SlideShare una empresa de Scribd logo
1 de 24
Ransomware
and Game
Theory:
To Pay, or Not
To Pay?
Tony Martin-Vegue
@tdmv
#nbt3
About me
Tony Martin-Vegue
• Manager, Information Security Risk at
SF-based Financial Institution
• CISSP, CISM, GCIH
• BS, Business Economics, University of
San Francisco
• 20 years in IT
• Focus: Risk management, the
economics of information security
Key Takeaways
• Learn about Game Theory
• Decision analysis
• Payoff matrix and decision tree
• Cooperation / competition between
actors
• Learn about Ransomware
• Options you have when infected
• Examine payouts, incentives
• What happens when you pay the
ransom?
(Very) Brief Ransomware 101
Image Source: TrendMicro.com
Ransom
Note
Game Theory
101
“Game Theory can be defined
as the study of mathematical
models of conflict and
cooperation between
intelligent rational decision-
makers.”
- Roger B. Myerson, Game Theory: Analysis of
Conflict
Game Theory
101
• Study of cooperative and non-cooperative game
since early 1700’s
• Emerged as a unique field via John von
Neumann
• “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior”
published in 1944
ChoicesPlayer1
• Walk
straight
• Swerve
Player2
• Walk
Straight
• Swerve
Swerve Straight
Swerve
-1,1 -1, 1
Straight 1,-1 -5, -5
Sidewalk Game
Swerve Straight
Swerve
-1,-1 -1, 1
Straight 1,-1 -5, -5
Sidewalk Game
Swerve Straight
Swerve
-1,-1 -1, 1
Straight 1,-1 -5, -5
Sidewalk Game
Game Theory
&
Ransomware
Key Attributes
• Two player
• Non-cooperative
• Asymmetric <- strategies are different for each
player
• Zero sum
Players & Their ChoicesCyberCriminal
• Start/don't start
ransomware campaign
• Release data/don't
release data
Victim
• Restore data from
backup
• Use or wait for a 3rd
party decrypter kit
• Negotiate or pay for
ransom
• Do nothing
Decision Tree
Cyber criminal
Do not start
ransomware
campaign
Start ransomware
campaign
Victim
Restore from
backup
No backups
available
Use third party
decrypter
None available
Don't pay ransom
Negotiate/pay
ransom
Cyber Criminal
Release Data
Don't release
data
IncentivesCyberCriminal
• (Almost) always purely profit
driven
• Provide good customer
service (good
reputation=more victims)
Victim
• Want their data back /
primary objective
• Time is a factor (e.g. can’t
wait forever for a decrypter
kit)
• Ransom needs to be
reasonably priced
• SOMETIMES: greater good
IncentivesLawEnforcement
• Investigate
crimes
• Prosecute cyber
criminals to the
fullest extent of
the law
Anti-VirusVendors
• Disrupt
ransomware, as
it aligns with
the firm's value
proposition
It depends.
Negative externality
How Can I Use This?
• Game theory and decision analysis can be used to analyze complex
adversary/defender events
• In turn, you will have more data to communicate complex concepts to
executives
• Try to think about risk in term of economics decisions instead of
red/yellow/green
Questions

Más contenido relacionado

Similar a Ransomware & Game Theory: To Pay, or Not to Pay?

Using Social Media for Security Monitoring
Using Social Media for Security MonitoringUsing Social Media for Security Monitoring
Using Social Media for Security MonitoringSysomos
 
Effective tactics used by hackers and how to avoid being the next cyber victim
Effective tactics used by hackers and how to avoid being the next cyber victimEffective tactics used by hackers and how to avoid being the next cyber victim
Effective tactics used by hackers and how to avoid being the next cyber victimChristian Espinosa
 
Understanding How Emergency Managers Evaluate Crowdsourced Data: A Trust Gam...
Understanding How Emergency Managers Evaluate Crowdsourced Data: A Trust Gam...Understanding How Emergency Managers Evaluate Crowdsourced Data: A Trust Gam...
Understanding How Emergency Managers Evaluate Crowdsourced Data: A Trust Gam...Mirjam-Mona
 
Ransomware
Ransomware Ransomware
Ransomware Armor
 
Applications of game theory on event management
Applications of game theory on event management Applications of game theory on event management
Applications of game theory on event management Sameer Dhurat
 
Dr. Tilman Lesch
Dr. Tilman LeschDr. Tilman Lesch
Dr. Tilman LeschHorizons RG
 
Playing with Pricing
Playing with PricingPlaying with Pricing
Playing with PricingPapayaMobile
 
Devnexus 2017 Cybercrime and the Developer: How do you make a difference?
Devnexus 2017 Cybercrime and the Developer: How do you make a difference?Devnexus 2017 Cybercrime and the Developer: How do you make a difference?
Devnexus 2017 Cybercrime and the Developer: How do you make a difference?Steve Poole
 
The Art of Human Hacking : Social Engineering
The Art of Human Hacking : Social Engineering The Art of Human Hacking : Social Engineering
The Art of Human Hacking : Social Engineering OWASP Foundation
 
Importance of Privacy in Distributed Systems - NDSU
Importance of Privacy in Distributed Systems - NDSUImportance of Privacy in Distributed Systems - NDSU
Importance of Privacy in Distributed Systems - NDSUJustin Ehrenhofer
 
Cyber Security Awareness Session for Executives and Non-IT professionals
Cyber Security Awareness Session for Executives and Non-IT professionalsCyber Security Awareness Session for Executives and Non-IT professionals
Cyber Security Awareness Session for Executives and Non-IT professionalsKrishna Srikanth Manda
 
Conference about Social Engineering (by Wh0s)
Conference about Social Engineering (by Wh0s)Conference about Social Engineering (by Wh0s)
Conference about Social Engineering (by Wh0s)Marta Barrio Marcos
 
LIFARS - Financial Cybercrime
LIFARS - Financial CybercrimeLIFARS - Financial Cybercrime
LIFARS - Financial CybercrimeLIFARS
 
What is social engineering & why it is important
What is social engineering & why it is importantWhat is social engineering & why it is important
What is social engineering & why it is importantVikram Khanna
 
CPA firm Cyber Insurance Specifics
CPA firm Cyber Insurance SpecificsCPA firm Cyber Insurance Specifics
CPA firm Cyber Insurance SpecificsJoseph Brunsman
 
The CPAs Guide to Buying Cyber Insurance
The CPAs Guide to Buying Cyber InsuranceThe CPAs Guide to Buying Cyber Insurance
The CPAs Guide to Buying Cyber InsuranceJoseph Brunsman
 
CCIAOR Cyber Security Forum
CCIAOR Cyber Security ForumCCIAOR Cyber Security Forum
CCIAOR Cyber Security ForumCCIAOR
 

Similar a Ransomware & Game Theory: To Pay, or Not to Pay? (20)

Game theory 1
Game theory 1Game theory 1
Game theory 1
 
Using Social Media for Security Monitoring
Using Social Media for Security MonitoringUsing Social Media for Security Monitoring
Using Social Media for Security Monitoring
 
Effective tactics used by hackers and how to avoid being the next cyber victim
Effective tactics used by hackers and how to avoid being the next cyber victimEffective tactics used by hackers and how to avoid being the next cyber victim
Effective tactics used by hackers and how to avoid being the next cyber victim
 
Understanding How Emergency Managers Evaluate Crowdsourced Data: A Trust Gam...
Understanding How Emergency Managers Evaluate Crowdsourced Data: A Trust Gam...Understanding How Emergency Managers Evaluate Crowdsourced Data: A Trust Gam...
Understanding How Emergency Managers Evaluate Crowdsourced Data: A Trust Gam...
 
Ransomware
Ransomware Ransomware
Ransomware
 
Webinar cybersecurity presentation-6-2018 (final)
Webinar cybersecurity presentation-6-2018 (final)Webinar cybersecurity presentation-6-2018 (final)
Webinar cybersecurity presentation-6-2018 (final)
 
Applications of game theory on event management
Applications of game theory on event management Applications of game theory on event management
Applications of game theory on event management
 
Dr. Tilman Lesch
Dr. Tilman LeschDr. Tilman Lesch
Dr. Tilman Lesch
 
AD4026 BI Sesión 04
AD4026 BI Sesión 04AD4026 BI Sesión 04
AD4026 BI Sesión 04
 
Playing with Pricing
Playing with PricingPlaying with Pricing
Playing with Pricing
 
Devnexus 2017 Cybercrime and the Developer: How do you make a difference?
Devnexus 2017 Cybercrime and the Developer: How do you make a difference?Devnexus 2017 Cybercrime and the Developer: How do you make a difference?
Devnexus 2017 Cybercrime and the Developer: How do you make a difference?
 
The Art of Human Hacking : Social Engineering
The Art of Human Hacking : Social Engineering The Art of Human Hacking : Social Engineering
The Art of Human Hacking : Social Engineering
 
Importance of Privacy in Distributed Systems - NDSU
Importance of Privacy in Distributed Systems - NDSUImportance of Privacy in Distributed Systems - NDSU
Importance of Privacy in Distributed Systems - NDSU
 
Cyber Security Awareness Session for Executives and Non-IT professionals
Cyber Security Awareness Session for Executives and Non-IT professionalsCyber Security Awareness Session for Executives and Non-IT professionals
Cyber Security Awareness Session for Executives and Non-IT professionals
 
Conference about Social Engineering (by Wh0s)
Conference about Social Engineering (by Wh0s)Conference about Social Engineering (by Wh0s)
Conference about Social Engineering (by Wh0s)
 
LIFARS - Financial Cybercrime
LIFARS - Financial CybercrimeLIFARS - Financial Cybercrime
LIFARS - Financial Cybercrime
 
What is social engineering & why it is important
What is social engineering & why it is importantWhat is social engineering & why it is important
What is social engineering & why it is important
 
CPA firm Cyber Insurance Specifics
CPA firm Cyber Insurance SpecificsCPA firm Cyber Insurance Specifics
CPA firm Cyber Insurance Specifics
 
The CPAs Guide to Buying Cyber Insurance
The CPAs Guide to Buying Cyber InsuranceThe CPAs Guide to Buying Cyber Insurance
The CPAs Guide to Buying Cyber Insurance
 
CCIAOR Cyber Security Forum
CCIAOR Cyber Security ForumCCIAOR Cyber Security Forum
CCIAOR Cyber Security Forum
 

Más de Tony Martin-Vegue

Incentivizing Better Risk Decisions - Lessons from Rogue Actuaries - SIRAcon ...
Incentivizing Better Risk Decisions - Lessons from Rogue Actuaries - SIRAcon ...Incentivizing Better Risk Decisions - Lessons from Rogue Actuaries - SIRAcon ...
Incentivizing Better Risk Decisions - Lessons from Rogue Actuaries - SIRAcon ...Tony Martin-Vegue
 
How to Lie with Statistics, Information Security Edition
How to Lie with Statistics, Information Security EditionHow to Lie with Statistics, Information Security Edition
How to Lie with Statistics, Information Security EditionTony Martin-Vegue
 
Crowdsourced Probability Estimates: A Field Guide (FAIR Institute)
Crowdsourced Probability Estimates: A Field Guide (FAIR Institute)Crowdsourced Probability Estimates: A Field Guide (FAIR Institute)
Crowdsourced Probability Estimates: A Field Guide (FAIR Institute)Tony Martin-Vegue
 
Cybersecurity aspects of blockchain and cryptocurrency
Cybersecurity aspects of blockchain and cryptocurrencyCybersecurity aspects of blockchain and cryptocurrency
Cybersecurity aspects of blockchain and cryptocurrencyTony Martin-Vegue
 
Crowdsourced Probability Estimates: A Field Guide
Crowdsourced Probability Estimates: A Field GuideCrowdsourced Probability Estimates: A Field Guide
Crowdsourced Probability Estimates: A Field GuideTony Martin-Vegue
 
Can cyber extortion happen to you? Practical tools for assessing the threat
Can cyber extortion happen to you? Practical tools for assessing the threatCan cyber extortion happen to you? Practical tools for assessing the threat
Can cyber extortion happen to you? Practical tools for assessing the threatTony Martin-Vegue
 
Measuring DDoS Risk using FAIR (Factor Analysis of Information Risk
Measuring DDoS Risk using FAIR (Factor Analysis of Information RiskMeasuring DDoS Risk using FAIR (Factor Analysis of Information Risk
Measuring DDoS Risk using FAIR (Factor Analysis of Information RiskTony Martin-Vegue
 
How to Lie with Statistics, Information Security Edition
How to Lie with Statistics, Information Security EditionHow to Lie with Statistics, Information Security Edition
How to Lie with Statistics, Information Security EditionTony Martin-Vegue
 
How to Improve Your Risk Assessments with Attacker-Centric Threat Modeling
How to Improve Your Risk Assessments with Attacker-Centric Threat ModelingHow to Improve Your Risk Assessments with Attacker-Centric Threat Modeling
How to Improve Your Risk Assessments with Attacker-Centric Threat ModelingTony Martin-Vegue
 

Más de Tony Martin-Vegue (9)

Incentivizing Better Risk Decisions - Lessons from Rogue Actuaries - SIRAcon ...
Incentivizing Better Risk Decisions - Lessons from Rogue Actuaries - SIRAcon ...Incentivizing Better Risk Decisions - Lessons from Rogue Actuaries - SIRAcon ...
Incentivizing Better Risk Decisions - Lessons from Rogue Actuaries - SIRAcon ...
 
How to Lie with Statistics, Information Security Edition
How to Lie with Statistics, Information Security EditionHow to Lie with Statistics, Information Security Edition
How to Lie with Statistics, Information Security Edition
 
Crowdsourced Probability Estimates: A Field Guide (FAIR Institute)
Crowdsourced Probability Estimates: A Field Guide (FAIR Institute)Crowdsourced Probability Estimates: A Field Guide (FAIR Institute)
Crowdsourced Probability Estimates: A Field Guide (FAIR Institute)
 
Cybersecurity aspects of blockchain and cryptocurrency
Cybersecurity aspects of blockchain and cryptocurrencyCybersecurity aspects of blockchain and cryptocurrency
Cybersecurity aspects of blockchain and cryptocurrency
 
Crowdsourced Probability Estimates: A Field Guide
Crowdsourced Probability Estimates: A Field GuideCrowdsourced Probability Estimates: A Field Guide
Crowdsourced Probability Estimates: A Field Guide
 
Can cyber extortion happen to you? Practical tools for assessing the threat
Can cyber extortion happen to you? Practical tools for assessing the threatCan cyber extortion happen to you? Practical tools for assessing the threat
Can cyber extortion happen to you? Practical tools for assessing the threat
 
Measuring DDoS Risk using FAIR (Factor Analysis of Information Risk
Measuring DDoS Risk using FAIR (Factor Analysis of Information RiskMeasuring DDoS Risk using FAIR (Factor Analysis of Information Risk
Measuring DDoS Risk using FAIR (Factor Analysis of Information Risk
 
How to Lie with Statistics, Information Security Edition
How to Lie with Statistics, Information Security EditionHow to Lie with Statistics, Information Security Edition
How to Lie with Statistics, Information Security Edition
 
How to Improve Your Risk Assessments with Attacker-Centric Threat Modeling
How to Improve Your Risk Assessments with Attacker-Centric Threat ModelingHow to Improve Your Risk Assessments with Attacker-Centric Threat Modeling
How to Improve Your Risk Assessments with Attacker-Centric Threat Modeling
 

Último

Long journey of Ruby standard library at RubyConf AU 2024
Long journey of Ruby standard library at RubyConf AU 2024Long journey of Ruby standard library at RubyConf AU 2024
Long journey of Ruby standard library at RubyConf AU 2024Hiroshi SHIBATA
 
Emixa Mendix Meetup 11 April 2024 about Mendix Native development
Emixa Mendix Meetup 11 April 2024 about Mendix Native developmentEmixa Mendix Meetup 11 April 2024 about Mendix Native development
Emixa Mendix Meetup 11 April 2024 about Mendix Native developmentPim van der Noll
 
Passkey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Passkey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxPasskey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Passkey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxLoriGlavin3
 
Generative AI for Technical Writer or Information Developers
Generative AI for Technical Writer or Information DevelopersGenerative AI for Technical Writer or Information Developers
Generative AI for Technical Writer or Information DevelopersRaghuram Pandurangan
 
What is DBT - The Ultimate Data Build Tool.pdf
What is DBT - The Ultimate Data Build Tool.pdfWhat is DBT - The Ultimate Data Build Tool.pdf
What is DBT - The Ultimate Data Build Tool.pdfMounikaPolabathina
 
Decarbonising Buildings: Making a net-zero built environment a reality
Decarbonising Buildings: Making a net-zero built environment a realityDecarbonising Buildings: Making a net-zero built environment a reality
Decarbonising Buildings: Making a net-zero built environment a realityIES VE
 
Merck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Merck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxMerck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Merck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxLoriGlavin3
 
So einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdf
So einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdfSo einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdf
So einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdfpanagenda
 
The State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptx
The State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptxThe State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptx
The State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptxLoriGlavin3
 
Modern Roaming for Notes and Nomad – Cheaper Faster Better Stronger
Modern Roaming for Notes and Nomad – Cheaper Faster Better StrongerModern Roaming for Notes and Nomad – Cheaper Faster Better Stronger
Modern Roaming for Notes and Nomad – Cheaper Faster Better Strongerpanagenda
 
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
A Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
A Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxA Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
A Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxLoriGlavin3
 
Time Series Foundation Models - current state and future directions
Time Series Foundation Models - current state and future directionsTime Series Foundation Models - current state and future directions
Time Series Foundation Models - current state and future directionsNathaniel Shimoni
 
Enhancing User Experience - Exploring the Latest Features of Tallyman Axis Lo...
Enhancing User Experience - Exploring the Latest Features of Tallyman Axis Lo...Enhancing User Experience - Exploring the Latest Features of Tallyman Axis Lo...
Enhancing User Experience - Exploring the Latest Features of Tallyman Axis Lo...Scott Andery
 
Potential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and Insights
Potential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and InsightsPotential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and Insights
Potential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and InsightsRavi Sanghani
 
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .Alan Dix
 
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platformsDevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platformsSergiu Bodiu
 
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and ConsThe Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and ConsPixlogix Infotech
 
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
Testing tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examples
Testing tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examplesTesting tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examples
Testing tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examplesKari Kakkonen
 

Último (20)

Long journey of Ruby standard library at RubyConf AU 2024
Long journey of Ruby standard library at RubyConf AU 2024Long journey of Ruby standard library at RubyConf AU 2024
Long journey of Ruby standard library at RubyConf AU 2024
 
Emixa Mendix Meetup 11 April 2024 about Mendix Native development
Emixa Mendix Meetup 11 April 2024 about Mendix Native developmentEmixa Mendix Meetup 11 April 2024 about Mendix Native development
Emixa Mendix Meetup 11 April 2024 about Mendix Native development
 
Passkey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Passkey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxPasskey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Passkey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
 
Generative AI for Technical Writer or Information Developers
Generative AI for Technical Writer or Information DevelopersGenerative AI for Technical Writer or Information Developers
Generative AI for Technical Writer or Information Developers
 
What is DBT - The Ultimate Data Build Tool.pdf
What is DBT - The Ultimate Data Build Tool.pdfWhat is DBT - The Ultimate Data Build Tool.pdf
What is DBT - The Ultimate Data Build Tool.pdf
 
Decarbonising Buildings: Making a net-zero built environment a reality
Decarbonising Buildings: Making a net-zero built environment a realityDecarbonising Buildings: Making a net-zero built environment a reality
Decarbonising Buildings: Making a net-zero built environment a reality
 
Merck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Merck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxMerck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Merck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
 
So einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdf
So einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdfSo einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdf
So einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdf
 
The State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptx
The State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptxThe State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptx
The State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptx
 
Modern Roaming for Notes and Nomad – Cheaper Faster Better Stronger
Modern Roaming for Notes and Nomad – Cheaper Faster Better StrongerModern Roaming for Notes and Nomad – Cheaper Faster Better Stronger
Modern Roaming for Notes and Nomad – Cheaper Faster Better Stronger
 
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024
 
A Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
A Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxA Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
A Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
 
Time Series Foundation Models - current state and future directions
Time Series Foundation Models - current state and future directionsTime Series Foundation Models - current state and future directions
Time Series Foundation Models - current state and future directions
 
Enhancing User Experience - Exploring the Latest Features of Tallyman Axis Lo...
Enhancing User Experience - Exploring the Latest Features of Tallyman Axis Lo...Enhancing User Experience - Exploring the Latest Features of Tallyman Axis Lo...
Enhancing User Experience - Exploring the Latest Features of Tallyman Axis Lo...
 
Potential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and Insights
Potential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and InsightsPotential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and Insights
Potential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and Insights
 
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
 
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platformsDevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
 
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and ConsThe Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
 
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024
 
Testing tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examples
Testing tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examplesTesting tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examples
Testing tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examples
 

Ransomware & Game Theory: To Pay, or Not to Pay?

  • 1. Ransomware and Game Theory: To Pay, or Not To Pay? Tony Martin-Vegue @tdmv #nbt3
  • 2.
  • 3. About me Tony Martin-Vegue • Manager, Information Security Risk at SF-based Financial Institution • CISSP, CISM, GCIH • BS, Business Economics, University of San Francisco • 20 years in IT • Focus: Risk management, the economics of information security
  • 4. Key Takeaways • Learn about Game Theory • Decision analysis • Payoff matrix and decision tree • Cooperation / competition between actors • Learn about Ransomware • Options you have when infected • Examine payouts, incentives • What happens when you pay the ransom?
  • 5. (Very) Brief Ransomware 101 Image Source: TrendMicro.com
  • 7. Game Theory 101 “Game Theory can be defined as the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision- makers.” - Roger B. Myerson, Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict
  • 8. Game Theory 101 • Study of cooperative and non-cooperative game since early 1700’s • Emerged as a unique field via John von Neumann • “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” published in 1944
  • 9.
  • 11. Swerve Straight Swerve -1,1 -1, 1 Straight 1,-1 -5, -5 Sidewalk Game
  • 12. Swerve Straight Swerve -1,-1 -1, 1 Straight 1,-1 -5, -5 Sidewalk Game
  • 13. Swerve Straight Swerve -1,-1 -1, 1 Straight 1,-1 -5, -5 Sidewalk Game
  • 14. Game Theory & Ransomware Key Attributes • Two player • Non-cooperative • Asymmetric <- strategies are different for each player • Zero sum
  • 15. Players & Their ChoicesCyberCriminal • Start/don't start ransomware campaign • Release data/don't release data Victim • Restore data from backup • Use or wait for a 3rd party decrypter kit • Negotiate or pay for ransom • Do nothing
  • 16. Decision Tree Cyber criminal Do not start ransomware campaign Start ransomware campaign Victim Restore from backup No backups available Use third party decrypter None available Don't pay ransom Negotiate/pay ransom Cyber Criminal Release Data Don't release data
  • 17. IncentivesCyberCriminal • (Almost) always purely profit driven • Provide good customer service (good reputation=more victims) Victim • Want their data back / primary objective • Time is a factor (e.g. can’t wait forever for a decrypter kit) • Ransom needs to be reasonably priced • SOMETIMES: greater good
  • 18. IncentivesLawEnforcement • Investigate crimes • Prosecute cyber criminals to the fullest extent of the law Anti-VirusVendors • Disrupt ransomware, as it aligns with the firm's value proposition
  • 19.
  • 21.
  • 23. How Can I Use This? • Game theory and decision analysis can be used to analyze complex adversary/defender events • In turn, you will have more data to communicate complex concepts to executives • Try to think about risk in term of economics decisions instead of red/yellow/green

Notas del editor

  1. Hi – welcome for coming I am very excited to be here Ransomware and Game Theory: to pay or not to pay Curious, how many of you would never ever pay a ransom?
  2. What do the SF Giants, nuclear war and Cryptolocker all have in common? It seems like the answer would be “nothing” but all three can be studied with a branch of economics called game theory. In the case of warfare and baseball, game theory is regularly used to examine potential outcomes, decisions and strategy today we’re going to learn about game theory and use it to analyze the decisions we make when dealing with ransomware incidents
  3. First, a little about me. I’ve been in IT for about 20 years and in security for 10. I’ve worked for start-ups, large banks, small fi’s, health care, global retailers and done a bit of consulting. I’ve been a primary incident responder in almost all of those roles and have had the opportunity to see lots of cyber extortion – not just ransomware like Cryptolocker, but some pretty nasty extortions. As part of my job as an information security risk manager, I analyze these types of attacks from a economics perspective. Often, before an attack or during an attack, I crunch numbers and provide decision makers with projected dollar amounts – how much decision A will cost, versus decision B. I’m going to show you all how to analyze ransomware infections from an economics perspective My goal if that you will come away from this presentation with a better understanding of both ransomware and how economics can be used to solve informtion security problems
  4. Here are the Key takeaways you will gain from attending this presentation. First, you will about Game Theory - what is it, how it works and why do we use it We’re going to look at some tools we use to analyze decisions – the payoff matrix and decision tree We’ll also look at cooperatoin and competition between actors. As we’re going through this, think about this with your incident handling hat on. There may be competiting incentives you haven’t thought about Another key takeway is learning about Ransomware. This isn’t a technical presentation at all – I assume most, if not all of you can teach me a thing or two about how ransnware works from a technical perspective. We’re going to talk about this subject from an economics and decision perspective. Trhe last key takeaway here is what happens when you actually pay. When you pay, you’re harming everyone else. In economics, ths is called a negative externalty.
  5. Ransomware is malicious software designed to lock a user out of a system or render data files unreadable until a ransom is paid. This is a high level overview of how ransomeare works. This particular example is Cryptolocker. The cyber criminal infects the victim computer with malware. This happens in a variety of ways, such as drive by download, stealth download, social engineering, malware infected ads and phishing. The victim clicks on a link and there it is – the computer is infected with ransomware. At this point the ransomware starts encrypting every file on your drive with common extensions, like DOC, XLS, PPT, jpegs, etc. If the victim uses dropbox or network storage, those can also be infected, making restoration very difficult. Most home users don’t have offline backups. The victim is then given instructions to pay the ransom in order to restore the files.
  6. This is a sample ransom note from Cryptolocker
  7. What is game theory? “Game Theory can be defined as the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers.” Famous economist roger myerson
  8. Thinks are economists started studying how people compete and cooperate with each other and laid the groundwork for game theory in the early 1700’s It didn’t emerge into it’s own unique field until the 20th century with John von Neumann. He wrote several landmark papers and finally published the book “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” in 1944
  9. So I know that was really abstract and some of you might be struggling to understand how game theory applies in your everyday life. So let's take a really common example of a very simple game that all of us play on an almost daily basis. Here are two people walking down the street toward each other. They’re going to hit if one person doesn't swerve to the left or to the right. Let's analyze this with game theory
  10. So the first thing we're going to do is analyze the choices that each player has. We have player 1 and player 2. both players have the same set of choices. they can walk straight or swerve out of the way to avoid a collision
  11. This is a payoff matrix. It’s a tool used in game theory to help us understand choices and payouts. An assumption here – when you’re walking down the street, one doesn’t want to move if they don’t have to. We consider that the best response. It’s best to go straight. The worst is collide. And somewhere in the middle is to swerve Each decision is given a number, that represents payouts. Payouts can be positive or negative Here both players decide to go straight, causing a collision. This is the worst outcome and both players can improve their response
  12. Next we have both swerving. Not too bad of an outcome -- We assign each value at a -1. Both players had to move, so it’s not the best response, this is why they get a negative number, even though they didn’t collide Both players can potentially improve their response
  13. Last we have two games. In each, one player swerves and the other goes straight. For the winning players, this is the best response. They didn’t have to move. Quick sidebad -- This is an example of Nash Equilibrium. It’s describes a condition in which the players cannot improve their outcome, assiming the other players doesn’t change their strategy.
  14. How does this apply to ransomware?
  15. I’ve done it in the past but I’ve made it a personal vow to never use the hoodie wearing keyboard guy symbolize a cyber criminal or hacker ever again. I’m using a raccoon from now on. Let’s take a look at the choices. They are different – so this is an asymmetric game. The criminal has two choices; they are the ones that choose to start the game. Second, at the end of the game, they can choose to release data or not to release data. I haven’t been able to find any hard figures about the success rate of paying the ransom, but a few folks at one of the ISACs told me it’s about 80%. 80% of ransomware payments result in you getting your data back. The victim has several choices when they are hit by ransomware. Restore data from backup Use or wait for a 3rd party decrypter kit Negotiate or pay for ransom Do nothing
  16. Let’s take a look at these choices in a decision tree. Decision trees are another way, in addiiton to the payoff matrix, that we use to visualize decisions in games
  17. There are two more players in this game that aren’t direct actors, but have incentives and payouts every time the game is played. Wev’e talked about incentives that the criminal and the victims have. Law enforcements is involved on a macro level. Ransowmare is a crime, and the FBI and other LE investigate crimes and prosceute criminals. Given this as their main objective, they don’t really care about your data. I’m sure they do on some level, but what they really want to do is totally shot down the ransomware profit stream and dry up the money. How do you do that – encourage people and companies not to pay the ransom, which is exactly what most LE do. This is greater good What about AV vendors? They want to disrupt ransomware and malware infections, but only as it aligns with the firm’s value proposition. What do I mean by that? There are many cases reported in news of big pharma doing things that put profit over people. The same has been alleged many times about AV firms.
  18. Go back to the sidewalk game – two players, but now imagine additional actors – law enforcement, av vendors, regulators, all with their own agenda, telling you want to do and trying to influence your decision It still goes back to the original question – do you pay?
  19. If you don’t have backups or they are encrypted too and you are totally out of options, paying the ransom may get your data back. I’m never one to say “never pay”. I also don’t say always pay. I think it situational all all depends on what is at stake. If you pay, your are enrinching criminals, enboldening them, and creating more victimes. If you don’t pay – and you have no other options and you’re looking at losing data and even putting peoples lives at risk --
  20. Like what happened with Hollywood Presbertarian in feb. The ransom was originally 3,6 million, but they nogotiated it dwn to 17k, when all other attempts to restore services failed. Paients lives were literally at risk – people were at risk of dying because the systems were down for so long. This is why, as an info sec professional, I don’t tell people never pay. I say it depends Would you feel confortable with telling any of these firms to never negotiate?
  21. Don’t fool yourself into thinking though that paying is harmless. Paying a ransom created what economists call a negative externality. A negative externality is when a third party suffers from an economics transaction. A great example is air pollution. The factory makes goods, sells them and makes money. However, the people that live around the factory suffer from the pollution. When you pay, you create a negative externality on that you are strenghtening and enringing these gangs, motivating them to continute to victimze other people long after you pay them. If no one paid them, this whole problem would cease to exist. And this is why LE, security folks, AV vendors all tell people to never ever pay. They are appealing to the greater good Star Trek Quote – needs of the many outweighthe needs of the few, or the one
  22. I have;g taught you hame theory in 25 minutes. Disclaimer. I’m trying to whet your appetite for economics and information security. Go back to main point, “Ransomware response is a good example of how game theory can used to analyze decisions, payouts and competition between actors.” Encourage the audience to use economic models to study security problems. Side with resources/further reading
  23. Go back to main point, “Ransomware response is a good example of how game theory can used to analyze decisions, payouts and competition between actors.” Encourage the audience to use economic models to study security problems. Side with resources/further reading