Treasury and Liquidity Management is like the heart of a bank and if the heart stops beating, the body stops working. This presentation reviews the issues and challenges associated with Islamic Bank Treasury and Liquidity Management by assessing the market conditions, the types of treasury and liquidity instruments available and the challenges that are facing this segment of the Islamic Finance industry that give rise to opportunities for the willing to provide solutions.
8. Dar Al Istithmar’s Shari'a Supervisory Board comprises world renown scholars
9. Dar Al Istithmar won the Euromoney awards for the “Best Islamic Assurance and Advisory Services” for two consecutive years. * Subject to FSA approval. Expected in 2010
10. Islamic Bank Treasury and Liquidity ManagementStatus, Opportunities and ChallengesDr. Sayd Farook Senior Consultant | Structuring and Legal Best Islamic Assurance and Advisory Services - 2006 Best Islamic Advisory House – 2007
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15. Historical Liquidity Position of Islamic BanksInterbank Ratio - Consistent Strength The interbank ratio is calculated by dividing the money lent to other banks by the money borrowed from other bank. If the ratio is greater than 100, then it indicates that the banks are net placers rather than borrower of funds in the market place, and therefore more liquid.
17. Past Present and Future of Islamic Bank Treasury and Liquidity ManagementVision 2.0 2010-2020 Global Islamic Treasury Market Real Time Transactions Exchange traded Profit Rate Swap Islamic Credit Default Takaful 2002-2010 Wakala/Mudaraba Forward Wa’d FX OTC Profit Rate Swap Market players Conventional banks and technology platforms bringing about market makers to trade real-time Bespoke infrastructure for Islamic financial institutions 1975-2001 Interbank Commodity Murabaha Spot FX Market players Entrance of conventional financial institution treasuries with global liquidity and FX capabilities Conventional infrastructure modified to Islamic finance needs Market players Islamic banks transacting with each other Adapt Islamic Finance to existing infrastructure
24. Commodity Murabaha TRADER D TRADER C No collusion is allowed between the brokers (4) A sells commodity to D for spot delivery and spot payment (5) A instructs C to transfer commodity to D (1) B purchases commodity from C for spot delivery and payment BANK A (Requires liquidity) BANK B (Surplus Funds) (2) B sells to A for deferred payment and spot delivery (3) B instructs C to transfer commodity to A’s account with C
25. Salam Interbank Instrument An Alternative to Commodity Murabaha Liquid Bank Liquid Bank promises to sell C for PC ($105), if PC < P90 ($110) Liquid Bank purchases C on Salam basis (P=100) A promises to buy C for PC($104), if PC > P90 ($100) 1 6 2 3 Illiquid Bank delivers C Illiquid Bank promises to buy C for PC ($105), if PC > P90 ($100) 5 Illiquid Bank A 4 A promises to sell C for PC ($106), if PC < P90 ($110) Source: Dar Al Istithmar
28. Short Term Sukuk (STS)Liquidity Management Center Issues Sukuk & receives subscriptions in ST Investment Sukuk Short Term Sukuk (STS) Centre B.S.C. (c) Investors Principal + Return on Sukuk Underlying Sukuk Assets PORTFOLIO OF STS ASSETS (underlying Sukuks, similar Assets and Liquidity Reserve) Source: Liquidity Management Center
46. Islamic Sukuk Liquidity Instrument (ISLI) Financial Institution (FI) requiring liquidity Sale of Sukuk Proceeds of sukuk sale 7 1 6 2 3 Proceeds of sukuk sale Sale of Sukuk Sukuk Purchase Undertaking Sale of Sukuk 4 Independent Trader Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) 5 Proceeds of sukuk sale Cash Tradable Sovereign Sukuk Source: Author’s own
47. CollateralisedMurabaha Central Bank (CB) Sukuk Cash Appoints FI as agent transfers cash to FI FI transfers sukuk pool as collateral to CB FI pays the cash on deferred basis CB returns the sukuk pool to FI Commodity 1 5 7 6 Financial Institution (FI) requiring liquidity Principal Agent for CB FI (as agent for CB) purchases commodity and pays cash spot FI sells commodity and receives cash spot 3 4 2 CB sells commodity to FI for deferred payment with mark-up Commodity Broker B Commodity Broker A Source: Author’s own with guidance from IIFM
49. Listed Investment Trust TREASURY INVESTORS 3 Purchase Shares in Investment Trust Optional:Undertaking to repurchase at face value 1 ISSUING SPV PURCHASING SPV Pro-rata tradable right to usufruct pool 4 2 Asset manager provides periodic yield to investors with incentive fees earned beyond expected rate of return. ASSET POOL ASSET MANAGER Source: Author’s own
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51. Credit balances of clients’ clearing accounts are invested in shares of ABC Clearing Company. The shares are valued on a daily basis by reference to the net asset value.
52. In the event that the shares in ABC Clearing Company fall in value, the Arab Banking Corporation (ABC), as a third party, provides a guarantee that on redemption of the shares, the client will receive an amount equal to the price paid for the shares.
61. Profit Rate Swap a vital tool for IFIs But is it everything? A number of IFIs in the GCC getting their first taste of the complications of PRS. Is this a voluminous market segment? Assumptions Total IF assets: $600 bln Financing/Asset Ratio: 60% Hedging requirements: 50% (conservative) Total market: $180 bln or 1200 transactions (avg size 150 mln) Issues: Transaction costs Legal Costs Shari’a scholar acceptability still not widespread Complications with transaction processing Enforcements of early termination provisions in ‘hostile’ jurisdictions Growing and necessary, but limited market
62. Profit Rate SwapWa’d Application 31 Execute Master Hedging Agreement (T0) Customer requiring variable rate and paying fixed rate Multinational Bank (MB) offering variable rate and receiving fixed rate 1 Undertakings to sell commodity for notional value + fixed rate at each exchange date TX (T0) 2 Undertakings to sell commodity for notional value + variable rate (T0) at each exchange date TX (T0) 3 At each exchange date (TX), sell commodity for notional value + variable rate (Tx) 4 At each exchange date (TX), sell commodity for notional value + fixed rate (Tx) 5 The payments are netted off and one party pays the other the difference between the fixed and floating (Tx) 6
63. Profit Rate SwapMurabaha Application 32 Multinational Bank (MB) as principal offering variable rate and receiving fixed rate First Leg: Provides revolving “variable rate” US100m Murabaha financing every 6 months for 5 years 1 4 Variable Rate Profit + Principal every six months are notionally distributed to MB Customer requiring variable rate and paying fixed rate Net-off: Difference between Variable rate and fixed rate (3-4) are netted off and counterparty pays /receives the difference between variable and fixed 5 Fixed Rate Profit + Principal every six months are notionally distributed to Customer Multinational Bank (MB) as AGENT for Customer 3 2 Second Leg: Invests the funds through “fixed rate” 6 month revolving Murabaha
64. Growth rates of external positions (assets) of banks1999–2008 (%) Source: Bank of International Settlements
65. External positions of banks in countries with Islamic finance presence 1977–2008 (US$bn)
66. Potential for Islamic FX Spot, Forwards and Options Profit Rate Swap necessity for IFIs, but corporate use limited, hence market is limited. Growth in international trading volume denotes opportunities for IFIs to offer FX services to their corporate clients March 2009 total external position: $1.2 trillion 31% of total require Shari’a compliance: $375 billion Last ten years of growth: 14% for assets and 12% for liabilities 2013 Shari’a compliant demand for hedging: $628 bln
67. Islamic FX Spot, Forwards and Options Platform Yet, very few IFIs have the ability to offer FX solutions to their clients as they are limited by: Cost Capability Infrastructure Multinational banks offer their own proprietary platform, with varying degrees of automation. However, cost per trade (CPT) remains very high at anywhere between $150 to $300+ A multibank e-commerce platform by an established platform provider would be the obvious solution and enhance: Price Discovery Convenience Liquidity Streamlined workflow processes Induced standardisation Challenge: Shari’a Opinion Diversity across the Islamic Finance markets
68. Murabaha FX Forward Sell Commodity Y for deferred payment at T90 in USD(principal + margin) (T0) 4 Customer requiring EUR Bank Sell Commodity X for deferred payment at T90 in EUR (principal + margin) (T0) 3 Purchase Commodity Y (T0) 1 Purchase Commodity X (T0) 2 Trader X Trader Y Commodity Cash
69. Unilateral Wa’d FX Forward Platform Mechanics 1 Financial institution (FI) requiring FX forward Multinational bank (MB) FX forward platform Execute Master Agreement for FX option (T0) Provide unilateral undertaking to exchangeforeign currency at T90 (T0) 2 3 Exchange foreign currency (T90) Binding on FI but not binding on MB to execute.
70. Wa’d FX Option 1 Financial institution (FI) requiring FX option Multinational bank (MB) offering FX option Execute Master Agreement for FX option (T0) Provide unilateral undertaking to buy commodity for foreign currency at T90 (T0) 2 Sell commodity for cash payment on murabaha (mark-up) basis to receive ‘Option Premium’ (T0) 3 5 Sell commodity for payment in foreign currency (T90 ) Purchase commodity for local currency (T90) 4 Trader
71. Treasurerscomplain of the difficulties in discovery, execution and confirmation. Poor infrastructurerequires that most transactions have to be done through unreliable telecommunications based services. Relatively higher operational risk, costs and transaction processing time As a result, treasurers have shied away from smaller ticket transactions. Therefore, unable to capture the high volume/small ticket corporate and SME transactions. This presents an exciting opportunity for information and transaction processing intermediaries and financial institutions to work together to build a global network. Infrastructure Constraints and Opportunities
73. Need of the Hour: A Treasury Transaction Platform
74. Future of Islamic Bank Treasury and Liquidity ManagementVision 2.0 2010-2020 Global Islamic Treasury Market Real Time Transactions Exchange traded Profit Rate Swap Islamic Credit Default Takaful 2002-2010 Wakala/Mudaraba Forward Wa’d FX OTC Profit Rate Swap Market players Conventional banks and technology platforms bringing about market makers to trade real-time 1975-2001 Interbank Commodity Murabaha Spot FX Market players Entrance of conventional financial institution treasuries with global liquidity and FX capabilities Market players Islamic banks transacting with each other
78. "I am very pleased by the thoroughness and professionalism of Dar Al Istithmar's management team. I am sure that with their innovative and responsive approach, Dar Al Istithmar will go a long way in serving the Islamic Financial industry." Dr. Hussein Hamed Hassan, Chairman, Dar Al Istithmar Supervisory Board “We have found Dar Al Istithmar management team to be very approachable, responsive and committed”. Dimitris Melas, MSCI Barra. “We are very impressed by Dar Al Istithmar’s management team’s knowledge on Shari’a related matters, their efforts to understand the client needs and, their dedication and helpful attitude throughout. With their approach, Dar Al Istithmar made us feel that they are more like partners to us rather than merely a service provider.” Richard Ellis, Partner, Amiri Capital 12 Our ReputationYour Capital
There are further technical complications with wakala that have yet to be resolved, in particular its balance sheet seniority status and default consequences. If wakala is construed as an equity investment, it is ranked lower in terms of priority than senior unsecured debt and the IFI would be faced with a capital charge of at least 150% in most jurisdictions. In contrast, if it were considered a claim on an Islamic bank or conventional bank, under for instance, Central Bank of Bahrain Supervisory jurisdiction, a risk weight of only 20% would be attached to it. To classify it as a debt claim would be detracting from its contractual form which provides no obligation to the agent to bear the risk and liability of the funds, other than those arising from the gross negligence or willful misconduct of the agent. Wakala agreements do not necessarily guarantee the return specified as the minimum amount, which is solely dependent on the underlying credit of the financing or investments the agent has undertaken on behalf of the principal. Wakalas do not also require any security from the agent for the placement, other than securities to protect against negligence and misconduct which is rarely taken up in interbank money markets. If the underlying credit defaults, the wakala investment also defaults, with no recourse to security or the agent for the return or the capital. While legally the principal has no right to seek redress from the issuer, the only way to see what would happen in terms of security would be to wait for a default. The issue of debt or equity classification would really only come to a head if there was a default. A recent case in Kuwait suggests that this might be a potentially high risk because there is really no obligation for the agent to pay a specific return or to return the principal. In the Kuwaiti case, the parties came to a settlement by offsetting the wakala investment for equity shares of the issuing company. A standardisedwakala document prepared by a body such as the IIFM would bode well to ensure the transparency of the rights and obligations of both parties in the event of default. Current wakala placement agreements are bare bones and do not contain any specifications of the invested asset classes, events of default, rights and obligations of parties, security provisions or what occurs in the event of default.