Who am I? Who are you? Who is anybody?
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One of the most difficult decisions in developing a Web site is how to manage user identity. As a user you have to assess the implications of connecting your Twitter or Facebook user to other random services. Meanwhile, enterprises are challenged to evaluate ever more magical products for connecting their silos with other silos, often in direct conflict with any desire for a RESTful architecture. Did innovation in authentication on the Web stop at usernames, passwords, and the HTTP Cookie? Does Firesheep mean you should serve everything over HTTPS? What happened to OpenID? Can outsourcing your userbase to Twitter, Facebook, Google or some other commercial entity really be a good idea? This talk has some answers, but mostly offers a wide-ranging and opinionated tour of the current state of identity on the Web. There will be URIs and angle-brackets, but mostly anecdotes involving venn diagrams, famous bridges, self-destructing kiosks and quantum computers.
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Who am I? Who are you? Who is anybody?
- 1. Who are You? Who am I? Who is Anybody?
- 2. Who am I? Who are You? Who is Anybody?
- 3. Who am I?
- 4. I’m not ...
- 5. <a href="http://lanyrd.com/people/psd" rel="me" >Lanyrd</a>
- 10. FAIL!
- 14. Who are you?
- 22. sha1
- 23. Secret URIs • http://farm3.static.flickr.com/2291/1806225034_50df5b8ba4_o.png • http://inmaps.linkedinlabs.com/share/Paul_Downey/ 254787113202758123919768153472111744090
- 32. EU Privacy Directive on Cookies
- 35. http://www.davidnaylor.co.uk/eu-cookies-directive-interactive-guide-to-25th- may-and-what-it-means-for-you.html
- 36. UX
- 37. More Secure Less pleasant to use
- 39. HTTPS
- 41. $ openssl s_client -connect www.google.com:443 < /dev/null | openssl x509 -outform DER | openssl sha1 depth=1 /C=ZA/O=Thawte Consulting (Pty) Ltd./CN=Thawte SGC CA verify error:num=20:unable to get local issuer certificate verify return:0 DONE 405062e5befde4af97e9382af16cc87c8fb7c4e2 $ dig +short 405062e5befde4af97e9382af16cc87c8fb7c4e2.certs.googled nstest.com TXT "14867 15062 74" http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2011/04/improving-ssl-certificate-security.html
- 42. Client Certs?
- 46. you have to opt-out .. .. in every browser .. .. this is evil .. .. and doomed to failure http://xauth.org/
- 50. <XRD> <Subject>http://blog.example.com/article/id/314</ Subject> <Alias>http://blog.example.com/cool_new_thing</Alias> <Expires>2010-01-30T09:30:00Z</Expires> <Type>http://blgx.example.net/ns/version/1.2</Type> <Type>http://blgx.example.net/ns/ext/language</Type> <Link> <Rel>author</Rel> <URI>http://blog.example.com/author/steve</URI> <MediaType>text/html</MediaType> </Link> </XRD> http://hueniverse.com/2009/03/xrd-sneak-peek/
- 52. Delegation UX
- 53. The “F” Word
- 54. Federated
- 59. ww .w3.org/ ss >http://w le.org/ <w sa:Addre ttp://examp dd ressing"> ustomer="h .org/2 005/08/a ers xmlns:c </ merKey> wsdl/"> .w3 et sto tt p://www eferenceParam </customer :Cu mlsoap.org/ / mln s:wsa="h ss><wsa:R 56789 m as.x rg /2006/01 eference x </wsa:Addre y>K ey#1234 lns="http://sche ttp://www.w3.o ce> < wsa:E ndpointR essing/none r :Cus tomerKe efinitions xm "h n xmlns= sa:EndpointRefe ren r me d tio 200 5/08/add tomer"><custo <wsa:Metada>< itions><descrip adata></w cus > n et Par ameters re! --></defi iption></wsa:M wsa:R eference of WSDL 1.1 he ! --></descr e <!-- load WSDL 2.0 her e wsdl"> <!-- mor
- 60. <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <SOAP-ENV:Envelope xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:ns1="http://sdk.bt.com/2007/01/WhiteLabelAuthentication" xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:wsa="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/08/addressing" xmlns:wsse="http://docs.oasis- open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd" xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity- HEADERS? utility-1.0.xsd" xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> <SOAP-ENV:Header> <wsse:Security> <ds:Signature> <ds:SignedInfo> <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/> <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/> <ds:Reference URI="#ac016ffe-a6e9-23d4-ebd1-ccef7ea31db7"> <ds:Transforms> <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/> </ds:Transforms> <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> <ds:DigestValue>bwlAKau7KQAubgGNJzysZoEEF8o=</ds:DigestValue> </ds:Reference> <ds:Reference URI="#78223460-ef68-5501-83d6-a5edb6d452b6"> <ds:Transforms> <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/> </ds:Transforms> <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> <ds:DigestValue>kyBw9fnMjhi2I39+wfBIklyk8g4=</ds:DigestValue> </ds:Reference> </ds:SignedInfo> <ds:SignatureValue>XW2FqP9o/A1J+NOg6Kv3ncn3PvSg5lzr2V4H/AQpRycXUSk7bzWK8kzhtMrlXUwkykrJ2AyEzw+xrRtSBIeaId1Iveme2KO02p21MTglr73cPCft/ GHvEvAHZ4B6N6gSaX7NcGFrYnsYKP0nX5vT7jBh7WZ7Euqn0PyjCHyYxbU=</ds:SignatureValue> <ds:KeyInfo> <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> <wsse:Reference URI="#CERTID"/> </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> </ds:KeyInfo> </ds:Signature> <wsu:Timestamp wsu:Id="ac016ffe-a6e9-23d4-ebd1-ccef7ea31db7"> <wsu:Created>2007-02-23T07:47:01Z</wsu:Created> <wsu:Expires>2007-02-23T08:47:01Z</wsu:Expires> </wsu:Timestamp> <wsse:BinarySecurityToken EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary" ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-1.0#X509v3" wsu:Id="CERTID">MIICdzCCAeCgAwIBAgICAX0wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwezEnMCUGA1UEChMeQnJpdGlzaCBUZWxlY29tbXVuaWNhdGlvbnMgUExDMR4wHAYDVQQLExVDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBBdXRob3 JpdHkxDzANBgNVBAcTBkxmRvbjELMAkGA1UEBhMCR0IxEjAQBgNVBTCUJUIFNESyBDQTAiFxEwNzAxMDMxNTE5MjIrMDAwMBcNMDgwMTA0MTUxOTIyWjCBgjELMAkGA1UEBhMCR0IxDzANBgNVBAgTBkxv bmRvbjEPMA0GA1UEBxMGTG9uZG9uMQ8wDQYDVQQKEwZCVCBTREsxLTArBgNVBAsTJDM0ZDU0NTkwLTRkZTEtNGJmNi04ZGMxLWZjODQzNzM1MmM4MjERMA8GA1UEAxMIcGhvbmVib3gwgZ8wDQYJKoZIhv cNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBANKIQf+DOAKNZqs+HvCBYJ7+Q/wdCQBfFslIOGMnKN5zxpCuwB/pPW4DjLnqcWkIIVIH4A7RlWRemIO5e5caTW9bwvz0Fl1ZM6e2Mx9XKT0ZkxvXq8Dxn0abqWzoKyD3IJ2/ tUhqriWveFR+6PY3PSBcj7NpJaqr7yH3z6RtEGNlAgMBAAEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQADgYEAmabZVFeAXfXcBKR6NUK7kYqHhtX7YdNtxZcULRMMpFEkCMGERWCH5bK6/xnFtNXG09RkwkSTGs2dhM6/ jQNvd1jJhLR6E2ejYrYWWf6Sap0Etok7sJqrS9awdbFmQGenFZKRUAEeyHeZhdFil8trzyJv1VzgPIjDRZmhnpItzQ8=</wsse:BinarySecurityToken> </wsse:Security> <wsa:Action>http://sdk.bt.com/2007/01/WhiteLabelAuthentication#login</wsa:Action> <wsa:MessageID>urn:uuid:e12edac3-f87d-3e0a-b621-04fa4d0b8cda</wsa:MessageID> </SOAP-ENV:Header> <SOAP-ENV:Body wsu:Id="78223460-ef68-5501-83d6-a5edb6d452b6"> <ns1:login> <ns1:userName>paul.downey@bt.com</ns1:userName> <ns1:password>2344324t</ns1:password> </ns1:login> </SOAP-ENV:Body> </SOAP-ENV:Envelope>
- 72. very cool!
- 80. .. but .. wait!
- 84. Verified by Visa not only protects your card against unauthorised use, it also means you can have confidence that the online retailer you’re buying from has made your security a priority. http://www.visaeurope.com/en/cardholders/verified_by_visa.aspx
- 103. Bio-meh-trics
- 106. Something you have Something you are Something you know
- 107. The Mobile is The Dongle ™ not really
- 110. Who is anybody?
- 112. BUTTON SLUTS
- 117. Yikes!
- 119. • Standard HTTP Cookies • Flash Local Shared Objects • Silverlight Isolated Storage • auto-generated force-cached RGB values • PNG/HTML5 Canvas tag to read pixels • Web History • HTTP ETags • Web cache evercookies • window.name caching • Internet Explorer userData storage • HTML5 Session Storage • HTML5 Local Storage • HTML5 Global Storage • HTML5 Database Storage (SQLite) • HTTP Authentication • Java NIC based unique key
- 125. “The thing that makes newspapers so fundamentally fascinating — that serendipity — can be calculated now. We can actually produce it electronically. The power of individual targeting — the technology will be so good it will be very hard for people to watch or consume something that has not in some sense been tailored for them” — Eric Schmidt http://googlesystem.blogspot.com/2010/08/eric-schmidt-on-future-of-search.html
- 127. Privacy Window
- 129. four legs good, two legs better ...
- 132. Test Driven Development Behaviour Driven Development Jenga Driven Development Domain Driven Design Development Driven Development Design Driven Driving
- 135. Confusion Conclusion
- 136. Who am I? — someone who treasures linking Who are you? — someone who deserves grokable security Who is Anybody? — mind your own bloomin’ business!