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Criticality – Mil-Std-1629 Approach


                            CRITICALITY is a measure of the frequency of
                            occurrence of an effect.
                            – May be based on qualitative judgement or
                            – May be based on failure rate data (most common)




http://www.fmea-fmeca-com                                                 Criticality Analysis
                                                  Slide 1
Criticality Analysis

                            Qualitative analysis:
                            – Used when specific part or item failure rates are not
                              available.

                            Quantitative analysis:
                            – Used when sufficient failure rate data is available to
                              calculate criticality numbers.




http://www.fmea-fmeca-com                                                      Criticality Analysis
                                                    Slide 2
Qualitative Approach
                            Because failure rate data is not available, failure mode
                            ratios and failure mode probability are not used.
                            The probability of occurrence of each failure is grouped
                            into discrete levels that establish the qualitative failure
                            probability level for each entry based on the judgment of
                            the analyst.
                            The failure mode probability levels of occurrence are:
                            – Level A - Frequent
                            – Level B - Reasonably Probable
                            – Level C - Occasional
                            – Level D - Remote
                            – Level E - Extremely Unlikely



http://www.fmea-fmeca-com                                                       Criticality Analysis
                                                     Slide 3
Quantitative Approach


                            Failure Mode Criticality (CM) is the
                            portion of the criticality number for an
                            item, due to one of its failure modes,
                            which results in a particular severity
                            classification (e.g. results in an end
                            effect with severity I, II, etc...).




http://www.fmea-fmeca-com                                              Criticality Analysis
                                              Slide 4
Mil-Std-1629 Severity Levels
                            Category I - Catastrophic: A failure which may cause death
                            or weapon system loss (i.e., aircraft, tank, missile, ship, etc...)
                            Category II - Critical: A failure which may cause severe
                            injury, major property damage, or major system damage which
                            will result in mission loss.
                            Category III - Marginal: A failure which may cause minor
                            injury, minor property damage, or minor system damage which
                            will result in delay or loss of availability or mission degradation.
                            Category IV - Minor: A failure not serious enough to cause
                            injury, property damage or system damage, but which will
                            result in unscheduled maintenance or repair.




http://www.fmea-fmeca-com                                                             Criticality Analysis
                                                        Slide 5
Quantitative Approach

                            The quantitative approach uses the following
                            formula for Failure Mode Criticality:
                                Cm = βαλpt
                            Where Cm = Failure Mode Criticality
                            β = Conditional probability of occurrence of next
                            higher failure effect
                            α = Failure mode ratio
                            λp = Part failure rate
                            T = Duration of applicable mission phase


http://www.fmea-fmeca-com                                              Criticality Analysis
                                                     Slide 6
Criticality Analysis Example
                       A resistor R6 with a failure rate of .01 failures per million hours is located on the
                       Missile Interface Board of the XYZ Missile Launch System. If the resistor fails, it fails
                       open 70 % of the time and short 30 % of the time. If it fails open, the system will be
                       unable to launch a missile 30 % of the time, the missile explodes in the tube 20 % of
                       the time, and there is no effect 50 % of the time. If it fails short, the performance of the
                       missile is degraded 50 % of the time and the missile inadvertently launches 50 % of the
                       time. Mission time is 1 hour.
                       λp = 0.01 in every case
                       α = 0.7 for open
                       β = 0.3 for unable to fire
                       β = 0.2 for missile explodes
                       β = 0.5 for no effect
                       α = 0.3 for short
                       β = 0.5 for missile performance degradation
                       β = 0.5 for inadvertent launch
                       Cm for R6 open resulting in being unable to fire is (.3)(.7)(.01)(1)=0.0021
                       Cm for R6 open resulting in a missile explosion is (.2)(.7)(.01)(1)=0.0014
                       Cm for R6 open resulting in no effect is (.5)(.7)(.01)(1)=0.0035
                       Cm for R6 short resulting in performance degradation is (.5)(.3)(.01)(1)=0.0015
                       Cm for R6 short resulting in inadvertent launch is (.5)(.3)(.01)(1)=0.0015



http://www.fmea-fmeca-com                                                                                Criticality Analysis
                                                                       Slide 7
Quantitative Approach


                            Item Criticality (Cr) is the criticality
                            number associated with the item under
                            analysis. For a mission phase, Cr is the
                            sum of the item’s failure mode
                            criticality numbers, Cm, which result in
                            the same severity classification.




http://www.fmea-fmeca-com                                              Criticality Analysis
                                              Slide 8
Quantitative Approach


                            The quantitative approach uses the following
                            formula for Item Criticality within a particular
                            severity level:


                            Where Cr Item Criticality


                            n = The current failure mode of the item being
                            analyzed
                            j = The number of failure modes for the item
                            being analyzed.
http://www.fmea-fmeca-com                                               Criticality Analysis
                                                 Slide 9
Criticality Analysis Exercise


                            Criticality Analysis:
                            Determine failure mode criticality values
                            and item criticality values for the R9
                            resistor, and create an item criticality
                            matrix.




http://www.fmea-fmeca-com                                           Criticality Analysis
                                               Slide 10
Criticality Analysis Exercise
                            A resistor R9 with a failure rate of .04 failures per million hours
                            is located on the Power Supply Board of the XYZ Missile Launch
                            System. If the resistor fails, it fails open 70 % of the time and
                            short 30 % of the time. If it fails open, the system will be unable
                            to launch a missile 30 % of the time and there is no effect 70 %
                            of the time. If it fails short, the performance of the missile is
                            degraded 100 % of the time. Mission time is 1 hour.
                            λp = __ in every case
                            α = __ for open
                            β = __ for unable to fire
                            β = __ for no effect
                            α = __ for short
                            β = __ for missile performance degradation
                            Cm for R9 open resulting in being unable to fire is ___
                            Cm for R9 open resulting in no effect is ___
                            Cm for R9 short resulting in performance degradation is ___

http://www.fmea-fmeca-com                                                             Criticality Analysis
                                                        Slide 11
Criticality Analysis Exercise




http://www.fmea-fmeca-com                              Criticality Analysis
                                        Slide 12
Criticality Analysis Exercise

                            Item Criticality




                                                   Severity Levels




http://www.fmea-fmeca-com                                            Criticality Analysis
                                               Slide 13
Criticality Analysis - Answers
                            A resistor R9 with a failure rate of .04 failures per million hours
                            is located on the Power Supply Board of the XYZ Missile Launch
                            System. If the resistor fails, it fails open 70 % of the time and
                            short 30 % of the time. If it fails open, the system will be unable
                            to launch a missile 30 % of the time and there is no effect 70 %
                            of the time. If it fails short, the performance of the missile is
                            degraded 100 % of the time. Mission time is 1 hour.
                            λp = 0.04 in every case
                            α = 0.70 for open
                            β = 0.30 for unable to fire
                            β = 0.70 for no effect
                            α = 0.30 for short
                            β = 1.00 for missile performance degradation
                            Cm for R9 open resulting in being unable to fire is 0.0084
                            Cm for R9 open resulting in no effect is 0.0196
                            Cm for R9 short resulting in performance degradation is 0.012

http://www.fmea-fmeca-com                                                                Criticality Analysis
                                                          Slide 14
Criticality Analysis - Answers




http://www.fmea-fmeca-com                               Criticality Analysis
                                        Slide 15
Criticality Analysis - Answers

                            Criticality Number x 10-6




                                                        R9(4)
                                                                   R9(3)

                                                                             R9(2)




                                                                 Severity Levels



http://www.fmea-fmeca-com                                                            Criticality Analysis
                                                                Slide 16

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FMEA Criticality analysis

  • 1. Criticality – Mil-Std-1629 Approach CRITICALITY is a measure of the frequency of occurrence of an effect. – May be based on qualitative judgement or – May be based on failure rate data (most common) http://www.fmea-fmeca-com Criticality Analysis Slide 1
  • 2. Criticality Analysis Qualitative analysis: – Used when specific part or item failure rates are not available. Quantitative analysis: – Used when sufficient failure rate data is available to calculate criticality numbers. http://www.fmea-fmeca-com Criticality Analysis Slide 2
  • 3. Qualitative Approach Because failure rate data is not available, failure mode ratios and failure mode probability are not used. The probability of occurrence of each failure is grouped into discrete levels that establish the qualitative failure probability level for each entry based on the judgment of the analyst. The failure mode probability levels of occurrence are: – Level A - Frequent – Level B - Reasonably Probable – Level C - Occasional – Level D - Remote – Level E - Extremely Unlikely http://www.fmea-fmeca-com Criticality Analysis Slide 3
  • 4. Quantitative Approach Failure Mode Criticality (CM) is the portion of the criticality number for an item, due to one of its failure modes, which results in a particular severity classification (e.g. results in an end effect with severity I, II, etc...). http://www.fmea-fmeca-com Criticality Analysis Slide 4
  • 5. Mil-Std-1629 Severity Levels Category I - Catastrophic: A failure which may cause death or weapon system loss (i.e., aircraft, tank, missile, ship, etc...) Category II - Critical: A failure which may cause severe injury, major property damage, or major system damage which will result in mission loss. Category III - Marginal: A failure which may cause minor injury, minor property damage, or minor system damage which will result in delay or loss of availability or mission degradation. Category IV - Minor: A failure not serious enough to cause injury, property damage or system damage, but which will result in unscheduled maintenance or repair. http://www.fmea-fmeca-com Criticality Analysis Slide 5
  • 6. Quantitative Approach The quantitative approach uses the following formula for Failure Mode Criticality: Cm = βαλpt Where Cm = Failure Mode Criticality β = Conditional probability of occurrence of next higher failure effect α = Failure mode ratio λp = Part failure rate T = Duration of applicable mission phase http://www.fmea-fmeca-com Criticality Analysis Slide 6
  • 7. Criticality Analysis Example A resistor R6 with a failure rate of .01 failures per million hours is located on the Missile Interface Board of the XYZ Missile Launch System. If the resistor fails, it fails open 70 % of the time and short 30 % of the time. If it fails open, the system will be unable to launch a missile 30 % of the time, the missile explodes in the tube 20 % of the time, and there is no effect 50 % of the time. If it fails short, the performance of the missile is degraded 50 % of the time and the missile inadvertently launches 50 % of the time. Mission time is 1 hour. λp = 0.01 in every case α = 0.7 for open β = 0.3 for unable to fire β = 0.2 for missile explodes β = 0.5 for no effect α = 0.3 for short β = 0.5 for missile performance degradation β = 0.5 for inadvertent launch Cm for R6 open resulting in being unable to fire is (.3)(.7)(.01)(1)=0.0021 Cm for R6 open resulting in a missile explosion is (.2)(.7)(.01)(1)=0.0014 Cm for R6 open resulting in no effect is (.5)(.7)(.01)(1)=0.0035 Cm for R6 short resulting in performance degradation is (.5)(.3)(.01)(1)=0.0015 Cm for R6 short resulting in inadvertent launch is (.5)(.3)(.01)(1)=0.0015 http://www.fmea-fmeca-com Criticality Analysis Slide 7
  • 8. Quantitative Approach Item Criticality (Cr) is the criticality number associated with the item under analysis. For a mission phase, Cr is the sum of the item’s failure mode criticality numbers, Cm, which result in the same severity classification. http://www.fmea-fmeca-com Criticality Analysis Slide 8
  • 9. Quantitative Approach The quantitative approach uses the following formula for Item Criticality within a particular severity level: Where Cr Item Criticality n = The current failure mode of the item being analyzed j = The number of failure modes for the item being analyzed. http://www.fmea-fmeca-com Criticality Analysis Slide 9
  • 10. Criticality Analysis Exercise Criticality Analysis: Determine failure mode criticality values and item criticality values for the R9 resistor, and create an item criticality matrix. http://www.fmea-fmeca-com Criticality Analysis Slide 10
  • 11. Criticality Analysis Exercise A resistor R9 with a failure rate of .04 failures per million hours is located on the Power Supply Board of the XYZ Missile Launch System. If the resistor fails, it fails open 70 % of the time and short 30 % of the time. If it fails open, the system will be unable to launch a missile 30 % of the time and there is no effect 70 % of the time. If it fails short, the performance of the missile is degraded 100 % of the time. Mission time is 1 hour. λp = __ in every case α = __ for open β = __ for unable to fire β = __ for no effect α = __ for short β = __ for missile performance degradation Cm for R9 open resulting in being unable to fire is ___ Cm for R9 open resulting in no effect is ___ Cm for R9 short resulting in performance degradation is ___ http://www.fmea-fmeca-com Criticality Analysis Slide 11
  • 13. Criticality Analysis Exercise Item Criticality Severity Levels http://www.fmea-fmeca-com Criticality Analysis Slide 13
  • 14. Criticality Analysis - Answers A resistor R9 with a failure rate of .04 failures per million hours is located on the Power Supply Board of the XYZ Missile Launch System. If the resistor fails, it fails open 70 % of the time and short 30 % of the time. If it fails open, the system will be unable to launch a missile 30 % of the time and there is no effect 70 % of the time. If it fails short, the performance of the missile is degraded 100 % of the time. Mission time is 1 hour. λp = 0.04 in every case α = 0.70 for open β = 0.30 for unable to fire β = 0.70 for no effect α = 0.30 for short β = 1.00 for missile performance degradation Cm for R9 open resulting in being unable to fire is 0.0084 Cm for R9 open resulting in no effect is 0.0196 Cm for R9 short resulting in performance degradation is 0.012 http://www.fmea-fmeca-com Criticality Analysis Slide 14
  • 15. Criticality Analysis - Answers http://www.fmea-fmeca-com Criticality Analysis Slide 15
  • 16. Criticality Analysis - Answers Criticality Number x 10-6 R9(4) R9(3) R9(2) Severity Levels http://www.fmea-fmeca-com Criticality Analysis Slide 16