Script Fragmentation - Stephan Chenette - OWASP/RSA 2008

Script Fragmentation Attacks
OWASP November 2008
Stephan Chenette, Security Researcher
Websense Security Labs

Agenda

 What
 Web Developer 101
 Web 1.0 versus Web 2.0
 Malicious Web 1.0
 Malicious Web 2.0 + Script Fragmentation
 Possible Solutions

2

What am I talking about today

The success of any exploit depends on some basic
assumptions:

The vulnerable service or application is:
1) Active
2) Accessible

The exploit is:
1) Reliable
2) Undetected

3

What am I talking about today

This presentation will focus on:

 Evading detection of the exploit

Specifically:

 A new evasion technique to avoid detection of client-side
web exploitation (Browser, ActiveX control, etc bugs)

4

Basic Web Developer 101

 HTML
 Browser Document Object Model (DOM)
 JavaScript/JSON
 Remote Requests - XMLHTTPRequest (XHR)
 Cross-Domains Requests - XDomainRequest (XDR)

 Available in:
– Internet Explorer, Firefox
– Safari, Opera and Konqeror, etc.

5

Basic HTML document and DOM

<html>
<body>
<div id=“target” /> HTML
</body>
</html>

<html>
<body>
<div id=“target” /> DOM
</body>
</html>

6

JavaScript can change DOM

<script>
var d = document.getElementById(“target”);
var n = document.createElement(“script”);
n.text = “alert(„test‟);”
d.appendChild(n);
</script>

7

New DOM

<html>
<body>
<div id=“target”>
<script>
alert(‘test’); DOM
</script>
</div>
</body>
</html>

8

Basic HTML document

<html>
<body>
</body>
</html>

9

JavaScript can execute directly

var text = “alert(„test‟);”
eval(text);

10

DOM stays the same

<html>
<body>
</body>
</html>

11

The power of scripting

var text=“ale” + “rt(“ + “„te” + “st‟” + “);”
eval(text);

12

JSON Basics

var text = { "firstName" : "John",
"lastName" : "Doe"
};
var JSONObj = eval(text);

// Outputs John
document.writeln(JSONObj.firstName);

// Outputs Doe
document.writeln(JSONObj.lastName);

13

XHR basics

var client = new XMLHttpRequest();
client.onreadystatechange = handler;
client.open("GET", "test.cgi");
client.send();

var client = new XMLHttpRequest();
client.open("POST", "/log");
client.setRequestHeader("Content-Type",
"text/plain;charset=UTF-8");
client.send(message);

14

XDR requests (Cross-site requests)

var xdr= new XDomainRequest();
Xdr.onload= handler;
xdr.open("GET",“http://test.com/test.cgi");
xdr.send();

var xdr= new XMLHTTPRequest();
xdr.onload = handler;
xdr.open("GET",“http://test.com/test.cgi");
xdr.send();

15

Web 1.0 client/server communication

•GET / HTTP/1.1

•Client Browser •Web Server

16

Web 2.0 Websites

Client fetching content from multiple Servers
+
Servers receiving content from Client

 Benign JavaScript/HTTPXMLRequest technologies:
– Gadgets
– Widgets
– Mashups

 Gmail, orkut, facebook, hi5.com, etc use JavaScript and
XMLHTTPRequest.

17

Web 2.0 Websites


18

Web attacks and defense

 Attack trends have shifted over the years. Intruders are
focusing more prominently on the Web

 Most companies/users don‟t block HTTP at the firewall

 ALL Malicious client-side web attacks are assumed to be
protected by desktop or gateway AV/IDS.

19

HTTP client/server communication

•GET / HTTP/1.1


20

Current desktop/gateway protection

 Looking at initial content

21

Current evasion techniques

 Obfuscated JS code

22

REGEX for Deobfuscation routine

for (fubatifi = 0; fubatifi < 1445; fubatifi++)
fepab += String.fromCharCode(mosetib[fubatifi] ^ fedene);

fors{0,5}(w{0,10}s{0,5}=s{0,5}0;s{0,5}w{0,10}s{0,5}<s{0
,5}d{0,10};s{0,5}w{0,10}++)s{0,5}w{0,10}s{0,5}+=s{0,5
}String.fromCharCode(w{0,10}[w{0,10}]s{0,2}^s{0,2}w{
0,10});

23

Successful Evasion…

 Passing malicious content over the network has a higher
chance of evading detection the indistinguishable it is from
benign traffic.

 A.K.A. Make malicious web 2.0 traffic look like good web
2.0 traffic.

24

Malicious Web 2.0/Script Fragmentation

 Script
Active Content e.g. JavaScript, VBscript, etc.

 Fragmentation
Little chunks of data

Note: The use of AJAX for malicious use was mentioned at
Toorcon 2007, but not in the detail I‟m about to go in…

25

Dynamic retrieval of data

<script>
xmlhttp.open(“GET”, “/index.php?q=2+2”, true);
var response = xmlhttp.responseText;
</script>

•GET /index.php?q=2+2

“4”

26

Steps for script fragmentation attack

1. Store malicious content on server

2. SERVER: Serve client webpage with script fragmentation decoder
routine.

3. CLIENT: Use XMLHTTPRequest object to request only small chunk of
malicious content from server

4. SERVER: respond with requested chunk of malicious content

5. CLIENT: Use JavaScript variable to save chunks of data and continue to
use JavaScript and XMLHTTPRequest object to request new chunk of
data until there is no more data

6. CLIENT: Execute resulting code once all data is received

27

Steps in action

 Step 1) Store malicious content on server

•Web Server

28

Steps in action

 Step 1) Store malicious content on server

•Web Server

29

Steps in action

 Step 2) SERVER: Serve client webpage with script
fragmentation decoder routine.

•<DECODER>


30

Script Fragmentation decoder routine

31

Steps in action

 Step 2) CLIENT: use XMLHTTPRequest object to request
only small chunk of malicious content from server

•GET /index.cgi?o=0&rl=3


32

Steps in action

 Step 3) SERVER: respond with requested chunk of
malicious content

•“var”


33

Steps in action

 Step 4) CLIENT: store chunk and continually request more
chunks until there is no more data.

•“ he”

•var text = “var he”;

34

Steps in action


•“apS”

•var text = “var heapS”;

35

Steps in action


•“pra”

•var text = “var heapSpra”;

36

Steps in action


•“yTo ”

•var text = “var heapSprayTo”;

37

Steps in action

 Step 5) CLIENT: execute resulting code once all data is
received.

•Client Browser
•// Method 1 •// Method 2
•eval(text); •var div = GetElementById(„target‟);
var n = document.CreateElement(“script”);
n.text = text;
div.appendChild(n);

38

The possibilities

Beyond the basic script fragmentation attacks:

 Randomize sequence of offsets
 xor/encrypt data
 Spread data across multiple web servers (botnet) (XDR)
 In memory keep string encrypted until the last minute

39

Options for data transfer

XMLHttpRequest is the object to make dynamic remote
HTTP request, but there are multiple data formats that may
be used for data transfer:

 RAW
 XML
 JSON
 etc.…

40

RAW data format

•GET /index.cgi?o=0&rl=3&u=guid

•Client Browser “var” •Web Server

41

XML data format


•Client Browser “<Data eof=“0” text=“var” />” •Web Server

42

JSON data format


“{
eof : “0”,
// S = server resp. text : “var”
var data = eval(S); }”
var text = data.text;

43

Flawlessly works on all major browsers

 Proof of concept (POC) exploited within 10-20s

44

AV won’t detect Script Fragmentations

 Initial page will hold decoder routine in script tag and then
blank body.
 The file on disk will never change
 DOM in memory will never change

 NO SUBSTANTIAL CONTENT
TO SCAN AS MALICIOUS!

45

HTML file on disk

 File on disk is the same before and after
 C:Documents and Settings<USER>Local
SettingsTemporary Internet Files

46

Victory!

 Script Fragmentation is a very successful evasion attack
that current desktop and gateway AV do not detect.

47

Ending remarks

 Reality: This attack is still a few years away

 We haven‟t seen this in the wild

 Possible Reasons: Dealing with scripting and obfuscation
are still the biggest problems

48

Possible solutions

 Detecting the decoder routine
 Detecting network anomalies
 Using a “feedback loop” and executing in remote location.
 Dis-allow execution of content that comes from
XMLHTTPRequest, hard to implement and would break
functionality – so no go.
 Post-detection
 Hooking Browser internals
 Install security add-ons
– NoScript, Flashblock, SafeHistory, Adblock Plus,
LocalRodeo, CustomizeGoogle, etc.

49

Thank you.

 Any questions?

Stephan Chenette, Websense Security Labs
schenette@websense.com

 Check out our website and blogs
 http://securitylabs.websense.com/content/blogs.aspx
 http://securitylabs.websense.com/

50

Script Fragmentation - Stephan Chenette - OWASP/RSA 2008

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