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Terry Martin - CASA UAS Standards Committee Meeting Nov 2016

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Terrence Martin (PhD)
Terrence Martin (PhD)

This is the presentation given to the UAS Standards Committee on 16 November 2016, Assoc Professor Terry Martin who is the Industry Co-Chair. The first 30 slides are a refresh from the previous meeting, before launching into an overview of the Australian RPAS Roadmap Development efforts from the team in the Strategic Action Working Group. A key component to progressing expanded RPAS operations will be the utilisation of principles contained in the JARUS Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) process, which we are expanding upon using Bow Tie Models developed at Nova Systems.

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UAS STANDARDS SUB COMMITTEE BI-ANNUAL MEETING NOVEMBER 2016 INDUSTRY CO-CHAIR TERRY MARTIN
Copyright:Terrence Martin Acknowledgements • Mick Jaeschke • 37Years Service • Originally En Route moved intoTower • ManyYears in CairnsTerminal Area • More recently approx. 15 in BrisbaneTMA where he was a supervisor • Finished up in ATS Integrity….
Copyright:Terrence Martin Introduction • Refresh • Where we were at last meeting • Where we would like to be. • Key Principles supporting remainder of presentation • What we are doing about it. • What remains to be done
Copyright: Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh
Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh • Innovation, Disruption, the vulnerability of smokestack economies • Supporting this requires improved Industry-Regulator Collaboration Key Points Made
Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh • Innovation, Disruption, the vulnerability of smokestack economies • Airworthiness & Lack of Suitable Regulatory Framework Key Points Made
Copyright:Terrence Martin AcceptablySafe is defined by the SafetyTargets- See Argument 1. Argument 4 System transitioned into services in acceptably safe manner Argument 5 System shown to be operated acceptably safely Argument 6 System maintained and sustained acceptably safely Airworthiness High Level Safety Argument Argument 2 System designed to be acceptably safe Personnel are appropriately trained to conduct and verify activities which underpin the safety argument Argument 3 System constructed and implemented completely and correctly Argument 1 System has been specified to acceptably safe. Assumptions stated Applicable for intended Operational Environment Verification of Evidence that SafetyTargets are met, with plans for ongoing monitoring ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE Last Meeting Refresh Airworthiness and the Safety Argument
Copyright:Terrence Martin AcceptablySafe is defined by the SafetyTargets- See Argument 1. Argument 4 System transitioned into services in acceptably safe manner Argument 5 System shown to be operated acceptably safely Argument 6 System maintained and sustained acceptably safely Airworthiness High Level Safety Argument Argument 2 System designed to be acceptably safe Personnel are appropriately trained to conduct and verify activities which underpin the safety argument Argument 3 System constructed and implemented completely and correctly Argument 1 System has been specified to acceptably safe. Assumptions stated Applicable for intended Operational Environment Verification of Evidence that SafetyTargets are met, with plans for ongoing monitoring ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE Last Meeting Refresh Airworthiness and the Safety Argument
Copyright:Terrence Martin AcceptablySafe is defined by the SafetyTargets- See Argument 1. Argument 4 System transitioned into services in acceptably safe manner Argument 5 System shown to be operated acceptably safely Argument 6 System maintained and sustained acceptably safely Airworthiness High Level Safety Argument Argument 2 System designed to be acceptably safe Personnel are appropriately trained to conduct and verify activities which underpin the safety argument Argument 3 System constructed and implemented completely and correctly Argument 1 System has been specified to acceptably safe. Assumptions stated Applicable for intended Operational Environment Verification of Evidence that SafetyTargets are met, with plans for ongoing monitoring ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE Last Meeting Refresh Airworthiness and the Safety Argument
Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh Future RPAS Framework Certified Specific Open Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Toys European Approach Australian Draft Framework Regulated Specific Open Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS
Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh Future RPAS Framework Certified Specific Open Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Toys European Approach Australian Draft Framework Regulated Specific Open Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Low Risk Operations
Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh Future RPAS Framework Certified Specific Open Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Toys European Approach Australian Draft Framework Regulated Specific Open Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Low Risk Operations Medium Risk Operations
Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh Future RPAS Framework Certified Specific Open Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Toys European Approach Australian Draft Framework Regulated Specific Open Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Low Risk Operations Medium Risk Operations High Risk Operations
Copyright:Terrence Martin Regulated Specific Open Small RPAS Very small RPAS Element of Initial Airworthiness CPA like Oversight of Integrity. NAA led Industry Appointed Oversight No Integrity Oversight Operational Restrictions Last Meeting Refresh Future RPAS Framework
Copyright:Terrence Martin Regulated Specific Open Small RPAS Very small RPAS Element of Initial Airworthiness CPA like Oversight of Integrity. NAA led Industry Appointed Oversight No Integrity Oversight Operational Restrictions Proportionate &SAFE: Operational Restrictions commensurate with technical integrity & operational environment Last Meeting Refresh Future RPAS Framework
Copyright:Terrence Martin Regulated Specific Open Small RPAS Very small RPAS Element of Initial Airworthiness CPA like Oversight of Integrity. NAA led Industry Appointed Oversight No Integrity Oversight Operational Restrictions Enter the US Element Derivative of US sUAS NPRM Last Meeting Refresh Future RPAS Framework
Copyright:Terrence Martin Regulated Specific Open Small RPAS Very small RPAS Element of Initial Airworthiness CPA like Oversight of Integrity. NAA led Industry Appointed Oversight No Integrity Oversight Operational Restrictions Enter the US Element Derivative of US sUAS NPRM Open = Small SegregatedVLOS Container Last Meeting Refresh Future RPAS Framework
Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome Last Meeting Refresh Work Outstanding Regulated Specific
Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome Last Meeting Refresh Work Outstanding Regulated Specific
Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome Airworthiness Expectations based on CPA Regulations e.g.TC/CoA Last Meeting Refresh Work Outstanding Regulated Specific
Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome Last Meeting Refresh Work Outstanding Regulated Specific
Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome Last Meeting Refresh Work Outstanding Regulated Specific Work to be done • What Equipment • What Restrictions • What Procedures • WhatTraining • How is RISK Assessed?
Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome Last Meeting Refresh Work Outstanding Regulated Specific
Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome Last Meeting Refresh Work Outstanding Regulated Specific Operational Flexibility Platform Technical Integrity Equipage Operator Competence
Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh • Innovation, Disruption, the vulnerability of smokestack economies • Airworthiness & Lack of Suitable Regulatory Framework Key Points Made
Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh • Innovation, Disruption, the vulnerability of smokestack economies • Airworthiness & Lack of Suitable Regulatory Framework • Need for a RPAS Roadmap Key Points Made Goals Milestones Gaps & Barriers Task List Priorities, Timelines, People
Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh • Innovation, Disruption, the vulnerability of smokestack economies • Airworthiness & Lack of Suitable Regulatory Framework • Need for a RPAS Roadmap • What is the Scope for a Roadmap Key Points Made Goals Milestones Gaps & Barriers Task List Priorities, Timelines, People
Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh • Innovation, Disruption, the vulnerability of smokestack economies • Airworthiness & Lack of Suitable Regulatory Framework • Need for a RPAS Roadmap • What is the Scope for a Roadmap • How Long will it take? Key Points Made Goals Milestones Gaps & Barriers Task List Priorities, Timelines, People
Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh What about aWBS….What needs to be done? Key Problems
Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh What about aWBS….What needs to be done? • National Priorities:What are they, CONOPS Key Problems
Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh What about aWBS….What needs to be done? • National Priorities:What are they, CONOPS • Gap Analysis 101: • Baseline: What is it? Is it transparent? • What regulations do we require • Do we know what we want? Kinda?  Benchmarking? • What else is uncertain: How can we correct that? • Risk Assessment; is it Fit for Purpose • Trials Key Problems
Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh What about aWBS….What needs to be done? • National Priorities:What are they, CONOPS • Gap Analysis 101: • Baseline: What is it? Is it transparent? • What regulations do we require • Do we know what we want? Kinda?  Benchmarking? • What else is uncertain: How can we correct that? • Risk Assessment; is it Fit for Purpose • Trials • Constraints: What’s Feasible with our workforce, • NumbersTo Develop Regulations & conduct necessary research • Skill to make decisions over safety • How much “Close Following” Key Problems
Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh What about aWBS….What needs to be done? • National Priorities:What are they, CONOPS • Gap Analysis 101: • Baseline: What is it? Is it transparent? • What regulations do we require • Do we know what we want? Kinda?  Benchmarking? • What else is uncertain: How can we correct that? • Risk Assessment; is it Fit for Purpose • Trials • Constraints: What’s Feasible with our workforce, • NumbersTo Develop Regulations & conduct necessary research • Skill to make decisions over safety • How much “Close Following” Key Problems Need to change how Industry is contributing in UASSC WG structures • More regular engagement, • Build trust • Achieve Outcomes • Be transparent • Isolate where accountability lies
Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh What about aWBS….What needs to be done? • National Priorities:What are they, CONOPS • Gap Analysis 101: • Baseline: What is it? Is it transparent? • What regulations do we require • Do we know what we want? Kinda?  Benchmarking? • What else is uncertain: How can we correct that? • Risk Assessment; is it Fit for Purpose • Trials • Constraints: What’s Feasible with our workforce, • NumbersTo Develop Regulations & conduct necessary research • Skill to make decisions over safety • How much “Close Following” Key Problems Need to change how Industry is contributing in UASSC WG structures • More regular engagement, • Build trust • Achieve Outcomes • Be transparent • Isolate where accountability lies Working Group Members Terry Martin Queensland Uni of Tech and Nova Systems Paul Herrmann Textron Jennifer Mulvaney Intel Lance King Northrup Grumman Kristian Cruickshank Nova Systems Carrie Hillier QLD Local Government Infrastructure Services Phillip Jones-Hope AMSA Matt Rayson Ground Effect Aviation Patrick Weeden Scout Arial System GregTyrrell AAUS Rhys Mudford Insitu Pacific Mike Jaeschke Airservices Australia Subject Matter Experts Duncan Greer Five Rings Aero Phillip Rowse ProfiCNC Dean Gilligan Australian Research Centre for Aerospace Automation Julian Webber Federal Police Peter Schofield Ergon
Copyright: Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap
System Certification Regulated Specific RiskAssessment Methodology Traffic Density Certification Status Population Comms & Surveillance Coverage CrewTraining Airspace Category Operation Criticality Benchmarking (EU, US) Airspace Management Policy Human Factors CNPC Detect & Avoid Risk Management sUAS & Low Level UAVOps Ops near Aerodromes Security EmergingTech National Operational Priorities CONOPS Unique Sector Requirements Common Requirements ALL CONOPS Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption Baselining CASA Processes Approval Benchmark Available Manpower Risk Management Knowledge Gaps Safety Obligations Trial Appetite Identification of Low Hanging Fruit Improved awareness of what is preventing progress • Technology Shortfalls, • Skills, Knowledge, Capacity • Evidence requirements for Risk: traffic, population • Platform Integrity Requirements for Operations • Trial Opportunities • Separation Confidence • Position Reporting: RAIM like assurance • Navigation Performance • Compatibility with Airspace Class Requirements • Confidence platform can reliably maintain flight Trials Evidence Requirements Skills Trial Sites Teaming Safety Expectations Trial Methodologies Feedback Expectation
Copyright:Terrence Martin Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption Developing the Roadmap Produce and Enact a Plan that will lead to: • Improvement of regulatory process to protect and promote RPAS related investment in Australia and enable Industry growth • Operation of RPA over populated areas, and • BVLOS RPA operations in unsegregated airspace. • Isolate and then delineate what are capability gaps and regulatory gaps (and overlaps) FOR Australian Operations ? Roadmap Goals
Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap Objectives Objectives: CONOPS Coverage Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption
Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap Objectives • Identify the Priority sectors, and benefits for RPAS Operations in Australia (Includes CONOPs development) . Objectives: CONOPS Coverage National Operational Priorities Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption
Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap Objectives • Identify the Priority sectors, and benefits for RPAS Operations in Australia (Includes CONOPs development) . • Set of CONOPS developed & provided to forum for review Objectives: CONOPS Coverage National Operational Priorities CONOPS Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption
Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap Objectives • Identify the Priority sectors, and benefits for RPAS Operations in Australia (Includes CONOPs development) . • Set of CONOPS developed & provided to forum for review Objectives: CONOPS Coverage National Operational Priorities CONOPS Agriculture: • Broad Area PrecisionAgriculture, • Pest &Weed Detection, Disaster & Emergency Services • SAR (Maritime) • Tropical Cyclone with Cells onWings • CBRN • Small Scale Urban SAR Cells onWings (COWS) & UTM Conservation Mining/Hard Rock/Pit/Open Cut Logistics • Package Delivery • Long Range Freight Training • BVLOS • VLOS/EVLOS Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption
Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap Objectives • Identify the Priority sectors, and benefits for RPAS Operations in Australia (Includes CONOPs development) . • Set of CONOPS developed & provided to forum for review Objectives: CONOPS Coverage National Operational Priorities CONOPS Agriculture: • Broad Area PrecisionAgriculture, • Pest &Weed Detection, Disaster & Emergency Services • SAR (Maritime) • Tropical Cyclone with Cells onWings • CBRN • Small Scale Urban SAR Cells onWings (COWS) & UTM Conservation Mining/Hard Rock/Pit/Open Cut Logistics • Package Delivery • Long Range Freight Training • BVLOS • VLOS/EVLOS Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption CONOPS Development Credits • Kristian Cruickshank (Major Credit) • Rhys Mudford • Terry Martin • JulianWebber • Phillip Rouse • Duncan Greer • Matt Rayson • Lance King • PatrickWeeden • Phillip Jones Hope
Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap Objectives • Identify the Priority sectors, and benefits for RPAS Operations in Australia (Includes CONOPs development) . • Set of CONOPS developed & provided to forum for review Objectives: Priority Sectors & CONOPS Coverage National Operational Priorities CONOPS Unique Sector Requirements Common Requirements ALL CONOPS Identification of Low Hanging Fruit Improved awareness of what is preventing progress Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption
Copyright:Terrence Martin Baselining CASA Processes Approval Benchmark Available Manpower Risk Management Knowledge Gaps Safety Obligations Trial Appetite Objectives • Baseline Australia’s RPAS regulatory environment and benchmark against key international developments Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption Developing the Roadmap Baselining CASA Processes WHY? • Community is uncertain what the current approval BVLOS baseline is! • Vague understanding of the regulatory and capability gaps that are preventing progress of range of BVLOS Operations • Not all Operations are the Same • Prudent to Harmonise
Benchmarking (EU, US) Airspace Management Policy Human Factors CNPC Detect & Avoid Risk Management sUAS & Low Level UAVOps Ops near Aerodromes Security EmergingTech Baselining CASA Processes Approval Benchmark Available Manpower Risk Management Knowledge Gaps Safety Obligations Trial Appetite Objectives • Baseline Australia’s RPAS regulatory environment and benchmark against key international developments • Benchmark against International Standards Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption
Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap 14 Key R&D Activities: • EVLOS/VLOS • 1.RPAS activities awareness for security • 2. Operations in Urban Areas • 3. Human Factors • IFR/VFR • 4. Visual Detectability solutions • 5. DAA • 6. Comms C2 Datalink • 7. Airspace & Airport Access • 8 Contingency • BVLOS • 9. DAA • 10. Comms C2 Datalink • 11 Airspace & Airport Access • 12. Security • 13 Human Factors: BVLOS & IFR/VFR • 14 Best Practice Demonstration Europe: Technology and Operational Gaps GAPS LINKED TO ACTION & MILESTONES Operational & Technology gaps: 1. Integration into ATM and Airspace environments 2. Surface operations incl. take-off and landing 3. Operational contingency procedures and systems 4. Data communication links incl. spectrum issues 5. Detect & Avoid systems and operational procedures 6. Security issues 7. Verification and Validation Methods
Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap 1. Communications • Impact of UAS Ops on NextGen comms systems • Availability of UAS Control frequency Spectrum • Develop &Validate UAS Control System Performance Requirement • Ensure security of safety critical comms with civil UAS • Design & Develop UAS Control Datalink for allocated frequency spectrum bands United States Identified R&D Areas/Gaps 2. Airspace Operations • Develop Integrated Separation Concepts • Develop Airspace Integration Safety Cases • Develop SAA Sensors & Fusion Requires • Develop Separation Algorithms • Assess Availability/Quality of Surveillance Data • Safe and Efficient Terminal Airspace & Surface Operations
Copyright:Terrence Martin 3. Unmanned Aircraft • State Awareness and RealTime Mission Management • Airframe Certification • Precise Location & Navigation • UAS Avionics & Control Systems Certification 4. Human Systems Integration • Display Traffic/airspace information • Effective Human Automation Interaction • Pilot Centric GCS • Definition Roles and Responsibilities • Predictability & Contingency Mgt • System Level Issues • Support for Future Capability of UAS Developing the Roadmap United States Identified R&D Areas/Gaps
Copyright:Terrence Martin 3. Unmanned Aircraft • State Awareness and RealTime Mission Management • Airframe Certification • Precise Location & Navigation • UAS Avionics & Control Systems Certification 4. Human Systems Integration • Display Traffic/airspace information • Effective Human Automation Interaction • Pilot Centric GCS • Definition Roles and Responsibilities • Predictability & Contingency Mgt • System Level Issues • Support for Future Capability of UAS Developing the Roadmap United States Identified R&D Areas/Gaps So are we going to reinvent the wheel on all of these? Do we even have the capacity? Where should we Close Follow?
Benchmarking (EU, US) Airspace Management Policy Human Factors CNPC Detect & Avoid Risk Management sUAS & Low Level UAVOps Ops near Aerodromes Security EmergingTech National Operational Priorities CONOPS Unique Sector Requirements Common Requirements ALL CONOPS Baselining CASA Processes Approval Benchmark Available Manpower Risk Management Knowledge Gaps Safety Obligations Trial Appetite Objectives • Baseline Australia’s RPAS regulatory environment and benchmark against key international developments • Benchmark against International Standards • Establish Australian specific gaps and necessary work Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption Prioritised Australian RPAS gaps & opportunities Identification of Low Hanging Fruit Improved awareness of what is preventing progress • Technology Shortfalls, • Skills, Knowledge, Capacity • Evidence requirements for Risk: traffic, population • Platform Integrity Requirements for Operations • Trial Opportunities
Copyright:Terrence Martin Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption Developing the Roadmap • Objectives • Taking into consideration Australia’s (CASA and Industry) skill and personnel capacity • Identify areas which can provide “quick wins “for commencing operations, • Establish the key issues and challenges which must be addressed, and isolate where we can act, and where we will be reliant on overseas organisations • Establish trial priorities, and key enablers/resources and prioritised sequencing for their conduct. • Establishment of regulatory development priorities and recommendations • Development of a proposed timeline for achieving the recommendations Objectives
Copyright:Terrence Martin Trials Evidence Requirements Skills Trial Sites Teaming Safety Expectations Trial Methodologies Feedback Expectation Developing the Roadmap Objectives • Help Address areas of uncertainty CASA’s has • Regulatory development & Certification criteria • Conducting risk analysis • Specific and certified categories, Operations in the vicinity of people, different classes of airspace • Progress BVLOS • With and without Surveillance : PSR, SSR, ADSB, other? • Airborne and ground based sensors Roadmap Development: Trials • Patience & Setting up environment where you can fail • Key Contributors: PatrickWeeden, Lance King,Terry Martin, Kristian Cruickshank Carrie Hillier
Copyright:Terrence Martin Trials Evidence Requirements Skills Trial Sites Teaming Safety Expectations Trial Methodologies Feedback Expectation Developing the Roadmap Site Attributes: • Location, Airspace Class, Surveillance, Population,VHF Coverage, IFR/VFR Routes,Terrain, • Proximity to Critical Infrastructure/CBD/Aerodromes • Politics, funding, investment • Instrumentation? • Feedback of Information/Data to CASA • Call for Input on the Forum. Roadmap Development: Trials • Key Contributors: PatrickWeeden, Lance King,Terry Martin, Kristian Cruickshank, Carrie Hillier
Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap • Yet to be Developed • JARUS SORA & Risk will drive training rigour • Some Considerations embedded in the CONOPS & MOS Roadmap Development: Training
System Certification Regulated Specific RiskAssessment Methodology Traffic Density Certification Status Population Comms & Surveillance Coverage CrewTraining Airspace Category Operation Criticality Benchmarking (EU, US) Airspace Management Policy Human Factors CNPC Detect & Avoid Risk Management sUAS & Low Level UAVOps Ops near Aerodromes Security EmergingTech National Operational Priorities CONOPS Unique Sector Requirements Common Requirements ALL CONOPS Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption Baselining CASA Processes Approval Benchmark Available Manpower Risk Management Knowledge Gaps Safety Obligations Trial Appetite Identification of Low Hanging Fruit Improved awareness of what is preventing progress • Technology Shortfalls, • Skills, Knowledge, Capacity • Evidence requirements for Risk: traffic, population • Platform Integrity Requirements for Operations • Trial Opportunities • Separation Confidence • Position Reporting: RAIM like assurance • Navigation Performance • Compatibility with Airspace Class Requirements • Confidence platform can reliably maintain flight Trials Evidence Requirements Skills Trial Sites Teaming Safety Expectations Trial Methodologies Feedback Expectation
Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap • Specific Category Operations will be based on risk assessment • Risk Methodology is critical, yet still uncertain in many facets • CASA is committed to harmonisation. • Little point departing too far from the likely Risk Methodology • Adopting EASA methodologies • JARUS SORA is a key part of the Risk Assessment process • Can we get a headstart? Risk Assessment Regulated Specific Open Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Platform Technical Integrity Operational Flexibility Equipage Operator Competence
Copyright: Terrence Martin Specific Operations Risk Assessment
Copyright:Terrence Martin • Step 0 -Initial Evaluation • Step 1 CONOPS Description • Step 2 Determine initial UAS Ground Risk Class • Step 3 Determine initial UAS Air Risk Class • Step 3A- Harm Barriers and GRC • Step 3B- Harm Barrier and ARC • Step 4 – Lethality Determination • Step 5 SpecificAssurance and Integrity Levels • Step 6 Ident of RecommendedThreat Barriers • Step 7 Feasibility Check • Step 8-Verification of robustness proposed barriers THE Process Specific Operation Risk Assessment
Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA and SAIL Overview
Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA and SAIL Overview
Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA OUTPUT Objectives to be met and the level of robustness SAIL I : 18 (Low) SAIL II : 19 (Low), 6 (Med) SAIL III : 18 (Low), 15 (Med), 6(High) SAIL IV : 3 (Low), 19 (Med), 12 (High) SAILV : 6 (Med), 28 (High) SAILVI : 35 (High) SORA and SAIL Overview
Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA OUTPUT Objectives to be met and the level of robustness SAIL I : 18 (Low) SAIL II : 19 (Low), 6 (Med) SAIL III : 18 (Low), 15 (Med), 6(High) SAIL IV : 3 (Low), 19 (Med), 12 (High) SAILV : 6 (Med), 28 (High) SAILVI : 35 (High) SORA and SAIL Overview SAIL is the level of confidence that a specific operation will stay under control Lowest SAIL I- low intrinsic risk, Highest, SAIL VI - high intrinsic risks
Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA OUTPUT Objectives to be met and the level of robustness SAIL I : 18 (Low) SAIL II : 19 (Low), 6 (Med) SAIL III : 18 (Low), 15 (Med), 6(High) SAIL IV : 3 (Low), 19 (Med), 12 (High) SAILV : 6 (Med), 28 (High) SAILVI : 35 (High) Training Barriers Design & Prod Barriers Ops Barriers SORA and SAIL Overview Maint Barriers
Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Step 2: CONOPS
Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Not really that different is it?
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Ground Risk Class Max UA Characteristic Dimension 1 metre 3 metres 8 metres > 8 metres Kinetic Energy Expected < 700 Joules < 34000 Joules < 1.084 MegaJoule s > 1.084 MegaJoules Operational Scenarios VLOS in controlled area, sparsely populated 1 2 3 4 BVLOS, sparsely populated 2 3 4 5 VLOS over controlled area, populated environment 3 4 5 6 BVLOS controlled area, populated orVLOS over populated 4 5 6 7 BVLOS Urban Environment 5 6 7 7 VLOS/BVLOS over gathering of people 6 7 7 7
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Ground Risk Class Max UA Characteristic Dimension 1 metre 3 metres 8 metres > 8 metres Kinetic Energy Expected < 700 Joules < 34000 Joules < 1.084 MegaJoule s > 1.084 MegaJoules Operational Scenarios VLOS in controlled area, sparsely populated 1 2 3 4 BVLOS, sparsely populated 2 3 4 5 VLOS over controlled area, populated environment 3 4 5 6 BVLOS controlled area, populated orVLOS over populated 4 5 6 7 BVLOS Urban Environment 5 6 7 7 VLOS/BVLOS over gathering of people 6 7 7 7 SUMMARY Inputs: • Dimension- 1 of 4 discrete categories • Kinetic Energy- 1 of 1 categories • Desired Operational Scenario. Permutations in • VLOS/BVLOS • Controlled area • Sparsely Populated, populated or urban or gathering of people Output • Ground Risk Score our of 7
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Air Risk Class Air Risk Class Very Low ( above FL600, below highest Building) 1 Low (Below 500 ft or within 400 ft from Infrastructure) 2/3 * Medium (Away from Major FL and Airways) 4/5 * High ( In Major FL & on airways, aerodrome traffic Patterns 6 Very High 7 Note: that for VLOS and EVLOS Operations, the lowest ARC should be chosen, For BLOS highest should be chosen.
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Air Risk Class Air Risk Class Very Low ( above FL600, below highest Building) 1 Low (Below 500 ft or within 400 ft from Infrastructure) 2/3 * Medium (Away from Major FL and Airways) 4/5 * High ( In Major FL & on airways, aerodrome traffic Patterns 6 Very High 7 Note: that for VLOS and EVLOS Operations, the lowest ARC should be chosen, For BLOS highest should be chosen. SUMMARY Inputs: • Altitude • Proximity to air traffic, aerodromes & infrastructure Output • Air Risk Score our of 7
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Lethality SAIL Lethality Highest of GRC and ARC 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 HIGH VI VI V IV III II I AVERAGE VI V IV III II I O LOW V IV III II I O O Note: that for VLOS and EVLOS Operations, the lowest ARC should be chosen, For BLOS highest should be chosen. No Guidance on what constitutes High, Average or Low Lethality ( See Later) Studies are being conducted and standards being written to evaluate the lethality of UAS. SORA will be updated when this occurs
Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA OUTPUT Objectives to be met and the level of robustness SAIL I : 18 (Low) SAIL II : 19 (Low), 6 (Med) SAIL III : 18 (Low), 15 (Med), 6(High) SAIL IV : 3 (Low), 19 (Med), 12 (High) SAILV : 6 (Med), 28 (High) SAILVI : 35 (High) JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA OUTPUT Objectives to be met and the level of robustness SAIL I : 18 (Low) SAIL II : 19 (Low), 6 (Med) SAIL III : 18 (Low), 15 (Med), 6(High) SAIL IV : 3 (Low), 19 (Med), 12 (High) SAILV : 6 (Med), 28 (High) SAILVI : 35 (High) JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Established SAIL will determine: • Objectives to be complied with, • Description of activities that might support the compliance with those objectives, and • Evidence to indicate the objectives have been satisfied
Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA OUTPUT Objectives to be met and the level of robustness SAIL I : 18 (Low) SAIL II : 19 (Low), 6 (Med) SAIL III : 18 (Low), 15 (Med), 6(High) SAIL IV : 3 (Low), 19 (Med), 12 (High) SAILV : 6 (Med), 28 (High) SAILVI : 35 (High) Training Barriers Design & Prod Barriers Ops Barriers Maint Barriers JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Established SAIL will determine: • Objectives to be complied with, • Description of activities that might support the compliance with those objectives, and • Evidence to indicate the objectives have been satisfied
Copyright: Terrence Martin JARUS Holistic Risk Model
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS Holistic Risk Model Bow Ties Initial Event 1 Initial Event 3 Initial Event 2 2. What Safety Event Could Initiate the Hazard? UNDESIRABLE EVENT/TOP EVENT 3. How do we avoid the undesirable Event. How do we control the hazard HAZARD 1. What is the Hazard? 4. What Happens when Hazard Control is lost? Potential Outcome 1 Potential Outcome 2 Potential Outcome 3 Preventative Barriers 6. How can the accident Scenario Develop? What are the potential Outcomes? Mitigation/Recovery Barriers 5. How do we recover if the event occurs? How can the outcome likelihood or consequence severity be reduced?
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS Holistic Risk Model JAURS SORA : Bow Ties UAS out Of Control HAZARD Fatalities to 3rd Parties on Ground Fatalities to 3rd Parties in the Air Damage to Critical Infrastructure Technical Issues with UAS Aircraft on CollisionCourse Technical Issues with UAS Human Error Datalink Deteroration Adverse Operating Conditions Deteriorating of External Systems THREATS HARM
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat and Harm Barriers Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat and Harm Barriers Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood UAS Out of Control
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat and Harm Barriers Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control X
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat and Harm Barriers Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat and Harm Barriers Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Objective is that the number of fatal injuries per flight hour should be equivalent with Manned Aviation
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified Specific
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified Specific Open Category
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified Specific Open Category 1E-6 1E-6 1E-6
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified Specific Open Category 1E-6 1E-6 1E-6 ThisValue is not appropriate see AMC 1309 … but its useful to demonstrate the principle of seeking to maintain equivalence
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified Specific Open Category 1E-61 1E-6 1E-6 ThisValue is not appropriate see AMC 1309 … but its useful to demonstrate the principle of seeking to maintain equivalence
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified Specific Open Category 1E-61 1E-6 1E-6 1 x 10-4 to 1x10-6 ThisValue is not appropriate see AMC 1309 … but its useful to demonstrate the principle of seeking to maintain equivalence
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified Specific Open Category 1E-61 1E-6 1E-6 0 to 0.01 (Harmless)0.01 to 1 1 x 10-4 to 1x10-6 ThisValue is not appropriate see AMC 1309 … but its useful to demonstrate the principle of seeking to maintain equivalence
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified Specific Open Category 1E-61 1E-6 1E-6 0.01 to 1 0 to 0.01 (Harmless)0.01 to 1 1 x 10-5 to 1 1 x 10-4 to 1x10-6 ThisValue is not appropriate see AMC 1309 … but its useful to demonstrate the principle of seeking to maintain equivalence
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified Specific Open Category 1E-610.01 to 1 1E-6 1E-6 1 x 10-5 to 1 0.01 to 1 0 to 0.01 (Harmless)0.01 to 1 x 10-5 0.01 to 1 1 x 10-5 to 1 1 x 10-4 to 1x10-6 ThisValue is not appropriate see AMC 1309 … but its useful to demonstrate the principle of seeking to maintain equivalence
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified Specific Open Category 1E-610.01 to 1 1E-6 1E-6 1 x 10-5 to 1 0.01 to 1 0 to 0.01 (Harmless)0.01 to 1 x 10-5 0.01 to 1 1 x 10-5 to 1 1 x 10-4 to 1x10-6 Lethality is not RISK!! It’s a proxy for consequence! ThisValue is not appropriate see AMC 1309 … but its useful to demonstrate the principle of seeking to maintain equivalence
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Bow Ties Threat 1 Threat 3 Threat 2 UAS Loses Control HAZARD HARM Outcome 1 HARM Outcome 2 HARM Outcome 3
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Bow Ties Threat 1 Threat 3 Threat 2 UAS Loses Control HAZARD HARM Outcome 1 HARM Outcome 2 HARM Outcome 3 Threat Barriers
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Bow Ties Threat 1 Threat 3 Threat 2 UAS Loses Control HAZARD HARM Outcome 1 HARM Outcome 2 HARM Outcome 3 Threat Barriers Harm Barriers
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat Barriers UAS out Of Control Technical Issues with UAS Aircraft on CollisionCourse Human Error Datalink Deterioration Adverse Operating Conditions Deteriorating of External Systems Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to The remote crew is trained to identify critical environmental conditions and to avoid them Environmental conditions for safe operations defined, measurable and adhered to UAS designed and qualified for adverse environmental conditions (e.g. adequate sensors, DO-160 qualification) UAS is designed to automatically manage datalink deterioration situations Datalink performance established and verified (e.g. datalink budget) Procedures and limitations are in- place and adhered to Datalink systems and infrastructure is manufactured to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is designed to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is installed and maintained to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Procs are in place to handle deterioration of external systems supporting RPAS Operations UAS is designed to manage deterioration of externals systems supporting RPAS Operations Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation The UAS is detectable by other airspace users UAS is equipped with functionality to maintain safe separation Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Multi crew coordination Adequate resting times are defined and followed Safe recovery from Human Error A Human Factors evaluation has been performed and the HMI found appropriate for the mission Automatic protection of critical flight functions (e.g. envelope protection) The operator is competent and/or proven UAS manufactured by competent and/or proven entity UAS maintained by competent and/or proven entity UAS developed to authority recognized design standards Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to UAS is designed considering system safety and reliability Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Safe recovery from technical issue Threats
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat Barriers UAS out Of Control Technical Issues with UAS Aircraft on CollisionCourse Human Error Datalink Deterioration Adverse Operating Conditions Deteriorating of External Systems Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to The remote crew is trained to identify critical environmental conditions and to avoid them Environmental conditions for safe operations defined, measurable and adhered to UAS designed and qualified for adverse environmental conditions (e.g. adequate sensors, DO-160 qualification) UAS is designed to automatically manage datalink deterioration situations Datalink performance established and verified (e.g. datalink budget) Procedures and limitations are in- place and adhered to Datalink systems and infrastructure is manufactured to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is designed to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is installed and maintained to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Procs are in place to handle deterioration of external systems supporting RPAS Operations UAS is designed to manage deterioration of externals systems supporting RPAS Operations Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation The UAS is detectable by other airspace users UAS is equipped with functionality to maintain safe separation Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Multi crew coordination Adequate resting times are defined and followed Safe recovery from Human Error A Human Factors evaluation has been performed and the HMI found appropriate for the mission Automatic protection of critical flight functions (e.g. envelope protection) The operator is competent and/or proven UAS manufactured by competent and/or proven entity UAS maintained by competent and/or proven entity UAS developed to authority recognized design standards Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to UAS is designed considering system safety and reliability Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Safe recovery from technical issue Threats
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat Barriers UAS out Of Control Technical Issues with UAS Aircraft on CollisionCourse Human Error Datalink Deterioration Adverse Operating Conditions Deteriorating of External Systems Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to The remote crew is trained to identify critical environmental conditions and to avoid them Environmental conditions for safe operations defined, measurable and adhered to UAS designed and qualified for adverse environmental conditions (e.g. adequate sensors, DO-160 qualification) UAS is designed to automatically manage datalink deterioration situations Datalink systems and infrastructure is manufactured to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is designed to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is installed and maintained to adequate standards appropriate to the operation UAS is designed to manage deterioration of externals systems supporting RPAS Operations Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation The UAS is detectable by other airspace users UAS is equipped with functionality to maintain safe separation Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Multi crew coordination Adequate resting times are defined and followed Safe recovery from Human Error A Human Factors evaluation has been performed and the HMI found appropriate for the mission Automatic protection of critical flight functions (e.g. envelope protection) The operator is competent and/or proven UAS manufactured by competent and/or proven entity UAS maintained by competent and/or proven entity UAS developed to authority recognized design standards Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to UAS is designed considering system safety and reliability Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Safe recovery from technical issue Threats
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat Barriers UAS out Of Control Technical Issues with UAS Aircraft on CollisionCourse Human Error Datalink Deterioration Adverse Operating Conditions Deteriorating of External Systems Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to The remote crew is trained to identify critical environmental conditions and to avoid them Environmental conditions for safe operations defined, measurable and adhered to UAS designed and qualified for adverse environmental conditions (e.g. adequate sensors, DO-160 qualification) UAS is designed to automatically manage datalink deterioration situations Datalink systems and infrastructure is manufactured to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is designed to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is installed and maintained to adequate standards appropriate to the operation UAS is designed to manage deterioration of externals systems supporting RPAS Operations Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation The UAS is detectable by other airspace users UAS is equipped with functionality to maintain safe separation Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Multi crew coordination Adequate resting times are defined and followed Safe recovery from Human Error A Human Factors evaluation has been performed and the HMI found appropriate for the mission Automatic protection of critical flight functions (e.g. envelope protection) The operator is competent and/or proven UAS manufactured by competent and/or proven entity UAS maintained by competent and/or proven entity UAS developed to authority recognized design standards Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to UAS is designed considering system safety and reliability Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Safe recovery from technical issue Threats Again…note the reoccurring thread…specify, design, construct, maintain, operate, train…
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat Barriers UAS out Of Control Technical Issues with UAS Aircraft on CollisionCourse Human Error Datalink Deterioration Adverse Operating Conditions Deteriorating of External Systems Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to The remote crew is trained to identify critical environmental conditions and to avoid them Environmental conditions for safe operations defined, measurable and adhered to UAS designed and qualified for adverse environmental conditions (e.g. adequate sensors, DO-160 qualification) UAS is designed to automatically manage datalink deterioration situations Datalink systems and infrastructure is manufactured to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is designed to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is installed and maintained to adequate standards appropriate to the operation UAS is designed to manage deterioration of externals systems supporting RPAS Operations Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation The UAS is detectable by other airspace users UAS is equipped with functionality to maintain safe separation Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Multi crew coordination Adequate resting times are defined and followed Safe recovery from Human Error A Human Factors evaluation has been performed and the HMI found appropriate for the mission Automatic protection of critical flight functions (e.g. envelope protection) The operator is competent and/or proven UAS manufactured by competent and/or proven entity UAS maintained by competent and/or proven entity UAS developed to authority recognized design standards Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to UAS is designed considering system safety and reliability Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Safe recovery from technical issue Threats Platform Technical Integrity Operational Flexibility Equipage Operator Competence The Challenge is obtaining a safe balance!
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Harm Barriers UAS out Of Control HAZARD Fatalities to 3rd Parties on Ground Fatalities to 3rd Parties in the Air Damage to Critical Infrastructure THREATS Two Types of Harm Barriers • Reduce Effect of Hazard with respect to relevant harm • Reduce the likelihood the hazard will cause harm Contingency Procedures are defined, validated & adhered to CrewTraining is adequate to cope with Situation Containment in place and effective Contingency Procedures are defined, validated & adhered to Contingency Procedures are defined, validated & adhered to CrewTraining is adequate to cope with the situation UAS Design Features mitigate the severity of MAC UAS equipped with capability to Avoid Collision Design features that aid visibility and or detection by other aircraft CrewTraining is adequate to cope with the situation UAS equipped with capability to Avoid Collision UAS equipped with obstacle Avoidance capability Effects of Ground Impact Reduced Allowed Operation Profile takes critical infrastructure into consideration Effects of Ground Impact are reduced
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Adaptation Scoring for Harm Barriers
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Adaptation Scoring for Harm Barriers Initial Ground Risk Class Assessment SAIL Determinations Initial Air Risk Class Assessment Lethality
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Adaptation Scoring for Harm Barriers Initial Ground Risk Class Assessment SAIL Determinations Initial Air Risk Class Assessment Robustness Requirement Lethality
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Adaptation Scoring for Harm Barriers Initial Ground Risk Class Assessment SAIL Determinations Initial Air Risk Class Assessment Suite of Harm Barriers for Ground Risk Category Contingency procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Crew training is adequate to cope with the situation Effects of ground impact are reduced (e.g. emergency parachute, shelter) Containment in place and effective (tether, geo-fencing, route planning, predefined crash areas, etc.) Robustness Requirement Lethality Medium Example Outcome
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Adaptation Scoring for Harm Barriers Initial Ground Risk Class Assessment SAIL Determinations Initial Air Risk Class Assessment CONOPS REALITY Suite of Harm Barriers for Ground Risk Category Contingency procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Crew training is adequate to cope with the situation Effects of ground impact are reduced (e.g. emergency parachute, shelter) Containment in place and effective (tether, geo-fencing, route planning, predefined crash areas, etc.) Robustness Requirement Lethality Medium Assessment Example Outcome SCORE
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Adaptation Scoring for Harm Barriers Initial Ground Risk Class Assessment SAIL Determinations Initial Air Risk Class Assessment CONOPS REALITY Suite of Harm Barriers for Ground Risk Category Contingency procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Crew training is adequate to cope with the situation Effects of ground impact are reduced (e.g. emergency parachute, shelter) Containment in place and effective (tether, geo-fencing, route planning, predefined crash areas, etc.) Robustness Requirement Lethality Assessment of System CONOPS Robustness Low Medium High 2 O 0 2 0 0 0 -1 -2 1 2 -2 Medium Assessment Example Outcome SCORE
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Adaptation Scoring for Harm Barriers Initial Ground Risk Class Assessment SAIL Determinations Initial Air Risk Class Assessment CONOPS REALITY Suite of Harm Barriers for Ground Risk Category Contingency procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Crew training is adequate to cope with the situation Effects of ground impact are reduced (e.g. emergency parachute, shelter) Containment in place and effective (tether, geo-fencing, route planning, predefined crash areas, etc.) Robustness Requirement Lethality Assessment of System CONOPS Robustness Low Medium High 2 O 0 2 0 0 0 -1 -2 1 2 -2 Medium Assessment Example Outcome SCORE RESCORE GRC Initial Ground Risk Classification 3 Contingency procedures are defined, validated and adhered to +0 Crew training is adequate to cope with the situation +0 Effects of ground impact are reduced (e.g. emergency parachute, shelter) -1 Containment in place and effective (tether, geo-fencing, route planning, predefined crash areas, etc.) 2 NEW Ground Risk Classification 2
Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA OUTPUT Objectives to be met and the level of robustness SAIL I : 18 (Low) SAIL II : 19 (Low), 6 (Med) SAIL III : 18 (Low), 15 (Med), 6(High) SAIL IV : 3 (Low), 19 (Med), 12 (High) SAILV : 6 (Med), 28 (High) SAILVI : 35 (High) JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA OUTPUT Objectives to be met and the level of robustness SAIL I : 18 (Low) SAIL II : 19 (Low), 6 (Med) SAIL III : 18 (Low), 15 (Med), 6(High) SAIL IV : 3 (Low), 19 (Med), 12 (High) SAILV : 6 (Med), 28 (High) SAILVI : 35 (High) Training Barriers Design & Prod Barriers Ops Barriers Maint Barriers JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat Barriers UAS out Of Control Technical Issues with UAS Aircraft on CollisionCourse Human Error Datalink Deterioration Adverse Operating Conditions Deteriorating of External Systems Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to The remote crew is trained to identify critical environmental conditions and to avoid them Environmental conditions for safe operations defined, measurable and adhered to UAS designed and qualified for adverse environmental conditions (e.g. adequate sensors, DO-160 qualification) UAS is designed to automatically manage datalink deterioration situations Datalink performance established and verified (e.g. datalink budget) Procedures and limitations are in- place and adhered to Datalink systems and infrastructure is manufactured to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is designed to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is installed and maintained to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Procs are in place to handle deterioration of external systems supporting RPAS Operations UAS is designed to manage deterioration of externals systems supporting RPAS Operations Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation The UAS is detectable by other airspace users UAS is equipped with functionality to maintain safe separation Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Multi crew coordination Adequate resting times are defined and followed Safe recovery from Human Error A Human Factors evaluation has been performed and the HMI found appropriate for the mission Automatic protection of critical flight functions (e.g. envelope protection) The operator is competent and/or proven UAS manufactured by competent and/or proven entity UAS maintained by competent and/or proven entity UAS developed to authority recognized design standards Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to UAS is designed considering system safety and reliability Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Safe recovery from technical issue Threats
Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Robustness and Verification of Barriers UAS out Of Control Technical Issues with UAS Aircraft on CollisionCourse Human Error Datalink Deterioration Adverse Operating Conditions Deteriorating of External Systems Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to The remote crew is trained to identify critical environmental conditions and to avoid them Environmental conditions for safe operations defined, measurable and adhered to UAS designed and qualified for adverse environmental conditions (e.g. adequate sensors, DO-160 qualification) UAS is designed to automatically manage datalink deterioration situations Datalink performance established and verified (e.g. datalink budget) Procedures and limitations are in- place and adhered to Datalink systems and infrastructure is manufactured to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is designed to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is installed and maintained to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Procs are in place to handle deterioration of external systems supporting RPAS Operations UAS is designed to manage deterioration of externals systems supporting RPAS Operations Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation The UAS is detectable by other airspace users UAS is equipped with functionality to maintain safe separation Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Multi crew coordination Adequate resting times are defined and followed Safe recovery from Human Error A Human Factors evaluation has been performed and the HMI found appropriate for the mission Automatic protection of critical flight functions (e.g. envelope protection) The operator is competent and/or proven UAS manufactured by competent and/or proven entity UAS maintained by competent and/or proven entity UAS developed to authority recognized design standards Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to UAS is designed considering system safety and reliability Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Safe recovery from technical issue Threats Robustness &Verification of Barriers LOW – Applicant provides self-declaration required level of integrity achieved. MEDIUM • Applicant provides supporting evidence required level of integrity achieved. • Local authority/qualified entity may request 3rd party validation for some supporting elements. HIGH • 3rd party validation of the achieved integrity is required
Copyright:Terrence Martin ARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Guidelines for System & Operation Information for a CONOPS Organisation Operations Training RPAS Airframe Performance Flight Controls Propulsion Sensors Payloads RPA Geo Fence Navigation Autopilot RPS FCS DAA Payloads Control Details & Architecture Loss Degradation Safety Features C2 Link GSE Training Barriers Maintenances Crew Details Safety Normal Ops Strategy AbnormalOps Accidents & Incidents SOPs Maint of Currency FSTDs Training Program InitialTRG & Quals
Copyright: Terrence Martin Moving Ahead of Basic SORA In Australia
Copyright:Terrence Martin Moving Ahead • Threat & Harm Barriers • No guidelines for Low, Medium or High Levels of robustness • Therefore, cant determine what a Nominal score in Adaptation Process? • Whats a 0 or + or – score? • Future Studies may update the Lethality categorisation process? • Quantitative Methodology • Barrier influence on Risk • AdaptationValues • Who will be the 3rd PartyVerifiers of Systems, Operations etc? Areas of Uncertainty
Copyright:Terrence Martin Moving Ahead • Threat & Harm Barriers • No guidelines for Low, Medium or High Levels of robustness • Therefore, cant determine what a Nominal score in Adaptation Process? • Whats a 0 or + or – score? • Future Studies may update the Lethality categorisation process? • Quantitative Methodology • Barrier influence on Risk • AdaptationValues • Who will be the 3rd PartyVerifiers of Systems, Operations etc? Areas of Uncertainty Kristian Cruickshank has taken the SORA and “stress tested it with one of the developed Australian CONOPS Found a number of additional uncertainties in SORA Process.
Copyright:Terrence Martin Moving Ahead • Expanded Operations can’t proceed until Risk Process developed • CouldWait for Europe to address the uncertainties or we could work with the basic concepts and enhance it with some of our own insight! SORA and Australia
Copyright:Terrence Martin Moving Ahead • Expanded Operations can’t proceed until Risk Process developed • CouldWait for Europe to address the uncertainties or we could work with the basic concepts and enhance it with some of our own insight! SORA and Australia WE CAN MAKE ITWORK LETS SHOWYOU HOW!
Copyright:Terrence Martin Moving Ahead • Risk Model Developed at Nova for ADF, distilled for public use • Employs BowTie XP • More Effort applied to breakdown of threat and harm barrier identified in JARUS model • Can be used to enhance Basic JARUS model significantly forAustralian RPAS community benefit SORA and Australia
Copyright:Terrence Martin Moving Ahead Nova Systems Risk Model Example Thread Hazard Central Event BarrierThreat Barrier Effectiveness Rating Barrier Category Consequence Barrier Degradation (or Escalation) Factor
Copyright:Terrence Martin Moving Ahead End State Suite of Indigenous CONOPS Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA Framework NOVA Model CASA HAZLOG
Copyright:Terrence Martin Updated SORA Blackbox Hazard Central Event BarrierThreat Barrier Effectiveness Rating Barrier Category Consequence Barrier Degradation (or Escalation) Factor Background Models & Process to be Updated by Risk Specialists Moving Ahead End State Suite of Indigenous CONOPS Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA Framework NOVA Model CASA HAZLOG
Copyright:Terrence Martin Updated SORA Blackbox Hazard Central Event BarrierThreat Barrier Effectiveness Rating Barrier Category Consequence Barrier Degradation (or Escalation) Factor Background Models & Process to be Updated by Risk Specialists Moving Ahead End State Priority Templates for National Priority CONOPSSuite of Indigenous CONOPS Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA Framework NOVA Model CASA HAZLOG
Copyright:Terrence Martin Updated SORA Blackbox Hazard Central Event BarrierThreat Barrier Effectiveness Rating Barrier Category Consequence Barrier Degradation (or Escalation) Factor Background Models & Process to be Updated by Risk Specialists Joe Public ApplicationTemplates Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. SAIL I SAILVSAIL IV SAILIIISAIL I SAILV Moving Ahead End State Priority Templates for National Priority CONOPSSuite of Indigenous CONOPS Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA Framework NOVA Model CASA HAZLOG
Copyright:Terrence Martin Updated SORA Blackbox Hazard Central Event BarrierThreat Barrier Effectiveness Rating Barrier Category Consequence Barrier Degradation (or Escalation) Factor Background Models & Process to be Updated by Risk Specialists Joe Public ApplicationTemplates Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. SAIL I SAILVSAIL IV SAILIIISAIL I SAILV Moving Ahead End State CASA Assessor Templates Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. SAIL I SAILVSAIL IV SAILIIISAIL I SAILV Priority Templates for National Priority CONOPSSuite of Indigenous CONOPS Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA Framework NOVA Model CASA HAZLOG
Terry Martin - CASA UAS Standards Committee Meeting Nov 2016
Terry Martin - CASA UAS Standards Committee Meeting Nov 2016
Terry Martin - CASA UAS Standards Committee Meeting Nov 2016
Terry Martin - CASA UAS Standards Committee Meeting Nov 2016
Terry Martin - CASA UAS Standards Committee Meeting Nov 2016
Terry Martin - CASA UAS Standards Committee Meeting Nov 2016
Terry Martin - CASA UAS Standards Committee Meeting Nov 2016

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Terry Martin - CASA UAS Standards Committee Meeting Nov 2016

  • 1. UAS STANDARDS SUB COMMITTEE BI-ANNUAL MEETING NOVEMBER 2016 INDUSTRY CO-CHAIR TERRY MARTIN
  • 2. Copyright:Terrence Martin Acknowledgements • Mick Jaeschke • 37Years Service • Originally En Route moved intoTower • ManyYears in CairnsTerminal Area • More recently approx. 15 in BrisbaneTMA where he was a supervisor • Finished up in ATS Integrity….
  • 3. Copyright:Terrence Martin Introduction • Refresh • Where we were at last meeting • Where we would like to be. • Key Principles supporting remainder of presentation • What we are doing about it. • What remains to be done
  • 5. Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh • Innovation, Disruption, the vulnerability of smokestack economies • Supporting this requires improved Industry-Regulator Collaboration Key Points Made
  • 6. Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh • Innovation, Disruption, the vulnerability of smokestack economies • Airworthiness & Lack of Suitable Regulatory Framework Key Points Made
  • 7. Copyright:Terrence Martin AcceptablySafe is defined by the SafetyTargets- See Argument 1. Argument 4 System transitioned into services in acceptably safe manner Argument 5 System shown to be operated acceptably safely Argument 6 System maintained and sustained acceptably safely Airworthiness High Level Safety Argument Argument 2 System designed to be acceptably safe Personnel are appropriately trained to conduct and verify activities which underpin the safety argument Argument 3 System constructed and implemented completely and correctly Argument 1 System has been specified to acceptably safe. Assumptions stated Applicable for intended Operational Environment Verification of Evidence that SafetyTargets are met, with plans for ongoing monitoring ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE Last Meeting Refresh Airworthiness and the Safety Argument
  • 8. Copyright:Terrence Martin AcceptablySafe is defined by the SafetyTargets- See Argument 1. Argument 4 System transitioned into services in acceptably safe manner Argument 5 System shown to be operated acceptably safely Argument 6 System maintained and sustained acceptably safely Airworthiness High Level Safety Argument Argument 2 System designed to be acceptably safe Personnel are appropriately trained to conduct and verify activities which underpin the safety argument Argument 3 System constructed and implemented completely and correctly Argument 1 System has been specified to acceptably safe. Assumptions stated Applicable for intended Operational Environment Verification of Evidence that SafetyTargets are met, with plans for ongoing monitoring ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE Last Meeting Refresh Airworthiness and the Safety Argument
  • 9. Copyright:Terrence Martin AcceptablySafe is defined by the SafetyTargets- See Argument 1. Argument 4 System transitioned into services in acceptably safe manner Argument 5 System shown to be operated acceptably safely Argument 6 System maintained and sustained acceptably safely Airworthiness High Level Safety Argument Argument 2 System designed to be acceptably safe Personnel are appropriately trained to conduct and verify activities which underpin the safety argument Argument 3 System constructed and implemented completely and correctly Argument 1 System has been specified to acceptably safe. Assumptions stated Applicable for intended Operational Environment Verification of Evidence that SafetyTargets are met, with plans for ongoing monitoring ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE Last Meeting Refresh Airworthiness and the Safety Argument
  • 10. Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh Future RPAS Framework Certified Specific Open Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Toys European Approach Australian Draft Framework Regulated Specific Open Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS
  • 11. Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh Future RPAS Framework Certified Specific Open Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Toys European Approach Australian Draft Framework Regulated Specific Open Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Low Risk Operations
  • 12. Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh Future RPAS Framework Certified Specific Open Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Toys European Approach Australian Draft Framework Regulated Specific Open Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Low Risk Operations Medium Risk Operations
  • 13. Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh Future RPAS Framework Certified Specific Open Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Toys European Approach Australian Draft Framework Regulated Specific Open Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Low Risk Operations Medium Risk Operations High Risk Operations
  • 14. Copyright:Terrence Martin Regulated Specific Open Small RPAS Very small RPAS Element of Initial Airworthiness CPA like Oversight of Integrity. NAA led Industry Appointed Oversight No Integrity Oversight Operational Restrictions Last Meeting Refresh Future RPAS Framework
  • 15. Copyright:Terrence Martin Regulated Specific Open Small RPAS Very small RPAS Element of Initial Airworthiness CPA like Oversight of Integrity. NAA led Industry Appointed Oversight No Integrity Oversight Operational Restrictions Proportionate &SAFE: Operational Restrictions commensurate with technical integrity & operational environment Last Meeting Refresh Future RPAS Framework
  • 16. Copyright:Terrence Martin Regulated Specific Open Small RPAS Very small RPAS Element of Initial Airworthiness CPA like Oversight of Integrity. NAA led Industry Appointed Oversight No Integrity Oversight Operational Restrictions Enter the US Element Derivative of US sUAS NPRM Last Meeting Refresh Future RPAS Framework
  • 17. Copyright:Terrence Martin Regulated Specific Open Small RPAS Very small RPAS Element of Initial Airworthiness CPA like Oversight of Integrity. NAA led Industry Appointed Oversight No Integrity Oversight Operational Restrictions Enter the US Element Derivative of US sUAS NPRM Open = Small SegregatedVLOS Container Last Meeting Refresh Future RPAS Framework
  • 18. Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome Last Meeting Refresh Work Outstanding Regulated Specific
  • 19. Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome Last Meeting Refresh Work Outstanding Regulated Specific
  • 20. Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome Airworthiness Expectations based on CPA Regulations e.g.TC/CoA Last Meeting Refresh Work Outstanding Regulated Specific
  • 21. Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome Last Meeting Refresh Work Outstanding Regulated Specific
  • 22. Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome Last Meeting Refresh Work Outstanding Regulated Specific Work to be done • What Equipment • What Restrictions • What Procedures • WhatTraining • How is RISK Assessed?
  • 23. Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome Last Meeting Refresh Work Outstanding Regulated Specific
  • 24. Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome Last Meeting Refresh Work Outstanding Regulated Specific Operational Flexibility Platform Technical Integrity Equipage Operator Competence
  • 25. Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh • Innovation, Disruption, the vulnerability of smokestack economies • Airworthiness & Lack of Suitable Regulatory Framework Key Points Made
  • 26. Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh • Innovation, Disruption, the vulnerability of smokestack economies • Airworthiness & Lack of Suitable Regulatory Framework • Need for a RPAS Roadmap Key Points Made Goals Milestones Gaps & Barriers Task List Priorities, Timelines, People
  • 27. Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh • Innovation, Disruption, the vulnerability of smokestack economies • Airworthiness & Lack of Suitable Regulatory Framework • Need for a RPAS Roadmap • What is the Scope for a Roadmap Key Points Made Goals Milestones Gaps & Barriers Task List Priorities, Timelines, People
  • 28. Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh • Innovation, Disruption, the vulnerability of smokestack economies • Airworthiness & Lack of Suitable Regulatory Framework • Need for a RPAS Roadmap • What is the Scope for a Roadmap • How Long will it take? Key Points Made Goals Milestones Gaps & Barriers Task List Priorities, Timelines, People
  • 29. Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh What about aWBS….What needs to be done? Key Problems
  • 30. Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh What about aWBS….What needs to be done? • National Priorities:What are they, CONOPS Key Problems
  • 31. Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh What about aWBS….What needs to be done? • National Priorities:What are they, CONOPS • Gap Analysis 101: • Baseline: What is it? Is it transparent? • What regulations do we require • Do we know what we want? Kinda?  Benchmarking? • What else is uncertain: How can we correct that? • Risk Assessment; is it Fit for Purpose • Trials Key Problems
  • 32. Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh What about aWBS….What needs to be done? • National Priorities:What are they, CONOPS • Gap Analysis 101: • Baseline: What is it? Is it transparent? • What regulations do we require • Do we know what we want? Kinda?  Benchmarking? • What else is uncertain: How can we correct that? • Risk Assessment; is it Fit for Purpose • Trials • Constraints: What’s Feasible with our workforce, • NumbersTo Develop Regulations & conduct necessary research • Skill to make decisions over safety • How much “Close Following” Key Problems
  • 33. Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh What about aWBS….What needs to be done? • National Priorities:What are they, CONOPS • Gap Analysis 101: • Baseline: What is it? Is it transparent? • What regulations do we require • Do we know what we want? Kinda?  Benchmarking? • What else is uncertain: How can we correct that? • Risk Assessment; is it Fit for Purpose • Trials • Constraints: What’s Feasible with our workforce, • NumbersTo Develop Regulations & conduct necessary research • Skill to make decisions over safety • How much “Close Following” Key Problems Need to change how Industry is contributing in UASSC WG structures • More regular engagement, • Build trust • Achieve Outcomes • Be transparent • Isolate where accountability lies
  • 34. Copyright:Terrence Martin Last Meeting Refresh What about aWBS….What needs to be done? • National Priorities:What are they, CONOPS • Gap Analysis 101: • Baseline: What is it? Is it transparent? • What regulations do we require • Do we know what we want? Kinda?  Benchmarking? • What else is uncertain: How can we correct that? • Risk Assessment; is it Fit for Purpose • Trials • Constraints: What’s Feasible with our workforce, • NumbersTo Develop Regulations & conduct necessary research • Skill to make decisions over safety • How much “Close Following” Key Problems Need to change how Industry is contributing in UASSC WG structures • More regular engagement, • Build trust • Achieve Outcomes • Be transparent • Isolate where accountability lies Working Group Members Terry Martin Queensland Uni of Tech and Nova Systems Paul Herrmann Textron Jennifer Mulvaney Intel Lance King Northrup Grumman Kristian Cruickshank Nova Systems Carrie Hillier QLD Local Government Infrastructure Services Phillip Jones-Hope AMSA Matt Rayson Ground Effect Aviation Patrick Weeden Scout Arial System GregTyrrell AAUS Rhys Mudford Insitu Pacific Mike Jaeschke Airservices Australia Subject Matter Experts Duncan Greer Five Rings Aero Phillip Rowse ProfiCNC Dean Gilligan Australian Research Centre for Aerospace Automation Julian Webber Federal Police Peter Schofield Ergon
  • 36. System Certification Regulated Specific RiskAssessment Methodology Traffic Density Certification Status Population Comms & Surveillance Coverage CrewTraining Airspace Category Operation Criticality Benchmarking (EU, US) Airspace Management Policy Human Factors CNPC Detect & Avoid Risk Management sUAS & Low Level UAVOps Ops near Aerodromes Security EmergingTech National Operational Priorities CONOPS Unique Sector Requirements Common Requirements ALL CONOPS Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption Baselining CASA Processes Approval Benchmark Available Manpower Risk Management Knowledge Gaps Safety Obligations Trial Appetite Identification of Low Hanging Fruit Improved awareness of what is preventing progress • Technology Shortfalls, • Skills, Knowledge, Capacity • Evidence requirements for Risk: traffic, population • Platform Integrity Requirements for Operations • Trial Opportunities • Separation Confidence • Position Reporting: RAIM like assurance • Navigation Performance • Compatibility with Airspace Class Requirements • Confidence platform can reliably maintain flight Trials Evidence Requirements Skills Trial Sites Teaming Safety Expectations Trial Methodologies Feedback Expectation
  • 37. Copyright:Terrence Martin Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption Developing the Roadmap Produce and Enact a Plan that will lead to: • Improvement of regulatory process to protect and promote RPAS related investment in Australia and enable Industry growth • Operation of RPA over populated areas, and • BVLOS RPA operations in unsegregated airspace. • Isolate and then delineate what are capability gaps and regulatory gaps (and overlaps) FOR Australian Operations ? Roadmap Goals
  • 38. Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap Objectives Objectives: CONOPS Coverage Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption
  • 39. Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap Objectives • Identify the Priority sectors, and benefits for RPAS Operations in Australia (Includes CONOPs development) . Objectives: CONOPS Coverage National Operational Priorities Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption
  • 40. Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap Objectives • Identify the Priority sectors, and benefits for RPAS Operations in Australia (Includes CONOPs development) . • Set of CONOPS developed & provided to forum for review Objectives: CONOPS Coverage National Operational Priorities CONOPS Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption
  • 41. Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap Objectives • Identify the Priority sectors, and benefits for RPAS Operations in Australia (Includes CONOPs development) . • Set of CONOPS developed & provided to forum for review Objectives: CONOPS Coverage National Operational Priorities CONOPS Agriculture: • Broad Area PrecisionAgriculture, • Pest &Weed Detection, Disaster & Emergency Services • SAR (Maritime) • Tropical Cyclone with Cells onWings • CBRN • Small Scale Urban SAR Cells onWings (COWS) & UTM Conservation Mining/Hard Rock/Pit/Open Cut Logistics • Package Delivery • Long Range Freight Training • BVLOS • VLOS/EVLOS Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption
  • 42. Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap Objectives • Identify the Priority sectors, and benefits for RPAS Operations in Australia (Includes CONOPs development) . • Set of CONOPS developed & provided to forum for review Objectives: CONOPS Coverage National Operational Priorities CONOPS Agriculture: • Broad Area PrecisionAgriculture, • Pest &Weed Detection, Disaster & Emergency Services • SAR (Maritime) • Tropical Cyclone with Cells onWings • CBRN • Small Scale Urban SAR Cells onWings (COWS) & UTM Conservation Mining/Hard Rock/Pit/Open Cut Logistics • Package Delivery • Long Range Freight Training • BVLOS • VLOS/EVLOS Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption CONOPS Development Credits • Kristian Cruickshank (Major Credit) • Rhys Mudford • Terry Martin • JulianWebber • Phillip Rouse • Duncan Greer • Matt Rayson • Lance King • PatrickWeeden • Phillip Jones Hope
  • 43. Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap Objectives • Identify the Priority sectors, and benefits for RPAS Operations in Australia (Includes CONOPs development) . • Set of CONOPS developed & provided to forum for review Objectives: Priority Sectors & CONOPS Coverage National Operational Priorities CONOPS Unique Sector Requirements Common Requirements ALL CONOPS Identification of Low Hanging Fruit Improved awareness of what is preventing progress Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption
  • 44. Copyright:Terrence Martin Baselining CASA Processes Approval Benchmark Available Manpower Risk Management Knowledge Gaps Safety Obligations Trial Appetite Objectives • Baseline Australia’s RPAS regulatory environment and benchmark against key international developments Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption Developing the Roadmap Baselining CASA Processes WHY? • Community is uncertain what the current approval BVLOS baseline is! • Vague understanding of the regulatory and capability gaps that are preventing progress of range of BVLOS Operations • Not all Operations are the Same • Prudent to Harmonise
  • 45. Benchmarking (EU, US) Airspace Management Policy Human Factors CNPC Detect & Avoid Risk Management sUAS & Low Level UAVOps Ops near Aerodromes Security EmergingTech Baselining CASA Processes Approval Benchmark Available Manpower Risk Management Knowledge Gaps Safety Obligations Trial Appetite Objectives • Baseline Australia’s RPAS regulatory environment and benchmark against key international developments • Benchmark against International Standards Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption
  • 46. Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap 14 Key R&D Activities: • EVLOS/VLOS • 1.RPAS activities awareness for security • 2. Operations in Urban Areas • 3. Human Factors • IFR/VFR • 4. Visual Detectability solutions • 5. DAA • 6. Comms C2 Datalink • 7. Airspace & Airport Access • 8 Contingency • BVLOS • 9. DAA • 10. Comms C2 Datalink • 11 Airspace & Airport Access • 12. Security • 13 Human Factors: BVLOS & IFR/VFR • 14 Best Practice Demonstration Europe: Technology and Operational Gaps GAPS LINKED TO ACTION & MILESTONES Operational & Technology gaps: 1. Integration into ATM and Airspace environments 2. Surface operations incl. take-off and landing 3. Operational contingency procedures and systems 4. Data communication links incl. spectrum issues 5. Detect & Avoid systems and operational procedures 6. Security issues 7. Verification and Validation Methods
  • 47. Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap 1. Communications • Impact of UAS Ops on NextGen comms systems • Availability of UAS Control frequency Spectrum • Develop &Validate UAS Control System Performance Requirement • Ensure security of safety critical comms with civil UAS • Design & Develop UAS Control Datalink for allocated frequency spectrum bands United States Identified R&D Areas/Gaps 2. Airspace Operations • Develop Integrated Separation Concepts • Develop Airspace Integration Safety Cases • Develop SAA Sensors & Fusion Requires • Develop Separation Algorithms • Assess Availability/Quality of Surveillance Data • Safe and Efficient Terminal Airspace & Surface Operations
  • 48. Copyright:Terrence Martin 3. Unmanned Aircraft • State Awareness and RealTime Mission Management • Airframe Certification • Precise Location & Navigation • UAS Avionics & Control Systems Certification 4. Human Systems Integration • Display Traffic/airspace information • Effective Human Automation Interaction • Pilot Centric GCS • Definition Roles and Responsibilities • Predictability & Contingency Mgt • System Level Issues • Support for Future Capability of UAS Developing the Roadmap United States Identified R&D Areas/Gaps
  • 49. Copyright:Terrence Martin 3. Unmanned Aircraft • State Awareness and RealTime Mission Management • Airframe Certification • Precise Location & Navigation • UAS Avionics & Control Systems Certification 4. Human Systems Integration • Display Traffic/airspace information • Effective Human Automation Interaction • Pilot Centric GCS • Definition Roles and Responsibilities • Predictability & Contingency Mgt • System Level Issues • Support for Future Capability of UAS Developing the Roadmap United States Identified R&D Areas/Gaps So are we going to reinvent the wheel on all of these? Do we even have the capacity? Where should we Close Follow?
  • 50. Benchmarking (EU, US) Airspace Management Policy Human Factors CNPC Detect & Avoid Risk Management sUAS & Low Level UAVOps Ops near Aerodromes Security EmergingTech National Operational Priorities CONOPS Unique Sector Requirements Common Requirements ALL CONOPS Baselining CASA Processes Approval Benchmark Available Manpower Risk Management Knowledge Gaps Safety Obligations Trial Appetite Objectives • Baseline Australia’s RPAS regulatory environment and benchmark against key international developments • Benchmark against International Standards • Establish Australian specific gaps and necessary work Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption Prioritised Australian RPAS gaps & opportunities Identification of Low Hanging Fruit Improved awareness of what is preventing progress • Technology Shortfalls, • Skills, Knowledge, Capacity • Evidence requirements for Risk: traffic, population • Platform Integrity Requirements for Operations • Trial Opportunities
  • 51. Copyright:Terrence Martin Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption Developing the Roadmap • Objectives • Taking into consideration Australia’s (CASA and Industry) skill and personnel capacity • Identify areas which can provide “quick wins “for commencing operations, • Establish the key issues and challenges which must be addressed, and isolate where we can act, and where we will be reliant on overseas organisations • Establish trial priorities, and key enablers/resources and prioritised sequencing for their conduct. • Establishment of regulatory development priorities and recommendations • Development of a proposed timeline for achieving the recommendations Objectives
  • 52. Copyright:Terrence Martin Trials Evidence Requirements Skills Trial Sites Teaming Safety Expectations Trial Methodologies Feedback Expectation Developing the Roadmap Objectives • Help Address areas of uncertainty CASA’s has • Regulatory development & Certification criteria • Conducting risk analysis • Specific and certified categories, Operations in the vicinity of people, different classes of airspace • Progress BVLOS • With and without Surveillance : PSR, SSR, ADSB, other? • Airborne and ground based sensors Roadmap Development: Trials • Patience & Setting up environment where you can fail • Key Contributors: PatrickWeeden, Lance King,Terry Martin, Kristian Cruickshank Carrie Hillier
  • 53. Copyright:Terrence Martin Trials Evidence Requirements Skills Trial Sites Teaming Safety Expectations Trial Methodologies Feedback Expectation Developing the Roadmap Site Attributes: • Location, Airspace Class, Surveillance, Population,VHF Coverage, IFR/VFR Routes,Terrain, • Proximity to Critical Infrastructure/CBD/Aerodromes • Politics, funding, investment • Instrumentation? • Feedback of Information/Data to CASA • Call for Input on the Forum. Roadmap Development: Trials • Key Contributors: PatrickWeeden, Lance King,Terry Martin, Kristian Cruickshank, Carrie Hillier
  • 54. Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap • Yet to be Developed • JARUS SORA & Risk will drive training rigour • Some Considerations embedded in the CONOPS & MOS Roadmap Development: Training
  • 55. System Certification Regulated Specific RiskAssessment Methodology Traffic Density Certification Status Population Comms & Surveillance Coverage CrewTraining Airspace Category Operation Criticality Benchmarking (EU, US) Airspace Management Policy Human Factors CNPC Detect & Avoid Risk Management sUAS & Low Level UAVOps Ops near Aerodromes Security EmergingTech National Operational Priorities CONOPS Unique Sector Requirements Common Requirements ALL CONOPS Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption Baselining CASA Processes Approval Benchmark Available Manpower Risk Management Knowledge Gaps Safety Obligations Trial Appetite Identification of Low Hanging Fruit Improved awareness of what is preventing progress • Technology Shortfalls, • Skills, Knowledge, Capacity • Evidence requirements for Risk: traffic, population • Platform Integrity Requirements for Operations • Trial Opportunities • Separation Confidence • Position Reporting: RAIM like assurance • Navigation Performance • Compatibility with Airspace Class Requirements • Confidence platform can reliably maintain flight Trials Evidence Requirements Skills Trial Sites Teaming Safety Expectations Trial Methodologies Feedback Expectation
  • 56. Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap • Specific Category Operations will be based on risk assessment • Risk Methodology is critical, yet still uncertain in many facets • CASA is committed to harmonisation. • Little point departing too far from the likely Risk Methodology • Adopting EASA methodologies • JARUS SORA is a key part of the Risk Assessment process • Can we get a headstart? Risk Assessment Regulated Specific Open Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Platform Technical Integrity Operational Flexibility Equipage Operator Competence
  • 57. Copyright: Terrence Martin Specific Operations Risk Assessment
  • 58. Copyright:Terrence Martin • Step 0 -Initial Evaluation • Step 1 CONOPS Description • Step 2 Determine initial UAS Ground Risk Class • Step 3 Determine initial UAS Air Risk Class • Step 3A- Harm Barriers and GRC • Step 3B- Harm Barrier and ARC • Step 4 – Lethality Determination • Step 5 SpecificAssurance and Integrity Levels • Step 6 Ident of RecommendedThreat Barriers • Step 7 Feasibility Check • Step 8-Verification of robustness proposed barriers THE Process Specific Operation Risk Assessment
  • 59. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA and SAIL Overview
  • 60. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA and SAIL Overview
  • 61. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA OUTPUT Objectives to be met and the level of robustness SAIL I : 18 (Low) SAIL II : 19 (Low), 6 (Med) SAIL III : 18 (Low), 15 (Med), 6(High) SAIL IV : 3 (Low), 19 (Med), 12 (High) SAILV : 6 (Med), 28 (High) SAILVI : 35 (High) SORA and SAIL Overview
  • 62. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA OUTPUT Objectives to be met and the level of robustness SAIL I : 18 (Low) SAIL II : 19 (Low), 6 (Med) SAIL III : 18 (Low), 15 (Med), 6(High) SAIL IV : 3 (Low), 19 (Med), 12 (High) SAILV : 6 (Med), 28 (High) SAILVI : 35 (High) SORA and SAIL Overview SAIL is the level of confidence that a specific operation will stay under control Lowest SAIL I- low intrinsic risk, Highest, SAIL VI - high intrinsic risks
  • 63. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA OUTPUT Objectives to be met and the level of robustness SAIL I : 18 (Low) SAIL II : 19 (Low), 6 (Med) SAIL III : 18 (Low), 15 (Med), 6(High) SAIL IV : 3 (Low), 19 (Med), 12 (High) SAILV : 6 (Med), 28 (High) SAILVI : 35 (High) Training Barriers Design & Prod Barriers Ops Barriers SORA and SAIL Overview Maint Barriers
  • 64. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Step 2: CONOPS
  • 65. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
  • 66. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Not really that different is it?
  • 67. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Ground Risk Class Max UA Characteristic Dimension 1 metre 3 metres 8 metres > 8 metres Kinetic Energy Expected < 700 Joules < 34000 Joules < 1.084 MegaJoule s > 1.084 MegaJoules Operational Scenarios VLOS in controlled area, sparsely populated 1 2 3 4 BVLOS, sparsely populated 2 3 4 5 VLOS over controlled area, populated environment 3 4 5 6 BVLOS controlled area, populated orVLOS over populated 4 5 6 7 BVLOS Urban Environment 5 6 7 7 VLOS/BVLOS over gathering of people 6 7 7 7
  • 68. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Ground Risk Class Max UA Characteristic Dimension 1 metre 3 metres 8 metres > 8 metres Kinetic Energy Expected < 700 Joules < 34000 Joules < 1.084 MegaJoule s > 1.084 MegaJoules Operational Scenarios VLOS in controlled area, sparsely populated 1 2 3 4 BVLOS, sparsely populated 2 3 4 5 VLOS over controlled area, populated environment 3 4 5 6 BVLOS controlled area, populated orVLOS over populated 4 5 6 7 BVLOS Urban Environment 5 6 7 7 VLOS/BVLOS over gathering of people 6 7 7 7 SUMMARY Inputs: • Dimension- 1 of 4 discrete categories • Kinetic Energy- 1 of 1 categories • Desired Operational Scenario. Permutations in • VLOS/BVLOS • Controlled area • Sparsely Populated, populated or urban or gathering of people Output • Ground Risk Score our of 7
  • 69. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Air Risk Class Air Risk Class Very Low ( above FL600, below highest Building) 1 Low (Below 500 ft or within 400 ft from Infrastructure) 2/3 * Medium (Away from Major FL and Airways) 4/5 * High ( In Major FL & on airways, aerodrome traffic Patterns 6 Very High 7 Note: that for VLOS and EVLOS Operations, the lowest ARC should be chosen, For BLOS highest should be chosen.
  • 70. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Air Risk Class Air Risk Class Very Low ( above FL600, below highest Building) 1 Low (Below 500 ft or within 400 ft from Infrastructure) 2/3 * Medium (Away from Major FL and Airways) 4/5 * High ( In Major FL & on airways, aerodrome traffic Patterns 6 Very High 7 Note: that for VLOS and EVLOS Operations, the lowest ARC should be chosen, For BLOS highest should be chosen. SUMMARY Inputs: • Altitude • Proximity to air traffic, aerodromes & infrastructure Output • Air Risk Score our of 7
  • 71. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Lethality SAIL Lethality Highest of GRC and ARC 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 HIGH VI VI V IV III II I AVERAGE VI V IV III II I O LOW V IV III II I O O Note: that for VLOS and EVLOS Operations, the lowest ARC should be chosen, For BLOS highest should be chosen. No Guidance on what constitutes High, Average or Low Lethality ( See Later) Studies are being conducted and standards being written to evaluate the lethality of UAS. SORA will be updated when this occurs
  • 72. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA OUTPUT Objectives to be met and the level of robustness SAIL I : 18 (Low) SAIL II : 19 (Low), 6 (Med) SAIL III : 18 (Low), 15 (Med), 6(High) SAIL IV : 3 (Low), 19 (Med), 12 (High) SAILV : 6 (Med), 28 (High) SAILVI : 35 (High) JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
  • 73. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA OUTPUT Objectives to be met and the level of robustness SAIL I : 18 (Low) SAIL II : 19 (Low), 6 (Med) SAIL III : 18 (Low), 15 (Med), 6(High) SAIL IV : 3 (Low), 19 (Med), 12 (High) SAILV : 6 (Med), 28 (High) SAILVI : 35 (High) JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Established SAIL will determine: • Objectives to be complied with, • Description of activities that might support the compliance with those objectives, and • Evidence to indicate the objectives have been satisfied
  • 74. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA OUTPUT Objectives to be met and the level of robustness SAIL I : 18 (Low) SAIL II : 19 (Low), 6 (Med) SAIL III : 18 (Low), 15 (Med), 6(High) SAIL IV : 3 (Low), 19 (Med), 12 (High) SAILV : 6 (Med), 28 (High) SAILVI : 35 (High) Training Barriers Design & Prod Barriers Ops Barriers Maint Barriers JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Established SAIL will determine: • Objectives to be complied with, • Description of activities that might support the compliance with those objectives, and • Evidence to indicate the objectives have been satisfied
  • 76. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS Holistic Risk Model Bow Ties Initial Event 1 Initial Event 3 Initial Event 2 2. What Safety Event Could Initiate the Hazard? UNDESIRABLE EVENT/TOP EVENT 3. How do we avoid the undesirable Event. How do we control the hazard HAZARD 1. What is the Hazard? 4. What Happens when Hazard Control is lost? Potential Outcome 1 Potential Outcome 2 Potential Outcome 3 Preventative Barriers 6. How can the accident Scenario Develop? What are the potential Outcomes? Mitigation/Recovery Barriers 5. How do we recover if the event occurs? How can the outcome likelihood or consequence severity be reduced?
  • 77. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS Holistic Risk Model JAURS SORA : Bow Ties UAS out Of Control HAZARD Fatalities to 3rd Parties on Ground Fatalities to 3rd Parties in the Air Damage to Critical Infrastructure Technical Issues with UAS Aircraft on CollisionCourse Technical Issues with UAS Human Error Datalink Deteroration Adverse Operating Conditions Deteriorating of External Systems THREATS HARM
  • 78. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat and Harm Barriers Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground
  • 79. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat and Harm Barriers Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood UAS Out of Control
  • 80. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat and Harm Barriers Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control X
  • 81. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat and Harm Barriers Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX
  • 82. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat and Harm Barriers Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Objective is that the number of fatal injuries per flight hour should be equivalent with Manned Aviation
  • 83. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX
  • 84. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified
  • 85. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified Specific
  • 86. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified Specific Open Category
  • 87. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified Specific Open Category 1E-6 1E-6 1E-6
  • 88. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified Specific Open Category 1E-6 1E-6 1E-6 ThisValue is not appropriate see AMC 1309 … but its useful to demonstrate the principle of seeking to maintain equivalence
  • 89. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified Specific Open Category 1E-61 1E-6 1E-6 ThisValue is not appropriate see AMC 1309 … but its useful to demonstrate the principle of seeking to maintain equivalence
  • 90. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified Specific Open Category 1E-61 1E-6 1E-6 1 x 10-4 to 1x10-6 ThisValue is not appropriate see AMC 1309 … but its useful to demonstrate the principle of seeking to maintain equivalence
  • 91. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified Specific Open Category 1E-61 1E-6 1E-6 0 to 0.01 (Harmless)0.01 to 1 1 x 10-4 to 1x10-6 ThisValue is not appropriate see AMC 1309 … but its useful to demonstrate the principle of seeking to maintain equivalence
  • 92. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified Specific Open Category 1E-61 1E-6 1E-6 0.01 to 1 0 to 0.01 (Harmless)0.01 to 1 1 x 10-5 to 1 1 x 10-4 to 1x10-6 ThisValue is not appropriate see AMC 1309 … but its useful to demonstrate the principle of seeking to maintain equivalence
  • 93. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified Specific Open Category 1E-610.01 to 1 1E-6 1E-6 1 x 10-5 to 1 0.01 to 1 0 to 0.01 (Harmless)0.01 to 1 x 10-5 0.01 to 1 1 x 10-5 to 1 1 x 10-4 to 1x10-6 ThisValue is not appropriate see AMC 1309 … but its useful to demonstrate the principle of seeking to maintain equivalence
  • 94. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Risk: Fatalities on the Ground Likelihood of Fatal Injuries to 3rd Parties on Ground Likelihood that you die, if struck Likelihood Person Struck by UAS given its out of Control Likelihood UAS Out of Control =XX Certified Specific Open Category 1E-610.01 to 1 1E-6 1E-6 1 x 10-5 to 1 0.01 to 1 0 to 0.01 (Harmless)0.01 to 1 x 10-5 0.01 to 1 1 x 10-5 to 1 1 x 10-4 to 1x10-6 Lethality is not RISK!! It’s a proxy for consequence! ThisValue is not appropriate see AMC 1309 … but its useful to demonstrate the principle of seeking to maintain equivalence
  • 95. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Bow Ties Threat 1 Threat 3 Threat 2 UAS Loses Control HAZARD HARM Outcome 1 HARM Outcome 2 HARM Outcome 3
  • 96. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Bow Ties Threat 1 Threat 3 Threat 2 UAS Loses Control HAZARD HARM Outcome 1 HARM Outcome 2 HARM Outcome 3 Threat Barriers
  • 97. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Bow Ties Threat 1 Threat 3 Threat 2 UAS Loses Control HAZARD HARM Outcome 1 HARM Outcome 2 HARM Outcome 3 Threat Barriers Harm Barriers
  • 98. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat Barriers UAS out Of Control Technical Issues with UAS Aircraft on CollisionCourse Human Error Datalink Deterioration Adverse Operating Conditions Deteriorating of External Systems Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to The remote crew is trained to identify critical environmental conditions and to avoid them Environmental conditions for safe operations defined, measurable and adhered to UAS designed and qualified for adverse environmental conditions (e.g. adequate sensors, DO-160 qualification) UAS is designed to automatically manage datalink deterioration situations Datalink performance established and verified (e.g. datalink budget) Procedures and limitations are in- place and adhered to Datalink systems and infrastructure is manufactured to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is designed to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is installed and maintained to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Procs are in place to handle deterioration of external systems supporting RPAS Operations UAS is designed to manage deterioration of externals systems supporting RPAS Operations Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation The UAS is detectable by other airspace users UAS is equipped with functionality to maintain safe separation Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Multi crew coordination Adequate resting times are defined and followed Safe recovery from Human Error A Human Factors evaluation has been performed and the HMI found appropriate for the mission Automatic protection of critical flight functions (e.g. envelope protection) The operator is competent and/or proven UAS manufactured by competent and/or proven entity UAS maintained by competent and/or proven entity UAS developed to authority recognized design standards Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to UAS is designed considering system safety and reliability Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Safe recovery from technical issue Threats
  • 99. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat Barriers UAS out Of Control Technical Issues with UAS Aircraft on CollisionCourse Human Error Datalink Deterioration Adverse Operating Conditions Deteriorating of External Systems Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to The remote crew is trained to identify critical environmental conditions and to avoid them Environmental conditions for safe operations defined, measurable and adhered to UAS designed and qualified for adverse environmental conditions (e.g. adequate sensors, DO-160 qualification) UAS is designed to automatically manage datalink deterioration situations Datalink performance established and verified (e.g. datalink budget) Procedures and limitations are in- place and adhered to Datalink systems and infrastructure is manufactured to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is designed to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is installed and maintained to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Procs are in place to handle deterioration of external systems supporting RPAS Operations UAS is designed to manage deterioration of externals systems supporting RPAS Operations Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation The UAS is detectable by other airspace users UAS is equipped with functionality to maintain safe separation Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Multi crew coordination Adequate resting times are defined and followed Safe recovery from Human Error A Human Factors evaluation has been performed and the HMI found appropriate for the mission Automatic protection of critical flight functions (e.g. envelope protection) The operator is competent and/or proven UAS manufactured by competent and/or proven entity UAS maintained by competent and/or proven entity UAS developed to authority recognized design standards Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to UAS is designed considering system safety and reliability Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Safe recovery from technical issue Threats
  • 100. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat Barriers UAS out Of Control Technical Issues with UAS Aircraft on CollisionCourse Human Error Datalink Deterioration Adverse Operating Conditions Deteriorating of External Systems Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to The remote crew is trained to identify critical environmental conditions and to avoid them Environmental conditions for safe operations defined, measurable and adhered to UAS designed and qualified for adverse environmental conditions (e.g. adequate sensors, DO-160 qualification) UAS is designed to automatically manage datalink deterioration situations Datalink systems and infrastructure is manufactured to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is designed to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is installed and maintained to adequate standards appropriate to the operation UAS is designed to manage deterioration of externals systems supporting RPAS Operations Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation The UAS is detectable by other airspace users UAS is equipped with functionality to maintain safe separation Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Multi crew coordination Adequate resting times are defined and followed Safe recovery from Human Error A Human Factors evaluation has been performed and the HMI found appropriate for the mission Automatic protection of critical flight functions (e.g. envelope protection) The operator is competent and/or proven UAS manufactured by competent and/or proven entity UAS maintained by competent and/or proven entity UAS developed to authority recognized design standards Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to UAS is designed considering system safety and reliability Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Safe recovery from technical issue Threats
  • 101. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat Barriers UAS out Of Control Technical Issues with UAS Aircraft on CollisionCourse Human Error Datalink Deterioration Adverse Operating Conditions Deteriorating of External Systems Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to The remote crew is trained to identify critical environmental conditions and to avoid them Environmental conditions for safe operations defined, measurable and adhered to UAS designed and qualified for adverse environmental conditions (e.g. adequate sensors, DO-160 qualification) UAS is designed to automatically manage datalink deterioration situations Datalink systems and infrastructure is manufactured to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is designed to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is installed and maintained to adequate standards appropriate to the operation UAS is designed to manage deterioration of externals systems supporting RPAS Operations Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation The UAS is detectable by other airspace users UAS is equipped with functionality to maintain safe separation Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Multi crew coordination Adequate resting times are defined and followed Safe recovery from Human Error A Human Factors evaluation has been performed and the HMI found appropriate for the mission Automatic protection of critical flight functions (e.g. envelope protection) The operator is competent and/or proven UAS manufactured by competent and/or proven entity UAS maintained by competent and/or proven entity UAS developed to authority recognized design standards Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to UAS is designed considering system safety and reliability Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Safe recovery from technical issue Threats Again…note the reoccurring thread…specify, design, construct, maintain, operate, train…
  • 102. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat Barriers UAS out Of Control Technical Issues with UAS Aircraft on CollisionCourse Human Error Datalink Deterioration Adverse Operating Conditions Deteriorating of External Systems Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to The remote crew is trained to identify critical environmental conditions and to avoid them Environmental conditions for safe operations defined, measurable and adhered to UAS designed and qualified for adverse environmental conditions (e.g. adequate sensors, DO-160 qualification) UAS is designed to automatically manage datalink deterioration situations Datalink systems and infrastructure is manufactured to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is designed to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is installed and maintained to adequate standards appropriate to the operation UAS is designed to manage deterioration of externals systems supporting RPAS Operations Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation The UAS is detectable by other airspace users UAS is equipped with functionality to maintain safe separation Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Multi crew coordination Adequate resting times are defined and followed Safe recovery from Human Error A Human Factors evaluation has been performed and the HMI found appropriate for the mission Automatic protection of critical flight functions (e.g. envelope protection) The operator is competent and/or proven UAS manufactured by competent and/or proven entity UAS maintained by competent and/or proven entity UAS developed to authority recognized design standards Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to UAS is designed considering system safety and reliability Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Safe recovery from technical issue Threats Platform Technical Integrity Operational Flexibility Equipage Operator Competence The Challenge is obtaining a safe balance!
  • 103. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Harm Barriers UAS out Of Control HAZARD Fatalities to 3rd Parties on Ground Fatalities to 3rd Parties in the Air Damage to Critical Infrastructure THREATS Two Types of Harm Barriers • Reduce Effect of Hazard with respect to relevant harm • Reduce the likelihood the hazard will cause harm Contingency Procedures are defined, validated & adhered to CrewTraining is adequate to cope with Situation Containment in place and effective Contingency Procedures are defined, validated & adhered to Contingency Procedures are defined, validated & adhered to CrewTraining is adequate to cope with the situation UAS Design Features mitigate the severity of MAC UAS equipped with capability to Avoid Collision Design features that aid visibility and or detection by other aircraft CrewTraining is adequate to cope with the situation UAS equipped with capability to Avoid Collision UAS equipped with obstacle Avoidance capability Effects of Ground Impact Reduced Allowed Operation Profile takes critical infrastructure into consideration Effects of Ground Impact are reduced
  • 104. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Adaptation Scoring for Harm Barriers
  • 105. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Adaptation Scoring for Harm Barriers Initial Ground Risk Class Assessment SAIL Determinations Initial Air Risk Class Assessment Lethality
  • 106. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Adaptation Scoring for Harm Barriers Initial Ground Risk Class Assessment SAIL Determinations Initial Air Risk Class Assessment Robustness Requirement Lethality
  • 107. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Adaptation Scoring for Harm Barriers Initial Ground Risk Class Assessment SAIL Determinations Initial Air Risk Class Assessment Suite of Harm Barriers for Ground Risk Category Contingency procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Crew training is adequate to cope with the situation Effects of ground impact are reduced (e.g. emergency parachute, shelter) Containment in place and effective (tether, geo-fencing, route planning, predefined crash areas, etc.) Robustness Requirement Lethality Medium Example Outcome
  • 108. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Adaptation Scoring for Harm Barriers Initial Ground Risk Class Assessment SAIL Determinations Initial Air Risk Class Assessment CONOPS REALITY Suite of Harm Barriers for Ground Risk Category Contingency procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Crew training is adequate to cope with the situation Effects of ground impact are reduced (e.g. emergency parachute, shelter) Containment in place and effective (tether, geo-fencing, route planning, predefined crash areas, etc.) Robustness Requirement Lethality Medium Assessment Example Outcome SCORE
  • 109. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Adaptation Scoring for Harm Barriers Initial Ground Risk Class Assessment SAIL Determinations Initial Air Risk Class Assessment CONOPS REALITY Suite of Harm Barriers for Ground Risk Category Contingency procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Crew training is adequate to cope with the situation Effects of ground impact are reduced (e.g. emergency parachute, shelter) Containment in place and effective (tether, geo-fencing, route planning, predefined crash areas, etc.) Robustness Requirement Lethality Assessment of System CONOPS Robustness Low Medium High 2 O 0 2 0 0 0 -1 -2 1 2 -2 Medium Assessment Example Outcome SCORE
  • 110. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Adaptation Scoring for Harm Barriers Initial Ground Risk Class Assessment SAIL Determinations Initial Air Risk Class Assessment CONOPS REALITY Suite of Harm Barriers for Ground Risk Category Contingency procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Crew training is adequate to cope with the situation Effects of ground impact are reduced (e.g. emergency parachute, shelter) Containment in place and effective (tether, geo-fencing, route planning, predefined crash areas, etc.) Robustness Requirement Lethality Assessment of System CONOPS Robustness Low Medium High 2 O 0 2 0 0 0 -1 -2 1 2 -2 Medium Assessment Example Outcome SCORE RESCORE GRC Initial Ground Risk Classification 3 Contingency procedures are defined, validated and adhered to +0 Crew training is adequate to cope with the situation +0 Effects of ground impact are reduced (e.g. emergency parachute, shelter) -1 Containment in place and effective (tether, geo-fencing, route planning, predefined crash areas, etc.) 2 NEW Ground Risk Classification 2
  • 111. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA OUTPUT Objectives to be met and the level of robustness SAIL I : 18 (Low) SAIL II : 19 (Low), 6 (Med) SAIL III : 18 (Low), 15 (Med), 6(High) SAIL IV : 3 (Low), 19 (Med), 12 (High) SAILV : 6 (Med), 28 (High) SAILVI : 35 (High) JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
  • 112. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAILVerdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA OUTPUT Objectives to be met and the level of robustness SAIL I : 18 (Low) SAIL II : 19 (Low), 6 (Med) SAIL III : 18 (Low), 15 (Med), 6(High) SAIL IV : 3 (Low), 19 (Med), 12 (High) SAILV : 6 (Med), 28 (High) SAILVI : 35 (High) Training Barriers Design & Prod Barriers Ops Barriers Maint Barriers JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
  • 113. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat Barriers UAS out Of Control Technical Issues with UAS Aircraft on CollisionCourse Human Error Datalink Deterioration Adverse Operating Conditions Deteriorating of External Systems Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to The remote crew is trained to identify critical environmental conditions and to avoid them Environmental conditions for safe operations defined, measurable and adhered to UAS designed and qualified for adverse environmental conditions (e.g. adequate sensors, DO-160 qualification) UAS is designed to automatically manage datalink deterioration situations Datalink performance established and verified (e.g. datalink budget) Procedures and limitations are in- place and adhered to Datalink systems and infrastructure is manufactured to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is designed to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is installed and maintained to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Procs are in place to handle deterioration of external systems supporting RPAS Operations UAS is designed to manage deterioration of externals systems supporting RPAS Operations Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation The UAS is detectable by other airspace users UAS is equipped with functionality to maintain safe separation Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Multi crew coordination Adequate resting times are defined and followed Safe recovery from Human Error A Human Factors evaluation has been performed and the HMI found appropriate for the mission Automatic protection of critical flight functions (e.g. envelope protection) The operator is competent and/or proven UAS manufactured by competent and/or proven entity UAS maintained by competent and/or proven entity UAS developed to authority recognized design standards Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to UAS is designed considering system safety and reliability Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Safe recovery from technical issue Threats
  • 114. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Robustness and Verification of Barriers UAS out Of Control Technical Issues with UAS Aircraft on CollisionCourse Human Error Datalink Deterioration Adverse Operating Conditions Deteriorating of External Systems Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to The remote crew is trained to identify critical environmental conditions and to avoid them Environmental conditions for safe operations defined, measurable and adhered to UAS designed and qualified for adverse environmental conditions (e.g. adequate sensors, DO-160 qualification) UAS is designed to automatically manage datalink deterioration situations Datalink performance established and verified (e.g. datalink budget) Procedures and limitations are in- place and adhered to Datalink systems and infrastructure is manufactured to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is designed to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is installed and maintained to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Procs are in place to handle deterioration of external systems supporting RPAS Operations UAS is designed to manage deterioration of externals systems supporting RPAS Operations Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation The UAS is detectable by other airspace users UAS is equipped with functionality to maintain safe separation Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Multi crew coordination Adequate resting times are defined and followed Safe recovery from Human Error A Human Factors evaluation has been performed and the HMI found appropriate for the mission Automatic protection of critical flight functions (e.g. envelope protection) The operator is competent and/or proven UAS manufactured by competent and/or proven entity UAS maintained by competent and/or proven entity UAS developed to authority recognized design standards Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to UAS is designed considering system safety and reliability Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Safe recovery from technical issue Threats Robustness &Verification of Barriers LOW – Applicant provides self-declaration required level of integrity achieved. MEDIUM • Applicant provides supporting evidence required level of integrity achieved. • Local authority/qualified entity may request 3rd party validation for some supporting elements. HIGH • 3rd party validation of the achieved integrity is required
  • 115. Copyright:Terrence Martin ARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Guidelines for System & Operation Information for a CONOPS Organisation Operations Training RPAS Airframe Performance Flight Controls Propulsion Sensors Payloads RPA Geo Fence Navigation Autopilot RPS FCS DAA Payloads Control Details & Architecture Loss Degradation Safety Features C2 Link GSE Training Barriers Maintenances Crew Details Safety Normal Ops Strategy AbnormalOps Accidents & Incidents SOPs Maint of Currency FSTDs Training Program InitialTRG & Quals
  • 116. Copyright: Terrence Martin Moving Ahead of Basic SORA In Australia
  • 117. Copyright:Terrence Martin Moving Ahead • Threat & Harm Barriers • No guidelines for Low, Medium or High Levels of robustness • Therefore, cant determine what a Nominal score in Adaptation Process? • Whats a 0 or + or – score? • Future Studies may update the Lethality categorisation process? • Quantitative Methodology • Barrier influence on Risk • AdaptationValues • Who will be the 3rd PartyVerifiers of Systems, Operations etc? Areas of Uncertainty
  • 118. Copyright:Terrence Martin Moving Ahead • Threat & Harm Barriers • No guidelines for Low, Medium or High Levels of robustness • Therefore, cant determine what a Nominal score in Adaptation Process? • Whats a 0 or + or – score? • Future Studies may update the Lethality categorisation process? • Quantitative Methodology • Barrier influence on Risk • AdaptationValues • Who will be the 3rd PartyVerifiers of Systems, Operations etc? Areas of Uncertainty Kristian Cruickshank has taken the SORA and “stress tested it with one of the developed Australian CONOPS Found a number of additional uncertainties in SORA Process.
  • 119. Copyright:Terrence Martin Moving Ahead • Expanded Operations can’t proceed until Risk Process developed • CouldWait for Europe to address the uncertainties or we could work with the basic concepts and enhance it with some of our own insight! SORA and Australia
  • 120. Copyright:Terrence Martin Moving Ahead • Expanded Operations can’t proceed until Risk Process developed • CouldWait for Europe to address the uncertainties or we could work with the basic concepts and enhance it with some of our own insight! SORA and Australia WE CAN MAKE ITWORK LETS SHOWYOU HOW!
  • 121. Copyright:Terrence Martin Moving Ahead • Risk Model Developed at Nova for ADF, distilled for public use • Employs BowTie XP • More Effort applied to breakdown of threat and harm barrier identified in JARUS model • Can be used to enhance Basic JARUS model significantly forAustralian RPAS community benefit SORA and Australia
  • 122. Copyright:Terrence Martin Moving Ahead Nova Systems Risk Model Example Thread Hazard Central Event BarrierThreat Barrier Effectiveness Rating Barrier Category Consequence Barrier Degradation (or Escalation) Factor
  • 123. Copyright:Terrence Martin Moving Ahead End State Suite of Indigenous CONOPS Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA Framework NOVA Model CASA HAZLOG
  • 124. Copyright:Terrence Martin Updated SORA Blackbox Hazard Central Event BarrierThreat Barrier Effectiveness Rating Barrier Category Consequence Barrier Degradation (or Escalation) Factor Background Models & Process to be Updated by Risk Specialists Moving Ahead End State Suite of Indigenous CONOPS Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA Framework NOVA Model CASA HAZLOG
  • 125. Copyright:Terrence Martin Updated SORA Blackbox Hazard Central Event BarrierThreat Barrier Effectiveness Rating Barrier Category Consequence Barrier Degradation (or Escalation) Factor Background Models & Process to be Updated by Risk Specialists Moving Ahead End State Priority Templates for National Priority CONOPSSuite of Indigenous CONOPS Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA Framework NOVA Model CASA HAZLOG
  • 126. Copyright:Terrence Martin Updated SORA Blackbox Hazard Central Event BarrierThreat Barrier Effectiveness Rating Barrier Category Consequence Barrier Degradation (or Escalation) Factor Background Models & Process to be Updated by Risk Specialists Joe Public ApplicationTemplates Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. SAIL I SAILVSAIL IV SAILIIISAIL I SAILV Moving Ahead End State Priority Templates for National Priority CONOPSSuite of Indigenous CONOPS Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA Framework NOVA Model CASA HAZLOG
  • 127. Copyright:Terrence Martin Updated SORA Blackbox Hazard Central Event BarrierThreat Barrier Effectiveness Rating Barrier Category Consequence Barrier Degradation (or Escalation) Factor Background Models & Process to be Updated by Risk Specialists Joe Public ApplicationTemplates Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. SAIL I SAILVSAIL IV SAILIIISAIL I SAILV Moving Ahead End State CASA Assessor Templates Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. SAIL I SAILVSAIL IV SAILIIISAIL I SAILV Priority Templates for National Priority CONOPSSuite of Indigenous CONOPS Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA Framework NOVA Model CASA HAZLOG