not fully understand what their organization actually does.
  15. In making decisions, the organized anarchy “bumbles along, and discovers preferences through action more than it acts on the basis of preferences,” resulting in decisions that are “a collection of choices looking for problems … solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work.” 17 The Implementation of Strategic Decisions Just as making big decisions is beset by bounded rationality, so is implementing them. Studies found that decision makers rely on four basic implementation tactics these are: persuasion, nudging, participation, and intervention. When making decisions, public administrators “place too great an emphasis on bargaining … but they do seem to understand the limits of analysis,” Public administrators believe that negotiating, in and of itself, legitimizes decisions, and thereby creates, unfortunately, “a false perception of support for a decision.” 18 Persuasion consumes the most time of all four tactics, and seems to be favored by public administrators, who spend an inordinate amount of their time talking or nudging subordinates and peers; “this talk accomplishes administration.” “Nudge” is shorthand for the framing of policies and procedures
  16. in ways (such as by simplifying choices and sending reminders) that more effectively persuade people to adopt and implement them. Participation refers to stakeholders cooperatively implementing the decision. The broader and deeper the participation, the greater the rate of successful adoption of the decision. Participative decision making is markedly present in government agencies. Intervention is used to justifying a need for change, establishing new performance standards, demonstrating the feasibility of the decision and the improvements that will result from it. Note: In contrast to executives in other sectors, those in government appear to rely heavily on intervention, overcoming “bureaucratic obstacles” by introducing training programs, demonstrating the benefits of new policies, consulting with stakeholders, and persistence to get their way. 19 A Complex and Slow Decision Process Governments’ decision makers must deal with vastly more, and more complex, decision criteria that are far broader in scope than those in business, who are measurably more likely to focus on a single and straightforward datum—that of financial performance—when making decisions.7 Public executives who have business experience view governments as conservative cultures that are slow to change, and research suggests that decisions are indeed made more slowly in public organizations than in private ones.
  17. Slower decision making may be a product of the fact that civilian agencies are less likely to take risks than private companies, regardless of the organizational mission. It is noted that governments’ decision makers swirl sporadically through a “vortex” of intense meetings and conversations with each other, and are much more likely than those in private organizations to engage in both formal and informal interaction with others when making decisions. 20 Consulting with Whom? Public administrators network extensively with internal “peers and underlings” when making decisions. This is a good thing: A thorough review concludes that “the greatest organizational gains from employee participation [in decision making] may come from producing better decisions.” In marked contrast to business managers, however, when public administrators make decisions they often “discount networking” with “external constituencies,” notably agency clients, citizens, and oversight bodies. This is not such a good thing. If clients and overseers were more involved in public administrators’ decision making, it would “improve their chances of success.” 21 The Decision Making Quality Decision making in public organizations, in contrast to its practice in private ones, seems to be: a process that relies more on bargaining than analysis;
  18. is slower, sloppier, and murkier; is more intense, constrained, and complicated; is more consultative, but containing elements of groupthink; and is risk averse, but unwittingly risky. In one of the few attempts to match the decision-making techniques used by each sector with the quality and successful implementation of the decisions made, it was determined that government managers who relied primarily on soliciting the views of experts and used hard data made the highest quality decisions. Obviously, decision makers who ignore their clients and bosses can produce decisions that “can be very dangerous” to the decision makers, especially “if an oversight body opposes” their decisions. Yet, this may be precisely the decision-making situation in public organizations. 22 Decision Making Roles in Nonprofit Organizations It must be noted that public agencies are far more influenced by factors in their external environments than are private companies and nonprofit associations. Consultative Decision Making Nonprofit strategic decision makers appear to be uniquely consultative; they “recycle” decisions back to earlier stages in the decision-making process, and take many more “steps” than in the private sector. Conflictive Decision Making Conflicts break out earlier in the decision-making process of non-profit organizations than in for- profit ones, and third-sector executives—who believe that conflict defines issues more sharply and thus produces better decisions—are less averse to conflict than are their corporate counterparts, who think just the opposite. Riskier Decision Making Third-sector administrators are
  19. especially fond of throwing the dice, and have been known to radically change the very missions of their organizations if they thought it useful, an option not available to public agencies and a limited one for private companies. Managers and professionals in the independent sector report that their organization encourages them “to take risks,” compared with federal administrators and for-profit managers. Nonprofit employees also are much less concerned with compensation and job security than are those in government and the private sector. With the obvious exception of the public sector’s dominance of life-or-death decision making, these characteristics strongly suggest that decision making in the third sector is a riskier business than in the other two. 23 Position Vs Personal Power There are two types of administrative or leadership power that facilitate subordinates’ acceptance of their executives’ roles. One is position power, a category that includes four “power bases.” They are: Control, specifically of information and the work environment; reward power, or the positive recognition of another; coercive power, or the capacity to punish; and legitimate power, or the acceptance of the leader by others. The other kind of power is personal power, and this includes three power bases: Expert power, or the perception that the leader is knowledgeable; referent power, or the personal attraction that a leader holds for others; and charisma, or the leader’s ability and will to exert great change.
  20. Corporate managers exercise a very high level of control over the critical positional power bases of rewards, coercion, and legitimacy, but public administrators have little, if any, control over them and are reduced to relying on personal power bases to lead. It is noteworthy in this regard that public employees perceive their executives to be far more inspirational and personally involved with them than do corporate employees.124 24 The Mechanisms of Control Once administrators have established their power bases, then they can exercise greater power. They do this through six major “mechanisms of administrative control.” These mechanisms include: supervision, or the direct observation and provision of feedback to subordinates; input control, or the cutting or increasing of resources to subunits; behavior control, or the structuring by administrators of individual and group activities; output control, or the evaluation of subunits’ productivity; selection-socialization control, or the internalization of selected norms and values in subunits; environmental control, or the constraints imposed by the organization’s external task environment (public administrators implement environmental control by obtaining feedback from their communities). Public administrators use all six mechanisms in surprisingly broad and balanced ways. 25
  21. Public Organization: A Dynamic Environment The tasks that public administrators must administer are far more “complex” than those managed by private managers, rendering public administration all the more difficult. The Whirlwind Public administrators have little control over how they use their time, and are more “rushed” to get things done. They are far more consumed with managing crises, and devote far more time to doing so, than their private-sector counterparts. More effective public administrators are more flexible and accord scant effort to “time management” and planning than less effective public administrators. The Pressures To “accomplish” their convoluted and ill-defined missions, public administrators must confront many more “conflicting environmental demands” and “external stakeholders” than business managers. 26 Lessons Learned Public administrators have learned some practical lessons about how to administer well. Here are the main ones. ■ Hire with care, and be alert to an employee’s performance during the probationary period. ■ Engage new employees with a welcoming first-year program that introduces them to the agency’s culture. ■ Communicate to build trust. Ask employees for their feedback and advice, and tell them whether you used it; meet regularly with each employee to review progress; and lead by example. ■ Hold employees accountable for their performance. ■ Closely link recognition, rewards, and sanctions to performance. ■ Give all employees the opportunity to grow and develop. 27
  22. Change Agents And Their Technology Governments are not associated with swift-paced change. As one study put it, “high-publicness organizations … show a slow change rate” and “a low rate of change.”138 But public organizations do change. Without question, the organization’s technology, or what the organization does and how it does it, is central to what any organization is, and changing its technology causes systemic change throughout any organization. However, legislatures rarely, if ever, allow a government agency to change what it does, and public technology is itself resistant to change. Executives who have served in the private and public sectors believe, accurately, that, compared to business, government and nonprofits are driven by processes. Changing a process in any organization involves extensive convincing and coordinating, and is a much slower affair than changing a product. Note: It appears that public managers are more change-oriented than managers in business organizations. 28 Paladins of Public Change Who is more likely to cause change in governments—elected officeholders, nonprofit public-interest groups, agency clients, citizens, or stodgy old bureaucrats? The bureaucrats, hands down. “Despite controls … career public servants” at all levels of government “do innovate,” and initiate innovations far more frequently than any other group. The environment that surrounds and suffuses the public organization appears to be the primal engine of its change. All legislatures pass laws that change their governments’
  23. agencies. Some statutes radically open public organizations to all manner of penetration by innumerable environmental forces, and to an extent that is unheard of in the other sectors. 29 Who or What Pressures or Impedes Change? Government agencies are pressured to change when specific elements in their environments change. Agencies that are dominated by professionals are pushed to adjust when outside observers perceive a loss of professional competence; those that are protected by patrons, such as legislators, are threatened with change when they lose their patrons; and those that have endlessly churned the same old unresponsive rut suddenly are challenged by new and sustained expectations. Pressure to change is no guarantee of change. Frustratingly, even when public administrators proactively address these challenges, change still remains stymied unless the agency’s leaders can gain “the support of oversight bodies,” and then only when agencies “are allowed to be responsive” to environmental demands. “ Creating such arrangements is always difficult and often impossible.”1 30 Laws That Can Impede Change Sunshine laws require that agencies provide, with some restrictions, to those who request it any information that they have about anyone and anything.
  24. The federal government, all the states, and the District of Columbia have sunshine laws. The federal sunshine law is the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of 1966, which exempts information pertaining to national security, citizen privacy, and Congress. Some 700,000 FOIA requests, on average, are received and processed each year by all agencies, at a cost of more than $480 million. To meet an FOIA request, federal administrators must execute no fewer than fifteen distinct tasks, and it takes from ten to 100 median days to do so. This is very expensive. Many public agencies are legislatively required to appoint advisory committees that recommend policies. In Washington alone, there are about a thousand active committees in any given year composed of more than 70,000 members advising around fifty agencies, at an annual cost of more than $350 million, averaged over ten years. 31 Federal Rulemaking and Special Interest Power Federal agencies spend, on average, about four years (ranging from one year to an astonishing fourteen) to make a rule. This vast amount of time implies that agencies must deal with formidable forces when making rules, and they do— specifically, special interests. Special interests view agency rulemaking with great seriousness because an agency’s “rule” can amount to a major public policy. Agency rulemaking is relatively unconstrained by the president, Congress, and the courts; it is interests that wield the power. These interests are effective. Federal agencies alter 49 percent of their decisions in favor of lobbyists purely as a result of the formal notice-and-comment
  25. process. Even allowing for a bit of braggadocio, it is nonetheless notable that business interests enjoying a “disproportionate influence over rule-making outputs.” Perhaps because federal rule makers are concerned about the disproportionate influence of special interests, the feds fail to notify the public that it can comment them. 32 State Rulemaking and Special Interest Power All states and the District of Columbia have administrative procedure acts, and they open agencies to a startling quantum of special interest power. Special interests’ general influence with state agencies that are making rules is impressive; 77 percent of state lobbyists submit comments on proposed rules and even “help draft regulations,” and more than half engage “in regulatory negotiations.” Administrative procedure acts are crucial in both the access and influence of special interests. The greater the access to state agencies enabled by an administrative procedure act, the higher that agency heads will rank the impact of interest groups on their agencies’ rulemaking, an opinion fortified by fact: “As the interactions between … agencies and third parties increase, so too does the influence of these parties over agency policies and decisions.” Access brings results. “Interest group power … is significantly influential” in an estimated 80 percent of state agency rulemaking. As with federal patterns, business interests dominate the states’ notice-and-comment process, and benefit most from it relative to other groups.
  26. 33 Environmental Forces On The Inner Workings Of Government Perhaps of greater impact on the inner workings of government agencies are not laws, but rather environmental forces. Environmental forces are those situations and relationships that influence decisions makers located in government, it’s legislatures, which in turn influence the distribution of budgets, make laws and have an obvious impact on public bureaucracies. Even in these pure power relationships, there are unspoken subtleties. For example: States with congressional committee members who oversee the Federal Emergency Management Agency receive much larger disaster-relief funds than those states without them, even though the emergencies are of comparable severity. Note: The Internal Revenue Service audits far fewer individual income tax returns from taxpayers in congressional districts that are important electorally to the president or which have representatives on key oversight committees. Other environmental forces do not even know that they are forces. Whether they are rough or refined, environmental forces change the accountability, structure, hierarchy, procedures, and autonomy of public organizations far more profoundly than those pressures that alter private and nonprofit organizations. 34 What Is A Bureaucracy?
  27. Bureaucracy refers to both a body of non-elective government officials and an administrative policy-making group. Historically, a bureaucracy was a government administration managed by departments staffed with non-elected officials. Today, bureaucracy is the administrative system governing any large institution, whether publicly owned or privately owned. The public administration in many countries is an example of a bureaucracy, but so is the centralized hierarchical structure of a business firm. Standard dictionaries generally agree on the following: Bureaucracy is a combination of organizational hierarchy and red tape. Hierarchy refers to layers of administrative units ranked one above the other. Red tape is a large number of reports, forms, procedures, and, most especially, rules. Hierarchy and red tape are symbiotic. Hierarchy produces red tape: “the larger the number of hierarchical levels, the greater the demand for explicit rules.” And red tape produces hierarchy: legislative rulemaking adds to “the structural complexity of bureaucratic action” in all sectors. 35 How Much Hierarchy Is Too Much? Two-fifths of federal employees at all ranks say that, in their agencies, there are “too many layers of supervisors and managers” between them and top management, compared to less than a fourth each of business and nonprofit employees, Anthony Downs’s famous law of hierarchy contends that the taller (i.e., the more hierarchical layers) and more complex the hierarchy, the more effort and expense that are required for “internal”
  28. administration to the detriment of “external” achievement. In the public sector, hierarchy can both undermine and improve organizational effectiveness Where hierarchy contributes most to public organizational effectiveness is in those agencies that are playing defense. Greater hierarchy associates with centralized decision making, which, in turn, “works best” in defending the organization against external threats. Lesser hierarchy correlates with decentralized decision making, which works best when agencies are prospecting for new opportunities in their environments. 36 Ribbons of Red Tape & Bureaucratic Rules Public organizations are wrapped in more red tape than are private and nonprofit ones (the independent sector has the least red tape)—ribbons more— that are spooled out almost entirely by external sources, such as special interests and legislatures. Reams of Reports A basic building block of red tape is reports. The annual cost of reports are millions of dollars. Many go unread by congressional members and staffers, one staffer stated, “We used them as doorstops.” Literally. Nevertheless, reports seem to stick around; one analysis concluded that only about 6 percent could be usefully abandoned, although Congress has identified only six-tenths of 1 percent that could be eliminated or consolidated. Rules Rule, a bureaucracy’s concentrate on the centrality of rules in red tape can have the same or larger social impact
  29. as a legislature’s laws. It seems that the amount of government rules more than doubles every decade because “the stock of rules expands due to a powerful internal dynamic: that is, rules breed rules. 37 Green Tape Rules need not be “red tape” in the sense that they foment negativity among public administrators. Rules can be green tape, or well-formulated regulations that facilitate “higher rule abidance” and, thereby, greater agency efficiency. “Compliance with rules … can be an essential element of both a project’s success and its accountability.” Written (not spoken) rules that are not overly controlling, whose purposes are understood by stakeholders, and which clearly work effectively, “significantly correlate” with green tape. Consistency in applying rules, oddly, seems not to matter. The most effective rules are neither overly vague nor overly prescriptive, in that those “moderate” rules that balance flexibility of implementation with clear guidelines are the most effective and productive. In fact, when rules violate either of these ends, the possibility of public corruption is enhanced. Note: Rigid rules and inflexible procedures help assure that bureaucrats and citizens alike are treated fairly, impartially, and equally. In a word, red tape can provide justice, an idea that is central to democratic government. 38
  30. 39 The Threads of Organization: Theories 1 1 Because organizations are different creatures to different people, organizations are “defined” according to the contexts and perspectives peculiar to the person doing the defining. Nevertheless, we can, at least, posit certain characteristics that are common to all organizations. Organizations: ■ are purposeful, complex human collectivities; ■ are characterized by secondary (or impersonal) relationships; ■ have specialized and limited goals; ■ are characterized by sustained cooperative activity; ■ are integrated within a larger social system; ■ provide services or products to their environment; and ■ are dependent upon exchanges with their environment. Organization theorists, using essentially this list of characteristics but stressing different items in it, have produced a vast body of literature on the nature of organizations.
  31. 2 THE CLOSED MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONS Closed model of organizations, which goes by many names are Bureaucratic, hierarchical, formal, rational, and mechanistic. Characteristics of the Closed Model of Organizations We rely on a classic analysis in listing the principal features of the closed model of organizations: ■ Routine tasks occur in stable conditions. ■ Task specialization (i.e., a division of labor) is central. ■ Means (or the proper way to do a job) are emphasized. ■ Conflict within the organization is adjudicated from the top. ■ “Responsibility” (or what one is supposed to do, one’s formal job description) is emphasized. ■ One’s primary sense of responsibility and loyalty is to the bureaucratic subunit to which one is assigned (such as the accounting department). ■ The organization is perceived as a hierarchic structure (that is, the structure “looks” like a pyramid). ■ Knowledge is inclusive only at the top of the hierarchy (in other words, only the chief executive knows everything). ■ Interaction between people in the organization tends to be vertical (that is, one takes orders from above and transmits orders below), but not horizontal. ■ The style of interaction is directed toward obedience, command, and clear superior/subordinate relationships. ■ Loyalty and obedience to one’s superior and the organization generally are emphasized, sometimes at the expense of performance. ■ Prestige is “internalized,” that is, personal status in the organization is determined largely by one’s formal office and rank. Note: No organizational model meets all twelve of its features in practice.
  32. Among organizations that are widely known, the Department of Defense likely comes closest to accomplishing the requisites of the closed model, but the Pentagon’s exceptions to the model are obvious, such as highly unstable conditions during wartime. There are at least three theoretical threads that have thrived within the closed model’s framework. Bureaucratic Theory, Scientific Management, and Administrative Management 3 The Backbone that Binds the Closed Model….. There are at least three theoretical threads that have thrived within the closed model’s framework. Bureaucratic Theory, Scientific Management, Administrative Management 4 Bureaucratic Theory The earliest school of the closed model is that of bureaucratic theory, or the study of the impersonal organization, and the execution, and enforcement of legal rules in organizations. Its best-known representative is Max Weber, a remarkable German sociologist who wrote around the turn of the twentieth century. Although “bureaucracy” is common in all sectors, Weber cast his theory of bureaucracy squarely in the public one. The features of a bureaucracy include the following: ■ hierarchy; ■ promotion based on professional merit and skill; ■ the development of a career service; ■ reliance on and use of rules and regulations; and ■ impersonality of relationships among career-professionals in
  33. the bureaucracy and with their clientele. To Weber, an impersonal, rule-abiding, efficient, merit-based career service provided the surest way of fulfilling the public interest in the face of a politically fragmented Germany and its arrogant, powerful, yet somewhat silly aristocracy. Weber’s rigidly rational theory was warmly welcomed by the first American public workers, who embraced it as a justification of their values, all of which shared an abhorrence with messy politics. 5 Scientific Management Another rivulet of research in the closed model is scientific management (more popularly known as “time-motion” studies), which is the analysis of workflow processes as the means of raising organizational productivity. Workers as “Gear Wheels” Scientific management’s overriding concern is to increase production, and it does this by making human beings as efficient as, and more like, machines. Key representatives of the scientific management school include Frederick Taylor (who gave this school its name with his 1911 volume, Principles of Scientific Management), and Frank and Lillian Gilbreth. Similarly, the Gilbreths developed the concept of the “therblig,” each one of which represented a category of eighteen basic human motions—all physical activity fell into a therblig class of one type or another. Rendering workers more physically efficient could benefit the workers (who, in the early twentieth century, were commonly paid on a piecework basis), as well as their bosses, and even clients. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Therblig Note; the impact of scientific management was stunning, and in every sector. Herbert Hoover, as commerce secretary (1921–
  34. 1928) and later as president, took Taylor’s writings to heart, declaring a “war on waste” in both government and business. Taylor was central in organizing America’s first graduate school to offer a degree in business . His theories underlay the Soviet Union’s first five-year economic plan. They were given their “fullest application by Henry Ford, who,” following Speedy Taylor’s example, “measured his workers’ movements on the assembly line with a stopwatch.” 6 Administrative Management Our final literature of the closed model is administrative management, also called generic management, which is the discovery and application of universal, scientific, administrative principles that can improve any organization’s efficiency and effectiveness. Unfortunately for this school, there are no universal, scientific, administrative principles, however every school, has made some contributions of consequence. The scholars of administrative management devoted their energies to the discovery of managerial principles that worked in any and all institutional settings Writers in this stream usually offered up very specific principles of administration: The public administration scholars, Luther Gulick and Lynda11 Urwick listed seven “principles”; James D. Mooney and Alan C. Reiley, in their aptly-titled and influential work, The Principles of Organization, found four; another, Henri Fayol, unearthed fourteen. Among the premier scholars in this tradition, Mary Parker Follett was one of the few who fudged when it came to enumerating principles of administration, but then she was unusually ahead of her time, perhaps because her intellectual roots were deeply planted in public administration. Henri Follett’s ideas (as channeled through W. Edwards Deming, of total-quality-management fame) were implemented
  35. by Japanese automakers, who applied them with enormous success, at least up to a point. Japan’s Toyota, after faithfully following Follett’s philosophy for more than fifty years, abandoned it in favor of overtaking General Motors as the globe’s biggest automaker (which it did) by embracing “disastrous policies adopted after 2000, when top management’s thinking changed sharply in a direction that, while consistent with that of most other Western companies, would never have been tolerated at Toyota in the past.” With the emergence of administrative management, a hint surfaced that presaged a revolution in organization theory, one that ultimately would bluntly question a foundation of its two theoretical predecessors, bureaucratic theory and scientific management. That hint was: underlings and toilers in organizations conceivably might have minds of their own. As Follett exemplifies, the administrative management writers were among the first to express a dawning recognition that subordinates were people (like managers) and could think (almost like managers). This breakthrough provided a basis for organization theory’s next paradigm, the open model. 7 The Open Model Of Organizations As with the closed model, the open model goes by many names. Collegial, competitive, free market, informal, natural, and organic are some of them. The origins of the open model actually precede those of the closed model by more than a century and a half, and can be traced to Count Louis de Rouvroy Saint-Simon, and to his protégée Auguste Comte, the “father of sociology.” Both speculated on administration of the future: technology would spawn new professions;
  36. administrators would be appointed on the basis of skill rather than heredity; and organizations would be created spontaneously, evolve “naturally,” and be a liberating force for humanity.2 8 Characteristics of the Open Model of Organizations The principal features of the open model of organization are: ■ Non-routine tasks occur in unstable conditions. ■ Specialized knowledge contributes to common tasks (thus differing from the closed model’s specialized task notion in that the specialized knowledge possessed by any one member of the organization may be applied profitably to a variety of tasks undertaken by various other members of the organization). ■ Ends (or getting the job done), rather than means, are emphasized. ■ Conflict within the organization is adjusted by interaction with peers, rather than adjudicated from the top. ■ “Shedding of responsibility” is emphasized (in other words, formal job descriptions are discarded in favor of all organizational members contributing to all organizational problems). ■ One’s sense of responsibility and loyalty is to the organization as a whole. ■ The organization is perceived as a fluidic network structure (that is, the organization “looks” like an amoeba). ■ Knowledge can be located anywhere in the organization (in other words, everybody knows something relevant about the organization, but no one, including the chief executive, knows everything). ■ Interaction between people in the organization tends to be horizontal (that is, peers interact with peers), as well as vertical. ■ The style of interaction is directed toward accomplishment,
  37. “advice” (rather than commands), and is characterized by a “myth of peerage,” which envelops even the most obvious superordinate/subordinate relationships. ■ Task achievement and excellence of performance in accomplishing a task are emphasized, sometimes at the expense of obedience to one’s superiors. ■ Prestige is “externalized” (i.e., personal status in the organization is determined largely by one’s professional ability and reputation, rather than by office and rank). Note: The open model of organizations, which, like the closed model, does not exist in actuality, although a major university might come close (which is why the open model occasionally is called the “collegial” model). As with the closed model, three threads comprise the open model of organizations. 9 The Backbone that Binds The Open Model….. As with the closed model, three threads comprise the open model of organizations. Human Relations Organizational Development The Organization As A Unit Of The Environment 10 Human Relations The first of our three threads, human relations, is the study of people’s problems, opportunities, and interactions in organizations. It focuses on organizational variables, such as personal
  38. motivations, never considered in the closed model. 11 The Hawthorne Experiments In 1924, Elton Mayo and Fritz J. Roethlisberger began a series of studies (later known as “the Hawthorne experiments,” for the location of the plant) of working conditions and worker behavior at a Western Electric factory. Ultimately, the research involved six massive, and hugely influential, studies conducted over eight years. Their experiment was predicated on the hypothesis that workers would respond like “gear wheels” to changes in working conditions. To test it, they altered the intensity of light available to a group of selected workers, expecting that the dimmer the light the lower their productivity. The lights were turned down and production went up. Mayo and Roethlisberger were disconcerted. They dimmed the lights to near darkness, and production kept climbing. Among the explanations of this phenomenon that later came forth were: human workers probably are not entirely like machines; the Western Electric workers were responding to some motivating variable other than the lighting, or despite the lack of it; and that the likely variable in question was that they had been told that they were being watched—a condition that became known as the “Hawthorne effect.” The Hawthorne experiments have grown increasingly controversial over time. Some re-examinations of the data conclude that factors other than human relations drove greater productivity, such as the observed workers’ fear of being laid off and that, unlike other workers, they were given rest periods and group pay incentives; others counter that the original findings remain valid. Nevertheless, the experiments rooted the idea deep into
  39. management theory that unquantifiable relationships (or “human relations”) between workers and managers, and among workers themselves, are significant determinants of workers’ productivity. 12 A Hierarchy of Human Needs: From Job Satisfaction to Self- Actualization The Hawthorne experiments inspired much research on job satisfaction—that is, what factors contribute to, or detract from, employees’ acceptance of, and even happiness with, their employment. An early and important contribution to this research is the “hierarchy of human needs” developed by A. H. Maslow. Maslow perceived job-related human desires to be based, first, on physiological needs (such as eating), which provided the foundation for a person’s next greatest need, economic security, then love or belongingness, followed by self-esteem, and ultimately self-actualization. Self-actualization refers to a person growing, maturing, and achieving a deep inner sense of self-worth as he or she relates to his or her job. Maslow wrote that these “highly evolved” self-actualized people assimilated “their work into the identity, into the self, i.e., work actually becomes part of the self, part of the individual’s definition of himself.” 13 14 Hygienic Factors and Motivator Factors
  40. Frederick Herzberg extended Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs to his “motivation-hygiene theory,” which holds that there are two classes of phenomena that make people feel good or bad about their jobs. One class relates to the context of the job, and includes such factors as working conditions, organizational policies, and salary. Herzberg called these “extrinsic” dimensions hygienic factors, so named because they are needed to avoid worker dissatisfaction, but fail, in and of themselves, to provide satisfaction and engagement. Hygienic factors correspond, more or less, with the base of Maslow’s pyramid of human needs, where physiological and security needs are found, Herzberg’s second category relates to the content of the job, and includes such factors as professional and personal challenge, appreciation of a job well done by supervisors and peers, and a sense of being responsible for important matters. Herzberg called these “intrinsic” aspects motivator factors. Motivators relate, by and large, with the upper reaches of Maslow’s pyramid—belongingness and self-esteem, but not necessarily with self-actualization. Belongingness and self- esteem result in employees who are satisfied with their jobs, whereas self-actualization refers to one’s job becoming part of one’s definition of self, which is beyond mere job satisfaction; self-actualization verges on obsession. 15 16 Hygienic or Motivator Factors: What Matters to Public and Nonprofit Employees? What matters more to public and nonprofit employees, hygienic factors, such as pay and perks, or motivators, such as praise and
  41. producing? Hygienic factors do not count for much among these workers. Consider, for example, salary, perhaps the most definitively hygienic factor of all. Large-scale studies have found that government workers are “significantly less motivated by salary” than are private-sector workers. Without question, motivator factors dominate. And they appear to be more important to government and nonprofit workers than they are to other and larger working populations. For over three decades, roughly nine out of every ten federal employees have stated that “the work I do is meaningful” or “important” compared with about half of all Americans who state, in a similar vein, that “a feeling of accomplishment” is the “most important” single aspect of their jobs. Federal managers are much more likely than their counterparts in business to “come to work” because of the “nature of their jobs.” State government workers “are more motivated to perform their work when they have clearly understood and challenging tasks that they feel are important and achievable.” 17 Hygienic or Motivator Factors: What Matters to Organizations? It may be comforting to know that motivators matter most to employees, but do they, or hygienic factors, matter more in advancing the interests of the organization? Hygienic factors count, but not much. There is simply no discernible relationship between generous hygienic policies (e.g., lengthy vacations, etc.)—or stingy ones—and more profitable companies. Hygienic factors “are like tickets to the ballpark—they can get you into the game, but they can’t help you win.”
  42. Motivator factors are more complicated. In and of themselves, they add more to employees’ job satisfaction than do hygienic factors, and job satisfaction can be, but not necessarily is, a positive component in organizational productivity. But job satisfaction is merely that; one can be satisfied with one’s job, but contribute to one’s organization so minimally that it suffices only to avoid dismissal. 18 Enter Employee Engagement The multitude of acolytes spawned by Maslow and Herzberg eventually began concentrating on what can help organizations win. Their answer is: employee engagement. Employee engagement holds that workers have a rational commitment (that is, employees’ logical understanding that their employment benefits them financially and professionally— basically, an extension of Herzberg’s hygienic factors) and an emotional commitment (i.e., the visceral pride and enjoyment that employees derive from their work and organization— arguably an extension of Herzberg’s motivator factors) to their organization that inspire them to exert their very best effort on their organization’s behalf. Employee engagement expands the employee’s psychic bonding with his or her job (that is, Maslow’s self-actualization, should it be realized) to the whole of the organization. A variety of large-scale analyses show that “employee engagement surpasses satisfaction as an indicator of [individual and organizational] productivity.” And an individual’s job satisfaction per se was about all that Maslow and Herzberg were really concerned with, but it is insufficient as a prod of productivity. 19
  43. What Engages Workers? Six conditions of employee engagement are the factors most clearly associated with organizational productivity. They are: when employees feel that they know what is expected of them at work; have what they need to do their jobs right; have the opportunity “to do what I do best every day”; receive recognition for work well done over the last seven days; believe that someone at work cares about them as a person and think that there is someone at work who encourages their development Companies that fulfill these conditions score markedly higher on the four critical measures of corporate strength: productivity, profit, employee retention, and customer satisfaction. 20 Rude, Crude, and Lewd: What Disengages Workers? “Toxic workers,” or employees who are thieves, fraudsters, sexual harassers, or similar sociopaths can infect colleagues with their toxicity and result in massive employee disengagement from their jobs and organizations. Hence, neutralizing toxic workers “enhances performance to a much greater extent than replacing an average worker with a superstar worker.” Two types of toxic workers are, unfortunately, common: uncivil boors and unconstrained bullies. 21
  44. Uncivil Actions Organizational incivility is “the exchange of seemingly inconsequential inconsiderate words and deeds that violate conventional norms of workplace conduct.” Incivility’s presence may veil deeper pathologies, such as racism and sexism; once started, rudeness spreads quickly, “like catching a cold”; and it can morph into an “incivility spiral” of “increasingly intense aggressive behaviors.” What happens to the perpetrators of incivility? On the surface, not much. Only 1 percent to 6 percent of employees who experience incivility report it. Dig a bit deeper, however, and the uncivil suffer. Three-fifths of perceived incivility is inflicted by supervisors on their subordinates, and their subordinates sneakily subvert them; a fifth of those miffed workers stall in responding to their supervisors’ requests, and a third spread unflattering rumors about them. Whether civil or uncivil, managers and executives in Fortune 1000 firms report that they spend 13 percent of their work time (or seven weeks per year) dealing with the turbulent wake of incivility. Bullying is incivility on steroids, and refers to overbearing and intimidating behavior. The organizational costs of bullying are far higher than those of incivility. 22 Organization Development Another important subfield of the open model is organization development (OD), which is a planned, organization-wide
  45. attempt directed from the top that is designed to increase organizational effectiveness and viability through calculated interventions in the active workings of the organization, using knowledge from the behavioral sciences. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organization_development 23 OD: Mission and Methods The mission of organization development is to: improve the individual member’s ability to get along with other members; legitimize human emotions in the organization; increase mutual understanding among members; reduce tensions; enhance “team management” and intergroup cooperation; develop more effective methods of conflict resolution using non-authoritarian and interactive methods; and evolve less structured and more “organic” organizations. “The basic value underlying all organization-development theory and practice is that of choice. Through … the collection and feedback of relevant data to relevant people, more choices become available and hence better decisions are made.” 24 The Executive’s Dilemma OD’s prime value seems to be less one of organizational productivity and more one of employee happiness. In fact, some of the field’s adherents worry that the very idea of using OD to boost organizational performance is a sell-out of the field’s mission of improving individual lives in the workplace. The bottom line and “the mind-set of management” have
  46. perverted organization development; as a consequence, employees trapped in “the grubby realities of work life soon figure out whose side [these] breezy, self- assured, and excessively articulate” OD consultants are truly on. They are, contemptibly (in this perspective), on management’s side. 25 The Organization as a Unit in Its Environment Our third school of the open model can be traced at least as far back as the 1930s, and this theoretical thread is undergoing a significant revitalization Adapting to the Environment Organization theorists often refer to this literary stream as adaptive systems or contingency theory, which holds that organizations are themselves, and function in, dynamic networks in which forces act and react to one another, and are able to cohere and stabilize only when their competition and collaboration achieve a rough balance. Adapting Biologically One school, known as population ecology or organizational ecology, holds that organizational adaptation is a biological, evolutionary process; organizations that cannot adapt die. Adapting Rationally Organizations are not happy families, but rather pastiches of passive and aggressive, astute and dumb, and ethical and unethical people, groups, and divisions, each with its own goals and methods. Adapting Politically The political approach to organizational adaptation is realistic in that, first, it recognizes that organizations are highly diverse, with multiple divisions of labor and vastly different goals held by their members, and, second, with few exceptions (e.g., prisons), their members are
  47. free to leave. 26 The Closed And Open Models: The Essential Differences We have reviewed two, eminently disparate, models of organizations, but they do share a pair of basic assumptions: Both models assume that organizations are not suicidal, and that they will try not only to survive, but to thrive. Beyond these commonalities, however, the models split over five assumptions about how the world works. These are Assumptions about the Organization’s Environment Assumptions about the Human Condition Assumptions about the Role and Legitimacy of Organizational Power Assumptions about Manipulating Members of Organizations Assumptions about the Moral Significance of Organizations in Society 27 1. Assumptions about the Organization’s Environment One such difference is the models’ assumptions about their respective external environments. Each works in the environment posited for it, but not in the other. A closed-model organization, with its tall, many-layered hierarchy, inflexible bureaucracy, and rigid routines, is superbly suited for its posited environment— one that is stable and devoid of surprises. Should its environment be shattered, however, and a chaotic environment, replete with swirling and confusing forces,
  48. smashes in, then our closed organization would perish from its own rigidities. By contrast, the open-model organization— with its flat hierarchy, flexible responses, and minimal, if any, routines—is supremely suited for its posited environment— one that is tumultuous and replete with surprises. The open organization’s inherent ability to nimbly respond to fast-paced, one-of-a-kind changes in its turbulent environment assures its survival. Should it find itself, however, in a new environment that is characterized by stability, slowness, repetition, predictability, and boredom, then our open organization would die from its inability to tighten up, bureaucratize, and routinize in ways that efficiently correspond to its new environmental realities. 28 2. Assumptions about the Human Condition The second difference between the closed and open models parallels the first, in that their respective models of human beings differ but are appropriate for each. Theory X and Theory Y Douglas McGregor famously named these models “Theory X” and “Theory Y.” Theory X assumes that motivation to work is an individual matter, and that most people do not like work, prefer close supervision, cannot contribute creatively to the solution of organizational problems, and are motivated by the threat of punishment. It is apparent that organizations exemplifying the closed model not only would fit, but possibly might be appealing, to Theory X people. Theory Y, by contrast, assumes that motivation to work is a group matter, and, given the right conditions, most people can enjoy work as much as play, exercise self-control and prefer doing jobs in their own way, solve organizational problems
  49. creatively, and often are motivated by social and ego rewards. It is apparent that organizations predicated on the open model likely would attract Theory Y people. 29 The Riddle of Rational Interest A related facet of human nature posited by the two models is the problem of rational interest (choice), or how people define their self-interest and the rationale that they use to fulfill it. In the closed model, rational interest means that everyone in the organization has the same goal (that is, the organization’s official mission) and agrees on how to achieve that goal in an optimal fashion. In the open model, however, rational interest means that each person in the organization has his or her own unique goals (e.g., getting ahead, enjoying work), and has his or her own personal way to achieve those goals. However, each person’s real goals are not only disparate, but often in conflict with the goals of other members and possibly with the mission of their own organization. Note: The way in which each person chooses to fulfill his or her goals is unique to that person Happily, in most agencies, public administrators’ “self-interests do not necessarily run counter to the organization’s overall interests, in that they reflect a desire to make a useful contribution to the performance of their organization…. The assumption of an inherent conflict between self- and collective interests is not always valid, particularly in a public sector context.” 30
  50. 3. Assumptions about the Role and Legitimacy of Organizational Power Power, in an organizational context, simply means getting people to do what you want them to do. The models divide not only on how to exercise organizational power, but also on whether it should be exercised at all. Power in the Closed Model The closed model has no qualms about employing power. Its theorists believe in orders and obedience, rules and regulations, punctuality and punctiliousness. Power in the Open Model These folks view coercion as reprehensible, and, indeed, the open model occasionally appears to argue against the presence of organizational power altogether. Relying on it is condemned as dehumanizing and not at all nice. 31 Power in the Closed Model The closed model has no qualms about employing power. Its theorists believe in orders and obedience, rules and regulations, punctuality and punctiliousness. The callous use of authoritarian coercion is seen as entirely legitimate. 32 Power in the Open Model In complete contrast to the closed model, the open model views coercion as reprehensible, and, indeed, the open model occasionally appears to argue against the presence of organizational power altogether.
  51. Relying on it is condemned as dehumanizing, “brutalizing,” and not at all nice. However the question remains: Is the individual autonomous or is the organization dominant? Regrettably, the open modelist’ distaste for power leads to a contradiction in their theory of organizational behavior. On the one hand, they argue that the exercise of authoritarian power makes people miserable, and misery undermines the attainment of organizational goals; ergo, terminate the use of power and unhappy-unproductive workers will blossom into “happy-productive workers” who will fulfill those goals. Maybe? 33 What is Collective Action? Collective action refers to action taken together by a group of people whose goal is to enhance their status and achieve a common objective. A collective action problem is a situation in which all individuals would be better off cooperating but fail to do so because of conflicting interests between individuals that discourage joint action. Even though all organizational members would benefit from attaining the collective good (that is, by fulfilling their organization’s mission), it is nonetheless irrational for any one member to voluntarily sacrifice to achieve that collective good. Why, for example, would an employee voluntarily work without compensation? Better to let other employees work for free so that the non-volunteer can freeload. And, unless the organization is composed of “altruistic” or “irrational” employees, no one else in the organization will volunteer, either. The open modelist’ contradictory and hopeless task suggests
  52. that large organizations, such as governments, face severe challenges in motivating their employees to work for the benefit of the whole organization—that is, for the common collective good. 34 The Inescapability of Organizational Power If organizations depended on each member’s unique rational interest to attain their common goals, as advocated in the open model, then organizations would be pushed toward actions that are collectively ruinous. Hence, coercion is mandatory in any organization whose members are rational and self-interested if the common good—the organization’s stated purpose—is to be realized. Power is fundamental to the very idea of organization. Most open-model theorists seem to accept, if poutingly, the immutable reality of organizational power. But some seem not to. 35 4. Assumptions about Manipulating Members of Organizations Manipulation is the techniques employed to exercise organizational power. In closed-model organizations, manipulation is obvious, coercive, and legitimate. The human and organizational dysfunctions of authoritarian manipulation are clear: fear, rigidity, secrecy, narrowness, alienation, falsification, and stultification number among them. people in closed-model organizations “know where they stand, "and it’s for people who like things straightforward and clear- cut. Manipulation in the open model is discreet, disguised, and complicated.
  53. It must be noted that whatever path that is chosen it must be “appropriately” tailored in tone to each of their recipients if one wishes to smooth the way for attaining organizational goals. 36 5. Assumptions about the Moral Significance of Organizations in Society The final distinction between the closed and open models can be understood best by comparing Max Weber views and the moral views with the larger society. A “closed modelist” Max Weber, believed that bureaucracy, replete with its own internal injustices, dehumanizing rules, and monocratic arbitrariness, was vital, in its very rigidity and rationalism, in mitigating the unorganized societal lunacy that surrounded it. If Weber’s notion of the bureaucracy’s stand-alone station in society could be illustrated, it would look something like this: 37 The Moral View of the Open Model In marked contrast, the open-model theorists hold that every citizen, bureaucrat and non-bureaucrat alike, is encased in some sort of bureaucratic organization. Society is a series of overlapping and interacting organizations, and there is no unorganized, irrational society “out there,” roiling beyond organizational boundaries. The open model’s concept that society is bureaucracy looks like
  54. this. 38 Reconciling the Open and the Closed Systems Reconciling the open and closed models begins with the open model’s world view—that is, organizations are spontaneous collectivities of people with their own goals and drives, who are operating uncertainly in an unstable environment. This is not a bad set of assumptions about any organization that is just getting started. But no organization can last long in a state of near nature. Nature is unpredictable and uncertain, and all organizations are extraordinarily averse to uncertainty. So organizations are possessed by an overpowering need to reduce uncertainty— that is, to routinize and rationalize the organization’s internal workings and its relations with its environment whenever and wherever possible. Note: The organizational need to reduce uncertainty reflects the deeply human need to do the same: psychologists tell us that the more certain we are, the happier we are. 39 Responses to Internal Sources of Uncertainty If the sources of organizational uncertainty are internal, then the organization will strive to reduce uncertainty by centralizing. Centralizing techniques include: indoctrinating all members of the organization “to respond only
  55. to commands from the central leadership and from no other source”; controlling all communication involving “vexing sub- organizations” in an effort to nip “nonconforming thought” and “deviant behavior”; intensifying surveillance of troublesome subunits; “detaching key operations,” such as the control of funds, from deviating departments, “thus reducing their self-containment and increasing their vulnerability to central direction”; and, finally, expelling offending units, a radical act that amounts to “a contraction of boundaries constituting a withdrawal from internal sources of uncertainty.” 40 Responses to External Sources of Uncertainty If, however, the sources of organizational uncertainty are external—that is, they are in the organization’s task environment—then the organization will seek to reduce that uncertainty by absorbing the outside sources of uncertainty into the organization itself. It does this by expanding its boundaries—by growing. Co-optation, described earlier, is one form that this incorporation of external uncertainties might take; the effort by an organization to control some facet of the natural environment (for example, to engage in flood control) is another form; to merge or ally with competitive organizations is yet another. Ironically, decentralization often is required if an organization is to expand, and decentralization can result in new, internal sources of uncertainty. If the expansion of an organization’s boundaries is blocked, then the organization will seek to reduce its exchanges with its environment—“withdrawal from the source of uncertainty, as it were.” A firm uncertain about its future supplies might decide to
  56. stockpile or produce its own manufacturing components. 41 The Public Organization and Environmental Uncertainty In the public sector, those administrators who perceive high levels of political, social, and economic uncertainty in their organizations’ environments also harbor concerns about their organizations’ “inertia”; consult with citizens a lot; and maintain a responsive, curious, and exploratory “strategic stance” relative to their external environments. When these public administrators worry about environmental uncertainty, the public can benefit. Public agencies “that perceive high levels of uncertainty in their external political environment perform better than those that perceive that environment to be certain,” and this linkage is “positive and statistically significant…. even when controlling for past performance, service expenditure, and external constraints.” 42 Folks you will love…..Maybe Max Weber https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Weber_bibliography Frederick Taylor https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_Winslow_Taylor Frank and Lillian Gilbreth https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lillian_Moller_Gilbreth Henri Fayol https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henri_Fayol Mary Parker Follett https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mary_Parker_Follett W. Edwards Deming
  57. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W._Edwards_Deming Hawthorne effect https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawthorne_effect A. H. Maslow https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abraham_Maslow 43 44 Are Public And Nonprofit Organizations Different?
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