UASSC Update by Industry Co-Chair

1. AAUS RPAS in Australian Skies 2017 Conference June 2017 CASA UASSC INDUSTRY CO-CHAIR UPDATE DR TERRY MARTIN

2. Acceptable Design Regulated Specific RiskAssessment Methodology Traffic Density Certification Status Population Comms & Surveillance Coverage CrewTraining Airspace Category Operation Criticality Benchmarking (EU, US) Airspace Management Policy Human Factors CNPC Detect & Avoid Risk Management sUAS & Low Level UAVOps Ops near Aerodromes Security EmergingTech National Operational Priorities CONOPS Unique Sector Requirements Common Requirements ALL CONOPS Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption Baselining CASA Processes Approval Benchmark Available Manpower Risk Management Knowledge Gaps Safety Obligations Trial Appetite KEY OUTPUTS • Separation Confidence • Position Reporting: RAIM like assurance • Navigation Performance • Compatibility with Airspace Class Requirements • Confidence platform can reliably maintain flight Trials Evidence Requirements Skills Trial Sites Teaming Safety Expectations Trial Methodologies Feedback Expectation

3. Copyright:Terrence Martin UASSC Roadmap Update Risk Assessment Methodology • Expanded Operations critically reliant on Risk Process developed • Likely adoption of JARUS SORA • SAWG exploring its merits, shortfalls, • Developing interim solutions, supplemented by general lessons developed at Nova: Shadow, Heron, etc • Close Follow, Hybrid or go it Alone • More Later Risk Assessment RiskAssessment Methodology Traffic Density Certification Status Population Comms & Surveillance Coverage CrewTraining Airspace Category Operation Criticality

4. Copyright:Terrence Martin UASSC Roadmap Update Objectives • Identify the Priority sectors, and benefits for RPAS Operations in Australia • Set of CONOPS developed & provided to forum for review Objectives: CONOPS Coverage National Operational Priorities CONOPS Agriculture: • Broad Area PrecisionAgriculture, • Pest &Weed Detection, Disaster & Emergency Services • SAR (Maritime) • Tropical Cyclone with Cells onWings • CBRN • Small Scale Urban SAR Cells onWings (COWS) & UTM Conservation Mining/Hard Rock/Pit/Open Cut Logistics • Package Delivery • Long Range Freight Training • BVLOS • VLOS/EVLOS Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption

5. Copyright:Terrence Martin UASSC Roadmap Update Objectives • Identify the Priority sectors, and benefits for RPAS Operations in Australia (Includes CONOPs development) . • Set of CONOPS developed & provided to forum for review Objectives: CONOPS Coverage National Operational Priorities CONOPS Agriculture: • Broad Area PrecisionAgriculture, • Pest &Weed Detection, Disaster & Emergency Services • SAR (Maritime) • Tropical Cyclone with Cells onWings • CBRN • Small Scale Urban SAR Cells onWings (COWS) & UTM Conservation Mining/Hard Rock/Pit/Open Cut Logistics • Package Delivery • Long Range Freight Training • BVLOS • VLOS/EVLOS Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption KEY ELEMENT of BENCHMARKING IS ADOPTION of JARUS SORA CONOPS DEVELOPMENT CRITICAL for SORA EFFORTS MORE LATER

6. Copyright:Terrence Martin Baselining CASA Processes Approval Benchmark Available Manpower Risk Management Knowledge Gaps Safety Obligations Trial Appetite Objectives • Baseline Australia’s RPAS regulatory environment • Benchmark against International Standards Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption UASSC Roadmap Update Baselining CASA Processes Benchmarking (EU, US) Airspace Management Policy Human Factors CNPC Detect & Avoid Risk Management sUAS & Low Level UAVOps Ops near Aerodromes Security EmergingTech

7. Copyright:Terrence Martin Baselining CASA Processes Approval Benchmark Available Manpower Risk Management Knowledge Gaps Safety Obligations Trial Appetite Objectives • Baseline Australia’s RPAS regulatory environment • Benchmark against International Standards Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption UASSC Roadmap Update Baselining CASA Processes Benchmarking (EU, US) Airspace Management Policy Human Factors CNPC Detect & Avoid Risk Management sUAS & Low Level UAVOps Ops near Aerodromes Security EmergingTech WHY? • Community is uncertain what the current approval BVLOS baseline is! • Don’t need to reinvent the wheel, & harmonisation • Vague understanding of the regulatory and capability gaps that are preventing progress of range of BVLOS Operations

8. Copyright:Terrence Martin UASSC Roadmap Update 14 Key R&D Activities: • EVLOS/VLOS • 1.RPAS activities awareness for security • 2. Operations in Urban Areas • 3. Human Factors • IFR/VFR • 4. Visual Detectability solutions • 5. DAA • 6. Comms C2 Datalink • 7. Airspace & Airport Access • 8 Contingency • BVLOS • 9. DAA • 10. Comms C2 Datalink • 11 Airspace & Airport Access • 12. Security • 13 Human Factors: BVLOS & IFR/VFR • 14 Best Practice Demonstration Europe: Technology and Operational Gaps GAPS LINKED TO ACTION & MILESTONES Operational & Technology gaps: 1. Integration into ATM and Airspace environments 2. Surface operations incl. take-off and landing 3. Operational contingency procedures and systems 4. Data communication links incl. spectrum issues 5. Detect & Avoid systems and operational procedures 6. Security issues 7. Verification and Validation Methods

9. Copyright:Terrence Martin UASSC Roadmap Update 14 Key R&D Activities: • EVLOS/VLOS • 1.RPAS activities awareness for security • 2. Operations in Urban Areas • 3. Human Factors • IFR/VFR • 4. Visual Detectability solutions • 5. DAA • 6. Comms C2 Datalink • 7. Airspace & Airport Access • 8 Contingency • BVLOS • 9. DAA • 10. Comms C2 Datalink • 11 Airspace & Airport Access • 12. Security • 13 Human Factors: BVLOS & IFR/VFR • 14 Best Practice Demonstration Europe: Technology and Operational Gaps GAPS LINKED TO ACTION & MILESTONES Operational & Technology gaps: 1. Integration into ATM and Airspace environments 2. Surface operations incl. take-off and landing 3. Operational contingency procedures and systems 4. Data communication links incl. spectrum issues 5. Detect & Avoid systems and operational procedures 6. Security issues 7. Verification and Validation Methods So are we going to reinvent the wheel on all of these? Do we even have the capacity? Where should we Close Follow?

10. Copyright:Terrence Martin Trials Evidence Requirements Skills Trial Sites Teaming Safety Expectations Trial Methodologies Feedback Expectation UASSC Roadmap Update Site Attributes: • Location, Proximity to Critical Infrastructure/CBD/Aerodromes • Politics, funding, investment • Instrumentation? • Airspace Class, Surveillance, Population,VHF Coverage, IFR/VFR Routes, Terrain, • Feedback of Information/Data to CASA Roadmap Development: Trials

11. Acceptable Design Regulated Specific RiskAssessment Methodology Traffic Density Certification Status Population Comms & Surveillance Coverage CrewTraining Airspace Category Operation Criticality Benchmarking (EU, US) Airspace Management Policy Human Factors CNPC Detect & Avoid Risk Management sUAS & Low Level UAVOps Ops near Aerodromes Security EmergingTech National Operational Priorities CONOPS Unique Sector Requirements Common Requirements ALL CONOPS Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption Baselining CASA Processes Approval Benchmark Available Manpower Risk Management Knowledge Gaps Safety Obligations Trial Appetite KEY OUTPUTS • Separation Confidence • Position Reporting: RAIM like assurance • Navigation Performance • Compatibility with Airspace Class Requirements • Confidence platform can reliably maintain flight Trials Evidence Requirements Skills Trial Sites Teaming Safety Expectations Trial Methodologies Feedback Expectation

12. Copyright:Terrence Martin UASSC Roadmap Update Identify key gaps & opportunities • Reg Procedures -> CASA or Airservices • Technical Specification Development : • DAA, CNPC -> Regulatory Bodies • Platform Integrity Requirements forOperations • Evidence requirements for Risk: traffic, population • Technology Shortfalls -> Industry (perhaps supported by Govt funding) • “Quick win” opportunities for commencing operations, Key Outputs

13. Copyright:Terrence Martin UASSC Roadmap Update Tough Choices [1] “Roadmap for the integration of civil RPAS into the European Aviation System”, EASA June 2013 [2] US Dept. Transport, ‘Integration of CivilUnmannedAircraftSystems (UAS) in the National AirspaceSystem (NAS) Roadmap, ’ CNPC DAA/SAA Performance Specifications including path loss, link margins, attennas, lost link declaration times Performance specifications considering Detection performance, FAR, tracking rates, encounter dynamics & platform manuevreability, human response times, ….. Spectrum allocations GBSAA & ABSAA possibilities Security Relationship with C2 • European1 RPAS & US DOT “NAS Integration” 2 roadmaps clearly highly the critical role that DAA, CNPC & ATM will play in safe integration of RPAS into the NAS, particularly for expanded operations, • JARUS, RTCA, EUROCAE, ICAO, EASA & FAA have various working groups conducting research into these topics to identify technical & procedural uncertainty, and produce necessary procs and specification . • Issues currently under review: • Indigenous effort (money & time) dedicated to this area is limited. • Our Capacity (Skills, Knowledge, Experience) is what???

14. Copyright:Terrence Martin UASSC Roadmap Update Tough Choices Options for CASA & Australian Industry on CNPC, DAA, ATM …(Risk???): 1. Do nothing, 2. CASA: • Work with international NAAs to develop regulatory and technological solutions for UAS integration into NAS. • Work independently from the international community on Australian specific solutions for UAS integration into NAS. 3. Industry provides bigger contribution to be part of the solution, working closely with CASA 4. A combination of above. Have we consciously decided to “close-follow”, or have we defaulted to it because its easy? What is the implications of doing so?

15. Copyright:Terrence Martin UASSC Roadmap Update • Identity key gaps/issues/challenges/opportunities which must be addressed to commence priority operations • Isolate Degrees of Freedom: • Where we can act, or where must we wait. • Who needs to be involved in that decision? Key Outputs

16. Copyright:Terrence Martin UASSC Roadmap Update Taking into consideration Indigenous Capacity (CASA and Industry) : • Identity key gaps/issues/challenges which must be addressed, • Isolate Degrees of Freedom: With known gaps, degrees of freedom, and areas of uncertainty • Establish trial priorities, prioritised sequencing for their conduct and necessary resourcing, partners • Provide recommendations and proposed schedules for CASA in regulatory development priorities CASR Part 101/102, MOS and ACs Key Outputs

17. Copyright:Terrence Martin UASSC Roadmap Update • Gap Analysis, Benchmark, Baseline • Risk Assessment: • SORA: more from Mike Roberts • Airworthiness : Initial and Continuing • Detect & Avoid: more from BrandonWilliams • Control & Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) • Airspace Integration: More from Brandon Suaraz • Training: more from Dan Minton • Test Ranges &Trials • Security & Privacy • Operations • EmergingTechnologies Remainder of Presentation

18. JARUS Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA)

19. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA Future RPAS Framework Certified Specific Open Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Toys European Approach Australian Draft Framework Regulated Specific Open Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Low Risk Operations Medium Risk Operations High Risk Operations

20. Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome JARUS SORA Regulation for Specific Category Regulated Specific

21. Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome JARUS SORA Regulation for Specific Category Regulated Specific Work to be done • What Equipment • What Restrictions • What Procedures • WhatTraining • How is RISK Assessed?

22. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAIL Verdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA OUTPUT Lowest SAIL I- low intrinsic risk, Highest, SAIL VI - high intrinsic risks SAIL determines objectives to be met and the level of robustness JARUS SORA High Level Overview JARUS has flagged that the release of an updated draft in July 2017. A pictorial overview of the SORA Process can be found here: https://www.slideshare.net/terrymartin2805826/overview-of-the-jarus-specific-operations-risk-assessment-process

23. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA OUTPUT Lowest SAIL I- low intrinsic risk, Highest, SAIL VI - high intrinsic risks SAIL determines objectives to be met and the level of robustness SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAIL Verdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Training Barriers Design & Prod Barriers Ops Barriers Maint Barriers Risk Management JARUS SORA

24. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA OUTPUT Lowest SAIL I- low intrinsic risk, Highest, SAIL VI - high intrinsic risks SAIL determines objectives to be met and the level of robustness SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAIL Verdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Training Barriers Design & Prod Barriers Ops Barriers Maint Barriers Risk Management JARUS SORA SAIL Drives the Robustness of the barriers • Level of Integrity (How tough is the standard) • Level of Assurance • Who checks and what their credentials are • Evidence required

25. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat Barriers UAS out Of Control Technical Issues with UAS Aircraft on Collision Course Human Error Datalink Deterioration Adverse Operating Conditions Deteriorating of External Systems Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to The remote crew is trained to identify critical environmental conditions and to avoid them Environmental conditions for safe operations defined, measurable and adhered to UAS designed and qualified for adverse environmental conditions (e.g. adequate sensors, DO-160 qualification) UAS is designed to automatically manage datalink deterioration situations Datalink performance established and verified (e.g. datalink budget) Procedures and limitations are in- place and adhered to Datalink systems and infrastructure is manufactured to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is designed to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is installed and maintained to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Procs are in place to handle deterioration of external systems supporting RPAS Operations UAS is designed to manage deterioration of externals systems supporting RPAS Operations Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation The UAS is detectable by other airspace users UAS is equipped with functionality to maintain safe separation Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Multi crew coordination Adequate resting times are defined and followed Safe recovery from Human Error A Human Factors evaluation has been performed and the HMI found appropriate for the mission Automatic protection of critical flight functions (e.g. envelope protection) The operator is competent and/or proven UAS manufactured by competent and/or proven entity UAS maintained by competent and/or proven entity UAS developed to authority recognized design standards Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to UAS is designed considering system safety and reliability Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Safe recovery from technical issue Threats Overview: Specific Threat Barriers identified for SORA Process

26. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Harm Barriers UAS out Of Control HAZARD Fatalities to 3rd Parties on Ground Fatalities to 3rd Parties in the Air Damage to Critical Infrastructure HARM Two Types of Harm Barriers • Reduce Effect of Hazard with respect to relevant harm • Reduce the likelihood the hazard will cause harm Contingency Procedures are defined, validated & adhered to Crew Training is adequate to cope with Situation Containment in place and effective Contingency Procedures are defined, validated & adhered to Contingency Procedures are defined, validated & adhered to Crew Training is adequate to cope with the situation UAS Design Features mitigate the severity of MAC UAS equipped with capability to Avoid Collision Design features that aid visibility and or detection by other aircraft Crew Training is adequate to cope with the situation Containment in place and effective (tether, geo- fencing, etc.) UAS equipped with obstacle Avoidance capability Effects of Ground Impact Reduced Allowed Operation Profile takes critical infrastructure into consideration Effects of Ground Impact are reduced

27. CONOPS

28. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAIL Verdict SORA OUTPUT Lowest SAIL I- low intrinsic risk, Highest, SAIL VI - high intrinsic risks SAIL determines objectives to be met and the level of robustness JARUS SORA CONOPS & the Roadmap

29. Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Guidelines for System & Operation Information for a CONOPS Organisation Operations Training RPAS Airframe Performance Flight Controls Propulsion Sensors Payloads RPA Geo Fence Navigation Autopilot RPS FCS DAA Payloads Control Details & Architecture Loss Degradation Safety Features C2 Link GSE Training Barriers Maintenances Crew Details Safety Normal Ops Strategy AbnormalOps Accidents & Incidents SOPs Maint of Currency FSTDs Training Program InitialTRG & Quals

30. Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS SAWG: Finding our Priority GAPS

31. Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS SAWG: Finding our Priority GAPS SORACONOPS Considerations Agriculture: • Broad Area Precision Agriculture, • Pest & Weed Detection, Disaster & Emergency Services • SAR (Maritime) • Tropical Cyclone with Cells on Wings • CBRN • Small Scale Urban SAR • Cells on Wings (COWS) & UTM Conservation Mining/Hard Rock/Pit/Open Cut Logistics • Package Delivery • Long Range Freight Training • BVLOS • VLOS/EVLOS RPASAWG CONOPS Unique CONOP Gaps Common Gaps ALL CONOPS SORA BLACKBOX Barrier Robustness Airworthiness Operations Training Procedures Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. GAPS in • Technical Specifications, or Solutions • ATC or CASA Procedures & processes • Low Hanging Fruit

32. AIRWORTHINESS

33. Copyright:Terrence Martin Airworthiness SORA Elements dedicated to Airworthiness Barriers in the SORA that have initial or continuing airworthiness implications shown in Orange

34. Copyright:Terrence Martin Airworthiness JARUS WG-3 Draft Proposal: Operator Approval Desired CONOPs SAIL Required Barriers for CONOPS Operational Approval NOTE: Intrinsic SAIL 5 Manufacturing Standards ? SORA Robustness • Level of Integrity: ADS • Assurance:Who & Evidence

35. Copyright:Terrence Martin Airworthiness JARUS WG-3 • OL-TC provides manufacturers with flexibility to produce RPAS for specific CONOPS, without the need to incorporate systems to mitigate risks that are not present within that CONOPS Manufacturer FullTC • CS-LURS, • CS-LUAS Operationally LimitedTC For Eg. Agricultural Application SORA Required Barriers for CONOPS Robustness • Level of Integrity:Tailored ADS • Assurance:Who & Evidence

36. TRAINING

37. Copyright:Terrence Martin UASSC Roadmap Update Training • Training Plays a significant Role in Preventing Undesired Consequences • Operating, Design, Maintenance

38. Copyright:Terrence Martin UASSC Roadmap Update SORA Training Distilled? • Competence • Operator • Maintainer • Manufacturer • Crew • Technical issues • Abnormal & emergencies • Deteriorating Systems • Operational & Contingency Procedure& limitations • In place, validated & adhered to across all threat & harm lines

39. Copyright:Terrence Martin UASSC Roadmap Update Training Objectives 1. Ensure training is designed in such a sequence that a person can ‘continue’ or ‘build on’ a previously attained qualification, much like the manned world (in line with part 61). 2. International licencing recognition 3. Address industry needs for todays operations (low hanging fruit) 4. Tiered flight training organisations (more accessible for industry) 5. Tiered licencing and ratings 6. Training for others: ATC, Maintenance, GroundCrew

40. Copyright:Terrence Martin UASSC Roadmap Update Training Objectives Suggested Categories • Basic RePL • Night Operations • EVLOS • CRP Rating: add to business…supports owning a business • Controlled Airspace Rating • Instructor Rating • BVLOS Rating • SpecificType Ratings and orTypeTraining

41. Copyright:Terrence Martin UASSC Roadmap Update Training Category Suggestions Suggested Categories • Basic RePL • Night Operations • EVLOS • CRP Rating: add to business…supports owning a business • Controlled Airspace Rating • Instructor Rating • BVLOS Rating • SpecificType Ratings and orTypeTraining

42. Copyright:Terrence Martin UASSC Roadmap Update Draft Observations Observations • Duration, skill of instructors, should organisation be an RTO • Should CASA set curriculum or other organisations • Should the training rigour scale with CONOPS, risk & SAIL

43. Safe Separation DAA & CNS-ATM

44. Copyright:Terrence Martin Detect & Avoid • Focused on UA requiring approval to fly in airspace normally frequented by commercial transport aircraft • Facilitates transition to Class A or special use airspace, traversing Class D, E & G • Requires Equipment supporting both Cooperative & uncooperative DAA RTCA Phase 1 MOPS

45. Copyright:Terrence Martin Detect & Avoid Encounter Set: Understanding the Risk DetectEncounters Own-ship Data Tracker Alerting Guidance Display Pilot Aircraft Model

46. Copyright:Terrence Martin Detect & Avoid SC-228 MOPS Development Alert Pilot Detect Intruder Determine Resolution 15 s Negotiate ATC Clearance 10 s 30.0 s maneuver to remain well clear (Aircraft Performance ??? 35.0 s DAAWell Clear Radar Declaration Range RDR and RCS to be established for: • Small (< 100kts), • Medium (<130 kts) • Large Aircraft (< 170 kts)

47. Copyright:Terrence Martin DAA Performance Assessment RTCA SC 228 SAA Requirements 220 Degrees 30 Degrees Day, Night, Bright Light, & any weather

48. Copyright:Terrence Martin SC-228 • Detection: • Range RDR: 8 NM + • Must establish intruder track before 4000 ft (RCPR) 99% of time • Must establish tracks for 95% of intruders starting at RDR • No more than 20 seconds to establish track once in FoR • Probability FalseTracks: 1 false track per hour • Within FoR, with Slant range out to 8 NM or RDR of Large Intruder • Range Accuracy: 50 feet • Range Rate Accuracy: 8 feet/second • Azimuth Angle Error: 0.5 Degrees • Elevation Angle Error: 0.5 Degrees Key Radar MOPS Specifications

49. Copyright:Terrence Martin Detect and Avoid RTCA SC 228 DAA MOPS • MOPS not applicable to sUAS: Must be > 55lb • Radar presents significant SWaP for sUAS • Bottom Line: requirements only achievable by “High End” of town • Yet , sUAS represent the overwhelming, and increasingVOLUME of UAV wanting to operate BVLOS

50. Copyright:Terrence Martin SC-228 • Range RDR: 8 NM + • Range Accuracy: 50 feet • Range Rate Accuracy: 8 feet/second • Azimuth Angle Error: 0.5 Degrees • Elevation Angle Error: 0.5 Degrees • Probability FalseTracks: 1 false track per hour • Within FoR, with Slant range out to 8 NM or RDR of Large Intruder • Detection: • Must establish intruder track before 4000 ft (RCPR) 99% of time • Must establish tracks for 95% of intruders starting at RDR • No more than 20 seconds to establish track once in FoR Key Radar MOPS Specifications How long before a specification is written for sUAS? How would the technical expectations vary? So what considerations will be used to make Risk Assessment, with no SPECs currently in PLAY ? Who MAKES the CALL, DOTHEY HAVETHE SKILLS?

51. Copyright:Terrence Martin Detect and Avoid Radar: Echodyne Negative Index Materials MESA Echodyne owned by Microsoft Flagged specifications include • FOV was up to 120° x 80 • Detected small UAVs out to 750m • Detect small Aircraft out to 3km • 4D data cube of radar returns accurately depicting ground vegetation, barbed wire fences & other stationary obstacles, • MESA-DAA will be available to commercial customers in early 2017

52. Copyright:Terrence Martin Detect and Avoid Visual Spectrum Camera IMPERX Bobcat 2.0 B6620 • Sensor: 16 Mpixel, CCD • Resolution: 6576 x 4384 • Pixel pitch: 5.5 micrometres • Power: 1.5 A, 12 VDC • 10 m Wingspan: falls subpixel at 36km with 20 mm lens and 100 degrees FOV • Weight: 250g Source: http://www.imperx.com/ccd-cameras/b6620

53. Copyright:Terrence Martin Detect and Avoid Sensors: Laser Range Finding DLEM diode laser rangefinder • Ranges up to 5 kilometers. • weight between 38 an 170 grams, • Minimal power ?? • Defence not keen on being painted with LASER https://www.jenoptik.com/products/defense-and-security/laser-rangefinders/oem-modules-system-integration/dlem

54. Copyright:Terrence Martin Detection Performance with Background Clutter Contrast Against Background Clutter Against Ground Clutter

55. Copyright:Terrence Martin Detect & AVoid Mil-Hard 1.3 MP High Resolution InGaAs SWIR Camera: GA1280 Source: https://www.photonicsonline.com/doc/mil-hard-mp-high-resolution-ingaas-swir-camera-ga-j-0001 • Pixels: 1280 x 1024 pixel • Pixel pitch: 15 um • Weight: 125 grams • Power: • Angular Resolution = 0.08 with 10 mm lens (88 FOV) • MOPS Radar only requires 0.5 degrees, • But Cessna sub-pixel is 2.6 km • Could move to 20mm lens and scan like Kestrel… • Could you team it with miniature LRF??

56. Copyright:Terrence Martin Detect and Avoid FLIR Neutrino MWIR • Pixels: 640 x 512 • Pixel pitch: 15 um • Weight: 450 grams • Power: 5 watts

57. BETTER INTRINSIC ARC Determinations Quantitative Methods

58. Copyright:Terrence Martin Detect & Avoid Alternates • SORA Process Intrinsic ARC employs crude metrics forTraffic Density Step 2B- Intrinsic Air Risk Class Traffic Density ( Examples) Air Risk Class Very Low ( above FL600, below highest Building) 1 Low (Below 500 ft or within 400 ft from Infrastructure) 2/3 * Medium (Away from Major FL and Airways) 4/5 * High ( In Major FL & on airways, aerodrome traffic Patterns 6 Very High 7 • DAA Systems are barriers, driven by this requirement • What if we could better represent Intrinsic ARC: spatially & temporally

59. This research was conducted by QUT as part of an Advance Queensland Fellowship held by Aaron McFadyen and supported by Queensland State Government Department of Science, InformationTechnology and Innovation (DSITI) & Thales Australia.The air traffic data was provided by Airservices Australia under aTailored Data Supply Agreement.

63. Fleshing out the Barriers

64. Copyright:Terrence Martin Moving Ahead Nova Systems Risk Model Hazard Central Event BarrierThreat Barrier Effectiveness Rating Barrier Category Consequence Barrier Degradation (or Escalation) Factor

65. Copyright:Terrence Martin Common Applicant CONOPS Information on: • Operator • IntendedOps • UAS Description • Remote Crew Updated SORA Blackbox Hazard Central Event BarrierThreat Barrier Effectiveness Rating Barrier Category Consequence Barrier Degradation (or Escalation) Factor Background Models & Process to be Updated by Risk Specialists Joe Public ApplicationTemplates Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. SAIL I SAILVSAIL IV SAILIIISAIL I SAILV Moving Ahead End State CASA Assessor Templates Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. SAIL I SAILVSAIL IV SAILIIISAIL I SAILV Submission Priority Templates for National Priority CONOPSSuite of Indigenous CONOPS Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA Framework NOVA Model Rare or Unseen CONOPS Reviewed by a Specialist Assessment Result Assessment Result CASA HAZLOG

66. Copyright:Terrence Martin Common Applicant CONOPS Information on: • Operator • IntendedOps • UAS Description • Remote Crew Updated SORA Blackbox Hazard Central Event BarrierThreat Barrier Effectiveness Rating Barrier Category Consequence Barrier Degradation (or Escalation) Factor Background Models & Process to be Updated by Risk Specialists Joe Public ApplicationTemplates Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. SAIL I SAILVSAIL IV SAILIIISAIL I SAILV Moving Ahead End State CASA Assessor Templates Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. SAIL I SAILVSAIL IV SAILIIISAIL I SAILV Submission Priority Templates for National Priority CONOPSSuite of Indigenous CONOPS Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA Framework NOVA Model Rare or Unseen CONOPS Reviewed by a Specialist • Safe & Commensurate with Risk • Repeatable • Transparent • Harmonised Internationally yetAhead of the Game Assessment Result Assessment Result CASA HAZLOG

67. CNS & SAFE SEPARATION

68. Copyright:Terrence Martin Availability and Continuity CNS and Safe Separation • Performance established and verified (i.e link budgets) • Procedures & limits in place • Eg Lost Link procedures • Declaration times • filters • Datalink system and infrastructure has a design standard and is manufactured appropriate for operation & is maintained…

69. Copyright:Terrence Martin Availability and Continuity CNS and Safe Separation

70. Copyright:Terrence Martin CNS and Safe Separation Indigenous Capacity: Lost Link Decision Times Taxi, Takeoff and Landing. Within 5nm of runway and below 10kft. • Lost C2 Link Decision time = 2 seconds. • Short time required because risk may increase rapidly and the pilot may not have time to intervene for a RPA with a low automation level. • A Lost C2 Link must be declared quickly; More automatic operation required by RPA if these times cant be achieved 2 NM 3 NM 400ft AGL 100ft AGL 0 NM 500ft 600ft AGL RPAS How Long would it take for RPAS to Communicate Lost Link to ATC???

71. Copyright:Terrence Martin CNS and Safe Separation Indigenous Capacity: Lost Link Decision Times Departure and Arrival. RPA within 30nm of runway and below 18kft. • RLOS at this longer range • Lost C2 Link Decision time = 10seconds. • Equivalent to the ATC RCP for terminal areas. Enroute. RPA greater than 30nm from runway and below 60kft. • Use BRLOS (terrestrial network) • 10 seconds Lost C2 Link Decision time (non-satellite) • 30 seconds when satellite C2 Link, e.g. when significantly further way than 30nm.

72. Copyright:Terrence Martin CNS, ATM and Emerging Requirements for RPAS ICAO Air Navigation Plan and ATM Concept Communication Navigation Surveillance AirTraffic Management Required Comms Performance Performance Based Comms & Surveillance Required Surveillance Performance Required Navigation Performance Performance Based Navigation

73. Copyright:Terrence Martin CNS, ATM and Emerging Requirements for RPAS Determining appropriate prescribed separation minima is complex. Key parameters impacting achievement of predeterminedTLS for a given traffic density are: • a) aircraft navigation performance; • b) ground and airborne communications performance; • c) surveillance performance. These performance capabilities are used to determine: • airspace design (separation minima/route spacing/sectorization), • instrument procedures and • air traffic control intervention capability. • An increase or decrease in any single parameter may result in a corresponding increase or decrease in some or all of the other parameters. Separation (ICAO 9689)

74. Copyright:Terrence Martin CNS and Safe Separation That’s all Great But… • Many RPA systems are not RNP compliant • Have different CNPC setups, , latency and transaction times • Therefore the Intervention times are different. 1. For ATC: (Flight Levels, heading, track change etc) at any point 2. For Pilot: when directed and when alerted about track deviation Should the separation distances change: •For MALE/HALE Operations •For UTM? RNP and Aircraft Separation

75. BVLOS RPAS Trials Trial Participants RPAS Operators UTM ProvidersTrial Management

76. Copyright:Terrence Martin CNPC UTM & LTE Coverage Source: LTETower Signal data generated by Stephen Dade at Nova Systems using STK

77. Copyright:Terrence Martin CNPC Altitude Source: LTETower Signal data generated by Stephen Dade at Nova Systems using STK • What will the altitude limitations be using LTE • Availability, Continuity, Integrity • How will this be substantiated

78. Copyright:Terrence Martin Required Communication Performance CNPC and RCP Requirements for RPAS CNPC 2 UA GRS GRS CNPC 1 GRS GRS GRS UA UA GRS UA UA Public Network GCS GCS GCS GCS GCS VPN VPN Handover to Standalone Inter Network Handover Intra Network Handover Handover to SATCOM Handover Between Standalones Derived with Permission from Hee Wook Kim, ETRI Korea, RTCA SC-228: Gateway Gateway

79. Copyright:Terrence Martin CNS, ATM and Emerging Requirements for RPAS Australia is moving from RNAV to RNP expectations for aircraft. From May 2016, will move to the following navigation specifications: • Oceanic routes - RNP 4 where capable, otherwise RNAV 10 (RNP 10) • Continental Routes: RNP 2 • Terminal instrument flight procedures - RNP 1 • Non-precision approach operations - RNP APCH Required Navigation Performance (RNP)

80. Copyright:Terrence Martin Performance Based Comms & Surveillance RNP considering COMMS and RPAS ALERT Track Correction after Alert Track Deviation RNP Containment RNP expects you to: • accurately know your position, • monitor it and be alerted if you deviate, • Act to correct it in a timely manner if you do deviate, and • communicate with relevant people (ATC & other pilots), so they can respond. • Also factors in ATC intervention time. • Separation distances are predicated on these assumptions

81. Copyright:Terrence Martin CNS, ATM and Emerging Requirements for RPAS In order to obtain RNP approval, an operator must meet both operational requirements as well as aircraft airworthiness: Operational Requirements • Flight crew training and operating procedures for the navigation systems to be used must be described by the operator in a syllabus of training and an aide-memoir • Methods of control for flight crew training, operational procedures and database management must be identified in the operations manual. • Navigation error reporting procedures RNP Compliance: Operational Requirements

82. Copyright:Terrence Martin Required Navigation Performance • Statement inType Certificate, or SupplementalType Certificate (STC), and Aircraft Flight Manual • Continuing Airworthiness: aircraft and RNP system maintenance; and • Validity and continuing integrity of the airborne navigation database, • A FMS alone cannot be certified for RNP operations RNP Compliance-Airworthiness

83. Copyright:Terrence Martin Required Navigation Performance Airworthiness Requirements: • RNP Performance captured usingTotal System Error (TSE) computed as sum of the following: • Navigation System Error (NSE): • FlightTechnical Error (FTE): • Path Definition Error (PDE). • Rapid improvements in GNSS mean the NSE is very small, • Under PBN, focus is on ensuring flown path is both accurate & maintained via alerting & monitoring…and now FTE is the area of biggest scrutiny RNP Compliance-Airworthiness

84. Copyright:Terrence Martin Required Navigation Performance Airworthiness Requirements: • RNP Performance captured usingTotal System Error (TSE) computed as sum of the following: • Navigation System Error (NSE): • FlightTechnical Error (FTE): • Path Definition Error (PDE). • Rapid improvements in GNSS mean the NSE is very small, • For RNP/PBN focus is on ensuring ensuring path definition is accurate & maintained via alerting & monitoring…FTE is the area of biggest scrutiny RNP Compliance-Airworthiness Will current/future generation MALE/HALE meet these standards Are they appropriate?

85. Performance Based Comms & Surveillance

86. Copyright:Terrence Martin Required Comms Performance Factors Affecting Separation & Route Spacing PBN Navigation NAVAID Infrastructure Performance Based Concept Navigation Specification Navigation Application Source: Derived from ICAO Performance Based Navigation Manual, Doc 9613 If the Navigation Specification cannot be met, …..

87. Copyright:Terrence Martin Required Comms Performance Factors Affecting Separation & Route Spacing Intervention PBN Exposure to RiskNavigation NAVAID Infrastructure Communication ATC Procs &Tools Surveillance Performance Based Concept Traffic Density Operational ErrorNavigation Specification Navigation Application Source: Derived from ICAO Performance Based Navigation Manual, Doc 9613 Route Configuration WHAT is the impact on separation distances. Needed to understand: • Exposure : See earlier work from Aaron McFadyen on data driven methods • Intervention: Comms and Surveillance

88. Copyright:Terrence Martin Performance Based Comms & Surveillance ICAO 9869- PBC&S Manual -- 2016 RNP 10 Network ATS Unit Applicable Airspace • Airspace characteristics • Tech Dependencies • Other considerations State Application to Airspace ie Local Safety Assessment Prescribe specs for communication & Surveillance supportingATM Operations in applicable airspace • ANSP requirements • Aircraft Operator Requirements • PBC&S Monitoring RSP 180 Specification RCP 240 ATM Operation (X) Standards & procs for Comms, Nav and Surveillance identifying appropriate RCP/RSP Specification It may be to possible to achieve separation distances commensurate with RNP 2 even if the aircraft is not RNP compliant provided the RCP/RSP environment supports it,

89. Copyright:Terrence Martin Performance Based Comms & Surveillance ICAO 9869- PBC&S Manual -- 2016 CAVEAT: • PBC&S isVERY NEW • RPAS RCP (RLP) still in development (Eg RTCA 228), JARUS • Limited attention paid to RSP, RNP, PBS&S inter-relationships, BUT RPAS differences may warrant attention.

90. Copyright:Terrence Martin Required Communication Performance Separation Distance for RNP/RCP/RSP Source: RTCA DO-350: End to End RCP (CPDLC) & RCTP [Continental, Oceanic and Remote For aircraft, climbing, cruising or descending on the same track, the following separation minima may be used… Separation Minima RNP Specification RCP Specification RSP Specification Max ADS-C periodic reporting interval 50 NM (93 km) 10 240 180 27 minutes 50 NM (93km) 4 240 180 32 minutes 30 NM (55km) 4 240 180 14 minutes

91. Copyright:Terrence Martin Required Communication Performance Separation Distance for RNP/RCP/RSP Source: RTCA DO-350: End to End RCP (CPDLC) & RCTP [Continental, Oceanic and Remote For aircraft, climbing, cruising or descending on the same track, the following separation minima may be used… Separation Minima RNP Specification RCP Specification RSP Specification Max ADS-C periodic reporting interval 50 NM (93 km) 10 240 180 27 minutes 50 NM (93km) 4 240 180 32 minutes 30 NM (55km) 4 240 180 14 minutes • Is the Concept of PBN and PBC&S scalable for UTM • What will be the separation distances for UTM • What happens if the network latency impacts on the position certainty and UTM intervention time?

92. Copyright:Terrence Martin Required Communication Performance Separation Assurance & RSP Source: PBC&S Doc 9869 RSP requires availability, continuity, integrity etc but an important aspect is “”RSP delivery time”. • The value for the RSP data delivery time is based on the time when the surveillance data delivery is considered overdue. • Again: reliant on a comms link… • For separation assurance, the RSP data delivery can be determined by collision risk modelling. • Collision risk modelling considers the RSP delivery times in the surveillance data delivery and controller intervention buffer supporting separation assurance.

93. Air Traffic Modelling 1 - Analytical and Simulated Models Separation < 1nm Separation < 500ft Manned Aircraft Unmanned Aircraft This research was conducted by QUT as part of an Advance Queensland Fellowship held by Aaron McFadyen and supported by Queensland State Government Department of Science, InformationTechnology and Innovation (DSITI) &Thales Australia.The air traffic data was provided by Airservices Australia under aTailored Data Supply Agreement.

94. Copyright:Terrence Martin Performance Based Comms & Surveillance But the CNPC Latency &Transaction times are different for RPAS! 1. What does the CNPC network topology look like. 2. Intervention times: 1. For ATC: (FL, heading, track change etc) at any point 2. For Pilot: when directed and when alerted about track deviation Should the separation distances change? RNP and Aircraft Separation

95. Copyright:Terrence Martin Required Communication Performance Manned Network Topology: CPDLC ATC Composes & Sends Message ATC Receives Response & Understands RCP Parameters • TransactionTime • Availability • Continuity • Integrity

96. Copyright:Terrence Martin Source: Derived from RTCA DO-350 Required Communication Performance C2 Link Required Communication Performance: DO 350 ATSU encodes Message & sends to CSP CSP transmits ATSU Message to Aircraft Aircraft decodes Message and gives to flight crew Crew reads and responds to ATC eg wilco Aircraft System encodes response & transmits to CSP CSP sends response message to ATSU ATC Compose Message ATSU decodes response and gives to ATC ATC reads response RCP Specification: TransactionTime + Availability, Integrity, Continuity Initiator Performance Responder Performance 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑆𝑃 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑆𝑈 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑃 Initiator Performance 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑃 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑆𝑈 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡

97. Copyright:Terrence Martin Required Link Performance RELAY CNPC via RPA ATC Composes & Sends Message ATSU RP Receives Response & Understands Comms Link

98. Copyright:Terrence Martin Source: Derived from RTCA DO-350 Required Link Performance Expanding RTCA SC-228 Required Link performance ATSU encodes Message & sends to CSP CSP transmit s ATSU Message to Aircraft Aircraft decodes Message and gives to flight crew Crew reads and responds to ATC eg wilco Aircraft System encodes response & transmits to CSP CSP sends response message to ATSU ATC Compose Message ATSU decodes response and gives to ATC ATC reads response RCP Specification: TransactionTime + Availability, Integrity, Continuity Initiator Performance Responder Performance𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑃𝐴 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑆𝑈 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑃 Initiator Performance 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑃 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑆𝑈 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑃 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐺𝐶𝑆 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑃𝐴 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑃 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐺𝐶𝑆

99. Copyright:Terrence Martin Required Link Performance RELAY CNPC via RPA ATC Composes & Sends Message ATSU RP Receives Response & Understands Comms Link Or ATC-RP Comms link could be direct Will this be transparent to ATC. Not currently ATC Surveillance Compliant

100. Copyright:Terrence Martin Source: Derived from RTCA DO-350 Required Link Performance Expanding RTCA SC-228 Required Link performance ATSU encodes Message & sends to CSP CSP transmit s ATSU Message to Aircraft Aircraft decodes Message and gives to flight crew Crew reads and responds to ATC eg wilco Aircraft System encodes response & transmits to CSP CSP sends response message to ATSU ATC Compose Message ATSU decodes response and gives to ATC ATC reads response RCP Specification: TransactionTime + Availability, Integrity, Continuity Initiator Performance Responder Performance𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑃𝐴 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑆𝑈 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑃 Initiator Performance 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑃 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑆𝑈 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑃 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐺𝐶𝑆 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑃𝐴 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑃 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐺𝐶𝑆 Not currently being examined in RTCA SC-228. How is PBNAlerting and Response catered for?

101. Copyright:Terrence Martin Required Link Performance RELAY CNPC via RPA ATC Composes & Sends Message Command Link ATSU RP Receives Response & Understands

102. Copyright:Terrence Martin Required “Link” Performance Unmanned Network Topology: RELAY COMMS ATC Composes & Sends Message Telemetry Link ATSU RP Receives Response & Understands

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