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How Dodd-Frank and Other New U.S. Laws May Affect Non-U.S.
  October 8, 2010                 Financial Institutions

CAPITAL MARKETS CLIENT ALERT
                                  One surprising and significant outgrowth of the 2008 financial crisis is that the United
 This Alert provides only         States is more aggressively asserting jurisdiction over non-U.S. financial institutions, even
 general information and          where the activities of such companies take place entirely outside the U.S. Given the
 should not be relied upon as     potentially severe financial penalties for violations of these new laws, non-U.S. financial
 legal advice. We would be        firms should remain cognizant of the extraterritorial reach of the recently-enacted Dodd-
 pleased to discuss our
                                  Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA or Dodd-Frank) and the
 experience and the issues
                                  Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Iran
                                  Sanctions Act or ISA).
 presented in this Alert with
 those contemplating
                                  I. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
 investments in these markets.
 For more information, contact         Non-U.S. headquartered banks, securities firms, insurance companies and other non-
 your Patton Boggs LLP            bank foreign financial companies that participate in the U.S. financial markets (Foreign
 attorney or the authors listed   Financial Firms or FFFs) may well be aware that the DFA will substantially impact their
 below.                           U.S. operations going forward. These firms are in much the same position as domestic
                                  financial services firms whose activities are already, or soon will become, subject to
 Gregg S. Buksbaum                additional capital requirements, prudential regulation, or general oversight by the Federal
 202-457-6153                     Reserve Board (Fed or Board), the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), or
 gbuksbaum@pattonboggs.com        the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC and together with the Board and the
                                  SEC, Federal Regulators).
 Eric L. Foster
 646-557-5131
 elfoster@pattonboggs.com                What is less well understood is the DFA’s likely impact on Foreign Financial Firms
                                  whose “off-shore” activities involve: (i) contact with U.S. investors; (ii) activities in the U.S.
 Stephen J. McHale                dollar denominated financial markets that are settled in the U.S. or transactions with U.S.
 202-457-6344                     financial institutions generally; or (iii) any other non-U.S. “financial” activities if such
 smchale@pattonboggs.com
                                  activities are deemed to have a “substantial impact on the United States financial system.”
 Daniel R. Murdock                It will be some time before implementing regulations are finalized and the full scope of the
 646-557-5117                     extraterritorial reach of certain provisions in the DFA become clear. Nevertheless, it is
 dmurdock@pattonboggs.com         already apparent that there are some areas where Foreign Financial Firms should
 Daniel E. Waltz
                                  immediately focus their attention and concern. Properly managing the new compliance
 202-457-5651                     risks and potential legal liabilities arising from this sweeping new grant of authority to U.S.
 dwaltz@pattonboggs.com           Federal Regulators will likely also require consultation with competent U.S. counsel.

                                  1. Possible Federal Reserve Supervision of Transactions by Certain Systemically
                                  Significant FFFs

                                        Legislation passed by Congress in the early 1990s to resolve the savings and loan
                                  crisis included so-called “prompt corrective action” provisions and other supervisory tools
                                  designed to eliminate the perception that certain depository institutions could ever become
 WWW.PATTONBOGGS.COM              so big or systemically important that they could not be allowed to fail. With the Fed-
                                  coordinated recapitalization of Long Term Capital Management in 1998, and the recent
                                  collapse of AIG and two leading U.S. broker/dealers (not to mention government-led
                                  recapitalizations of many other large financial companies), policy makers have realized
that even a nonbank financial company (NBFC) could in fact become so “interconnected”
or “systemically significant” in our financial system that regulators can not let them fail for
fear such firm’s default would cause a financial crisis by creating contagion risk (i.e. a
domino effect on counterparty credit concerns within the broader financial system).

       With Dodd-Frank, Congress is once again attempting to avoid future financial crises
while also eliminating the risk that U.S. taxpayers will ever again have to bail out a
financial firm because it was “too-big-to-fail.” This time around, Congress is adopting an
approach that grants the Board additional broad prophylactic measures to proactively
combat systemic risk. The DFA thus grants the Board new authority to impose capital and
prudential requirements on certain NBFC before such firm becomes a possible source of
systemic risk. Congress has thus created a regime whereby a systemically significant
NBFC or large bank holding company (including an FFF) can be identified in advance so
that its financial condition can be monitored and its riskier activities regulated, curtailed or
eliminated. Later, if and when any “grave” risk arises at the NBFC, the Board is already
able to order the firm to cease certain activities, raise capital or face forced divestiture of
one or more subsidiaries or affiliates. Anointed with this auspicious responsibility to identify
and manage such risks outside the banking system is a new quasi-regulator, the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC or Council).

      Given the supervisors’ failure to identify in advance the systemic risks posed by
AIG’s activities in the credit default swaps and securities lending markets, it is not
surprising that the Act’s principal target is insurance companies, non-bank banks, and
other NBFCs. Under Dodd-Frank, the FSOC will decide if a particular NBFC should in fact
be supervised by the Board and subjected to higher prudential standards. The grounds for
such a determination are numerous. The DFA merely requires the FSOC to find that the
“material financial distress or failure” of the company, or the company’s “nature, scope,
size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of activities” could pose a threat to
the U.S. financial system.

      However, the FSOC’s authority to subject quasi-financial firms to Board regulation
and oversight is not unlimited. Only those NBFCs that are “predominantly engaged in
financial activities” as defined in section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA)
can be subjected to Board oversight by the FSOC. Under this standard, a company is
considered “predominantly engaged in financial activities” if at least 85 percent of its
consolidated annual gross revenues are derived from, or 85 percent of its consolidated
assets are related to, activities that are financial in nature.

      Section 113(b) of Dodd-Frank also grants the Board authority to supervise certain
foreign nonbank financial companies (Foreign NBFC), which are defined to include
companies that are (i) incorporated or organized outside of the U.S.; and (ii) predominantly
engaged in financial activities. While the same 85 percent test also applies to FFFs, it is
unclear whether the Council will elect to adopt the Fed’s previous guidance regarding
section 4(k) when it issues implementing regulations.

      Dodd-Frank also gives the Board, rather than the FSOC responsibility for providing
specific guidance on the sorts of foreign financial activities that will render a Foreign
Financial Firm eligible to be deemed a Foreign NBFCs and thus subject to Board
oversight. Further, the DFA also grants the Board specific authority to recommend that
the FSOC designate a particular FFF as a Foreign NBFC based on a finding that material
financial distress at the Foreign Financial Firm (or the nature, size, scope, or
interconnectedness of the firm) could pose a threat to the U.S. financial system. Once
designated as a systemically significant nonbank financial company (Significant NBFC),
presumably all the company’s U.S. financial activities would become subject to possible
supervision by the Board and the company would have to comply with any prudential, risk
based capital requirements and other regulations promulgated by the Board under its new
authority. While it is unclear whether the Board would seek to supervise Foreign NBFC
non-U.S. activities, it seems likely that any such designation would, in essence, require a
FFF to create a U.S. intermediate holding company.

     A determination by the Council that a Foreign NBFC should be supervised by the
Board will involve weighing the following factors:

    (i) the extent of the leverage of the company;

    (ii) the extent and nature of the company’s U.S. related off-balance sheet exposures;

    (iii) the extent and nature of the company’s relationships with other systemically
    significant nonbank financial companies and systemically significant bank holding
    companies;

    (iv) the importance of the company as a source of credit for U.S. households,
    businesses, and State and local governments, and as a source of liquidity for the U.S.
    financial system;

    (v) the importance of the company as a source of credit for low-income, minority, or
    underserved communities in the United States and the impact that failure of the
    company would have on the availability of credit in these communities;

    (vi) the extent to which assets are managed rather than owned by the company and
    the extent to which ownership of those assets is diffuse;

    (vii) the nature, size, scale and interconnectedness of the activities of the company;

    (viii) the extent to which the company is subject to prudential standards on a
    consolidated basis in its home country that are administered and enforced by a
    comparable foreign supervisory authority;

    (ix) the amount and nature of the company’s U.S. financial assets;

    (x) the amount and nature of the liabilities of the company used to fund activities and
    operations in the United States; and

    (xi) any other risk-related factors that the FSOC deems appropriate.

Needless to say, with this laundry list, the Council and the Board have been granted
substantial discretion to determine that a particular Foreign Financial Firm’s financial
activities are so significant as to necessitate that it become subject to this special U.S.
supervisory regime. FFFs concerned about being inappropriately subjected to the new
regime should communicate their specific concerns to the Board and the Council prior to
the issuance of final implementing regulations.

2. Extraterritorial Reach of Section 10b of the 1934 Act and Morrison v. National
Australia Bank Ltd.

     In June 2010, while Congress was in the final stages of passing the Dodd-Frank, the
U.S. Supreme Court in Morrison v. National Australian Bank, Ltd., rejected lower court
decisions upholding the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and ruled that this securities fraud provision does not provide a cause of
action to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for misconduct in
connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges. This much publicized decision,
however, will not likely provide material support for any challenge to the extraterritorial
reach of either the DFA or the Iran Sanctions Act. The Morrison decision was one of
statutory interpretation, and did not consider the constitutional limits of jurisdiction.
Reaffirming the longstanding principle of American law “that legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States,” the Supreme Court found nothing in the 1934 Act to suggest that
Section 10(b) was intended by Congress to apply abroad. Implicit in the ruling is that use
of the presumption against extraterritorial application would be inappropriate in interpreting
Federal legislation in which Congress clearly has expressed “a contrary intent.” Indeed,
shortly after the Morrison decision, Congress responded by adding a provision which gave
the SEC express authority under another antifraud provision, Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933, to bring enforcement actions which would encompass the sort of
wrongdoing alleged in Morrison. Under the DFA, the SEC is given additional authority to
bring actions to enforce the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws in a manner
that rolls back Morrison. The DFA provides that:

     district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory shall
     have jurisdiction of an action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission
     or the United States alleging a violation of section 17(a) involving: (1) conduct within
     the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even
     if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign
     investors; or (2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable
     substantial effect within the United States.

Representative Paul Kanjorski, who authored this language, stated in his floor comments
that it was intended to rebut any general presumption against territoriality. While most
commentators agree that this provision effectively reversed the Supreme Court’s decision
in Morrison, 1 at least one has questioned whether this provision has indeed extended the
application of anti-fraud provisions to outside the U.S. 2 While the DFA does not affect the
application of Morrison to private Section 10b actions, it is worthwhile to note that it does
require the SEC to evaluate whether Congress should in the future restore the conduct
and effects tests in private actions to enforce the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act.

3. Foreign Subsidiaries Deemed Covered Financial Institution Under Dodd-Frank’s
New Special Insolvency Regime

     Title II of Dodd-Frank creates a risk for certain “financial institutions” that they could
one day be subjected to an involuntary orderly liquidation proceeding pursuant to special
resolution authority granted to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) under
the DFA. Section 201 grants the Secretary of the Treasury the ability to authorize the FDIC
to bring a special emergency proceeding in a federal court in connection with any
“financial institution.” The DFA defines the term “financial institution” very broadly to
include any organization that is incorporated or organized under any provision of federal
law or the laws of any state and that is a bank holding company, NBFC, or a company
engaged in activities that are “financial in nature.” Section 203 of the DFA, specifically
refers to situations “in which the largest United States subsidiary …of a financial company
is a broker or dealer …or in which the largest United States subsidiary of a financial
company is an insurance company.”

    A foreign company that owns or controls a significantly-sized U.S. subsidiary
engaged in activities that are financial in nature should begin evaluating whether such
subsidiary could become subject to the orderly liquidation process provided for by Dodd-
Frank. More importantly, foreign banks that lend to such companies should consult with
competent U.S. counsel regarding the implications of this change in the applicable law. It
is possible that an existing credit facilities or syndicated loans in which the bank is a
participant could face unanticipated losses should the relevant borrower become subject
to such a proceeding rather than being wound up pursuant to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

4. Non-U.S. Swaps Activities Subject to SEC or CFTC Jurisdiction and Requirement
to Register as a Swap Dealer, Major Swap Participant or Swap Execution Facility

      Title VII of the DFA provides a comprehensive grant of regulatory authority to the
CFTC and the SEC whereby previously exempt over-the-counter (OTC) markets for
bilaterally negotiated swap transactions in the U.S. will become subject to mandatory
trading and clearing requirements. Title VII will have a substantial impact on the many
foreign financial firms currently active in the U.S. OTC derivatives markets.

      The good news is that, as with pre-existing provisions in the Commodity Exchange
Act (CEA), the DFA exempts from its mandatory licensing and registration regime certain
OTC swaps activities conducted outside the U.S. and activities of foreign firms not directed
at U.S. markets or U.S. persons. The DFA specifically states that it does not apply to
swaps-related activities outside the U.S. provided such activities neither (i) have a direct
and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce in the U.S., nor (ii)
contravene any CFTC rules or regulations designed to prevent the evasion of the DFA.
However, Title VII of the DFA does contain several provisions specifically targeted at
Foreign Financial Firms and other provisions that are ambiguous as to their extraterritorial
application. For instance, Section 715 of the DFA provides the CFTC and SEC with
authority to prohibit an entity domiciled in a foreign country from participating in the U.S. in
any swaps or security-based swap markets if it is determined that the regulation of swaps
or security-based swaps markets in the foreign country undermines the stability of the U.S.
financial system. It remains unclear how the CFTC will exercise this broad grant of
discretion.

     Likewise, the DFA amends Section 4s of the CEA to make it “unlawful for any person
to act as a swap dealer unless … registered … with the Commission” and “unlawful … to
act as a major swap participant unless … registered … with the Commission.” However, it
is unclear how these prohibitions apply to FFFs engaged in such activities outside the U.S.
because the CFTC is not expressly granted authority in the CEA over swap dealer desks
located in London and other “off-shore” locations, or over foreign domiciled swap dealers
and market participants already subject to comparable supervision by a foreign regulator.
In contrast, the CFTC is expressly authorized to exempt swap execution facilities from the
registration requirements if it finds that they are:

     subject to comparable, comprehensive supervision and regulation on a consolidated
     basis by the SEC, [another Federal Regulator] or “the appropriate governmental
     authorities in the home country of the facility.”

Hopefully, given the CFTC’s new authority under the DFA to further define the terms
“swap dealer” and “major swap participant,” 3 and its general exemptive authority under
section 4c of the CEA, additional clarification as to the extraterritorial scope of these
registration requirements will be provided when final regulations are released by the CFTC
and the SEC. 4
5. Grandfathered Foreign Controlled Unitary Savings Companies may be Required
to Conduct their U.S. Activities through an Intermediate U.S. Holding Company

      Several Foreign Financial Firms currently own U.S. thrifts. It is, therefore, significant
that Section 626 of the DFA amends the Home Owners’ Loan Act to provide that if a
grandfathered unitary savings and loan holding company conducts activities other than
financial activities, the Board may require the company to establish and conduct some or
all of these activities through an intermediate holding company. Such an intermediate
holding company would be required to register with the Board as a savings and loan
holding company established pursuant to regulations of the Board. Also, the Board may
require the grandfathered unitary savings and loan holding company to establish an
intermediate holding company if the Board determines that such establishment is
necessary to (i) appropriately supervise activities determined to be financial activities, or
(ii) ensure that supervision by the Board does not extend to outside financial activities.
Foreign entities that own or are considering acquiring a grandfathered unitary savings and
loan holding companies could be affected by this requirement.

6. Certain Foreign Private Investment Fund Advisers may be Required to Register
as Investment Advisers with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

     Section 203(b) of the U.S. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the
Advisers Act), provides certain exemptions from the requirement to register as an
investment adviser with the SEC. As written, prior to the amendments made by Dodd-
Frank, Section 203(b) of the Advisers Act did not distinguish between U.S. and
non-U.S. investment advisers. Accordingly, a non-U.S. adviser seeking to avoid
registration as an investment adviser with the SEC typically relied on the primary
exemption which generally provided that an adviser having fewer than fifteen clients within
a rolling twelve-month period would not have to register. Section 403 of the DFA
amended the Advisers Act by removing the primary exemption in Section 203(b) and
inserting in its place a specific exemption for a “foreign private adviser,” which is defined
as an investment adviser that:

     •   has no place of business in the United States;
     •   has in total fewer than 15 clients and investors in the United States in private
         funds advised by the investment adviser;
     •   has aggregate assets under management attributable to clients in the United
         States and investors in the United States in private funds advised by the
         investment advisor of less than $25 million (or such higher amount as determined
         by the SEC); and
     •   neither holds itself out to the public in the United States as an investment adviser,
         nor acts as an investment adviser to a registered investment company or a
         business development company.

The inclusion of language in the definition referring to both “clients” and “investors in the
United States in private funds” appears to be intended to prevent an adviser from relying
on Rule 203(b)(3)-1 promulgated under the Advisers Act, which generally allows a private
fund to be considered a single “client” for purposes of Section 203(b)(3) in determining
whether it satisfies the definition of “foreign private adviser.” As such, the clear intention of
the “foreign private adviser” definition is to “look through” an investment fund to determine
the number of its underlying investors.
In summary, if a non-U.S. investment fund sponsor or manager can satisfy all of the
components of the definition of a “foreign private adviser,” then it will be exempt from the
requirement to register as an investment adviser with the SEC. However, the inability to
satisfy any component will require a non-U.S. firm to register. This is particularly important
because the location of the investment fund’s organization or registered office is
immaterial with respect to the application of the exemption – it can be a U.S. fund or an
offshore fund.

II. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010

Non-U.S. Financial Institutions can be Deprived of Access to the U.S. Financial
System under the new Iran Sanctions Law

      On July 1, President Obama signed into law the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (the Iran Sanctions Act or ISA). The ISA
significantly expands the list of activities that can subject non-U.S. financial institutions to
potential U.S. sanctions. Foreign banks and financial institutions that engage in
transactions with Iranian banks, companies, or individuals that have been designated by
the U.S. Government as assisting in Iran’s efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction
or Iran’s support for organizations the U.S. Government has designated as terrorists can
be denied access to the U.S. financial system through new restrictions placed on
correspondent accounts in the U.S.

     Section 104(c) of the ISA requires the Treasury Department to adopt regulations that
prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining in the U.S. of a
correspondent account or a payable-through account for foreign financial institutions that
engage in any of the following transactions:

     (i) “Facilitating” efforts of the Government of Iran to acquire or develop weapons of
     mass destruction or delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction;

     (ii) “Facilitating” efforts of the Government of Iran to provide support for organizations
     designated by the U.S. Government as terrorist organizations;

     (iii) “Facilitating” activities of persons subject to financial sanctions pursuant to UN
     Security Council resolutions;

     (iv) Engaging in money laundering to carry out any of the preceding activities;

     (v) “Facilitating” efforts by the Central Bank of Iran or any other Iranian financial
     institution to carry out any of the preceding activities;

     (vi) “Facilitating” transactions of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); and

     (vii) “Facilitating” transactions of a financial institution whose property in the U.S. is
     “blocked” because of its support for Iran’s proliferation of weapons of mass
     destruction or support for terrorism.

A U.S. financial institution that violates these regulations is subject to significant penalties.
A foreign financial institution that “causes” a U.S. financial institution to violate these
regulations is likewise subject to such penalties. 5

     The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) has
designated a number of Iranian banks under its sanctions programs relating to weapons of
mass destruction or terrorism programs, including: Bank Saderat, Bank Sepah, Bank
                  Mellat, Bank Melli, Persia International Bank, Bank Kargoshaee, Future Bank (Bahrain),
                  Export Development Bank of Iran and the Post Bank of Iran. OFAC has not yet designated
                  the Central Bank of Iran, though it remains a possibility. Under Section 104(c) of the ISA, a
                  non-U.S. financial institution becomes subject to sanctions if it “facilitates” transactions on
                  behalf of any of these listed banks. The term “facilitation” is broadly
                  interpreted by OFAC and other U.S. enforcement authorities. Thus, any transaction by a
                  non-U.S. financial institution with one of the listed banks could lead to the closing of all of
                  its correspondent and payable-through accounts in the U.S. and also render it subject to
                  investigation and possible U.S. penalties.

                         The Iran Sanctions Act thus greatly increases the power of U.S. authorities to take
                  severe action against non-U.S. institutions that are viewed as thwarting U.S. sanctions
                  policies against Iran. Even before its enactment, the United States had shown its
                  willingness to impose heavy monetary penalties on foreign financial institutions. In the
                  recent past, U.S. enforcement authorities have imposed massive penalties against Lloyds
                  TSB, Credit Suisse, and ABN AMRO (now the Royal Bank of Scotland). These banks
                  were subjected to penalties in the hundreds of millions of dollars for activities undertaken
                  entirely outside of the United States. Specifically, the non-U.S. branches of these banks
                  were accused of “stripping” information about the Iranian source of funds routed to or
                  through the U.S. financial system. In each case, the penalties were imposed because the
                  non-U.S. banks “prevented” U.S. financial institutions from fulfilling their obligations under
                  U.S. regulations to properly screen the funds transfers. Barclays was similarly fined almost
                  $300 million under a deferred prosecution agreement in August 2010. In the future, such
                  non-U.S. institutions could not only face fines but the ruinous consequences of being
                  barred from access to the U.S. financial markets, even if none of their activities with the
                  proscribed Iranian entities touched the U.S. in any way.




                WASHINGTON DC | NORTHERN VIRGINIA | NEW JERSEY | NEW YORK | DALLAS | DENVER | ANCHORAGE
                                                 DOHA, QATAR | ABU DHABI, UAE



1
 Bork, Paul, Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=108352 (last visited
Oct. 6, 2010).
2
 Conway, George T., Extraterritoriality After Dodd-Frank, The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and
Financial Regulation, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/08/05/extraterritoriality-after-dodd-frank/ (last visited Oct. 6,
2010).
3
  In light of the authority provided to the CFTC to further define terms under Title VII of Dodd-Frank, the CFTC on August 20,
2010, issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking in which it made a request for comment on the further definitions of the
following terms “swap,” “security-based swap,” “swap dealer,” “security-based swap dealer,” “major swap participant,” “major
security-based swap participant,” “eligible contract participant,” and “security-based swap agreement.”
4
  The CFTC on October 4, 2010 issued a notice of proposed rulemaking containing provisions that would impose new
requirements on derivatives clearing organizations (DCOs), designated contract markets (DCMs), and swap execution facilities
(SEFs) with respect to the mitigation of conflicts of interest. On a prophylactic basis, the proposed rules aim to mitigate (i) a
DCO’s conflict of interest regarding whether a swap be cleared, the minimum criteria that an entity must meet in order to become
a swap clearing member, and whether a particular entity satisfies such minimum criteria, and (ii) a DCM or SEF’s conflict between
advancing commercial interests versus the self-regulatory responsibilities. To achieve these two goals the proposed rules will
impose (i) structural governance requirements and (ii) limits on the ownership of voting equity and the exercise of voting power.
5
 This potential liability is explicitly provided for in Section 104(c)(3) of the Act. In like manner, non-U.S. banks could become
subject to massive penalties if they engage in any of the activities identified in Section 104(c) of the bill.

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CAPITAL MARKETS ALERT: How Dodd-Frank and Other New U.S. Laws May Affect Non-U.S. Financial Institutions

  • 1. How Dodd-Frank and Other New U.S. Laws May Affect Non-U.S. October 8, 2010 Financial Institutions CAPITAL MARKETS CLIENT ALERT One surprising and significant outgrowth of the 2008 financial crisis is that the United This Alert provides only States is more aggressively asserting jurisdiction over non-U.S. financial institutions, even general information and where the activities of such companies take place entirely outside the U.S. Given the should not be relied upon as potentially severe financial penalties for violations of these new laws, non-U.S. financial legal advice. We would be firms should remain cognizant of the extraterritorial reach of the recently-enacted Dodd- pleased to discuss our Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA or Dodd-Frank) and the experience and the issues Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Iran Sanctions Act or ISA). presented in this Alert with those contemplating I. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act investments in these markets. For more information, contact Non-U.S. headquartered banks, securities firms, insurance companies and other non- your Patton Boggs LLP bank foreign financial companies that participate in the U.S. financial markets (Foreign attorney or the authors listed Financial Firms or FFFs) may well be aware that the DFA will substantially impact their below. U.S. operations going forward. These firms are in much the same position as domestic financial services firms whose activities are already, or soon will become, subject to Gregg S. Buksbaum additional capital requirements, prudential regulation, or general oversight by the Federal 202-457-6153 Reserve Board (Fed or Board), the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), or gbuksbaum@pattonboggs.com the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC and together with the Board and the SEC, Federal Regulators). Eric L. Foster 646-557-5131 elfoster@pattonboggs.com What is less well understood is the DFA’s likely impact on Foreign Financial Firms whose “off-shore” activities involve: (i) contact with U.S. investors; (ii) activities in the U.S. Stephen J. McHale dollar denominated financial markets that are settled in the U.S. or transactions with U.S. 202-457-6344 financial institutions generally; or (iii) any other non-U.S. “financial” activities if such smchale@pattonboggs.com activities are deemed to have a “substantial impact on the United States financial system.” Daniel R. Murdock It will be some time before implementing regulations are finalized and the full scope of the 646-557-5117 extraterritorial reach of certain provisions in the DFA become clear. Nevertheless, it is dmurdock@pattonboggs.com already apparent that there are some areas where Foreign Financial Firms should Daniel E. Waltz immediately focus their attention and concern. Properly managing the new compliance 202-457-5651 risks and potential legal liabilities arising from this sweeping new grant of authority to U.S. dwaltz@pattonboggs.com Federal Regulators will likely also require consultation with competent U.S. counsel. 1. Possible Federal Reserve Supervision of Transactions by Certain Systemically Significant FFFs Legislation passed by Congress in the early 1990s to resolve the savings and loan crisis included so-called “prompt corrective action” provisions and other supervisory tools designed to eliminate the perception that certain depository institutions could ever become WWW.PATTONBOGGS.COM so big or systemically important that they could not be allowed to fail. With the Fed- coordinated recapitalization of Long Term Capital Management in 1998, and the recent collapse of AIG and two leading U.S. broker/dealers (not to mention government-led recapitalizations of many other large financial companies), policy makers have realized
  • 2. that even a nonbank financial company (NBFC) could in fact become so “interconnected” or “systemically significant” in our financial system that regulators can not let them fail for fear such firm’s default would cause a financial crisis by creating contagion risk (i.e. a domino effect on counterparty credit concerns within the broader financial system). With Dodd-Frank, Congress is once again attempting to avoid future financial crises while also eliminating the risk that U.S. taxpayers will ever again have to bail out a financial firm because it was “too-big-to-fail.” This time around, Congress is adopting an approach that grants the Board additional broad prophylactic measures to proactively combat systemic risk. The DFA thus grants the Board new authority to impose capital and prudential requirements on certain NBFC before such firm becomes a possible source of systemic risk. Congress has thus created a regime whereby a systemically significant NBFC or large bank holding company (including an FFF) can be identified in advance so that its financial condition can be monitored and its riskier activities regulated, curtailed or eliminated. Later, if and when any “grave” risk arises at the NBFC, the Board is already able to order the firm to cease certain activities, raise capital or face forced divestiture of one or more subsidiaries or affiliates. Anointed with this auspicious responsibility to identify and manage such risks outside the banking system is a new quasi-regulator, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC or Council). Given the supervisors’ failure to identify in advance the systemic risks posed by AIG’s activities in the credit default swaps and securities lending markets, it is not surprising that the Act’s principal target is insurance companies, non-bank banks, and other NBFCs. Under Dodd-Frank, the FSOC will decide if a particular NBFC should in fact be supervised by the Board and subjected to higher prudential standards. The grounds for such a determination are numerous. The DFA merely requires the FSOC to find that the “material financial distress or failure” of the company, or the company’s “nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of activities” could pose a threat to the U.S. financial system. However, the FSOC’s authority to subject quasi-financial firms to Board regulation and oversight is not unlimited. Only those NBFCs that are “predominantly engaged in financial activities” as defined in section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) can be subjected to Board oversight by the FSOC. Under this standard, a company is considered “predominantly engaged in financial activities” if at least 85 percent of its consolidated annual gross revenues are derived from, or 85 percent of its consolidated assets are related to, activities that are financial in nature. Section 113(b) of Dodd-Frank also grants the Board authority to supervise certain foreign nonbank financial companies (Foreign NBFC), which are defined to include companies that are (i) incorporated or organized outside of the U.S.; and (ii) predominantly engaged in financial activities. While the same 85 percent test also applies to FFFs, it is unclear whether the Council will elect to adopt the Fed’s previous guidance regarding section 4(k) when it issues implementing regulations. Dodd-Frank also gives the Board, rather than the FSOC responsibility for providing specific guidance on the sorts of foreign financial activities that will render a Foreign Financial Firm eligible to be deemed a Foreign NBFCs and thus subject to Board oversight. Further, the DFA also grants the Board specific authority to recommend that the FSOC designate a particular FFF as a Foreign NBFC based on a finding that material financial distress at the Foreign Financial Firm (or the nature, size, scope, or interconnectedness of the firm) could pose a threat to the U.S. financial system. Once designated as a systemically significant nonbank financial company (Significant NBFC), presumably all the company’s U.S. financial activities would become subject to possible
  • 3. supervision by the Board and the company would have to comply with any prudential, risk based capital requirements and other regulations promulgated by the Board under its new authority. While it is unclear whether the Board would seek to supervise Foreign NBFC non-U.S. activities, it seems likely that any such designation would, in essence, require a FFF to create a U.S. intermediate holding company. A determination by the Council that a Foreign NBFC should be supervised by the Board will involve weighing the following factors: (i) the extent of the leverage of the company; (ii) the extent and nature of the company’s U.S. related off-balance sheet exposures; (iii) the extent and nature of the company’s relationships with other systemically significant nonbank financial companies and systemically significant bank holding companies; (iv) the importance of the company as a source of credit for U.S. households, businesses, and State and local governments, and as a source of liquidity for the U.S. financial system; (v) the importance of the company as a source of credit for low-income, minority, or underserved communities in the United States and the impact that failure of the company would have on the availability of credit in these communities; (vi) the extent to which assets are managed rather than owned by the company and the extent to which ownership of those assets is diffuse; (vii) the nature, size, scale and interconnectedness of the activities of the company; (viii) the extent to which the company is subject to prudential standards on a consolidated basis in its home country that are administered and enforced by a comparable foreign supervisory authority; (ix) the amount and nature of the company’s U.S. financial assets; (x) the amount and nature of the liabilities of the company used to fund activities and operations in the United States; and (xi) any other risk-related factors that the FSOC deems appropriate. Needless to say, with this laundry list, the Council and the Board have been granted substantial discretion to determine that a particular Foreign Financial Firm’s financial activities are so significant as to necessitate that it become subject to this special U.S. supervisory regime. FFFs concerned about being inappropriately subjected to the new regime should communicate their specific concerns to the Board and the Council prior to the issuance of final implementing regulations. 2. Extraterritorial Reach of Section 10b of the 1934 Act and Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. In June 2010, while Congress was in the final stages of passing the Dodd-Frank, the U.S. Supreme Court in Morrison v. National Australian Bank, Ltd., rejected lower court decisions upholding the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
  • 4. Act of 1934 and ruled that this securities fraud provision does not provide a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges. This much publicized decision, however, will not likely provide material support for any challenge to the extraterritorial reach of either the DFA or the Iran Sanctions Act. The Morrison decision was one of statutory interpretation, and did not consider the constitutional limits of jurisdiction. Reaffirming the longstanding principle of American law “that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” the Supreme Court found nothing in the 1934 Act to suggest that Section 10(b) was intended by Congress to apply abroad. Implicit in the ruling is that use of the presumption against extraterritorial application would be inappropriate in interpreting Federal legislation in which Congress clearly has expressed “a contrary intent.” Indeed, shortly after the Morrison decision, Congress responded by adding a provision which gave the SEC express authority under another antifraud provision, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, to bring enforcement actions which would encompass the sort of wrongdoing alleged in Morrison. Under the DFA, the SEC is given additional authority to bring actions to enforce the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws in a manner that rolls back Morrison. The DFA provides that: district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction of an action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission or the United States alleging a violation of section 17(a) involving: (1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign investors; or (2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States. Representative Paul Kanjorski, who authored this language, stated in his floor comments that it was intended to rebut any general presumption against territoriality. While most commentators agree that this provision effectively reversed the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison, 1 at least one has questioned whether this provision has indeed extended the application of anti-fraud provisions to outside the U.S. 2 While the DFA does not affect the application of Morrison to private Section 10b actions, it is worthwhile to note that it does require the SEC to evaluate whether Congress should in the future restore the conduct and effects tests in private actions to enforce the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act. 3. Foreign Subsidiaries Deemed Covered Financial Institution Under Dodd-Frank’s New Special Insolvency Regime Title II of Dodd-Frank creates a risk for certain “financial institutions” that they could one day be subjected to an involuntary orderly liquidation proceeding pursuant to special resolution authority granted to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) under the DFA. Section 201 grants the Secretary of the Treasury the ability to authorize the FDIC to bring a special emergency proceeding in a federal court in connection with any “financial institution.” The DFA defines the term “financial institution” very broadly to include any organization that is incorporated or organized under any provision of federal law or the laws of any state and that is a bank holding company, NBFC, or a company engaged in activities that are “financial in nature.” Section 203 of the DFA, specifically refers to situations “in which the largest United States subsidiary …of a financial company is a broker or dealer …or in which the largest United States subsidiary of a financial company is an insurance company.” A foreign company that owns or controls a significantly-sized U.S. subsidiary engaged in activities that are financial in nature should begin evaluating whether such
  • 5. subsidiary could become subject to the orderly liquidation process provided for by Dodd- Frank. More importantly, foreign banks that lend to such companies should consult with competent U.S. counsel regarding the implications of this change in the applicable law. It is possible that an existing credit facilities or syndicated loans in which the bank is a participant could face unanticipated losses should the relevant borrower become subject to such a proceeding rather than being wound up pursuant to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 4. Non-U.S. Swaps Activities Subject to SEC or CFTC Jurisdiction and Requirement to Register as a Swap Dealer, Major Swap Participant or Swap Execution Facility Title VII of the DFA provides a comprehensive grant of regulatory authority to the CFTC and the SEC whereby previously exempt over-the-counter (OTC) markets for bilaterally negotiated swap transactions in the U.S. will become subject to mandatory trading and clearing requirements. Title VII will have a substantial impact on the many foreign financial firms currently active in the U.S. OTC derivatives markets. The good news is that, as with pre-existing provisions in the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), the DFA exempts from its mandatory licensing and registration regime certain OTC swaps activities conducted outside the U.S. and activities of foreign firms not directed at U.S. markets or U.S. persons. The DFA specifically states that it does not apply to swaps-related activities outside the U.S. provided such activities neither (i) have a direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce in the U.S., nor (ii) contravene any CFTC rules or regulations designed to prevent the evasion of the DFA. However, Title VII of the DFA does contain several provisions specifically targeted at Foreign Financial Firms and other provisions that are ambiguous as to their extraterritorial application. For instance, Section 715 of the DFA provides the CFTC and SEC with authority to prohibit an entity domiciled in a foreign country from participating in the U.S. in any swaps or security-based swap markets if it is determined that the regulation of swaps or security-based swaps markets in the foreign country undermines the stability of the U.S. financial system. It remains unclear how the CFTC will exercise this broad grant of discretion. Likewise, the DFA amends Section 4s of the CEA to make it “unlawful for any person to act as a swap dealer unless … registered … with the Commission” and “unlawful … to act as a major swap participant unless … registered … with the Commission.” However, it is unclear how these prohibitions apply to FFFs engaged in such activities outside the U.S. because the CFTC is not expressly granted authority in the CEA over swap dealer desks located in London and other “off-shore” locations, or over foreign domiciled swap dealers and market participants already subject to comparable supervision by a foreign regulator. In contrast, the CFTC is expressly authorized to exempt swap execution facilities from the registration requirements if it finds that they are: subject to comparable, comprehensive supervision and regulation on a consolidated basis by the SEC, [another Federal Regulator] or “the appropriate governmental authorities in the home country of the facility.” Hopefully, given the CFTC’s new authority under the DFA to further define the terms “swap dealer” and “major swap participant,” 3 and its general exemptive authority under section 4c of the CEA, additional clarification as to the extraterritorial scope of these registration requirements will be provided when final regulations are released by the CFTC and the SEC. 4
  • 6. 5. Grandfathered Foreign Controlled Unitary Savings Companies may be Required to Conduct their U.S. Activities through an Intermediate U.S. Holding Company Several Foreign Financial Firms currently own U.S. thrifts. It is, therefore, significant that Section 626 of the DFA amends the Home Owners’ Loan Act to provide that if a grandfathered unitary savings and loan holding company conducts activities other than financial activities, the Board may require the company to establish and conduct some or all of these activities through an intermediate holding company. Such an intermediate holding company would be required to register with the Board as a savings and loan holding company established pursuant to regulations of the Board. Also, the Board may require the grandfathered unitary savings and loan holding company to establish an intermediate holding company if the Board determines that such establishment is necessary to (i) appropriately supervise activities determined to be financial activities, or (ii) ensure that supervision by the Board does not extend to outside financial activities. Foreign entities that own or are considering acquiring a grandfathered unitary savings and loan holding companies could be affected by this requirement. 6. Certain Foreign Private Investment Fund Advisers may be Required to Register as Investment Advisers with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Section 203(b) of the U.S. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the Advisers Act), provides certain exemptions from the requirement to register as an investment adviser with the SEC. As written, prior to the amendments made by Dodd- Frank, Section 203(b) of the Advisers Act did not distinguish between U.S. and non-U.S. investment advisers. Accordingly, a non-U.S. adviser seeking to avoid registration as an investment adviser with the SEC typically relied on the primary exemption which generally provided that an adviser having fewer than fifteen clients within a rolling twelve-month period would not have to register. Section 403 of the DFA amended the Advisers Act by removing the primary exemption in Section 203(b) and inserting in its place a specific exemption for a “foreign private adviser,” which is defined as an investment adviser that: • has no place of business in the United States; • has in total fewer than 15 clients and investors in the United States in private funds advised by the investment adviser; • has aggregate assets under management attributable to clients in the United States and investors in the United States in private funds advised by the investment advisor of less than $25 million (or such higher amount as determined by the SEC); and • neither holds itself out to the public in the United States as an investment adviser, nor acts as an investment adviser to a registered investment company or a business development company. The inclusion of language in the definition referring to both “clients” and “investors in the United States in private funds” appears to be intended to prevent an adviser from relying on Rule 203(b)(3)-1 promulgated under the Advisers Act, which generally allows a private fund to be considered a single “client” for purposes of Section 203(b)(3) in determining whether it satisfies the definition of “foreign private adviser.” As such, the clear intention of the “foreign private adviser” definition is to “look through” an investment fund to determine the number of its underlying investors.
  • 7. In summary, if a non-U.S. investment fund sponsor or manager can satisfy all of the components of the definition of a “foreign private adviser,” then it will be exempt from the requirement to register as an investment adviser with the SEC. However, the inability to satisfy any component will require a non-U.S. firm to register. This is particularly important because the location of the investment fund’s organization or registered office is immaterial with respect to the application of the exemption – it can be a U.S. fund or an offshore fund. II. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 Non-U.S. Financial Institutions can be Deprived of Access to the U.S. Financial System under the new Iran Sanctions Law On July 1, President Obama signed into law the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (the Iran Sanctions Act or ISA). The ISA significantly expands the list of activities that can subject non-U.S. financial institutions to potential U.S. sanctions. Foreign banks and financial institutions that engage in transactions with Iranian banks, companies, or individuals that have been designated by the U.S. Government as assisting in Iran’s efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction or Iran’s support for organizations the U.S. Government has designated as terrorists can be denied access to the U.S. financial system through new restrictions placed on correspondent accounts in the U.S. Section 104(c) of the ISA requires the Treasury Department to adopt regulations that prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining in the U.S. of a correspondent account or a payable-through account for foreign financial institutions that engage in any of the following transactions: (i) “Facilitating” efforts of the Government of Iran to acquire or develop weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction; (ii) “Facilitating” efforts of the Government of Iran to provide support for organizations designated by the U.S. Government as terrorist organizations; (iii) “Facilitating” activities of persons subject to financial sanctions pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions; (iv) Engaging in money laundering to carry out any of the preceding activities; (v) “Facilitating” efforts by the Central Bank of Iran or any other Iranian financial institution to carry out any of the preceding activities; (vi) “Facilitating” transactions of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); and (vii) “Facilitating” transactions of a financial institution whose property in the U.S. is “blocked” because of its support for Iran’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or support for terrorism. A U.S. financial institution that violates these regulations is subject to significant penalties. A foreign financial institution that “causes” a U.S. financial institution to violate these regulations is likewise subject to such penalties. 5 The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) has designated a number of Iranian banks under its sanctions programs relating to weapons of
  • 8. mass destruction or terrorism programs, including: Bank Saderat, Bank Sepah, Bank Mellat, Bank Melli, Persia International Bank, Bank Kargoshaee, Future Bank (Bahrain), Export Development Bank of Iran and the Post Bank of Iran. OFAC has not yet designated the Central Bank of Iran, though it remains a possibility. Under Section 104(c) of the ISA, a non-U.S. financial institution becomes subject to sanctions if it “facilitates” transactions on behalf of any of these listed banks. The term “facilitation” is broadly interpreted by OFAC and other U.S. enforcement authorities. Thus, any transaction by a non-U.S. financial institution with one of the listed banks could lead to the closing of all of its correspondent and payable-through accounts in the U.S. and also render it subject to investigation and possible U.S. penalties. The Iran Sanctions Act thus greatly increases the power of U.S. authorities to take severe action against non-U.S. institutions that are viewed as thwarting U.S. sanctions policies against Iran. Even before its enactment, the United States had shown its willingness to impose heavy monetary penalties on foreign financial institutions. In the recent past, U.S. enforcement authorities have imposed massive penalties against Lloyds TSB, Credit Suisse, and ABN AMRO (now the Royal Bank of Scotland). These banks were subjected to penalties in the hundreds of millions of dollars for activities undertaken entirely outside of the United States. Specifically, the non-U.S. branches of these banks were accused of “stripping” information about the Iranian source of funds routed to or through the U.S. financial system. In each case, the penalties were imposed because the non-U.S. banks “prevented” U.S. financial institutions from fulfilling their obligations under U.S. regulations to properly screen the funds transfers. Barclays was similarly fined almost $300 million under a deferred prosecution agreement in August 2010. In the future, such non-U.S. institutions could not only face fines but the ruinous consequences of being barred from access to the U.S. financial markets, even if none of their activities with the proscribed Iranian entities touched the U.S. in any way. WASHINGTON DC | NORTHERN VIRGINIA | NEW JERSEY | NEW YORK | DALLAS | DENVER | ANCHORAGE DOHA, QATAR | ABU DHABI, UAE 1 Bork, Paul, Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=108352 (last visited Oct. 6, 2010). 2 Conway, George T., Extraterritoriality After Dodd-Frank, The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/08/05/extraterritoriality-after-dodd-frank/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2010). 3 In light of the authority provided to the CFTC to further define terms under Title VII of Dodd-Frank, the CFTC on August 20, 2010, issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking in which it made a request for comment on the further definitions of the following terms “swap,” “security-based swap,” “swap dealer,” “security-based swap dealer,” “major swap participant,” “major security-based swap participant,” “eligible contract participant,” and “security-based swap agreement.” 4 The CFTC on October 4, 2010 issued a notice of proposed rulemaking containing provisions that would impose new requirements on derivatives clearing organizations (DCOs), designated contract markets (DCMs), and swap execution facilities (SEFs) with respect to the mitigation of conflicts of interest. On a prophylactic basis, the proposed rules aim to mitigate (i) a DCO’s conflict of interest regarding whether a swap be cleared, the minimum criteria that an entity must meet in order to become a swap clearing member, and whether a particular entity satisfies such minimum criteria, and (ii) a DCM or SEF’s conflict between advancing commercial interests versus the self-regulatory responsibilities. To achieve these two goals the proposed rules will impose (i) structural governance requirements and (ii) limits on the ownership of voting equity and the exercise of voting power. 5 This potential liability is explicitly provided for in Section 104(c)(3) of the Act. In like manner, non-U.S. banks could become subject to massive penalties if they engage in any of the activities identified in Section 104(c) of the bill.