This document summarizes key concepts from the book "Antifragile" by Nassim Nicholas Taleb. It discusses the difference between systems that are fragile, resilient, and antifragile. Antifragile systems gain from disorder, randomness, stressors and volatility instead of being harmed by them. The document also discusses problems with policies that aim to eliminate volatility and variation, as this can increase fragility and lead to larger crises down the road.

1. ANTIFRAGILE:
THINGS THAT
GAIN FROM
DISORDER
BOOK BY: NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB
NOTES BY: SAMI PAJU
www.mindspace.fi :: www.samipaju.com

2. FRAGILE
RESILIENT / ROBUST
ANTIFRAGILE
THE RESILIENT RESISTS SHOCKS AND STAYS THE SAME. THE
ANTIFRAGILE GETS BETTER. IT DOES NOT JUST TOLERATE UNCERTAINTY
AND RANDOMNESS, IT LOVES IT.
!
ANTIFRAGILITY IS A PROPERTY OF LIVING, ORGANIC (AND COMPLEX)
SYSTEMS.
!
MACHINES ARE HARMED BY LOW-LEVEL STRESSORS (MATERIAL
FATIGUE), ORGANISMS ARE HARMED BY THE ABSENCE OF LOW-LEVEL
STRESSORS (HORMESIS).

3. FRAGILE
RESILIENT / ROBUST
ANTIFRAGILE
DEPRIVING ANTIFRAGILE SYSTEMS OF VOLATILITY, RANDOMNESS, AND
STRESSORS WILL HARM THEM. YET MUCH OF MODERN MANAGEMENT AND
POLICY-MAKING IS FOCUSED ON ELIMINATING VOLATILITY AND
VARIATION. FIRMS BECOME VERY WEAK DURING LONG PERIODS STEADY
PROSPERITY DEVOID OF SETBACKS, AND HIDDEN VULNERABILITIES
ACCUMULATE SILENTLY UNDER THE SURFACE—SO DELAYING CRISES IS
NOT A VERY GOOD IDEA.

4. FRAGILE
RESILIENT / ROBUST
ANTIFRAGILE
WHEN YOU ARE FRAGILE, YOU DEPEND ON THINGS FOLLOWING THE
EXACT PLANNED COURSE, WITH AS LITTLE DEVIATION AS POSSIBLE—FOR
DEVIATIONS ARE MORE HARMFUL THAN HELPFUL. THIS IS WHY THE
FRAGILE NEEDS TO BE VERY PREDICTIVE IN ITS APPROACH, AND,
CONVERSELY, PREDICTIVE SYSTEMS CAUSE FRAGILITY. WHEN YOU WANT
DEVIATIONS, AND YOU DON’T CARE ABOUT THE POSSIBLE DISPERSION OF
OUTCOMES THAT THE FUTURE CAN BRING, SINCE MOST WILL BE
HELPFUL, YOU ARE ANTIFRAGILE.

5. DETECTING FRAGILITY
OF SYSTEMS
ANYTHING THAT HAS MORE UPSIDE THAN DOWNSIDE FROM RANDOM
EVENTS (OR CERTAIN NON-LETHAL SHOCKS) IS ANTIFRAGILE. THE
REVERSE IS FRAGILE.
!
IT IS EASIER TO FIGURE OUT IF SOMETHING IS FRAGILE (I.E. DOES
DOUBLING THE EXPOSURE TO SOMETHING MORE THAN DOUBLE THE
HARM IT WILL CAUSE?) THAN TO PREDICT THE OCCURRENCE OF AN
EVENT THAT MAY HARM IT.
!
YOU CANNOT SAY WITH ANY RELIABILITY THAT A CERTAIN REMOTE
EVENT IS MORE LIKELY THAN ANOTHER, BUT YOU CAN STATE WITH A
LOT MORE CONFIDENCE THAT AN OBJECT OR A STRUCTURE IS MORE
FRAGILE THAN ANOTHER SHOULD A CERTAIN EVENT HAPPEN.

6. BLACK SWAN EVENTS
IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT, WITH SIGNIFICANT IMPACT.
!
ALTHOUGH USUALLY PREDICTED / EXPLAINED AFTERWARDS BY
ANALYSTS…
!
ANTIFRAGILITY TRANSLATES INTO CAPABILITY TO WITHSTAND - AND
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF - BLACK SWAN EVENTS.
!
PERFECT RESILIENCE / ROBUSTNESS IS UNATTAINABLE.

7. THE GREAT TURKEY
PROBLEM
A TURKEY IS FED FOR A THOUSAND DAYS BY A BUTCHER; EVERY DAY
CONFIRMS TO ITS STAFF OF ANALYSTS THAT BUTCHERS LOVE TURKEYS
“WITH INCREASED STATISTICAL CONFIDENCE.” THE BUTCHER WILL KEEP
FEEDING THE TURKEY. AND THEN COMES THE THANKSGIVING. RIGHT
WHEN THE TURKEY’S CONFIDENCE IN THE STATEMENT THAT ‘THE
BUTCHER LOVES TURKEYS’ IS MAXIMAL AND “IT IS VERY QUIET” AND
SOOTHINGLY PREDICTABLE IN THE LIFE OF THE TURKEY.
!
THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE (OF HARM) IS NOT THE EVIDENCE OF
ABSENCE. A MISTAKE THAT IS PREVALENT IN INTELLECTUAL CIRCLES
AND ONE THAT IS GROUNDED IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.

8. THE FRAGILISTA
MEDICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL PLANNING…
!
SOMEONE WHO MAKES YOU ENGAGE IN POLICIES AND ACTIONS IN WHICH
THE BENEFITS ARE SMALL AND VISIBLE, AND THE SIDE-EFFECTS
POTENTIALLY SEVERE AND INVISIBLE.
!
THE POLICY FRAGILISTA WHO MISTAKES ECONOMY FOR A
WASHING MACHINE IN NEED OF CONTINUOUS FIXING BY HIM.
!

9. COMPLEX SYSTEMS
A COMPLEX SYSTEM, CONTRARY TO WHAT PEOPLE BELIEVE, DOES NOT
REQUIRE COMPLICATED SYSTEMS AND REGULATIONS AND INTRICATE
POLICIES. THE SIMPLER, THE BETTER. COMPLICATIONS LEAD TO
MULTIPLICATIVE CHAINS OF UNANTICIPATED EFFECTS. BECAUSE OF
OPACITY (DIFFICULTY TO SEE), INTERVENTION LEADS TO UNFORESEEN
CONSEQUENCES, FOLLOWED BY APOLOGIES ABOUT THE “UNFORESEEN”
ASPECT OF THE CONSEQUENCES, THEN TO ANOTHER INTERVENTION TO
CORRECT THE SECONDARY EFFECTS, LEADING TO AN EXPLOSIVE SERIES
OF BRANCHING “UNFORESEEN” RESPONSES, EACH ONE WORSE THAN THE
PRECEDING ONE.
!
COMPLEX AND COMPLICATED ARE NOT THE SAME THING. COMPLEXITY
MEANS SEVERE INTERDEPENDENCIES WITHIN THE SYSTEM, MAKING IT
HARD TO SEE THE ARROW FROM CAUSE TO CONSEQUENCE.

10. COMPLEX SYSTEMS
THE DISTRIBUTION IS MOVING AWAY FROM 80/20. E.G. 99 % OF
INTERNET TRAFFIC IS TO LESS THAN 1 % OF SITES, 99 % OF BOOK
SALES COME FROM LESS THAN 1 % OF AUTHORS, A SMALL NUMBER OF
HOMELESS PEOPLE COST THE STATES A DISPROPORTIONATE AMOUNT, A
SMALL NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN A CORPORATION CAUSE THE MOST
PROBLEMS, THE SICKEST 10 % OF PATIENTS CONSUME 64 % OF TOTAL
HEALTH CARE COSTS, WHEREAS HALF THE POPULATION ACCOUNTS FOR
LESS THAN 3 % OF THE COSTS.
!
1 % MODIFICATION OF SYSTEMS CAN LOWER FRAGILITY (OR INCREASE
ANTIFRAGILITY) BY ABOUT 99 %—AND ALL IT TAKES IS A FEW STEPS,
OFTEN AT LOW COST, TO MAKE THINGS BETTER AND SAFER.

11. NAIVE
INTERVENTIONISM
WE NAIVELY FRAGILIZE SYSTEMS BY PROTECTING THEM. THE
AVOIDANCE OF SMALL MISTAKES MAKES THE LARGE ONES MORE SEVERE.
!
THE PROBLEM WITH ARTIFICIALLY SUPPRESSED VOLATILITY IS NOT JUST
THAT THE SYSTEM TENDS TO BECOME EXTREMELY FRAGILE; IT IS THAT,
AT THE SAME TIME, IT EXHIBITS NO VISIBLE RISKS, SEEMING TO BE
CALM AND WITH MINIMAL VARIABILITY AS SILENT RISKS ACCUMULATE
BENEATH THE SURFACE. ALTHOUGH THE STATED INTENTION OF
POLITICAL LEADERS AND ECONOMIC POLICY MAKERS IS TO STABILISE
THE SYSTEM BY INHIBITING FLUCTUATIONS, THE RESULT TENDS TO BE
THE OPPOSITE. THESE ARTIFICIALLY CONSTRAINED SYSTEMS BECOME
PRONE TO BLACK SWANS.

13. THE AGENCY PROBLEM
TRANSFER OF FRAGILITY: THE ONE WHO CARRIES FRAGILITY AND RISK
IS NOT THE ONE WHO BENEFITS FROM POTENTIAL PAYOFF.
!
THE SAME ECONOMISTS WHO CAUSED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (AND
PROFITED FROM IT, BEING EXPERT CONSULTANTS), THEN POSTDICTED
THE CRISIS, HAVE THEN BECAME THEORISTS ON WHAT HAPPENED. NO
WONDER WE WILL HAVE LARGER CRISES.
!
CORPORATE MANAGERS HAVE INCENTIVES WITHOUT DISINCENTIVES.
SOMEHOW THESE MANAGERS HAVE BEEN GIVEN FREE OPTIONS BY
INNOCENT SAVERS AND INVESTORS.
!
TAXPAYERS TAKE THE DOWNSIDE, MANAGERS GET THE UPSIDE.

14. THE AGENCY PROBLEM
VOLATILITY BENEFITS MANAGERS SINCE THEY ONLY GET THE PAYOFFS.
THE MORE VARIATIONS, THE BETTER FOR THEM, HENCE THEY ARE
ANTIFRAGILE. CONSIDER:
1) MARKET GOES UP 50 %, THEN GOES BACK DOWN TO ERASE ALL
GAINS.
2) MARKET DOES NOT MOVE AT ALL.
!
VISIBLY, 1) IS MORE PROFITABLE TO THE MANAGERS, WHO CAN CASH IN
THEIR STOCK OPTIONS. WHEREAS THE SOCIETY HAS THE EXACT
OPPOSITE PAYOFF SINCE THEY FINANCE BANKERS AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVES. SOCIETY PAYS FOR THEIR LOSSES BUT GETS NO BONUSES
FROM THEM.

15. THE AGENCY PROBLEM
A SYMMETRY OF FRAGILITY IS NEEDED, AS IN HAMMURABI’S CODE 3800
YEARS AGO: IF A BUILDER BUILDS A HOUSE AND IT COLLAPSES, CAUSING
THE DEATH OF THE OWNER, THE BUILDER SHALL BE PUT TO DEATH. IF IT
CAUSES THE DEATH OF THE SON OF THE OWNER, A SON OF THE BUILDER
SHALL BE PUT TO DEATH ETC…
!
THE ENTIRE IDEA IS THAT THE BUILDER KNOWS A LOT MORE THAN ANY
SAFETY INSPECTOR, PARTICULARLY ABOUT WHAT LIES HIDDEN IN THE
FOUNDATIONS—MAKING IT THE BEST RISK MANAGEMENT RULE EVER.
THE OBJECTIVE IS NOT TO PUNISH RETROSPECTIVELY, BUT TO SAVE
LIVES BY PROVIDING UP-FRONT DISINCENTIVE IN CASE OF HARM TO
OTHERS DURING THE FULFILMENT OF ONE’S PROFESSION.

16. THE AGENCY PROBLEM
EVERY OPINION MAKER NEEDS TO HAVE “SKIN IN THE GAME” IN THE
EVENT OF HARM CAUSED BY RELIANCE ON HIS INFORMATION OF OPINION
(NOT HAVING SUCH PERSONS COME OUT—OF OTHERS FOLLOWING THEIR
ADVICE AND SUFFERING FROM IT—COMPLETELY UNSCATHED).
!
ANYONE PRODUCING A FORECAST OR MAKING AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
NEEDS TO HAVE SOMETHING TO LOSE FROM IT, GIVEN THAT OTHERS
RELY ON THESE FORECASTS.

17. THE AGENCY PROBLEM
FORCING RESEARCHERS TO EAT THEIR OWN COOKING WHENEVER
POSSIBLE WOULD SOLVE A SERIOUS PROBLEM IN SCIENCE: DOES THE
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCHER WHOSE IDEAS ARE APPLICABLE TO THE REAL
WORLD APPLY HIS IDEAS TO HIS DAILY LIFE? IF SO, TAKE HIM
SERIOUSLY. OTHERWISE, IGNORE HIM.

18. THE AGENCY PROBLEM
IT IS PROFOUNDLY UNETHICAL TO TALK WITHOUT DOING, WITHOUT
EXPOSURE TO HARM, WITHOUT HAVING ONE’S SKIN IN THE GAME,
WITHOUT HAVING SOMETHING AT RISK. YOU EXPRESS YOUR OPINION; IT
CAN HURT OTHERS (WHO RELY ON IT), YET YOU INCUR NO LIABILITY. IS
THIS FAIR?
!
1) NEVER GET ON A PLANE IF THE PILOT IS NOT ON BOARD (I.E. DO NOT
FOLLOW THE ADVICE OF OTHERS UNLESS THEY FOLLOW IT FIRST)
!
2) MAKE SURE THERE IS ALSO A COPILOT (BUILD REDUNDANCIES)

19. IATROGENICS
PREVENTABLE HARM RESULTING FROM BIAS TO (OVER)INTERVENE IN
THE NATURAL ORDER OF SYSTEMS.
!
SOMEONE WITH A PERSONAL DOCTOR ON STAFF SHOULD BE
PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO NAIVE INTERVENTIONISM, HENCE
IATROGENICS; DOCTORS NEED TO JUSTIFY THEIR SALARIES AND PROVE
TO THEMSELVES THAT THEY HAVE A MODICUM OF WORK ETHIC,
SOMETHING THAT “DOING NOTHING” DOESN’T SATISFY.
!
WE NEED TO AVOID BEING BLIND TO THE NATURAL ANTIFRAGILITY OF
SYSTEMS, THEIR ABILITY TO TAKE CARE OF THEMSELVES, AND FIGHT
OUR TENDENCY TO HARM AND FRAGILISE THEM BY NOT GIVING THEM A
CHANCE TO DO SO.

20. IATROGENICS
SMALL COMPANIES AND ARTISANS TEND TO SELL US HEALTHY
PRODUCTS, ONES THAT SEEM NATURALLY AND SPONTANEOUSLY NEEDED;
LARGER ONES—INCLUDING PHARMACEUTICAL GIANTS—ARE LIKELY TO
BE IN THE BUSINESS OF PRODUCING WHOLESALE IATROGENICS, TAKING
OUR MONEY, AND THEN, TO ADD INSULT TO INJURY, HIJACKING THE
STATE THANKS TO THEIR ARMY OF LOBBYISTS. FURTHER, ANYTHING
THAT REQUIRES MARKETING APPEARS TO CARRY SUCH SIDE EFFECTS.
!
ANYTHING ONE NEEDS TO MARKET HEAVILY IS NECESSARILY EITHER AN
INFERIOR PRODUCT OR AN EVIL ONE. AND IT IS HIGHLY UNETHICAL TO
PORTRAY SOMETHING IN A MORE FAVOURABLE LIGHT THAN IT ACTUALLY
IS.

21. OPTIONALITY
OPPORTUNISTIC APPROACH WITH SOME LARGE EDGE COMING FROM
ASYMMETRY WITH LARGE BENEFITS AND BENIGN HARM. IT IS A
RATIONAL WAY TO BEHAVE WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE.
!
IT IS SAFER TO DECIDE BASED ON FRAGILITY (RISK/REWARD), NOT
PROBABILITY (CHANCE OF AN OUTCOME).

22. EXPERIMENTATION-
DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT
ERRORS ARE A SOURCE OF INFORMATION. IF EVERY EXPERIMENT
PROVIDES YOU WITH INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT DOES NOT WORK, YOU
START ZOOMING IN ON A SOLUTION—SO EVERY ATTEMPT BECOMES MORE
VALUABLE, MORE LIKE AN EXPENSE THAN AN ERROR. AND OF COURSE
YOU MAKE DISCOVERIES ALONG THE WAY.
!
THE WORLD IS TOO RANDOM AND UNPREDICTABLE TO BASE A POLICY ON
VISIBILITY OF THE FUTURE.
!
THE MORE STUDIES, THE LESS OBVIOUS ELEMENTARY BUT
FUNDAMENTAL THINGS BECOME; ACTIVITY, ON THE OTHER HAND, STRIPS
THINGS TO THEIR SIMPLEST POSSIBLE MODEL.

23. EXPERIMENTATION-
DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT
THE CONCEPT OF SPECIALISATION THAT HAS OBSESSED ECONOMISTS
BLOWS UP COUNTRIES WHEN IMPOSED BY POLICY MAKERS, AS IT MAKES
THE ECONOMIES ERROR-PRONE; BUT IT WORKS WELL WHEN REACHED
PROGRESSIVELY BY EVOLUTIONARY MEANS, WITH THE RIGHT BUFFERS
AND LAYERS OF REDUNDANCIES.

24. ENTREPRENEURSHIP
THE FRAGILITY OF EVERY STARTUP IS NECESSARY FOR THE ECONOMY TO
BE ANTIFRAGILE, AND THAT’S WHAT MAKES, AMONG OTHER THINGS,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP WORK: THE FRAGILITY OF INDIVIDUAL
ENTREPRENEURS AND THEIR NECESSARILY HIGH FAILURE RATE.
!
ENTREPRENEURSHIP CREATES RANDOMNESS AND VOLATILITY TO THE
ECONOMY, WHICH IS A GOOD THING.
!
EXAMPLE: RESTAURANTS ARE FRAGILE; THEY COMPETE WITH EACH
OTHER, BUT THE COLLECTIVE OF LOCAL RESTAURANTS IS ANTIFRAGILE
FOR THAT VERY REASON. HAD RESTAURANTS BEEN INDIVIDUALLY
ROBUST, HENCE IMMORTAL, THE OVERALL BUSINESS WOULD BE EITHER
STAGNANT OR WEAK.

25. ECONOMICS
SUCCESS BRINGS AN ASYMMETRY: YOU NOW HAVE A LOT MORE TO LOSE
THAN TO GAIN (FROM RANDOM EVENTS). YOU ARE HENCE FRAGILE.
!
ECONOMIES OF SCALE IS NOT ENTIRELY BENEFICIAL. IT IS NOT A GOOD
IDEA TO BE LARGE DURING DIFFICULT TIMES.

26. ECONOMICS
ALL (COMPUTATIONAL) SMALL PROBABILITIES TEND TO BE VERY FRAGILE
TO ERRORS, AS A SMALL CHANGE IN THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS
CAN MAKE PROBABILITY RISE DRAMATICALLY, FROM ONE PER MILLION
TO ONE PER HUNDRED. INDEED, A TEN-THOUSAND-FOLD
UNDERESTIMATION.
!
THIS SHOWS US WHERE THE MATH IN ECONOMIC MODELS IS BOGUS, AND
WHICH MODELS ARE FRAGILE AND WHICH ONES ARE NOT. SIMPLY DO A
SMALL CHANGE IN THE ASSUMPTIONS, AND LOOK AT HOW LARGE THE
EFFECT, AND IF THERE IS ACCELERATION OF SUCH EFFECT.
ACCELERATION IMPLIES—AS WITH FANNIE MAE—THAT SOMEONE
RELYING ON THE MODEL BLOWS UP FROM BLACK SWAN EFFECTS.

27. PROJECT
MANAGEMENT
WHEN YOU ADD UNCERTAINTY TO PROJECTS THEY TEND TO COST MORE
AND TAKE LONGER TO COMPLETE. THIS HAS BEEN TRIED TO EXPLAIN BY
“PLANNING FALLACY” BY PSYCHOLOGISTS. HOWEVER, A CENTURY AND
HALF AGO PEOPLE HAD THE SAME BIASES, YET GRAND PROJECTS GOT
COMPLETED IN TIME (E.G. EMPIRE STATE BUILDING, LONDON CRYSTAL
PALACE).
!
A CENTURY AGO THERE WERE NO COMPUTERS, PARTS WERE BUILT NOT
FAR FROM THE SOURCE, WITH A SMALL NUMBER OF BUSINESSES
INVOLVED IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN. IN OTHER WORDS, THERE WAS LESS
COMPLEXITY (AND THEREFORE NON-LINEAR EFFECTS) IN THE SYSTEM.

28. OPTIMISATION
SMOOTH FUNCTIONING AT REGULAR TIMES IS DIFFERENT FROM THE
ROUGH FUNCTIONING AT TIMES OF STRESS. OPTIMISATION REDUCES THE
CAPABILITY OF THE SYSTEM TO WITHSTAND VOLATILITY.
!
THE NOTION OF AVERAGE IS OF NO SIGNIFICANCE WHEN ONE IS FRAGILE
TO VARIATIONS (CONVEXITY EFFECT). E.G. 90 000 CARS FOR AN HOUR
IN A CITY, FOLLOWED BY 110 000 CARS FOR THE NEXT ONE WILL LEAD
TO TRAFFIC JAMS, WHEREAS 100 000 CARS FOR TWO HOURS AND
TRAFFIC WILL BE SMOOTH.

29. BIG DATA
THE MORE FREQUENTLY YOU LOOK AT DATA, THE MORE NOISE YOU ARE
DISPROPORTIONALLY LIKELY TO GET (RATHER THAN THE VALUABLE
PART, CALLED THE SIGNAL); HENCE THE HIGHER THE NOISE-TO-SIGNAL
RATIO.
!
EXAMPLE: YOU FOLLOW A STOCK PRICE AT A YEARLY FREQUENCY, AND
HAVE ONE TO ONE SIGNAL-TO-NOISE RATIO (HALF NOISE, HALF SIGNAL)
—THIS MEANS THAT ABOUT HALF THE CHANGES ARE REAL
IMPROVEMENTS OR DEGRADATIONS, THE OTHER HALF COME FROM
RANDOMNESS. BUT IF YOU LOOK AT THE VERY SAME DATA ON A DAILY
BASIS, THE COMPOSITION WOULD CHANGE TO 95 PERCENT NOISE, 5
PERCENT SIGNAL.

30. SCIENCE
PHENOMENOLOGY (THE OBSERVATION OF AN EMPIRICAL REGULARITY
WITHOUT A VISIBLE THEORY FOR IT) IS ROBUST AND THEORIES ARE
FRAGILE—THEY COME AND GO WHILE PHENOMENOLOGIES STAY. THIS
MAKES THEORIES UNRELIABLE FOR DECISION MAKING (OUTSIDE
PHYSICS).
!
WE KNOW A LOT MORE WHAT IS WRONG THAN WHAT IS RIGHT: NEGATIVE
KNOWLEDGE (WHAT IS WRONG, WHAT DOES NOT WORK) IS MORE ROBUST
TO ERROR THAN POSITIVE KNOWLEDGE (WHAT IS RIGHT, WHAT WORKS).
SO KNOWLEDGE GROWS BY SUBTRACTION MUCH MORE THAN BY
ADDITION—GIVEN THAT WHAT WE KNOW TODAY MIGHT TURN OUT TO BE
WRONG BUT WHAT WE KNOW TO BE WRONG CANNOT TURN OUT TO BE
RIGHT, AT LEAST NOT EASILY.

31. SCIENCE
THE PROBLEM IN DECIDING WHETHER A SCIENTIFIC RESULT OR A NEW
“INNOVATION” IS A BREAKTHROUGH, THAT IS, THE OPPOSITE OF NOISE,
IS THAT ONE NEEDS TO SEE ALL ASPECTS OF THE IDEA—AND THERE IS
ALWAYS SOME OPACITY THAT TIME, AND ONLY TIME, CAN DISSIPATE.
!
TIME CAN ACT AS A CLEANSER OF NOISE BY CONFINING TO ITS
DUSTBINS ALL THESE OVERHYPED WORKS.

32. SCIENCE
SCIENCE IS NOISY. OPEN AN ELEMENTARY TEXTBOOK TO A RANDOM
CHAPTER, AND SEE IF THE IDEA IS STILL RELEVANT. NOW COMPARE
THAT TO PROCEEDINGS OF A RANDOM CONFERENCE THAT TOOK PLACE
FIVE YEARS AGO.
!
ATTENDING BREAKTHROUGH CONFERENCES MIGHT BE, STATISTICALLY
SPEAKING, AS MUCH A WASTE OF TIME AS BUYING A MEDIOCRE LOTTERY
TICKET, ONE WITH A SMALL PAYOFF. THE ODDS OF A PAPER’S BEING
RELEVANT—AND INTERESTING—IN FIVE YEARS IS NO BETTER THAN ONE
IN TEN THOUSAND.

33. SCIENCE
THE NON-NATURAL NEEDS TO PROVE ITS BENEFITS, NOT THE NATURAL:
NATURE IS TO BE CONSIDERED MUCH LESS OF A SUCKER THAN HUMANS.
IN A COMPLEX DOMAIN, ONLY TIME—A LONG TIME—IS EVIDENCE.
!
NO EVIDENCE OF HARM MISTAKEN FOR EVIDENCE OF NO HARM.
NO EVIDENCE OF DISEASE MISTAKEN FOR EVIDENCE OF NO DISEASE.
ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE MISTAKEN FOR EVIDENCE OF ABSENCE.
!
WHAT MOTHER NATURE DOES IS RIGOROUS UNTIL PROVEN OTHERWISE;
WHAT HUMANS AND SCIENCE DO IS FLAWED UNTIL PROVEN OTHERWISE.

34. SCIENCE
POPPER WAS UNDER THE ILLUSION THAT IDEAS COMPETE WITH EACH
OTHER, WITH THE LEAST WRONG SURVIVING AT ANY POINT IN TIME. HE
MISSED THE POINT THAT IT IS NOT IDEAS THAT SURVIVE, BUT PEOPLE
WHO HAVE THE RIGHT ONES, OR SOCIETIES THAT HAVE CORRECT
HEURISTICS, OR THE ONES, RIGHT OR WRONG, THAT LEAD THEM TO DO
THE GOOD THING. HE MISSED THE THALESIAN EFFECT, THE FACT THAT
A WRONG IDEA THAT IS HARMLESS CAN SURVIVE. THOSE WHO HAVE
WRONG HEURISTICS—BUT WITH A SMALL HARM IN THE EVENT OF ERROR
—WILL SURVIVE.
!
WHICH IS MORE DANGEROUS, TO MISTAKE A BEAR FOR A STONE, OR
MISTAKE A STONE FOR A BEAR? THOSE WHO OVERREACT UPON SEEING
WHAT MAY LOOK LIKE A BEAR HAVE HAD A SURVIVAL ADVANTAGE.
THOSE WHO MADE THE OPPOSITE MISTAKE LEFT THE GENE POOL.

35. STATISTICS
NOTHING ON THE PLANET CAN BE AS CLOSE TO “STATISTICALLY
SIGNIFICANT” AS NATURE. OVERRIDING HER REQUIRES SOME VERY
CONVINCING JUSTIFICATION ON OUR PART, RATHER THAN THE REVERSE,
AS IS COMMONLY DONE, AND IT IS VERY HARD TO BEAT HER ON
STATISTICAL GROUNDS.
!
IN THE PAST, MANY FACED THE QUESTION “DO YOU HAVE EVIDENCE
THAT TRANS FAT IS HARMFUL?” AND NEEDED TO PRODUCE PROOFS—
WHICH THEY WERE OBVIOUSLY UNABLE TO DO BECAUSE IT TOOK
DECADES BEFORE THE HARM BECAME APPARENT. SO WHEN THE PRESENT
INHABITANTS OF MOTHER EARTH WANT TO DO SOMETHING COUNTER TO
NATURE, THEY ARE THE ONES THAT NEED TO PRODUCE THE EVIDENCE,
IF THEY CAN.

36. STATISTICS
A CERTAIN DISEASE MIGHT MARGINALLY LOWER YOUR LIFE EXPECTANCY,
BUT CAN BE DEEMED TO DO SO WITH “HIGH STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE,”
PROMPTING PANICS WHEN IN FACT ALL THESE STUDIES MIGHT BE
SAYING IS THEY ESTABLISHED WITH A STATISTICAL MARGIN THAT IN
SOME CASES, SAY 1 %, PATIENTS ARE LIKELY TO BE HARMED BY IT.
THE MAGNITUDE OF THE RESULT, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EFFECT, IS
NOT CAPTURED BY WHAT IS CALLED “STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE”.

37. THE LINDY EFFECT
THINGS THAT HAVE BEEN AROUND FOR A LONG TIME ARE NOT “AGING”
LIKE PERSONS, BUT “AGING” IN REVERSE. EVERY YEAR THAT PASSES
WITHOUT EXTINCTION DOUBLES THE ADDITIONAL LIFE EXPECTANCY. THE
NONPERISHABLE HAS A LIFE EXPECTANCY THAT INCREASES WITH EVERY
DAY IT SURVIVES.
!
THE OLDER THE TECHNOLOGY, NOT ONLY THE LONGER IT IS EXPECTED
TO LAST, BUT THE MORE CERTAINTY CAN BE ATTACHED TO SUCH A
STATEMENT.

38. EDUCATION
DEPARTMENTS NEED TO TEACH SOMETHING SO STUDENTS GET JOBS,
EVEN IF THEY ARE TEACHING SNAKE OIL—THIS GOT US TRAPPED IN A
CIRCULAR SYSTEM IN WHICH EVERYONE KNOWS THAT THE MATERIAL IS
WRONG BUT NOBODY IS FREE ENOUGH OR HAS ENOUGH COURAGE TO DO
ANYTHING ABOUT IT.*
!
!
!
!
!
!
*SEE ‘THE MANAGEMENT MYTH’ BY MATTHEW STEWART

39. SOCIETY
FORMER REGULATORS AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS WHO WERE EMPLOYED BY
THE CITIZENS TO REPRESENT THEIR BEST INTERESTS CAN USE THE
EXPERTISE AND CONTACTS ACQUIRED ON THE JOB TO BENEFIT FROM
GLITCHES IN THE SYSTEM UPON JOINING PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT—LAW
FIRMS, ETC.
!
ANYONE WHO GOES INTO PUBLIC SERVICE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO
SUBSEQUENTLY EARN MORE FROM ANY COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY THAN THE
INCOME OF THE HIGHEST PAID CIVIL SERVANT. IT IS LIKE A VOLUNTARY
CAP (IT WOULD PREVENT PEOPLE FROM USING PUBLIC OFFICE AS A
CREDENTIAL-BUILDING TEMPORARY ACCOMMODATION, THEN GOING TO
WALL STREET TO EARN SEVERAL MILLION DOLLARS). THIS WOULD GET
PRIESTLY PEOPLE INTO OFFICE.

40. IMMORTALITY
TO SURVIVE, AN IMMORTAL ORGANISM WOULD NEED TO BE COMPLETELY
FIT FOR ALL POSSIBLE RANDOM EVENTS THAT CAN TAKE PLACE IN THE
ENVIRONMENT. A RANDOM EVENT DOES NOT ALLOW FOR TIME TO
PREPARE AND MAKE ADJUSTMENTS TO SUSTAIN SHOCKS. FOR AN
IMMORTAL ORGANISM, PRE-ADAPTATION FOR ALL SUCH EVENTS WOULD
BE A NECESSITY. IT IS TOO LATE TO REACT WHEN THE EVENT HAPPENS.
!
BY LETTING ORGANISMS GO ONE LIFESPAN AT A TIME, WITH
EVOLUTIONARY MODIFICATIONS BETWEEN SUCCESSIVE GENERATIONS,
NATURE DOES NOT NEED TO PREDICT FUTURE CONDITIONS.