Real Madrid has very high brand equity according to Aaker's model. They have near universal awareness and recognition globally as one of the top soccer teams due to their winning history and superstar players. Their brand is strongly associated with pride, success, and Spain. Real Madrid uses a branded house architecture, though their superstar players act as ingredient brands that mutually benefit Real Madrid and enhance their own personal brands. However, Real Madrid faces risks if they begin to lose games and see declines in quality perceptions or if their star players leave the team.

1.
Ross
Simons
Final
Exam
1A.)
Aaker
Brand
Equity:
Awareness:
Real
Madrid
has
a
high
awareness
which
is
comprised
of
recall
and
recognition.
In
Spain
alone
about
60%
of
soccer
fans
follow
Real
Madrid
(recall)
and
one
can
only
assume
they
have
much
higher
recognition
rate.
Outside
of
Spain,
one
can
assume
their
recall
and
recognition
is
high
as
well:
11
out
of
12
countries
in
exhibit
3
cite
Real
Madrid
as
a
top
soccer
team;
www.realmadrid.com
reaches
1.5
million
unique
users
a
month
(with
only
28%
coming
from
Spain)
up
from
200,000
in
2001;
Madrid
has
6
million
tourists
a
year,
some
of
those
just
to
see
Real
Madrid
play.
Association:
This
is
a
lot
of
what
you’ll
see
in
the
answers
to
the
questions
after
this,
associations
like:
spain,
championships,
pride,
belonging,
superstars,
legacy.
Quality:
Given
Real
Madrid’s
winning
heritage,
their
plethora
of
superstars,
and
the
team
oft-­‐cited
as
a
leading
team,
it’s
clear
they
are
one
of
the
highest
quality
teams
out
there.
Loyalty:
As
loyalty
is
derived
from
the
strength
of
awareness,
association,
and
quality,
Loyalty
for
Real
Madrid
is
also
very
high.
Other
Brand
Assets:
Besides
the
standard
logo,
uniforms,
brand
colors,
etc.
Real
Madrid
has
a
few
brand
assets
that
really
allow
for
success.
The
first
is
that
since
they
have
superstar
players,
this
results
in
a
lot
of
endorsements
for
individual
players,
and
by
extension,
the
Real
Madrid
brand.
Second,
they
really
utilize
their
channels
well
to
reach
the
audiences,
particularly
their
website
and
TV
channel.
Last,
the
fan
clubs
of
Real
Madrid
help
to
create
a
worldwide
community
amongst
the
fans,
a
very
important
aspect
of
the
CVP.
Brand
Architecture:
Real
Madrid
has
an
interesting
brand
architecture.
Though
it’s
primarily
a
Branded
House
as
evidenced
by
brands
like
realmadrid.com
and
Real
Madrid
TV
in
which
Real
Madrid
master
brand
is
the
driver
and
.com
or
TV
is
just
a
descriptor.
There
are
cases
of
other
brands
under
a
House
of
Brands
andstrategy
such
as
Sociedad
Mixta,
but
it
seems
that
it
is
a
Branded
House
architecture
mostly.
The
reason
the
architecture
is
interesting
however
is
that
it
contains
ingredient
brands.
An
ingredient
brand
is,
as
it
sounds,
a
brand
that
is
an
ingredient
of
another
brand.
For
example,
Chrysler—
in
addition
to
its
many
recent
branding
efforts—has
recently
introduced
Beats
by
Dr.
Dre
audio
in
some
of
its
cars.
Though
both
receive
benefits
out
of
this
scenario,
it’s
really
hard
to
say
which
brand
is
the
driver.
Traditionally,
when
both
brands
seem
to
have
an
equal
driver
role,
you
would
call
it
a
subbrand.
However
ingredient
brands
clearly
are
not
subbrands.
Where
you
encounter
this
with
Real
Madrid
is
through
its
players.
The
players
are
massive
brands
in
their
own
right
complete
with
their
own
revenue
streams,
their
own
“customers”
and
clearly
their
own
driver
role.
The
players
benefit
from
playing
with
Real
Madrid
as
they
are
playing
with
many
other
superstars
on
a
team
that
provides
a
fantastic
chance

2.
Ross
Simons
Final
Exam
for
huge
success.
They
get
to
share
responsibility
for
victory
with
other
stars
and
get
to
leverage
the
prestige
of
the
Real
Madrid
name
to
increase
their
own
revenue
streams.
At
the
same
time,
having
a
team
of
superstars
allows
for
further
success
for
Real
Madrid
and
supports
its
core.
There
is
a
co-­‐driver
relationship
here
as
both
brands
support
the
other’s
success,
but
this
could
not
be
considered
subbranding
(just
as
Intel
processors
in
an
Apple
computer
is
not
subbranding).
Risks:
There
are
a
number
of
weaknesses
and
risks
I
see
with
their
equity
and
architecture.
The
biggest
risk
is
that
soccer
clubs’
success
is
on
a
precarious
edge.
For
many
of
the
top
teams,
winning
is
in
their
core.
If
teams
begin
to
lose
(as
Manchester
United
did),
they
risk
decreasing
brand
value.
If
Real
Madrid
were
to
go
on
a
bad
losing
streak,
it
would
lose
a
lot
of
brand
equity
in
association
and
quality.
Another
big
risk
is
the
strength
of
the
players.
With
these
ingredient
brands
contributing
significant
value
to
the
master
brand,
they
are
at
risk
of
players
leaving
the
team,
being
headhunted
by
others,
or
doing
things
that
tarnish
their
personal
brands
off-­‐field.
Any
of
the
above
scenarios
would
decrease
the
brand
value
of
the
master
brand.
The
above
two
risks
are
relatively
hard
to
control
for,
so
they’re
not
conducive
to
suggestions
for
improvement
other
than
to
make
sure
their
front
office
is
staffed
with
the
absolute
best
talent
scouts
and
negotiators
to
insure
that
the
team
keeps
winning,
acquiring
and
retaining
superstars.
Another
very
significant
risk
is
dilution
of
the
brand
through
the
various
brand
extensions
they
are
undertaking
(restaurants,
merchandising,
etc.)
In
the
case
they
explain
that
they
must
insure
“a
branded
item
is
not
too
far
removed
from
soccer
(e.g.
tablecloth
or
wallet),
yet
the
case
says
that
mugs
and
watches
are
sold.
If
this
situation
is
the
norm,
it
does
not
seem
as
if
the
brand
has
a
grasp
on
what
is
“not
too
far
removed
from
Soccer”.
My
suggestion
would
be
to
clearly
define
what
constitutes
a
viable
extension
that
does
not
violate
the
identity
of
Real
Madrid
and
make
sure
that
they
any
proposed
extension
fit
the
acceptable
criteria.
And
last,
with
fan
clubs
and
channels
of
distribution
being
very
valuable
brand
assets
that
provide
a
huge
return
on
investment
and
a
competitive
advantage
within
their
equity
and
architecture,
it’s
important
that
they
strengthen
these
particular
brand
assets
as
they
look
to
expand.

3.
Ross
Simons
Final
Exam
1B.)
Specific
Players
Stadium
Logo
Website
Brand
Colors
Spain
-­‐Heritage
Spain
-­‐Winning
League
-­‐Superstars
Merchandise
Uniforms
Soccer
Retail
Stores
Fan
cards
Rationale:
Real
Madrid
has
a
storied
heritage
as
a
101-­‐year
old
soccer
team
that
has
met
great
success.
It
is
one
of
the
most
winningest
teams
in
the
world,
and
in
the
soccer
world
winning
is
vital.
It
is
this
winning
heritage
that
allows
Real
Madrid
to
continue
success.
It
becomes
clear
that
winning
is
vital
to
Madrid’s
(and
any
top-­‐tier
soccer
team)
brand
using
two
examples.
The
first
is
when
an
industry
observer
explained
that
a
team’s
market
capitalization
could
drastically
drop
after
only
a
single
bad
season.
This
assertion
is
then
proven
later
when
the
case
explains
that
when
Manchester
United
lost
a
game
in
the
final
minute—keeping
ManU
out
of
the
quarterfinals—it
was
forced
out
of
the
Champion’s
League
and
was
expected
to
lost
~$18.23
in
revenue
as
a
result.
This
shows
the
clear
connection
between
a
brand’s
success
and
their
wins;
losses
will
drive
down
the
value
of
the
club
and
thus
winning
is
a
part
of
the
core
identity.

4.
Ross
Simons
Final
Exam
Central
to
Real
Madrid’s
brand
is
having
a
team
of
superstars
as
well.
I’ve
put
“specific
players”
in
the
extended
identity
because
specific
players
do
not
belong
in
the
core
as
Real
Madrid
can
continue
to
thrive
without
specific
players
(ex.
If
Ronaldo
left,
Madrid
would
still
succeed).
However
it
is
dependent
on
having
superstars.
A
team
of
superstars
creates
wins,
drives
heritage,
and
attracts
fans.
With
the
way
the
soccer
world
is
set
up,
those
teams
who
are
not
capable
of
multiple
superstars
do
not
achieve
the
level
of
success
that
Madrid
does.
Further,
each
of
the
superstars
are
their
own
very
strong
brands
in
their
own
right,
so
they
bring
their
own
brand
assets
and
“customers”
(fans)
with
them
and
allows
the
brand
to
rapidly
appreciate
in
value
through
acquisition
of
superstars
as
well
as
expand.
The
value
of
Madrid’s
talent
can
be
seen
during
Lorenzo
Sanz
presidency
of
Real
Madrid.
He
regularly
sold
players
to
cover
expenses
and
the
team
began
to
decline
on
the
field
and
off
the
field.
The
last
thing
I
feel
must
be
explained
is
the
placement
of
soccer
in
the
extended
identity.
Though
soccer
is
important,
I
do
not
feel
as
if
it
is
a
part
of
the
core
identity.
As
the
Madrid
management
puts
it,
they
“are
a
content
provider”,
not
a
soccer
provider.
By
having
soccer
only
a
part
of
the
extended
identity,
this
allows
them
to
expand
into
things
loosely
connected
to
soccer,
if
at
all
(such
as
movies,
or
themeparks,
etc.)
Customer
Value
Proposition:
• Appreciafng
Stock
Funcfonal
• Entertainment
• Compeffon
• Excifng
games
• Pride
• Belonging
Emofonal
• Hope
("We
turn
down
the
lights
and
people
dream")
• Bragging
rights
• Camaraderie
• "I
am
a
Madrismo,
a
global
community."
Self-­‐Exp.
• "I
am
a
winner."
• "I
am
a
proud
Spaniard,
from
my
family
to
my
futbol."

5.
Ross
Simons
Final
Exam
Brand
Personality:
Aaker:
Aaker
would
argue
that
the
Real
Madrid
has
a
personality
of
Excitement
(causes
hope,
exciting
sport,
innovative
organization),
Competence
(trustworthy,
winners,
leadership,
influential,
successful),
and
ruggedness
(masculine,
athletic,
tough-­‐to-­‐beat,
will
fight
for
a
win)
Kopp
Gestalt
Model:
"I
can
trust
Real
Madrid.
By
"Real
Madrid
is
a
team
started
being
a
fan,
I
am
a
part
of
a
in
1902
that
has
a
long
history
huge
community
worldwide
of
of
winning,
superstars,
and
a
people
just
like
me.
They
are
a
huge
fan
base
that
spans
the
part
of
my
idenfty
and
when
enfre
globe.
It
wins
games
year
they
win,
I
win
(as
my
friends
in
and
year
out"
know
when
I
brag
to
them.)"
"Real
Madrid
for
Real
Success."

6.
Ross
Simons
Final
Exam
1C.)
Segmentation:
I
believe
that
Real
Madrid
has
four
main
segments
as
well
as
sub-­‐segments
(keep
in
mind,
there
is
some
overlap.
For
example,
there
are
some
international
socios
abonados
but
international
and
socios
abonados
have
their
own
segments
as
they
require
separate
strategies
and
are
exclusive,
even
if
there
is
overlap):
1. International
(non-­‐European)
segment:
a. This
looks
to
be
the
segment
with
the
most
growth
potential,
especially
in
the
U.S.
and
Asia.
It
is
a
separate
segment
because
it
will
require
a
different
strategy
to
grow
the
brand
amongst
this
segment.
i. I
believe
one
of
the
best
ways
to
grow
amongst
international
segments
is
to
go
after
the
most
popular
players
in
the
specific
regions.
This
is
evidenced
by
the
sales
of
Real
Madrid
jerseys
in
Britain
shortly
after
the
announcement
that
Beckham
would
be
transferred
to
Real
Madrid.
They
can
also
tour
significantly
in
the
regions
they
want
to
grow
the
brand
in.
Beyond
that,
they
could
get
placement
on
local
television
stations,
placement
in
movies,
extend
their
usage
of
restaurants,
insure
strong
advertising
of
major
games
(like
RM
vs.
FC
Barcelona)
on
the
major
sports
networks,
create
a
huge
online
system
filled
with
really
high-­‐quality
training
and
skill
videos
and
market
the
system
internationally,
sponsorships,
amongst
other
things.
2. Age-­‐related
segments:
a. Children
i. Follow
the
Manchester
United
approach
and
sell
products
(e.g.
toys,
bedding,
shoes,
backpacks)
that
are
catered
to
children.
In
addition,
they
can
create
cartoons
(as
McDonald’s
is
famous
for
doing),
get
their
stars
placement
in
very
popular
kid’s
shows,
soccer
camps,
youth
competitions,
as
well
as
deep
ticket
discounts
for
young
children
to
encourage
parents
to
bring
them,
etc.
b. Teenagers
i. They
can
do
much
of
what
they
would
do
for
children,
just
targeted
to
an
older
segment.
c. Adults
i. Very
high-­‐quality
and
expensive
apparel,
further
expansion
of
fan
clubs
with
strong
incentives,
half-­‐time
competitions,
etc.
3. Members
(Socios):
a. Paying
(Abonados)
i. They
should
first
create
multiple-­‐tiers
of
paying
members.
Paying
members
are
undoubtedly
more
loyal
as
people
tend
to
want
to
“get
what
they
pay
for”.
However,
paying
members
currently
receive
rights
to
go
to
every
game,
discounts
on
seats,
and
a
right
to
vote
in
elections.
This
seems
like
it
comes
with

7.
Ross
Simons
Final
Exam
a
high
dues
cost.
Through
offering
multiple
tiers,
you
can
maintain
exclusivity
of
upper
tiers
while
being
more
accessible.
Second,
they
should
create
more
non-­‐
match
day
opportunities
as
match
day
ticket
sales
account
for
just
a
portion
of
revenue.
Potential
ideas:
hold
events
in
the
stadium
on
non-­‐match
days
that
only
members
are
invited
to,
offer
meet
and
greet
sessions
with
the
stars,
ability
to
vote
on
merchandise
designs,
member-­‐related
apparel
(i.e.
member’s
jackets)
to
heighten
the
self-­‐expressive
benefits,
etc.
ii. Non-­‐paying
(non-­‐abonados):
I
foresee
the
biggest
growth
potential
for
this
segment
is
international.
Through
the
implementation
of
really
great
fan
clubs
that
inspire
people
to
join,
they
can
heighten
the
camaraderie
and
belonging
benefits
associated.
Registered
socios
abonados
would
get
special
information
and
rights
to
the
best
fan
clubs
4. Fans
(non
socios):
a. People
who
list
the
team
as
their
favorite
but
are
not
members
of
the
club:
i. The
best
way
to
go
after
this
segment
is
to
continue
to
improve,
win
championships,
and
expanding
into
other
channels.
1D.)
New
Brand
Personality
Statement:
“Real
Madrid
is
a
big-­‐time
team
from
a
humble
beginning,
started
by
a
few
Spanish
soccer
fans
in
1902.
It’s
remained
member-­‐owned
as
it’s
grown
to
one
of
the
most
successful
teams
in
history
through
its
talent
acquisition
and
willpower.
Ever
on
the
rise,
we
continue
to
attract
the
highest-­‐level
players
to
insure
that
we
remain
competitive
for
our
huge
fan
community
that’s
comprised
from
all
over
the
world,
all
united
by
their
support
of
Real
Madrid.”
Risks:
It
could
be
a
brand
positioning
statement
could
emphasize
the
soccer
team
aspect
of
the
club
entirely
too
much
and
limit
expansion
potential.
The
threat
of
new,
very
rich
team
owners
that
are
willing
to
pay
exorbitant
amounts
of
money
to
headhunt
talent
from
other
teams
could
drive
up
the
salary
costs
for
talent
and
limit
the
talent
pool
available
for
Real
Madrid
and
other
teams.

8.
Ross
Simons
Final
Exam
2A.)
In
the
two
articles
given
in
the
exhibits,
I
believe
it
is
nearly
impossible
to
claim
that
no
one
loses
in
the
scenarios
presented.
As
a
matter
of
fact,
when
reading
the
first
article,
I
couldn’t
believe
that
Versace
really
sold
their
brand
through
H&M;
I
was
dumbfounded.
Personally
I
love
H&M;
it
is
probably
my
favorite
clothing
retailer.
Though
American
Eagle
has
a
higher
market
share
of
my
closet,
H&M
is
undoubtedly
my
favorite
consumer
brand,
even
if
I
do
not
buy
most
of
my
wardrobe
there.
This
is
primarily
because
of
its
aspirational
nature.
H&M,
for
me—and
im
sure
many
others—represents
accessible
high
fashion.
There’s
something
about
going
there,
seeing
the
well-­‐dressed
mannequins
with
their
perfectly
fitted
dress
shirts
and
skinny
ties,
pants
that
fit
around
the
thigh
tight,
and
yet
lightly,
and
falling
just
at
the
top
of
the
shoe.
You
step
into
H&M,
and
the
clothing
catches
your
eye
all
around,
and
not
only
makes
you
feel
like
this
is
a
store
that
represents
high
fashion
at
its
core,
but
when
looking
at
the
prices
you’re
inspired
that
dressing
nice
is
not
only
for
the
people
with
a
lot
of
money.
When
looking
at
the
Versace
deal
from
H&M’s
perspective,
it
was
a
fantastic
idea.
To
sell
an
accessible
line
of
Versace
through
its
store
fits
with
its
CVP
and
identity
to
the
core.
They
were
undoubtedly
able
to
build
some
excitement
behind
the
brand
with
this
move,
and
I
hope
they
continue
pursuing
such
strategies
while
the
economy
is
still
weak
and
designers
are
willing
to
consider
it.
If
they
can,
I
expect
their
brand
value
to
continue
going
up
the
Interbrand
rankings.
Versace’s
decision
on
the
other
hand
is…dumb.
That
is
the
most
direct
way
to
say
it.
I’m
sure
there
was
some
logic
behind
the
decision:
I
expect
they
wanted
to
prop
up
their
margins
in
a
weak
economy,
as
well
as
try
to
attract
new
customers
that
would
continue
buying
Versace
at
full
price
afterwards.
However,
they
undoubtedly
ran
their
white
gloves
through
the
mud
and
muck.
The
first
of
Versace’s
transgressions
is
selling
through
H&M
in
the
first
place.
Like
I
said
before,
the
key
emotional
benefit
of
H&M
is
that
it’s
aspirational.
I
believe
one
of
the
key
self-­‐expressive
benefits
is
“I
am
a
snazzy
dresser,
even
if
I
cannot
afford
designer
labels.
I
know
how
to
dress,
and
I’ll
make
sure
I
dress
well
even
if
I
spend
little
money.”
This
does
not
mesh
with
Versace’s
customers
who
do
not
care
that
much
about
value.
The
second
transgression
is
that
many
of
these
customers
that
purchased
the
items
are
not
current,
nor
future
customers
as
they
intend
to
take
the
items
and
proceed
to
sell
them
on
eBay,
an
auction
site,
for
higher
prices
(though
probably
lower
than
Versace
prices
overall).
Therefore,
Versace
did
not
actually
receive
many
new
customers
through
this
line
of
clothing.
A
quick
look
over
at
eBay
reveals
a
pair
of
Versace
for
H&M
skinny
jeans
selling
for
a
little
over
$80
and
dresses
selling
for
~$250.
Those
are
Abercrombie
and
Fitch
(jeans)
and
Banana
Republic
(dresses)
prices.
The
last
transgression
is
that
as
a
retailer
brand,
they
put
a
potential
wedge
in
future
negotiations
with
retailers.
Retailers
such
as
Saks
or
Neiman
Marcus
will
be
concerned
about
the
cheapening
of
the
brand,
as
well
as
the
prices
they
are
being
charged
to
sell
Versace
items.
Versace
potentially
set
a
bad
precedent
as
retailers
in
the
future
will
call
for
lower
prices
on
Versace-­‐branded

9.
Ross
Simons
Final
Exam
items
or
refuse
to
sell
them
at
all
if
they
are
really
concerned
about
consumer
perceptions
about
the
brand.
They
really
put
their
future
negotiations
with
retailers
at
risk
with
this
move.
To
some
extent,
I
think
the
retailer
brand
Missoni
made
an
even
bigger
mistake.
The
differences
between
Target
and
Wal-­‐mart
are
similar
to
the
BC’s
of
Massachusetts:
Babson
College
and
Boston
College.
Yeah,
one
is
a
little
better
(though
I
will
not
say
which),
but
overall
it’s
about
the
same
in
quality
level.
Further,
the
consumer
who
shops
at
Target
is
most
likely
much
more
mass-­‐market
than
an
avid
H&M
shopper.
The
fact
that
Missoni
sold
in
a
channel
in
which
you
can
place
their
items
into
a
big
red
shopping
cart,
along
with
Skechers
shoes,
a
pound
of
Bacon,
and
motor
oil
reveals
the
error
of
its
decision.
Target,
a
consumer
brand,
is
a
winner
even
if
it
did
meet
operational
issues.
It
was
a
pretty
big
retail
day
I
presume,
with
a
large
contribution
to
revenue.
Further,
Target
got
a
lot
of
buzz
even
from
celebrities.
The
one
risk
I
see
with
Target
continuing
to
pursue
a
strategy
is
that
they
may
raise
consumer
expectations
about
what
quality
of
clothing
they
expect
from
the
brand
and
may
find
they
are
unable
to
meet
expectations.
2B.)
The
key
takeaway
from
the
WSJ
article
on
AdSpend
is
that
brands
are
decreasing
spending
in
a
bid
to
increase
the
bottom
line.
This
is
a
mistake
on
numerous
fronts.
The
first
is
that
while
it
is
nice
to
have
short-­‐term
profits,
perhaps
to
prop
up
your
share
price,
it
is
at
the
sacrifice
of
long-­‐term
market
share
and
success
for
shareholders.
By
lowering
adspend,
they
risk
decreasing
sales
as
consumers
must
really
limit
the
breadth
of
their
purchases.
In
addition,
brands
who
conform
to
the
predictions
in
the
article
are
subject
to
two
other
issues
in
regards
to
the
Shroer
Model.
The
Shroer
model
explains
that
in
order
to
gain
market
share,
you
must
ad
spend
at
a
20-­‐30%
premium
to
the
companies
with
higher
market
share
for
an
extended
period
of
time—a
minimum
of
about
18
months.
The
first
issue
they
have
is
that
they
limit
their
ability
to
gain
market
share.
When
the
economy
is
in
a
recession,
a
company
should
actually
spend
more
in
advertising
based
on
Shroer’s
model
combined
with
game
theory.
One
can
expect,
as
history
as
shown,
for
many
brands
to
decrease
their
spending
as
a
response
to
a
slow
economy.
Understanding
that
this
will
happen,
a
company
should
increase
their
spending
to
maintain
a
premium
as
other
competitor’s
decrease
their
spending.
If
they
can
maintain
this
spending
level
for
at
least
18
months,
they
can
see
high
gains
in
revenue
as
well
as
market
share.
The
second
issue
is
that
by
decreasing
their
spending
during
a
recession,
they
put
themselves
at
risk
to
other
brands
who
understand
the
Shroer
model
and
aggressively
outspend
the
brand,
resulting
in
a
lower
market
share
for
the
brand
that
decreased
spending.
Brands
have
a
lot
to
gain
from
spending
during
a
recession
and
it
is
probably
the
optimal
time
to
gain
market
share
as
decreased
ad
spending
from
competitor’s
is
expected.
The
brands
that
conform
to
the
predictions
in
the
article
are
not
leveraging
the
shroer
model
to
increase
their
market
share
as
they
should
be
doing.

10.
Ross
Simons
Final
Exam
2C.)
In
the
case
of
Skippy
Peanut
Butter,
utilizing
DSS
tools
would
be
very
helpful
to
find
out
what
is
causing
the
slide.
The
first
thing
I
would
use
is
the
Trial-­‐Repeat
Model,
a
predictive
and
diagnostic
tool
to
begin
diagnosing
Skippy’s
problems.
This
would
be
primarily
useful
because
you
see
at
exactly
what
point
in
the
B2C
relationship
it
begins
to
break
down.
For
example:
Is
there
a
low
distribution
percentage?
Meaning
you
aren’t
getting
Skippy
in
the
stores
that
Skippy’s
consumers
are
shopping
at
(though
for
a
large,
successful
brand,
I
do
not
expect
there
to
be
major
distribution
issues
that
went
unnoticed).
Is
there
low
awareness?
Are
you
not
advertising
enough
to
drive
consumer
recall
of
the
brand
name,
and
thus
you
should
begin
advertising
more
in
an
effort
to
increase
awareness.
Are
consumers
just
not
trying
the
brand?
Is
it
priced
to
high?
Is
it
not
at
good
eyesight
levels
on
store
shelves?
In
that
case,
you
should
consider
increasing
trade
allowances
to
get
favorable
shelving,
as
well
as
promotion
devices
such
as
on-­‐pack
premiums
(such
as
a
small
jar
of
jelly).
Are
you
not
receiving
repeat
customers
after
trial?
Well
then
you
should
consider
utilizing
repeat-­‐
generating
promotional
devices
such
as
bonus
packs
or
coupon
plans.
An
effective
usage
of
the
Trial-­‐
Repeat
model
would
allow
Skippy
to
diagnose
at
which
point
from
awareness,
distribution,
trial,
and
repeat
that
they
are
weak
on,
and
they
should
be
able
to
meet
success
by
creating
solutions
that
overcome
those
weaknesses.
I
would
also
utilize
conjoint
analysis
to
understand
what
values
consumers
place
on
the
attributes
of
Skippy
Peanut
Butter
(i.e.
fat
content,
taste,
brand
name,
caloric
content,
price,
size,
crunchy
vs.
smooth,
etc.).
Using
conjoint
analysis,
you
may
find
that
even
though
Skippy
Peanut
Butter
is
perceived
to
be
a
quality
peanut
butter
in
the
marketplace
by
consumers,
consumers
are
beginning
to
prefer
to
buy
healthier
foods
with
a
lower
fat
content
for
themselves
and
their
children.
With
this
knowledge,
you
could
emphasize
the
benefits
of
polyunsaturated
fats
vs.
saturated
fats
in
an
“All
fats
are
not
created
equal,
don’t
skip
out
on
Skippy”
ad
campaign.
The
above
is
but
one
example
of
a
problem
and
solution
that
could
be
identified
using
conjoint
analysis
to
get
at
consumer
preferences
as
opposed
to
just
consumer
perceptions
and
when
coupled
with
the
Trial-­‐Repeat
Model
should
result
in
a
gain
of
market
share.
3A.)
Based
on
my
knowledge
of
Brand
Management,
I
advise
that
Saucony
does
not
create
a
brand
extension,
nor
should
it
create
a
new
brand.
They
certainly
should
not
create
a
new
brand.
First
and
foremost,
creating
a
new
brand
typically
requires
the
potential
brand
to
be
a
big
idea
in
a
big
category
(though
niche
brands
can
certainly
operate
as
a
big
idea
in
a
small
category).
Were
this
a
truly
innovative
idea
(but
it’d
have
to
be
new
technology
that
represents
a
fantastic
leap
forward
from
the
competitors),
it
would
make
sense
to
introduce
a
new
brand
as
it
would
not
limit
the
opportunity
for
the
new
product
to
maximize
it’s
potential.
In
addition,
the
brand’s
success
would
create
a
new
beachhead
which
could
then
be
subject
to
brand
extensions.
It’s
a
big
category,
with
brands
from
Mizuno
to
Nike
that
operate
in
the
volleyball
segment
of
the
footwear
market.
However
it
is
not
a
big
idea
as
I
would
suspect
brands
typically
introduce
newer
versions
of
shoes
that
are
lighter,
with
better

11.
Ross
Simons
Final
Exam
traction,
and
better
cushioning
properties.
With
this
in
mind,
as
well
as
the
costs
associated
with
a
new
brand
launch
(typically
3X
times
the
price
of
a
brand
extension),
it
would
be
a
mistake
to
introduce
it
as
a
new
brand.
Introducing
it
as
a
brand
extension
would
be
a
mistake
as
well.
From
our
discussions
in
class,
it
seems
as
if
the
strategy
decision
chosen
by
Saucony
was
just
to
focus
on
the
running
segment,
using
a
Rie’s
approach.
A
quick
look
at
the
website
of
Saucony
confirms
this
assertion
(besides
the
walking
shoes
portion).
This
is
a
good
decision
as
Saucony
operates
in
a
niche,
and
would
do
well
to
focus
and
reach
further
success
in
the
high-­‐performance
running
niche.
As
other
competitors
enter
the
niche
market
Saucony
operates
in
(ex.
Vibram
Five
Fingers),
they
should
insure
they
have
the
resources
to
retain/gain
market
share.
A
brand
extension
would
be
a
mistake
as
it
would
spread
the
resources
thin
of
a
company
that
already
does
not
have
a
large
marketing
budget.
Further,
a
brand
extensions
has
the
potential
of
harming
the
masterbrand.
In
the
case
of
Saucony,
they
are
somewhat
in
a
brand
image
trap,
but
for
better
not
for
worse.
An
extension
of
Saucony
to
volleyball
shoes
would
likely
be
unsuccessful,
harm
the
masterbrand’s
associations,
as
well
as
potentially
lead
to
a
path
in
which
the
brand
extends
even
further,
becoming
distracted
and
losing
a
lot
of
brand
value
in
the
process.
3B.)
The
case
that
best
illustrates
the
“Silver
Bullet”
strategy
would
be
Diesel.
Diesel
had
a
lot
of
issues
it
wanted
to
resolve:
the
biggest
issue
is
that
it’s
consumers
still
had
the
Diesel
Identity
(edgy,
irreverence,
creative,
and
trendy)
but
they
were
older
and
more
sophisticated.
It
also
did
not
have
products
to
reach
the
new
emerging
high-­‐end
casual
wear
market
and
did
not
believe
that
Diesel
alone
could
reach
those
customers.
In
addition,
it
was
concerned
that
if
the
older
customers
were
to
still
wear
Diesel,
it
would
increase
the
diffusion
of
the
brand
taking
away
Diesel’s
exclusiveness,
prestige
and
take
away
the
youthful
image
of
the
brand.
And
last,
but
not
least,
Renzo
was
concerned
that
his
designers’
creativity
was
being
stifled
by
the
overall
mainstream
nature
of
the
Diesel
Brand.
With
that,
Diesel
created
a
single
brand,
StyleLab,
meant
to
go
after
all
of
those.
It
was
to
be
a
more
expensive
brand
of
casual
wear
that
would
appeal
to
customers
who
wanted
refinement,
exclusivity
and
most
of
all,
innovation.
The
designers
would
be
able
to
flex
their
creative
muscles
with
their
designs
and
use
innovative
materials
such
as
thin
metal
mesh.
The
price
point
would
create
exclusivity
(an
expected
$150
for
a
pair
of
casual
pants).
Successful
designs
would
also
trickle
down
to
the
Diesel
brand
in
some
shape
or
form.
This
was
to
be
effective
because
it
allowed
it’s
designers
to
be
happy
through
creation
of
products
that
were
attractive
to
customers
who
were
trendy,
and
wanted
cutting
edge
fashion
and
were
willing
to
pay
for
it.
The
new
brand
would
lower
the
diffusion
of
D-­‐diesel,
and
as
StyleLab
designs
made
their
way
to
Diesel
it
would
allow
Diesel
to
continue
to
be
trendy
and
have
prestige.
It
was
a
silver
bullet
strategy
that
would’ve
worked
had
it
been
introduced
as
a
new
brand
and
not
a
brand
extension
as
up-­‐market
stretches
are
rare.

12.
Ross
Simons
Final
Exam
3C.)
Having
done
a
quick
look
at
Drambuie
online,
it
looks
like
one
of
the
primary
concerns
with
Drambuie
was
that
its
customers
were
dying
off
<
http://video.forbes.com/fvn/cmo/drambuie-­‐for-­‐a-­‐
younger-­‐crowd>.
Of
the
customers
still
alive,
they
are
the
grandmothers
and
grandfathers
of
the
world,
with
Drambuie
on
the
shelf
next
to
their
denture
adhesive.
This
shrinking
customer
base
represented
a
key
risk
for
Drambuie.
To
offset
this,
it
needed
to
appeal
to
a
younger
generation.
The
attempt
to
appeal
to
a
younger
generation
is
what
you
see
in
the
advertisement.
“There
are
after
dinner
drinks”
is
put
at
the
top
because
after-­‐dinner
drinks
are
not
really
young
and
exciting;
it’s
a
very
traditional
and
old-­‐fashioned
idea.
You
see
a
person,
one
can
assume
an
older
person,
out
on
the
still
water,
sun
setting,
and
probably
after
a
full
day
of
fishing.
On
the
bottom
part
of
the
advertisement,
you
see
a
much
more
exciting
advertisement.
The
water
is
at
full
churn,
you
can
clearly
make
out
the
young
people’s
faces
in
the
image,
they’re
doing
a
very
exciting
activity,
a
lot
of
intensity,
and
they
look
like
they’re
having
a
lot
of
fun.
Even
more
so,
the
activity
isn’t
standard—not
a
lot
of
people
do
it—and
it’s
truly
an
experience
and
the
imagery
on
the
bottom
is
meant
to
contrast
starkly
with
the
imagery
on
top.
The
ad
is
most
conducive
to
an
analysis
with
Aaker’s
Brand
Personality
concept
as
there’s
not
quite
enough
information
in
the
ad
to
perform
a
high-­‐quality
Gestalt
Model
that’s
mutually
consistent
between
both
the
thinking
and
feeling
based
thoughts.
Aaker
says
that
Brand
Personality
is
“a
set
of
human
characteristics
associated
with
a
given
brand”.
Jennifer
Aaker
argues
that
this
can
be
further
broken
down
into
five
key
human
characteristics:
sincerity,
excitement,
competence,
sophistication,
and
ruggedness.
While
Drambuie
used
to
have
the
traits
of
Sincerity
and
Competence,
it’s
clear
that
they
are
aggressively
moving
away
from
that
based
on
this
advertisement.
The
key
trait
they
are
putting
forth
is
excitement
as
evidenced
by
their
new
exciting,
flashy,
and
adventurous
depictions
in
this
ad.
The
other
key
characteristic
they’re
putting
forth
is
ruggedness,
as
it’s
male-­‐dominated,
athletic,
and
very
outdoorsy.
5.)
Green
Bay’s
Hottest
Stock
–
Wall
Street
Journal
<
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204903804577082524238902912.html>
There
are
few
cases
that
I
believe
are
quite
as
intriguing
to
analyze
from
a
brand
management
perspective
as
the
Green
Bay
Packers
stock.
As
one
of
the
few
publicly-­‐owned
sports
franchises
in
the
world,
it
has
recently
began
its
fourth
stock
offering
in
its
92
year
existence.
It
is
an
interesting
case
to
look
at
as
public
ownership
of
Green
Bay
has
little
financial
incentive;
you
do
not
receive
dividends,
the
stock
never
appreciates
in
value,
and
it
is
not
traded.
As
financial
investments
go,
it
is
one
of
the
worst.
And
yet,
they
have
no
problem
selling
the
shares.
The
team
had
sold
$43
million
worth
as
of
~9:00
a.m.

13.
Ross
Simons
Final
Exam
on
December
9th,
just
since
going
on
sale
Tuesday.
There
are
a
couple
reasons
why
this
case
is
particularly
interesting:
1.) It
seems
to
refute
many
of
the
traditional
models
that
discuss
price.
Kopp
in
particular
emphasizes
that
a
CVP
is
comprised
of
Functional
+
Emotional
+
Self-­‐Expressive
Benefits
+
Value.
However,
Green
Bay
stock
with
virtually
zero
functional
benefits,
wouldn’t
seem
to
have
much
value
vs.
benefits.
This
is
especially
true
as
the
number
of
shares
an
individual
owns
increases.
When
a
person
owns
one
share,
you
could
possibly
have
a
balanced
CVP
as
they
can
be
given
as
gifts,
the
Green
Bay
Packers
do
have
emotional
and
self-­‐expressive
benefits
that
you
would
be
purchasing
through
ownership,
and
you
do
have
minor
voting
privileges
at
the
annual
meeting.
However,
regardless
of
if
you
own
two
shares,
or
three
shares,
or
200,000
shares
(the
limit
for
shareholders
to
own),
you
do
not
have
any
special
voting
privileges.
You
do
not
necessarily
gain
rising
benefits
as
your
purchase
costs
rise.
You
get
the
same
amount
of
benefits
for
one
share
as
you
do
for
100,
and
yet
people
will
still
buy
more
than
one
share.
For
that
reason,
it
provides
an
exception
to
any
model
that
emphasizes
a
balance
between
benefits
(functional,
emotional,
self-­‐expressive)
and
cost.
2.) It
is
a
product
that
has
zero
functional
benefits,
possibly
other
than
gifting,
and
even
then
the
person
who
receives
the
gift
gets
very
little
functional
benefits.
It
is
a
product
that
takes
the
idea
of
a
balanced
CVP
and
disregards
it,
only
offering
emotional
and
self-­‐expressive
benefits
solely.
The
Green
Bay
Packers
have
a
core
identity
of
what
I
believe
to
be
Heritage,
Winning,
Competitive
Spirit,
and
12th
Man
(referring
to
the
fans
participation
in
the
franchise).
People
who
purchase
the
stock
are
paying
to
own
a
team
they
may
have
grown
up
watching
with
their
family,
that
they
watch
every
Sunday,
that
embodies
toughness
and
willpower
having
won
many,
many
games
in
the
mid-­‐1960’s
without
stars,
only
a
team
(much
like
the
Patriots
first
Super
Bowl
win
of
the
21st
century)
that
stuck
together
and
fought
it
out
to
win,
win,
and
then
win
some
more.
People
who
purchase
them
can
feel
as
if
they
are
a
part
of
something
bigger,
as
if
they
are
winners
themselves.
It
is
a
product
that
is
propped
up
entirely
on
its
emotional
and
self-­‐expressive
benefits.
Under
the
same
line
of
thinking,
it’s
a
fantastically
successful
product
being
sold
that
operates
primarily
on
the
top
rung
of
the
Emotional
Ladder
(i.e.
values:
pride,
belonging,
ownership,
and
winning
for
GB).
For
that
reason,
it
takes
an
untraditional
top-­‐down
approach
to
the
emotional
ladder.
I
picked
this
particular
story
because
I
know
that
many
people
will
talk
about
how
Olive
Garden
has
had
their
share
of
hardships
and
why
they
think
that
may
be,
or
they
may
talk
about
how
Olympus
(camera)
recently
had
a
multi-­‐decade
investment
scandal,
or
other
things.
The
underlying
theme
with
writings
such
as
those
is
that
they
continue
to
support
the
models.
With
the
Green
Bay
example,
it
provides
what
looks
to
be
a
very
rare
exception
to
those
models
that
have
an
emphasis
on
functional
benefits
and
value.

14.
Ross
Simons
Final
Exam
6.)
For
New
Idea
Confectioners
I
recommend
that
they
go
forward
with
the
“Fluffernutter”
brand
name
for
their
new
candy.
The
research
performed
by
the
New
Idea
Company
and
others
have
concluded
that
in
the
marketplace
the
candy
tests
very
well
across
many
different
age
demographics.
As
they
have
a
quality
product,
they
are
at
risk
of
not
succeeding
through
a
lack
of
awareness
about
the
product.
By
using
the
Fluffernutter
brand
name,
consumers
immediately
understand
what
they
can
expect
the
candy
to
taste
like,
and
using
the
name
Fluffernutter
will
have
nostalgic
properties
dating
back
to
the
1960’s.
As
many
consumers
have
strong,
ingrained
associations
with
the
name,
they
can
use
this
form
of
Judo
Brand
Diversion
to
piggyback
off
of
those
associations.
Upon
research,
we
found
that
“Fluffernutter”
is
a
registered
trademark
of
Durkee-­‐Mower,
Inc.
who
is
the
manufacturer
of
the
most
popular
brand
of
fluff
in
the
marketplace,
simply
branded
“Marshmallow
Fluff”.
However,
this
should
not
be
something
to
be
concerned
about.
If
they
sue
the
company,
they
will
gain
a
lot
of
awareness,
particularly
as
I
expect
many
people
and
news
outlets
to
be
surprised
that
the
term
is
actually
trademarked.
This
will
undoubtedly
result
in
a
slew
of
news
stories
that
will
provide
free
marketing
and
awareness
to
the
brand.
In
addition,
a
potential
lawsuit
is
defeatable.
First,
trademarks
are
subject
to
becoming
generic
terms
for
society
which
negates
their
legal
protection.
There
are
plenty
of
examples
of
this
happening:
Aspirin,
Dry
Ice,
Escalator,
Thermos,
Yo-­‐Yo
and
even
Webster’s
Dictionary.
As
the
trademark
for
Fluffernutter
(serial number 75175400) was
registered
just
in1998,
years
after
Fluffernutter
was
a
generic
term
to
describe
a
sandwich
comprised
of
peanut
butter
and
marshmallow
fluff.
In
addition,
the
trademark
is
only
for
“printed
recipes
sold
as
a
component
of
food
packaging
and
cookbooks”
while
they
will
be
selling
candy,
far
from
what
the
trademark
entails.
The
company
may
not
even
take
it
to
court
as
it
could
be
cost-­‐prohibitive
for
a
small
northeastern
company
that
has
somewhat
of
a
weak
case
for
the
trademark.
If
they
do
plan
to
pursue
it
all
the
way
to
court,
you
could
simply
change
the
name
to
something
like
“Fluffenbutter”
and
take
the
awareness
gained
and
move
on.
In
addition,
as
a
candy
company
introducing
a
new
brand,
it
is
likely
that
they
will
take
a
House
of
Brands
approach.
Though
Judo
Brand
Diversion
often
neglects
the
white
glove
approach,
the
brand
harm
is
minimized
with
a
house
of
brands
strategy
as
its
simple
enough
to
drop
the
brand
and
introduce
a
different
one.
Though
there
are
risks,
the
benefits
of
leveraging
the
generic
term
fluffernutter
as
a
brand
name
outweighs
the
potential
risks.