Title of the event: The EU-Japan Partnership in the Shadow of China: The Crisis of Liberalism Title of the slides: Abe's Pro-active Pacifism, Values Diplomacy, China, and EU-Japan Political and Security Cooperation Speaker: Paul Midford, Professor and Director of the Japan Program, the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)

1. 2019/2/13 1
By
Paul Midford
Director, NTNU Japan Program
Norwegian University for Science and Technology
ノルウェー科学技術大学
Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no
Knowledge /Kunnskap
The NTNU Japan Program
Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet (NTNU)
Norwegian University for Science and Technology
Abe’s Pro-active Pacifism, Values
Diplomacy, China, and EU-Japan
Political and Security Cooperation

2. Book Overview
 The Backdrop: The global crisis of liberalism, punctuated by
the rise of China as an authoritarian peer competitor of the
US
 Not in our title, but Trump’s election is also part of our conception of
this crisis of liberalism
 Central hypothesis: There is great untapped potential in
EU-Japan cooperation, and together these two liberal
actors can uphold the liberal order in the shadow of China
and the absence of US leadership
 Timely, because of the historic EU-Japan Economic
Partnership Agreement (EPA) & Strategic Partnership
Agreement (SPA) that went into force this month
 Our book exams the potential for these two agreements (as
they appeared in 2017-2018) to help the EU & Japan realize
their leadership potential2019/2/13 2

3. Overview of My Chapter
 Abe’s “pro-active pacifism”(積極的平和主義）
and values diplomacy（価値観外交）
 Meaning of pro-active pacifism & values
diplomacy for EU-Japan security cooperation?
 Post-conflict peace-building
 Promoting liberal democratic values in aid policy
 Promoting rule of law
 Implications for EU-Japan cooperation based on
“common values”
2019/2/13 3

4. Pro-active Pacifism
 Term originates with the Norwegian peace researcher Johan
Galtung
 Developed as a Japanese foreign policy concept around 2009
by Japan International Forum, a research institute led by Itoh
Kenichi
 Adopted by Abe after returning to the premiership in 2012
 A critique of Japan’s post-war pacifism as one-country pacifism,
a posture characterized by professing peace but doing little to
contribute to peace globally or even regionally
 Implication that Japan under Abe is shifting toward making an
active contribution to global peace, one that includes possible
use of force by the SDF overseas
 Galtung does not agree with Abe’s use of the term
2019/2/13 4

5. Peace-building:
Pro-Active vs. Passive Pacifism
 A potentially promising area for EU-Japan cooperation
 Yes, under Abe Japan has been practicing passive pacifism
 Previous DPJ governments practiced Pro-Active Pacifism by
comparison
 In 3 years and 4 months DPJ governments started 2 new PKO
missions, Haiti and South Sudan, and maintained a third, Golan
Heights, (started by a socialist prime minister in 1995)
 Abe has started no new overseas SDF missions and ended all
three
 Counter piracy deployment off Somalia and short term disaster
relief deployments (the Philippines) are the only related cases, but
they are not peace-building missions
 However, might now be considering a very small deployment to the
Sinai peninsula
5

6. Peace-building & Abe’s Passive Pacifism
 Has passed up opportunities to deploy the SDF overseas for
meaningful non-combat missions that contribute to global
security
 Deployment of the SDF to West Africa to combat Ebola
 Deployment of the SDF to Mali for reconstruction/development
missions
 However, some funding and technical assistance for this CSDP
mission
 Deployment of the SDF and Coast Guard (MSA) to help deal with
the Mediterranean refugee crisis
 Has appeared more interested in expanding the Rules of
Engagement (ROEs) for the SDF overseas than in maximizing
Japan’s contribution under the pre-existing legal framework
 Provoked domestic opposition to SDF peace-building missions,
notably in South Sudan 6

7. Values Diplomacy
 Successor to the geographic based “Arc of Freedom”
 The Arc of Freedom was geographically shaped to
contain China, but included some very illiberal countries
 Departure from post-war “developmentalism” that
promoted peace and security by promoting economic
development
 Promotes “common values” of liberal democracy,
human rights, and rule of law
 Values Diplomacy lacks a geographic concept, but
appears aimed at China more than at promoting
common values
7

8. Values Diplomacy and Southeast Asia
 Abe’s 2013 Jakarta speech: emphasized promoting “universal
values, such as freedom, democracy and basic human rights”
 ODA Charters since 1992 have emphasized “promoting
democratization … and the situation regarding the securing of
basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient country”
 Yet, Japan’s aid track record shows little emphasis on these
liberal values
 The 4 least democratic countries in ASEAN have received
the highest aid per capita from Japan, and 80% of all aid
disbursements to ASEAN Vietnam’s human rights record
has been no better than China’s, and worsened as
Japanese aid to Hanoi tripled between 2008 and 2011
 Cambodia and Laos made no progress and even backslid
 (Asplund chapter) 8

9. Zimbabwe and Common Values
 Abe has hosted Zimbabwean President Robert
Mugabe twice since 2015
 Mugabe’s regime is one of the most illiberal in
Africa with one of the worst human rights records
 Has offered two aid packages to Zimbabwe
 Reflects the goal of counteracting Chinese
influence/competing with China in Zimbabwe and
Africa and a general competition mentality w/
China
 Also an attempt to enlist Zimbabwe’s support for
Japan’s quest a permanent Security Council seat
9

10. Common Values: Rule of Law at Sea
 The Abe administration has been emphasizing its
support for the rule of law internationally
 Special emphasis has been placed on the rule of
law in maritime conflicts and on the inadmissibility of
changing the status quo through the use of force
 The last point undoubtedly represents a common
value with the EU
 However, it is unclear whether the EU and Japan
always share a common understanding of maritime
law
 In some respects Japan’s understanding of maritime
law may to closer to that of China2019/2/13 10

11. Foreign Naval and Intelligence
Activities in EEZs
 UNCLOS allows foreign naval activity in EEZs as
long as these activities are not “hostile” to the littoral
state
 US and most western states define intelligence
gathering as non-hostile
 A number of other states led by China defines
intelligence gathering activities as “hostile”
 Although Japan publicly sides with western
countries on this issue, in practice it appears closer
to China’s interpretation (and other Asian states)
2019/2/13 11

12. Japan’s Response to Intelligence
gathering in its EEZ
 Late 1990s: Japan complained about Chinese intelligence
gathering and maritime surveys in its claimed EEZ
 Later a bilateral notification regime was enacted based on shared
interpretation of UNCLOS (at variance w/ US interpretation)
 Japan asserted the right to carry out a survey in a disputed EEZ area
disputed w/ South Korea, although backed down when Seoul
threatened to seize the Japanese Coast Guard (CG) vessels
 December 2001: Japan’ CG chased a North Korean
intelligence ship discovered in its EEZ into China’s EEZ, and
after a fire-fight the North Korean ship sunk
 Clearly clashes with US assertions of its right to operate
intelligence ships in other states’ EEZs (e.g. China’s)
 Just after this confrontation PM Koizumi even proposed
introducing legislation banning foreign intelligence gathering in
Japan’s EEZ2019/2/13

13. Conclusions
 Hard to argue that Abe’s pro-active pacifism offers an
opportunity for greater EU-Japan security cooperation
based on shared liberal values
 Counter (cynical) argument: the EU (and US) is also
retreating from liberal values and future cooperation might
be based on shared illiberal values
 However, this would attenuate the values distinction with
illiberal China and Russia
 Abe’s “Pro-active Pacifism” can plausibly be described as
liberal clothing for a realist strategy
 Maybe a reasonable realist strategy aimed at China
 Yet, this is not a good basis for cooperation with Europe given
significant interest and China gaps between the EU and Japan
2019/2/13 13

14. 2019/2/13 14
Thank you for Listening!
At Trondheim Cruising along the canal, From the windows Of houses are people Seen smiling and
waving hands
トロンハイムの運河を行けば家々の窓より人ら笑みて手を振る
The 2006 New Years poem by his majesty, the Emperor of Japan
Knowledge /Kunnskap
The NTNU Japan Program

15. Extra Slides
2019/2/13 15

16. Waters around the Senkaku Islands
 In June 2016 Japan recently complained about a “first
ever” entry by the Chinese navy into the “contiguous
zone” (CZ) of 12 nautical miles beyond the 12 mile
territorial waters (TZ) of the Senkaku islands
 Yet, the prevailing US/western interpretation of UNCLOS
essentially regards CZs as high seas as far as naval
vessels are concerned
 Moreover, UNCLOS even allows naval vessels to transit
through TZs, although with some significant restrictions
 PRC naval vessels passed through the US TZ in Alaska in
2015 without the US registering any complaint
16

17. Okinotorishima (沖ノ鳥島）
 A small reef (around 10 m2 at high tide) that Japan has
used to claim a 200 nm EEZ
 Article 121, Clause 3, of UNCLOS forbids claiming an EEZ
around islands incapable of sustaining human habitation
 Has also built up area to artificially preserve the decaying
reef
 In 2012 the UN Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf in April, 2012 denied Japan’s claim for
giving Okinotorishima a continental shelf based on the
inhabitability of this geographical feature
 Risk that China could “Okinotorishimize” its SCS claims
 Fiery Cross and Johnson Atoll both are both above high tide
geographical features
 Reflects some parallels in policy
 Similar issues for Minami-Torishima 17

18. Japan’s Rejection of an Important Part of the UNCLOS
Permanent Court of Arbitration Ruling
 In July 2016 the Permanent Court of Arbitration dismissed a
large part of China’s territorial claims in the South China
Sea
 In the process the Court also invalidated Japan’s EEZ claims
around Okinotorishima and Minami Torishima
 The Court argued that Article 121 must be interpreted “to prevent
insignificant features from generating large entitlements to maritime
zones”
 Japan rejected the Court of Arbitration’s finding, clinging the
discredited rock vs. island distinction and claiming the ruling
did not apply in the Western Pacific
 Like the Xi administration, the Abe administration has prioritized its
own territorial interests over UNCLOS and the rule of law when the
two come into conflict
2019/2/13 18

19. Competition Mentality with China
 A tendency, pre-dating the second Abe
administration, and especially prevalent among
conservatives, to see competition with China as
taking precedence over, and divorced from, liberal
values
 The provision of aid to Zimbabwe
 The “me too” return to providing large scale
infrastructure development aid
 However, European and other donors do show a
similar tendency in terms of infrastructure aid
2019/2/13 19

20. Competition Mentality with China:
Liberal Values Do not Distinguish
Japan from China
 While this story appears to have mainly been a
bureaucratic leak intended to undermine PM
Hatoyama’s policy of ending the MSDF refueling
mission in the Indian Ocean, the underlying
assumption is that the US would quickly choose
China as a naval partner to replace Japan
irrespective of values
 The implication is that to compete Japan sometimes
has to pursue illiberal policies to match China
[“China may take over Refueling”]
2019/2/13 20