Regional Senior Leaders Seminar (RSLS) 2011 - Strengthening Civil-Military Coordination for conflict and disaster management - Summary Report

SUMMARY REPORT

Regional Senior Leaders Seminar (RSLS) 2011

STRENGTHENING CIVIL-MILITARY
COORDINATION FOR
CONFLICT AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT

16-19 May 2011, Pullman Reef Hotel, Cairns, Australia

Compiled by Sarah Shteir, Research Project Officer,
Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence

July 2011

Table of Contents

Acronyms................................................................................................................................... 3
I. Executive Summary................................................................................................................ 4
II. Background ........................................................................................................................... 6
III. Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Management......................................................... 7
i. Context.................................................................................................................................... 7
ii. Progress Made ....................................................................................................................... 7
iii. Challenges & Gaps ............................................................................................................... 9
iv. Priorities & Solutions - Where do we go from here? ......................................................... 10
IV. Protection of Civilians in a Multiagency Environment in Complex
Emergencies............................................................................................................................. 13
i. Context.................................................................................................................................. 13
ii. Progress Made ..................................................................................................................... 15
iii. Challenges & Gaps ............................................................................................................. 17
iv. Priorities & Solutions - Where do we go from here? ......................................................... 19
V. Common Issues ................................................................................................................... 21
VI. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 23
VII. Key Readings, Resources & References .......................................................................... 25
Annex A. RSLS 2011 Program................................................................................................ 29

RSLS 2011 Summary Report 2

Acronyms
ADF Australian Defence Force
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development
C-34 UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
Centre Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence
COE-DMHA Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and
Humanitarian Assistance
CONOPS Concept of Operations
DFS Department of Field Support (UN)
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
FPU Formed Police Unit
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ISAF International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
MINUSTAH UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MONUC UN Mission in the DRC
MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in DRC
(formerly MONUC)
NDMO National Disaster Management Office
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
POC Protection of Civilians
POC Framework UN ‘Framework for Drafting Comprehensive POC
Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations’
RSLS Regional Senior Leaders Seminar
R2P Responsibility to Protect
T/PCC Troop/Police-Contributing Countries
UNAMID African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur
UNAMSIL UN Mission in Sierra Lone
UNCT UN Country Team
UNDP UN Development Programme
UNFPA UN Population Fund
UNHCR Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHCHR Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights
UNICEF UN Children’s Fund
UNIFIL UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIS UN Mission in Sudan
UN OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOCI UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
WFP World Food Programme (UN)


I. Executive Summary
The Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence (the Centre), in conjunction
with the US Government’s Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and
Humanitarian Assistance (COE-DMHA), co-hosted the Regional Senior Leaders
Seminar (RSLS) in Cairns, Australia, from 16-19 May 2011. 1 The seminar - a
civil-military coordination forum for emerging government and non-government
leaders from the Asia Pacific region – was attended by 31 participants from ten
countries and included representatives from the United Nations and a number of
other relevant organisations. 2 Participants considered contemporary civil-military
challenges for conflict and disaster management. The subject of the three-day
seminar was Strengthening Civil-Military Coordination for Conflict and Disaster
Management. It focused on two predominant themes: 1) ‘civil-military
coordination in Disaster Management – what progress has been made and where
do we go from here?’; and 2) ‘Protection of Civilians in a multiagency
environment in complex emergencies’. The final day included a session on ‘New
Ideas - Working with hyperconnected information in conflicts and disasters’.

The two main seminar themes were chosen because they reflect contemporary
operational challenges for civil-military actors. In the context of disasters, not
only is the Asia Pacific region the most disaster-prone in the world, but the
number and complexity of disasters is increasing, as is the requirement for
coordinated civil-military responses. In the context of protection of civilians
(POC) in complex emergencies, since 1999, the UN Security Council has
mandated POC in 10 UN peacekeeping missions. In these environments,
protection actors continue to face significant challenges in achieving coherence,
often with limited resources, insufficient guidance and under intense public
scrutiny. Often working in a contested post-conflict environment, protection
actors also may have to contend with armed groups, a hostile or incapable host
state, and the lack of a coherent protection implementation plan.

Despite these operational challenges, participants identified progress being made.
In disaster contexts, the wealth of experience within the region is proving
critically important. Countries, such as those represented by the RSLS
participants, are gaining experience in multiagency and whole-of-government
disaster management. These experiences have reinforced the importance of civil-
military coordination, and helped to identify areas requiring attention and
improvement. The utility of a Pacific Disaster Management Map was seen as a
useful mechanism to understand the basic interactions between domestic and
international actors in disaster response. In complex emergency contexts, the high
level of activity to improve POC by UN peacekeeping missions has resulted in
considerable progress, including the development of the ‘UN Framework for
Drafting Comprehensive POC Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations’
(hereafter ‘POC Framework’); the development of POC training modules for

1
A Regional Senior Leaders Seminar was held in 2010 in Honolulu on ‘The Challenges of
Multinational U.N. Peace Support Operations after a Natural Disaster’.
2
Participants represented the following countries: the Philippines, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Tonga, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and New Caledonia-France. The
non-government organisations present were: Australia Aid International, Save the Children,
Oxfam, ICRC, and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.


civilian, police and military personnel; and a focus on operationalising POC as a
core strategic objective for (and within) UN peacekeeping missions.

Despite advances in both these contexts, participants noted that considerable work
still lies ahead. Participants highlighted the challenges and gaps that presented
obstacles to improved civil-military effectiveness. In disaster contexts, the
obstacles identified included a lack of practical operational mechanisms for civil-
military coordination, and the need for clearer reporting lines. In the POC context,
challenges included a lack of POC doctrine and training, personnel and resource
shortfalls, and the need for peacekeepers to act pre-emptively to protect civilians
under imminent threat of violence, in the face of a helpless, unwilling or abusive
host state.

Participants did not shy away from these challenges, suggesting solutions and
priorities to enhance civil-military collaboration in both disaster response and
POC. These suggestions ranged from the more philosophical to the pragmatic and
concrete. The central conclusion was that civil-military actors require knowledge
and a ‘common understanding’ of the actual situation and of each others’ roles
and responsibilities. In the context of disaster management, participants suggested
various solutions and priorities. These included recognising the importance of
prevention and preparation, the critical role of liaison officers, the critical need for
relationships and trust, and the importance of joint training, exercises and
doctrine. For POC, participants’ suggestions addressed the importance of
engagement between peacekeepers and communities and the need for community
liaison interpreters. They also prioritised the POC Framework and the POC
strategy consultation process, the importance of responsive patrols, benchmarks,
and an improved attitude about intelligence gathering, among other issues.

The presentations and discussions during the seminar highlighted a number of
common themes. These related to: the importance of achieving a common
understanding; understanding the context for civil-military engagement (the
nature or ‘typology’ of the crisis and the nature of the response effort); the
multiplicity of actors involved in crisis environments; the utility of social media
for civil-military crisis management; the unavoidable presence of political
realities; and the importance of the ‘bigger picture’.

The RSLS 2011 was an effective activity that drew upon the experiences of
agencies and individuals working to address civil-military challenges in conflict
and disaster situations. The RSLS encouraged a strong sense of information
sharing and a strong focus on the need for common understanding, and directly
enhanced relationships across the civil-military community.


I. Background
The Regional Senior Leaders Seminar (RSLS) 2011 brought together 31
participants representing ten countries in the Asia-Pacific region; expert speakers
from government, the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs); and
staff from the Centre and COE-DMHA. The three-day seminar focused on two
predominant themes: 1) ‘civil-military coordination in Disaster Management –
what progress has been made and where do we go from here?’; and 2) ‘Protection
of Civilians in a multiagency environment in complex emergencies’. In addition,
the final day included a session on ‘New Ideas - Working with hyperconnected
information in conflicts and disasters’. The seminar comprised keynote
presentations, panel discussions, significant working group activity, supported by
circulating mentors, and a conference dinner with a keynote address by LtGen
(Ret) John Goodman, Executive Director of the COE-DMHA. Networking was a
key objective and was prominent with working relationships developed and
strengthened among civilian, police and military practitioners from the region.

The aim of RSLS 2011 was to provide an opportunity for senior government and
nongovernment officials from the Asia Pacific region to come together to
workshop civil-military issues and challenges for conflict and disaster
management. The seminar was framed by a series of background papers,
circulated to participants in advance of the seminar (see section VII). The format
of the event provided an environment for participants to develop a shared
understanding of civil-military approaches to collaborating in multinational
responses to conflict and disaster situations. The seminar was conducted under
Chatham House Rule to encourage openness and sharing of information and
opinions.

The objectives of RSLS 2011 were to:
• Provide senior regional leaders the opportunity to share and improve their
understanding of civil-military coordination in complex emergencies and
disaster management;
• Enhance communication and coordination between participating countries
and organisations; and
• Access senior experts in the fields of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief
and conflict management.

This report summarises the two themes, examples of progress made, continuing
challenges and gaps, and solutions and priorities identified and highlighted during
the three days of presentations and discussions. 3 This summary report also
considers numerous common themes linking the distinct but related issues of
disaster management and POC in multiagency complex emergencies. The report
concludes with a list of the documents and resources that were referenced and
circulated during the seminar, as well as useful links.
3
This report draws upon notes from Sarah Shteir, the RSLS rapporteur, PowerPoint presentations
and talking points shared by participants, notes from working group discussions and their plenary
feedback, comments posted on a communal whiteboard, and notes shared by participants via
feedback sheets. The views expressed in this report do not represent Australian Government
policy.


III. Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Management
i. Context
The Asia Pacific is the most disaster-prone region in the world. 4 Those living in
the region are ‘four times more likely to be affected by natural disasters than those
living in Africa, and 25 times more likely than those living in Europe or North
America’. 5 As participants heard, the vulnerabilities of this region are exacerbated
by multiple factors including: limited resources; the remoteness of many locations
and isolation of many communities; increasing urbanisation; reliance on outside
assistance; and the loss of traditional coping mechanisms.

Disasters can wipe out decades of • Over half of the 4 billion
development and investment. According to the people living in Asia (60% of
United Nations, in 2010, disasters caused an the world’s population), live
near the coasts, ‘making them
estimated $109 billion in economic damage –
directly vulnerable to sea-level
‘three times more than in 2009’. 6 The rise’ (The Working Group on
estimated cost of the disasters in Queensland Climate Change and
alone was $9-10 billion. Disasters distract Development, 2007).
governments from other critical priorities and • ‘In 2009, over 75 per cent of
activities and can weaken them politically. people killed by natural
Due to the increasing use of social media, disasters worldwide were in
disasters and the efforts to manage them now Asia and the Pacific’ (OCHA
face increasing media scrutiny. Regional Office for Asia Pacific,
‘Briefing Kit’, 2011).
While decreasing global fatality rates from
disasters suggest that preparedness efforts are reaping some rewards, the reality is
that the number of catastrophes is increasing. These disasters are not only
increasing, they are also increasingly complex, as is the response effort,
comprised of an increasingly diverse range of actors. This reality demands
effective civil-military coordination and engagement. While there is increasing
acknowledgement and awareness of the importance of civil-military coordination,
and significant advances in this area, considerable challenges and work remain.

ii. Progress Made

Australia’s Growing Experience of Civil-Military Coordination
Australia has been developing strong skills and capabilities in civil-military
coordination over the past two decades of its operations in disaster situations.
These operations have shifted over time from arrangements in which the civilian
and military efforts were run in parallel and in isolation from one another, to
integrated, co-led operations, demonstrated most recently with the Australian
Government’s contribution to the Pakistan Floods (2010) response. Under the
unifying badge of the Australian Medical Task Force, a joint medical task force

4
OCHA Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, ‘Regional Trends and Implications for OCHA
in Asia and the Pacific’, September 2010, viewed at http://ochaonline.un.org/ocha2010/roap.html.
5
UN ESCAP and UNISDR, Protecting Development Gains: Reducing Disaster Vulnerability and
Building Resilience in Asia and the Pacific - The Asia-Pacific Disaster Report, 2010, p.vii, viewed
at http://www.unescap.org/idd/pubs/Asia-Pacific-Disaster-Report%20-2010.pdf.
6
Laura MacInnis, ‘Cost of natural disasters $109 billion in 2010: U.N.’, Reuters, 24 January 2011,
viewed at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/24/us-disasters-un-idUSTRE70N26K20110124.


was deployed to Kot Adu. It was led under a diarchy arrangement, with leadership
shared between a team leader from the Australian Agency for International
Development (AusAID) and an Australian Defence Force (ADF) Commander. As
one participant reflected, this arrangement ‘ensured a unity in decision-making,
promoted a united front and allowed both the ADF and AusAID to take the
respective lead on their collective and individual areas of responsibility’.

A Pacific Disaster Management Stakeholder Map
As was explained by one participant, the Pacific region provides a useful model of
domestic arrangements for disaster response in the form of the Pacific Disaster
Management Stakeholder Map copied below. The core domestic components of

the map are the national government, a National Disaster Management Office
(NDMO), which can be civilian or military-led, a National Disaster Council,
national societies of the Red Cross, and national NGOs and community-based
organisations. These domestic components share the disaster management space
with various international actors, including regional organisations and
arrangements (Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN
Regional Forum [ARF], Pacific Islands Forum [PIF], FRANZ 7 etc), the United
Nations and international NGOs and donor countries.

Engagement between and among domestic and international actors is facilitated
by various layers of informal, and formal domestic and international networks.
These include the UN cluster system, regional networks such as the South Pacific
Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC), the Pacific Humanitarian Team, and
informal networks. There are also strong informal networks in place. These may
include church networks, and links between Pacific communities and Pacific
Island nationals living in New Zealand and Australia who often provide assistance
through their remittances and other forms of support.

7
FRANZ is an agreement between the three signatory states France, Australia and New Zealand,
which facilitates cooperative emergency relief assistance to the South Pacific in situations of
natural disasters. From Embassy of France in Canberra, ‘FRANZ meeting - Sydney (May
18)’,http://www.ambafrance-au.org/spip.php?article1641.


Tools for Civil-Military Coordination (see Section VII)
There is a wealth of existing tools to facilitate and enhance civil-military
coordination in disaster management. As one participant noted, there is no need to
reinvent the wheel. These tools include:
• The Sphere Handbook - Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in
Humanitarian Response;
• The Australian Council for International Development Code of Conduct, a
‘voluntary, self regulatory industry code’; 8
• ‘Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief’;
• International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law, and Refugee Law;
• Specific Terms of Reference and agreements (such as FRANZ);
• Asia-Pacific Conferences on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief
Operations ‘Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military
Assets in National Disaster Response Operations’;
• ASEAN Standby Arrangements and Standard Operating Procedures; and
• Joint contingency planning and simulation exercises.

These tools are especially important as disaster environments become
increasingly crowded with greater numbers of agencies with their own distinct
mandates, approaches and capabilities. According to one participant, the key
question is how to engage with this multitude of tools.

iii. Challenges & Gaps

Policy and Doctrine
While there is a substantial body of tools to help guide ‘We are only just
civil-military coordination and engagement, it was managing to get by
noted that there is a serious lack of explicit policy and now…we need all the
doctrine within the region. In Australia, for example, skills and coordinated
there is no clear policy on the civil-military space. A effort we can get. ‘
civil-military policy would enable the development and Participant
production of effective civil-military doctrine. Such
policy and doctrine is fundamental for effective civil-military coordination and
cohesion, and it was noted that progress will be difficult without it.

Practical Mechanisms
As one participant noted, while we have a good comprehensive set of
philosophies, what we do not have are the practical mechanisms to allow for civil-
military coordination to actually take place. This observation mirrors a comment
made by Australia’s Foreign Minister, Kevin Rudd:

If we have a huge event affecting a major capital city in the region or
across the world with a large loss of life, the international effort
required would be massive, and I am not confident that currently the
international system of cooperation and coordination would be up to

8
ACFID, viewed at http://www.acfid.asn.au/code-of-conduct


it…Our current arrangements are not sharp enough for that response
to be as rapid and as large scale as it needs to be. 9

As one participant remarked, ‘the first ten days we are not as good as we are on
day 11…will the first ten days of the next disaster change and be improved or will
we still face the same challenges?

‘Same same, but different’
Every disaster is different; not only the nature of the disaster (the ‘typology’) but
also the context in which it occurs (politics,
‘Be wary of the model that worked
culture, economics). For this reason, no
last time. It won’t necessarily work
next time’. single disaster response template is feasible,
Participant regardless of the convenience of the idea.

Reporting Chains
As operations become increasingly coordinated and even integrated, a key factor
that requires consideration is the question of reporting lines. In the joint
Australian Medical Task Force in Pakistan, for example, the dual reporting chains
proved problematic, with the same information sometimes interpreted differently
by civilian and military partners. This experience raises the question of whether
some form of a centralised reporting system or a shared information system is
required in such situations.

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Participants acknowledged the critical civil-military coordination role played by
the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 10 including
in ensuring that humanitarian principles are operationally applied in the civil-
military space. They also acknowledged the pressing need for more OCHA civil-
military coordination officers in the Asia-Pacific.

iv. Priorities & Solutions - Where do we go from here?
Participants identified the following key priorities and solutions during the
seminar:

1. Preparation and Prevention: Participants noted that, in the civil-military
disaster management space, the predominant focus tends to be on the
response phase. However, the response should not be the endgame.
Resources are needed to work with communities and NDMOs/Host
Governments to enhance preparedness and disaster risk reduction - the
prevention and mitigation aspects of disaster management, including the
civil-military interface. After all, the preparatory and preventive efforts
(training, preparedness, contingency planning, and exercises) play a
critical role in determining and shaping the response effort.

9
Excerpt from Transcript from Joint media conference with Pedro Villagra Delgado, Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps on ‘Diplomatic Corps visit to Queensland, Climate Change, Qantas, Tourism,
ASX merger decision’, Brisbane, 6 April 2011
10
UN OCHA was ultimately unable to attend RSLS for reasons of current operational overstretch.
They are currently preparing a study to address the Office’s future civil-military roles and
priorities.


2. Deployment of Liaison Officers: Professional and trained liaison officers
are needed to facilitate civil-military coordination. These officers must be
empowered to make decisions, have developed contacts and networks, and
know what to look for, and who to talk to. If adequately resourced, OCHA
could provide trained civil-military coordination officers for such roles.
Given the limited capacity and capability issues for domestic disaster
management structures, such as NDMOs, one participant cautioned that
such personnel must be cognisant of the potential burden they place on
national offices with their requests for information.

3. Credible Reference List of Coordination Arrangements: There are
multiple regional, multilateral, and bilateral arrangements to support civil-
military coordination in disaster management. OCHA plays a critical role
in this effort, as does the UN Cluster system; ASEAN has a number of
applicable arrangements, some theoretical and some operational; so too
does the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. However,
according to one participant, there is no credible list of these
arrangements. Participants highlighted on a number of occasions the need
for a clear and credible mapping of the full range of existing networks and
arrangements.

4. Civil-Military Coordination Framework: Institutional processes or
frameworks need to be established to guide civil-military coordination and
ensure it is not ad hoc and based solely on individual personalities and
relationships. This will ensure that such coordination does not vanish with
personnel changes.

5. Relationships and Trust: Relationships alone are insufficient, as the
above point highlights, but they are nonetheless critical for effective
disaster response. Developing relationships prior to disasters – bilateral
and multilateral relationships between countries and organisations,
between civilian and military organisations, and between individuals -
enables actors to know their counterparts (their approach, doctrine,
sensibilities), can facilitate the development of a common understanding
between diverse actors, and can facilitate improved coordination during
the chaos and complexity of a disaster situation.

6. Joint Exercises and Training: Shared exercises and training increase
interoperability. While there is limited activity in this area – with NGOs
often excluded from joint exercises - it was acknowledged that momentum
is building. However, it was also acknowledged that the varying capacities
and capabilities of civilian, police and military personnel present a
challenge for such initiatives. For example, NGOs often have such limited
resources and time that they may not be able to participate in joint
exercises, even if they were invited to and wanted to.

7. ‘Double Counting’ Skills: One participant proposed ‘double counting’
skills; in other words proactively utilising the multiple core skills that
many individuals bring to a disaster response. The multi-skilled nature of
team members, such as reservists who have both a military and civilian


career (with knowledge of both ‘sides’), could have great utility in a
multidimensional, multiagency environment. 11

8. Simplicity: As one participant reflected, there will always be tensions and
friction between civilian and military actors. Even with training,
awareness-raising and exercises, the civil-military dynamic will always
prove complex and complicated. Observing that we tend to
overcomplicate things, this participant noted that ‘It behoves us to keep
things as simple as possible’.

9. End-state: One participant asked the questions - why do we want to do
better? What is the desired end-state? It is critical that we remember we
are there to save lives, reduce injury, and enable and support recovery.
This is the driving need to enhance civil-military effectiveness.

11
At the same time, it was noted that double counting can be a ‘double-edged sword’, as reservists
may face multiple competing demands for their capabilities.


IV. Protection of Civilians in a Multiagency Environment in
Complex Emergencies

i. Context
UN peacekeeping operations have been explicitly involved in the protection of
civilians in 10 different missions over the past 12 years. Beginning with the 1999
mandate for the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), this journey has been
challenging and difficult. The role of peacekeeping in POC has been controversial
and contested, as it is bound up in sensitive issues of sovereignty and host nation
consent. There have been differing levels of support and acceptance for POC
among key Member States, including Security Council members and Troop and
Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs). Among the latter, concern and resistance
to a POC role has sometimes been reflected in
national caveats limiting what their personnel are We need to remember who
allowed to do when faced with civilians under protection is about.
imminent threat of violence. The controversial Participant (paraphrased)
nature of POC is further compounded by its links to
the politically charged ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’ norm. 12 Despite the
challenges and resistance, today, there are seven UN missions, out of a total of 16,
with a POC mandate: Sudan (UNMIS); Sudan-Darfur (UNAMID); Lebanon
(UNIFIL); Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI); Liberia (UNMIL); Haiti (MINUSTAH); and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (MONUSCO). Across these
missions, there are approximately 112, 000 personnel deployed under a POC
mandate. 13

There are multiple protection players and stakeholders in a multiagency
peacekeeping environment. The host state has primary responsibility for the
protection of (its) civilians. Communities themselves are a central actor in their
own protection, with often well-developed self-protection mechanisms and
strategies (eg. ‘run, hide, negotiate, fight-back’). There are explicit protection-
mandated organisations, including the ICRC, and the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). There is the UN peacekeeping mission
itself (military, police and civilian personnel). There is the UN Country Team
(UNCT), which may include UN OCHA, UNHCR, the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the UN Children’s Fund
(UNICEF), the World Food Program (WFP), the UN Population Fund (UNFPA),

12
R2P is a norm (also described as a concept and principle) that addresses the responsibility to
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. R2P
was embraced by UN General Assembly Member States at the 2005 World Summit in paragraphs
138-139 of the Outcome Document. In 2009, the UN Secretary-General released the first
comprehensive document outlining implementation of R2P. In this document he proposes a three-
pillar approach for advancing the R2P agenda: ‘The protection responsibilities of the State’;
‘International assistance and capacity-building’; and ‘Timely and decisive response’. From
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Core Documents: Understanding RtoP’,
viewed at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/publications/core-rtop-documents and
UN General Assembly, ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-
General’, A/63/677, 12 January 2009, p.2.
13
It is important to note that non-UN operations also include protection tasks. For example, in
Afghanistan, ‘population protection’ has become a central focus for the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF).


UN Women, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), as well as
international NGOs. These organisations often coordinate among each other and
with the peacekeeping mission through the UN protection cluster system. Other
players and stakeholders include national NGOs and community-based
organisations.

These varied protection actors approach their protection efforts in diverse ways.
Within the human rights and humanitarian field, there is a consensus-based
definition that has been used for many years by many organisations, based on the
ICRC definition and endorsed by the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee:

The concept of protection encompasses all activities aimed at
obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance
with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law, i.e. human
rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law…

A protection activity is any activity – consistent with the above-mentioned
purpose – aimed at creating an environment conducive to respect for human
beings, preventing and/or alleviating the immediate effects of a specific
pattern of abuse, and restoring dignified conditions of life through
reparation, restitution and rehabilitation. 14

Protection actors who use this rights-based definition, such as the ICRC, have
developed a conceptual reference known as the ‘protection egg’. The ‘protection
response egg’ identifies three levels of protection action: responsive action;
remedial action; and environment building. 15

More recently, the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and
Field Support (DFS) developed a Concept of Operations for the application of
Examples of Successful Protection
POC in UN peacekeeping operations.
by Peacekeepers: The 2009 Operational Concept on the
• MONUSCO (DRC): Swift Protection of Civilians in UN
intervention by peacekeepers led Peacekeeping Operations outlines a
to the release of seven women on ‘three-tiered approach’ to protection for
the same day they were abducted peacekeeping missions: protection
by rebels. through political process; protection
• MINUSTAH (Haiti): Peacekeeper from physical violence; and establishing
patrols in an IDP camp helped a protective environment (promotion of
reduce crime and improve security legal protection, facilitation of
for camp residents. humanitarian assistance and advocacy,
and support to national institutions). 16

There has been considerable activity over the past three years to improve POC in
UN peacekeeping operations. Much of this activity has been guided by requests

14
ICVA, ‘What Is Protection?: A Definition by Consensus: A Background Note for the Workshop
on the Development of Human Rights Training for Humanitarian Actors’, 2001, viewed at
http://www.icva.ch/doc00000663.html.
15
ICRC, Strengthening Protection in War: A Search for Professional Standards, 2001, viewed at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0783.htm.
16
DPKO/DFS, ‘Draft DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United
Nations Peacekeeping Operations’, 2010, pp. 1, 9.


from Member States, in particular through the UN Special Committee on
Peacekeeping Operations (the C-34). This flurry of activity also has been driven
by challenging and difficult environments faced by a number of the UN’s larger
missions. The UN missions in Haiti, Sudan, Darfur, DRC and Côte d’Ivoire have
all had to grapple with difficult events and, as one participant explained, their
ability to protect civilians ‘has been put to the test’. There have been highly
publicised failures, where peacekeepers were unable to reach civilians in time to
protect them, due, among other factors, to inaccessibility and lack of resources.
There have also been many, less publicised, cases where peacekeepers have
successfully protected civilians in the mission area; participants heard success
stories from DRC, Darfur and Haiti.

ii. Progress Made

UN ‘Framework for Drafting Comprehensive POC Strategies in UN
Peacekeeping Operations’
The newest POC tool to be developed by DPKO is
the UN ‘Framework for Drafting Comprehensive Template for Comprehensive
POC Strategies
POC Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations’
(hereafter the ‘POC Framework’). Developed A. Purpose and scope of the
through extensive consultation, it is designed as an strategy
‘umbrella’ to help missions build a mission-wide B. Analysis of POC risks and
strategy responsive to their context and situation, undertaking risk
assessments
while ensuring they have all the necessary elements, C. POC activities
and are consulting and coordinating with all the D. Information-gathering and
right protection actors. A core component of the sharing system
POC Framework template is a POC risk analysis, E. Early warning systems and
‘in many ways the focus of the Framework’, crisis response
F. Analysis of mission
according to one participant. A POC risk analysis capacities, resources and
must be conducted jointly with other UN protection national caveats
actors, including the UNCT, ‘in order to ensure a G. Roles and responsibilities of
common understanding and prioritization of those mission components and
risks’. 17
Through this analysis, and a candid other protection actors
H. Coordination mechanisms
assessment of a mission’s capacities and I. Expectations Management
capabilities, the mission can then prioritise their J. Monitoring and reporting on
POC tasks and activities, in coordination with other implementation of POC
protection actors. The POC Framework is now mandates
official guidance for the field, following its recent
approval by the C-34.

Development of UN POC Training Modules
DPKO is developing a series of training modules for military, police and civilian
personnel working in missions with POC mandates. The modules address the
conceptual underpinnings of POC and are based on realistic scenarios. As one
participant outlined, the modules have been shared with Member States and will
shortly be pilot tested with peacekeeping training institutes and missions, after
which they will be finalised and shared again with Member States in July 2011.

17
DPKO/DFS, ‘Framework for Drafting POC Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations’, 2011,
p.8.


Regional training-of-trainer courses on the modules will be conducted from July
2011 to July 2012, pending resources. Once finalised, the modules will be
delivered as part of pre-deployment training as well as in-mission training.

UN Scenario-based Training Modules on Sexual Violence
DPKO is working with UN Women and UN Action Against Sexual Violence in
Conflict on scenario-based training modules on sexual violence for military
personnel. These modules present military personnel, prior to deployment, with
‘real-life sexual violence situations’ to teach them how to respond. 18

Resource and Capability Requirements for POC
Upon a request from Member States, DPKO has begun to outline the resource and
capability requirements for implementing POC mandates. A resource and
capability matrix has been drafted and shared with the C-34 and UN missions for
feedback. The matrix is intended to clarify requirements based on specific POC
activities. This tool is intended to provide insight into the planning for future POC
missions.

Concept of Operations
DPKO has begun assessing existing mission Concept of Operations (CONOPS) to
determine their adequacy in achieving POC-mandated requirements. A review of
existing police and military CONOPS for POC missions has revealed
considerable variation: some make explicit mention of POC; and some indirect
reference. According to one participant, an explicit statement on POC in the
CONOPS is desired. An example of this is the police CONOPS for UNAMID, in
which ‘contributing to the protection of civilians’ is cited as a strategic objective.

South Sudan UN Mission Planning
As one participant explained, POC is an integral part of the ongoing planning for
a new mission in South Sudan. It has been defined as a core responsibility. With
the recent release and finalisation of the POC Framework, and other
developments on POC, the South Sudan mission represents a litmus test for
assessing the impact and benefits of these new and ongoing reforms and
developments on the ground.

UN Police
According to one participant, through their varying roles, it can be said that police
engage in all three tiers of POC (as delineated in the Operational Concept
mentioned above). Based on this assessment, the increasing number of missions
involving police is a significant and promising trend. 19 So too is the increase in

18
The training modules on sexual violence draw upon the resource Addressing Conflict-Related
Sexual Violence - An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice, a collaborative initiative
between UNIFEM and DPKO, on behalf of UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict. The
Inventory provides a detailed listing of concrete practices utilised by peacekeeping missions to
address sexual violence.
19
According to a 2010 report by the Stimson Center, ‘[A]s of spring 2010, there were over 13,000
UNPOL officers (individuals and members of FPUs) deployed in 12 DPKO-led missions
worldwide…’This is compared to 1988 when there were only ‘35 UN police officers…serving
worldwide, all in a single UN mission, in Cyprus’. From W.J. Durch and M.L. England, eds.,
‘Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law’ (Revised
and Updated), Stimson Center Report No. 63, August 2010, p.17, viewed at


deployment of special police units, called Formed Police Units (FPUs). Police
‘are on the front-edge of the security apparatus of a
‘POC can be seen as the
raison d’etre [of UN
mission’; they may engage in criminal investigations,
police]’. forensic analysis, counternarcotics, training and
Participant capacity-building, and disarmament, demobilisation
and reintegration. These roles may be further
diversified in situations where there is a critical dearth of local policing capacity.

Sphere Handbook 2011 Edition
The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, also
known as the Sphere Handbook, sets out the ‘core principles that govern
humanitarian action’ and compiles minimum standards and indicators in various
technical areas. 20 Building on the 2004 edition, the new 2011 edition integrates
new emerging issues including civil-military relations, disaster risk reduction,
climate change, and urban settings 21 . It also includes a stronger focus on
protection, after the consultation process revealed ‘the need to address protection
more substantially’. 22

iii. Challenges & Gaps

Conceptual Dilemmas and Operative Inconsistencies
According to one participant, the lack of clarity in a mandate’s POC language
creates difficulties and burdens for a mission’s leadership. How should
‘imminent’ be interpreted? How imminent is imminent? Where does ‘vicinity of a
base’ start and end? A military commander (and other component heads) needs to
define these terms and turn this vague mandate language into operational
language for troops. The manner in which commanders (and component heads)
define this language may differ considerably one from the other. More
understanding and consistency is required at UN Secretariat and mission levels,
cognisant that the language in UN Security Council mandates will always reflect
political realities and may sometimes be open to interpretation.

Personnel and Resource Constraints
Critical personnel and resource shortfalls are a
‘300 troops with basic continuing constraint for POC efforts in
equipment in charge of a peacekeeping missions. Reflecting on the
sector of 80,000 square
insufficient troop numbers in one mission, a
kilometres’.
Participant (paraphrased) participant reflected that it was ‘unrealistic that
they could accomplish anything’. To compound
the situation, troops that are deployed often do not
meet the capability requirements of the mission. Troops may lack the
expeditionary capabilities required by the mandate, or at the most basic level,

http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-
pdfs/Enhancing_United_Nations_Capacity_2010_revision.pdf.
20
The Sphere Project, ‘About Us’, viewed at
http://www.sphereproject.org/content/view/91/58/lang,english/.
21
Ibid.
22
The Sphere Project, ‘What is new in the 2011 edition of the Sphere Handbook’, viewed at
http://www.sphereproject.org/component/option,com_docman/task,doc_details/Itemid,203/gid,393/
lang,english/.


arrive with substandard equipment (‘guns held together with duck tape’). As one
participant reflected, ‘troops are on one side of the world and assets are on the
other side of the world’. In one mission with a POC mandate, many troops were
deployed without mobility assets, including night flying capability. Such asset
shortfalls make critical protection activities, such as long-term patrols, next to
impossible.

Complementarity versus Competition
No single protection intervention strategy will be sufficient. Yet, according to one
participant, it has proven to be a challenge for the multiple protection actors
working in a multiagency environment to
respect each others’ roles and try not to do ‘There is a need to be smart
each others’ jobs. The multiple protection about engaging with other
approaches need to be complementary not actors’.
Participant
competitive. As one participant proposed,
what is needed is a ‘reflex in our planning to measure whether our approach is
damaging or complementing other approaches’. This is especially important with
regards to civilian roles in UN peacekeeping missions. Specifically, it has been
observed that civilian peacekeeping personnel can be a source of confusion for
local authorities and communities who have difficulty differentiating them from
other civilian protection actors. This can damage the long-term POC efforts of
other non-UN civilian actors. 23

Independence of Action
What happens when peacekeepers find themselves face-to-face with a host nation
that is unable or unwilling to engage in POC, directly impeding peacekeepers’
POC tasks, or worse, perpetrating abuses against
‘A lot of TCCs are at the their own citizens? These situations place T/PCCs
pointy end of POC’. in a very difficult situation, both from a safety
Participant perspective and also a political perspective
(uncertain about political backing if they chose to
engage). Such challenging situations are receiving increasing focus and
acknowledgement. Yet there is still ongoing disagreement among Member States
about the role of missions and their peacekeepers in this kind of scenario. One
participant, while acknowledging the controversial nature of this issue,
recommended that the UN recognise that policing and security is an issue for
management on the ground, not at UN Headquarters in New York.

23
In contrast, military and police personnel are much more easily distinguishable from other non-
mission POC efforts.


UN Police
As one participant explained, highly-skilled police are rarely in surplus in any
society. Taxpayers pay for police to be deployed in their own countries, not sent
abroad. There are few countries where there are paid police roles dedicated to
deployment; Australia is one example, through its
International Deployment Group within the Australian ‘The issue is about
Federal Police. When police are deployed, except for having enough people
in enough jobs, not
FPUs, they are deployed individually. For peacekeeping
about the right people
missions, this means that a timely deployment of skilled in the right jobs’.
police personnel is very difficult to achieve. Often, police Participant
that are sent are minimally trained; some have been
known to have fewer skills than those of the national police force they are there to
support. To fill the capacity gap, personnel from FPUs have sometimes been
reassigned as police officers, though they are minimally trained for such work; the
training they have received has little utility and applicability in a mission where
policing involves a broad range of activities.

Non-UN Peace Operations
Considerable advances have been made on POC in UN peacekeeping, but less
attention has been given to POC guidelines, doctrine and training for non-UN
missions. For example, while ‘population protection’ has been emphasised by
ISAF in Afghanistan there is no agreed doctrine on how this should be achieved.
The same applies for other non-UN peace operations where protection is more
loosely interpreted under a ‘security’ banner, and primarily from a military
perspective. More work is required to leverage the UN’s work on POC for
application in non-UN peace operations.

iv. Priorities & Solutions - Where do we go from here?
Participants identified the following key priorities and solutions during the
seminar:
.
1. Peacekeepers’ Engagement with Communities: Participants
emphasised the need for more regular engagement between peacekeepers
(civilian and military) and local communities. After all, it was noted that
‘the beneficiaries of protection are often those least consulted’. Such
engagement enables peacekeepers to gain better situational awareness,
build on and support existing self-protection measures adopted by the
communities, and also helps manage communities’ expectations of the
peacekeeping mission. As one participant explained, regular
communication with communities is the only way to achieve realistic
expectations of the mission, as a two-way dialogue enables communities
to ask questions and be given explanations. Women interpreters are
essential for such engagement, though, in at least one mission, the few
women interpreters that had been hired were based solely in the capitol.
To implement protection effectively, UN missions require information and
communications systems that enable information flows with communities.

2. Community Liaison Interpreters: Interpreters help bridge both the
language and cultural divides that exist between peacekeeping personnel
and communities; in this way they provide a community liaison function


as well. As one participant explained, communities often appreciate and
trust these interpreters. While these interpreters are often located on
military bases to support peacekeeping troops, concern was voiced that
military commanders tend to view them solely as interpreters and have a
limited understanding of, and appreciation for, their cultural liaison skills.

3. Responsive Patrols: There was consensus that more work is needed by
peacekeeping missions to make patrols more responsive to the protection
needs of communities. Numerous good practices exist, including locating
peacekeepers near checkpoints, organising firewood and market patrols, as
well as patrols to help villagers access their fields. Responsive patrols are
only possible with regular communication between peacekeepers and
communities, including through such arrangements as firewood patrol
committees in refugee/displaced persons camp settings. Differences were
recognised between POC implementation requirements in rural and urban
environments.

4. Timely Implementation of the Strategic Framework: There was
widespread agreement among participants of the need to begin moving the
POC Framework forward by ‘getting it out there’. Participants proposed
numerous next steps including turning the POC Framework into doctrine;
incorporating it in training; making sure there is clarity and consensus on
the terminology used; and also facilitating a timely feedback process so
the POC Framework can be improved and strengthened where needed. It
was also recommended that a dedicated focal point be identified to
coordinate and manage this important process. 24 There was also
agreement that the POC Framework has utility for non-UN mission
environments such as the Solomon Islands, Libya, and Afghanistan, and
therefore should be shared as a potential tool for actors in those
operations.

5. Cross-reference in POC Strategy Consultation Process: During the
consultative process to develop a mission’s POC strategy, it is important
to cross-reference with available experiences, initiatives, and
documentation. Cross-referencing will help to ensure that lessons and
good practices from previous POC efforts are integrated in the
development of the new mission strategy.

6. POC Strategic Directive for Military Peacekeepers: It was noted that
military personnel are not technically POC specialists, yet they are
increasingly engaged directly in a mission’s POC efforts and activities.
Given the inconsistent POC language in mandates, as noted above, there is
a need for an ‘unambiguous orientation’ to POC specifically targeting
military personnel. Though the Operational Concept and POC Framework
are critical overarching guidance, a UN strategic directive on POC by
military peacekeepers would help to ensure the military approach is
consistent.
24
A representative from DPKO pointed out that some of the comments made about the POC
Framework by participants reinforce input they have already received from the field. It was noted
that participants’ comments on the POC Framework would be shared with DPKO HQ.


7. Intelligence Gathering: Intelligence enables a mission to know what is
going on in a community. Yet according to one participant, the ‘apparatus
of intelligence has been a very difficult phenomenon’ to deal with, given
the pervasive reality that intelligence has been used against civilian
populations. For this reason, it has been a struggle to encourage people to
see the benefits of intelligence and recognize its critical link to POC. 25

8. Capacity-Building: Some participants observed that there can be an
unrealistic tendency to seek to build local capacity during a crisis,
maintain it artificially, and then remove the support prematurely. If there
is interest in building local long-term protection capacity, it is best to start
before a crisis rather than at a time of peak crisis. It is also important to
identify culturally appropriate capacity-building approaches. As
participants heard, the right models are often those observed in the
community. This approach strengthens the nexus between peacekeeping
and peacebuilding.

9. POC Benchmarks: Developing benchmarks for POC is a highly
analytical and challenging exercise. Benchmarks need to be context-
specific. They also need to be linked to how the community perceives its
own safety, and their own objectives and expectations. It was suggested
that the UN may benefit from consulting with Member States on
developing POC-specific benchmarks for mission drawdown and
transition.

10. POC Training for Mission Leadership: POC training is necessary for all
mission components. Beyond POC training for civilian and police
personnel and military troops, targeted in the POC modules currently
under development, commanders and senior leaders require more
advanced training, and this should be conducted in a civil-military
environment.

V. Common Issues
The two themes of disaster management and POC were addressed separately
during RSLS. Nonetheless, it was apparent that the civil-military interaction lens
illuminated linkages and coherence between them. The presentations and
discussions highlighted numerous common issues across these discrete but related
fields, which are elaborated below.

Achieving a Common Understanding
In both a multiagency disaster and for POC in complex emergencies, an effective
and sustainable response is only possible when there is a common understanding
among the diverse actors. A common understanding is needed not only of the
situation, but also of the needs, of who is doing what to address those needs, of

25
The Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) needs to be clearly directed to synthesise
information through a ‘protection lens’ to enable coordinated, proactive and pre-emptive action by
mission components.


the progress being made, and how to assess that progress. There are numerous
mechanisms and tools for facilitating a common understanding. These include
regular communication and dialogue (‘Comms!
‘How do we create a Comms! Comms!’ was regularly reiterated by
common understanding of participants), and joint training and education. In a
the situation? Until you conflict environment, the POC Framework is a
do, you are all solving potential unifying mechanism for helping to achieve
different problems’. and implement a common understanding of POC
Participant (paraphrased)
among multiple protection actors with different
protection approaches and activities. A common
understanding does NOT mean that all organisations and /or peacekeeping
elements do the SAME thing, but rather that they understand how their specific
efforts contribute to the overall effort.

Understanding the Context for Civil-Military Engagement
A clear understanding of the dynamics and context of a crisis will help to
determine the nature of civil-military engagement in that crisis. The ‘typology’
and scale of a disaster, for example, – whether it is a single volcanic eruption, a
cascading disaster such as in Japan (earthquake, tsunami, nuclear meltdown), or a
natural disaster in a conflict zone – will affect the range and type of civilian and
military actors deployed as well as the way in which they engage with one
another. It is also necessary to understand the types of engagement involved. Are
the diverse civil-military actors engaging at an intergovernmental, international,
and/or interdepartmental level? These different types of engagement will present
different challenges for civil-military engagement. OCHA civil-military
coordination officers can play a critical role facilitating these different forms of
engagement and linking this engagement to the host state.

Multiplicity of Players
In both conflict and disaster management, it is often hard to identify who is the
‘conductor’ and get all the instruments to play the same tune. The diverse range
of actors that converge on a crisis come from different ‘doctrinal bases’, and bring
their own organisational cultural approach, and capabilities. This can create
significant friction. Yet, as was often reflected during the seminar, ‘no one will
win the effort alone’.

The Utility of Social Media 26
Increasingly, connected networks of volunteers and their use of social media are
playing a role in facilitating and supporting both disaster and conflict
management. Following disasters or in response to ‘The public [is a]
growing unrest, connected communities such as the resource rather than a
Standby Taskforce, Crisis Commons, and Crisis liability’.
Mappers are activated and call upon volunteers to Craig Fugate, FEMA
scan news media, and social technologies such as

26
The boxed quote is from C Fugate, ‘Understanding the Power of Social Media as a
Communication Tool in the Aftermath of Disasters’, Statement before the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and
Intergovernmental Affairs, Washington, DC, 5 May 2011, p. 2, viewed at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=e928effc-
4bfd-4024-9017-130bb45b4ed4.


Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, blogs, and SMS to collect, verify and analyse
information rapidly in real or near-real-time. Once validated and fully ‘de-
identified’, this information can then be used by UN, governmental, and NGO
actors to enhance situational awareness and influence operational planning. These
connected communities have been activated in numerous disaster and conflict
crises, beginning with the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004), and including the 2007-
2008 post-election crisis in Kenya, the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, and most
recently in response to conflicts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. These connected
networks, and the tools they use (including FrontlineSMS, Medic Mobile, Sahana,
SwiftRiver, and Ushahidi – see Section VII) can help civil-military actors
improve their disaster and conflict response efforts. For this reason, as one
participant explained, civil-military actors ought to be engaging with these
volunteer technical communities. However, low familiarity with these tools and
the value they provide, as well as an institutional penchant for state-based security
systems, has created resistance to engaging with them. This resistance is visible
among many communities including the military. Given the utility of these
communities and the tools they use, this field requires considerably more
attention, including in the areas of training, exercises, and doctrine.

Unavoidable Political Realities
Politics plays a significant role in both disaster management and POC in a
multiagency complex emergency. The domestic political
architecture has to allow action in the first place, be it ‘You can’t keep
international aid to a disaster (as the case of Cyclone Nargis politics out of the
so clearly illustrated), or the deployment of a peacekeeping room’.
mission. Politics also determines who and what is deployed Participant
to participate in a response and what deployed personnel
are willing (national caveats, for example) and able (capacity and capabilities) to
do.

Importance of the ‘Bigger Picture’
Various participants highlighted the importance of seeing the ‘bigger picture’. On
Day 1, it was suggested ‘put yourself 100 years
‘Is there a difference between
civilians in danger in a UN from now…are we being ambitious enough about
theatre and not a UN theatre?’ what we want in terms of better civil-military
Participant (paraphrase) coordination?’ On Day 2, in the context of POC,
one participant encouraged a broader, more
proactive approach to POC. Recognising that poverty is a ‘pernicious’ root cause
of violence, the participant encouraged greater support to impoverished fragile
and failing states, regardless of whether they are on the Security Council agenda
and ‘UN theatres’.

VI. Conclusion
RSLS 2011 provided a valuable opportunity to bring together senior government,
military and non-government officials from the Asia Pacific region to workshop
civil-military issues and challenges. The seminar helped develop a common
understanding of civil-military approaches to improve collaboration (and
recognise separation) in conflict and disaster situations. The seminar generated
partnerships and new and expanded networks among regional and global


practitioners. RSLS 2011 enabled experts and practitioners to speak freely, and
share opinions and ideas about civil-military issues and challenges. It was a
working seminar; for three days, participants engaged in fruitful discussion, which
was informed and stimulated by an outstanding array of speakers. As one
participant remarked, ‘this is not a conference where you sit back and observe’.

Despite daunting operational environments, numerous examples of progress were
identified and highlighted, including the growth of critical civil-military
experience, the establishment of arrangements to facilitate civil-military
coordination, and the development of training modules. Nonetheless, considerable
work remains to be done. Participants highlighted challenges and gaps to
improved civil-military effectiveness. Many of these challenges and gaps derive
from the every-day reality of civil-military struggles on the ground, and reflect an
expanding wealth of experience in this multiagency field. Participants did not shy
away from these challenges and put forward solutions and priorities for enhancing
civil-military collaboration in both disaster environments and complex
emergencies. These ranged from the more philosophical to the pragmatic and
concrete. The central conclusion was that civil-military actors require
knowledge and a ‘common understanding’ of the actual situation and of each
others’ roles and responsibilities.

To paraphrase one participant, ‘how we move communication and coordination
forward is a task for everyone’. It is no easy task; the chaos of a crisis situation,
cultural tensions, and unavoidable political realities represent some of the
challenges that confront actors responding to a crisis, be it a natural disaster or
complex emergency with civilians under imminent threat of violence. However, it
is a necessary task that must be appreciated and applied from political and
strategic decision makers through to those implementing agencies on the ground.
An effective and sustainable response is only possible when there is a common
understanding among civil-military actors, and a full appreciation of the needs
and capabilities of local actors. And a common understanding begins with
communication and coordination.

COE-DMHA, in conjunction with the Centre, is currently planning to co-host the
3rd Regional Senior Leaders Seminar in mid-2012. Details will be advised.


VII. Key Readings, Resources & References

[Background reading] Asia-Pacific Conferences on Military Assistance to
Disaster Relief Operations, ‘Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines For The Use Of
Foreign Military Assets In National Disaster Response Operations’, Draft version
8.0, November 2010,
http://ochaonline.un.org/roap/APCMADRO/tabid/7303/language/en-
US/Default.aspx

Australian Council for International Development, ‘ACFID Code of Conduct for
Non Government Development Organisations’, 2010, effective January 2012,
http://www.acfid.asn.au//code-of-conduct/acfid-code-of-conduct-revised-
effective-jan2012

S Collins, ‘Conflict and Disaster Management in a Hyperconnected World -
Cooperative, Collaborative, Real Time’, May 2011,
http://www.acidlabs.org/2011/05/19/conflict-and-disaster-management-in-a-
hyperconnected-world-cooperative-collaborative-real-time/

W.J. Durch and M.L. England, eds., ‘Enhancing United Nations Capacity to
Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law’ (Revised and Updated), Stimson
Center Report No. 63, August 2010, viewed at
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-
pdfs/Enhancing_United_Nations_Capacity_2010_revision.pdf.

C Fugate, ‘Understanding the Power of Social Media as a Communication Tool in
the Aftermath of Disasters’, Statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and
Intergovernmental Affairs, Washington, DC, 5 May 2011, p. 2, viewed at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing
_ID=e928effc-4bfd-4024-9017-130bb45b4ed4

A Giffen, ‘Considerations for a New Peacekeeping Operation in South Sudan:
Preventing Conflict and Protecting Civilians’, Working Paper, Stimson Center,
April/May 2011, http://www.stimson.org/summaries/considerations-for-a-new-
peacekeeping-operation-in-south-sudan/

[Background reading] Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘The
Relationship between the Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians
in Armed Conflict’, Policy Brief , May 2011,
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/The%20Relationship%20Between%20POC%20
and%20R2P-%20Updated.pdf

[Background reading] Government of Pakistan National Disaster Management
Authority, Pakistan 2010 Flood Relief – Learning from Experience: Observations
and Opportunities, 2011,
http://www.ndma.gov.pk/Documents/flood_2010/lesson_learned/Pakistan%20201
0%20Flood%20Relief-Learning%20from%20Experience.pdf


[Background reading] ‘Hope For’ Initiative, ‘A Global Cooperative Framework to
Improve the Effectiveness of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Relief
Operations’ (initiative of Qatar), 2011

International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Code of Conduct for the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) in Disaster Relief’, 1994,
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p1067.htm
-
-, Strengthening Protection in War: A Search for Professional Standards, 2001,
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0783.htm.

ICVA, ‘What Is Protection?: A Definition by Consensus: A Background Note for
the Workshop on the Development of Human Rights Training for Humanitarian
Actors’, 2001, viewed at http://www.icva.ch/doc00000663.html.

International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Core Documents:
Understanding RtoP’, viewed at
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/publications/core-rtop-
documents

L MacInnis, ‘Cost of natural disasters $109 billion in 2010: U.N.’, Reuters, 24
January 2011, viewed at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/24/us-disasters-
un-idUSTRE70N26K20110124.

Oxfam, ‘Engaging with Communities: The Next Challenge for Peacekeeping’,
141 Oxfam Briefing Paper, November 2010,
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp141-engaging-with-
communities-221110-en.pdf

K Rudd MP, Transcript from Joint media conference with Pedro Villagra
Delgado, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps on ‘Diplomatic Corps visit to
Queensland, Climate Change, Qantas, Tourism, ASX merger decision’,
Brisbane, 6 April 2011,
http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2011/kr_tr_110406_joint_media_c
onference.html

The Sphere Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in
Humanitarian Response, 3rd edition, Practical Action Publishing, Rugby, UK,
2011

[Background reading] UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations/Field
Support, ‘Framework for Drafting POC Strategies in UN Peacekeeping
Operations’, 2011

--, ‘Draft DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in UN
Peacekeeping Operations’, 2010

UN DPKO, UNIFEM, UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict,
'Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence - An Analytical Inventory of


Peacekeeping Practice', 2010,
http://www.unifem.org/materials/item_detail.php?ProductID=172

UN ESCAP and UNISDR, Protecting Development Gains: Reducing Disaster
Vulnerability and Building Resilience in Asia and the Pacific - The Asia-Pacific
Disaster Report, 2010, p.vii, viewed at http://www.unescap.org/idd/pubs/Asia-
Pacific-Disaster-Report%20-2010.pdf.

UN General Assembly, ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect:
Report of the Secretary-General’, A/63/677, 12 January 2009.

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations
Foundation, Vodafone Technology Partnership and Harvard Humanitarian
Initiative, ‘Disaster Relief 2.0: The Future of Information Sharing in
Humanitarian Emergencies, March 2011, http://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-
stories/disaster-relief-20-future-information-sharing-humanitarian-emergencies

UN OCHA Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, ‘Regional Trends and
Implications for OCHA in Asia and the Pacific’, September 2010, viewed at
http://ochaonline.un.org/ocha2010/roap.html.

--, ‘Briefing Kit’, p.4, viewed at
http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1233156.

United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs -
Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs,
Hearing on ‘Understanding the Power of Social Media as a Communications Tool
in the Aftermath of Disasters’, May 2011,
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing
_ID=e928effc-4bfd-4024-9017-130bb45b4ed4

Working Group on Climate Change and Development, ‘Up in smoke? Asia and
the Pacific: The threat from climate change to human development and the
environment’, The fifth report from the Working Group on Climate Change and
Development, 2007, viewed at http://www.upinsmokecoalition.org/

World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and
Development, 2011, http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/fulltext

World Bank and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
(GFDRR), ‘Volunteer Technology Communities: Open Development’, 2011,
http://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/volunteer-technology-communities-open-development

‘Guidelines On The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster
Relief - “Oslo Guidelines”’, Updated November 2006 (Revision 1.1 November
2007), http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1084542


Useful Links
• Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence: http://civmilcoe.gov.au/
• Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance
(COE-DMHA): http://coe-dmha.org/
• CrisisCommons: http://crisiscommons.org
• CrisisMappers Net: http://www.crisismappers.net/
• FrontlineSMS: http://www.frontlinesms.com/
• Global Disaster Assistance Coordination System (GDACS):
http://www.gdacs.org/
• Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) (US Government):
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi/index.htm
• Libya Crisis Map, OCHA: http://libyacrisismap.net/
• Medic Mobile: http://medicmobile.org/
• On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC), OCHA:
http://vosocc.unocha.org/
• Sahana Software Foundation: http://sahanafoundation.org/
• The Sphere Project: http://www.sphereproject.org/
• SwiftRiver: http://swift.ushahidi.com/
• Ushahidi: http://www.ushahidi.com/about-us


Annex A

Regional Senior Leaders Seminar
2011 (RSLS 2011)

STRENGTHENING CIVIL-
MILITARY COORDINATION FOR
CONFLICT AND DISASTER
MANAGEMENT

16-19 May 2011

Pullman Reef Hotel
35-41 Wharf Street
Cairns, Queensland, Australia


Background

The Regional Senior Leaders Seminar (RSLS) is an annual opportunity for
the Centre to co-host, in conjunction with the US Government’s Center for
Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COE-
DMHA), a civil-military coordination forum for emerging leaders from the
Asia Pacific region. RSLS 2011 will be held in Cairns, Australia from 16-19
May 2011 with the Centre being the lead organisation.

The RSLS uses specific case studies to provide platforms by which senior
leaders can consider civil-military coordination in both conflict and
disaster management and develop practical solutions in a
workshop/discussion environment to exchange ideas, enhance knowledge
and contribute to international engagement.

Aim
The aim of the RSLS is to provide an opportunity for senior government
and non-government officials from the Asia Pacific region to come
together to workshop civil-military issues and challenges for conflict and
disaster management. RSLS provides a secure space for participants to
develop a shared understanding of civil-military approaches to
collaborating in multinational responses to conflict and disaster situations.

Objectives
The objectives of RSLS 2011 are to:
• provide senior regional leaders the opportunity to share and improve
their understanding of civil-military coordination in complex
emergencies and disaster management;
• enhance communication and coordination between participating
countries and organisations; and
• access senior experts in the fields of humanitarian assistance, disaster
relief and conflict management.

The Conference will be conducted under the Chatham House
Rule to encourage openness and the sharing of information.
A summary report of the proceedings will be published by the
Centre.
The Conference will be conducted in English.


MONDAY 16 May

From 1600 Registration
Venue: Pullman Reef Hotel
Michaelmas Cay Pre-Function Area

1800-2000 Welcome Reception
Pool Deck & Coral Lounge
Welcome: GPCAPT Keith Brackenbury
Hosts: MAJGEN (Ret) Michael G. Smith AO,
Executive Director APCMCOE and LTGEN (Ret) John
F. Goodman, Executive Director COE-DMHA

TUESDAY 17 May

Michaelmas Cay 1

08.30 Registration (tea and coffee available)

Opening Session

08.55 Welcome to Country

09.00 Administrative Announcements
GPCAPT Keith Brackenbury, APCMCOE

09.10 Welcome remarks
MAJGEN (Ret) Michael G. Smith AO, Executive
Director APCMCOE and LTGEN (Ret) John F.
Goodman, Executive Director COE-DMHA

09.45 Official Photograph and Morning Tea


SESSION 1: Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster
Management –
what progress has been made and where do we go from here?

FOCUS: To consider the civil-military challenges and lessons learnt from
recent regional natural disasters. Panel sessions followed by breakout
groups that will report back to plenary.

Chair: Stacey Greene, Disaster Management Manager, APCMCOE

10.30 Keynote Address: The evolution of Civil-Military
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (through
Australian eyes)
Alan March
Humanitarian Coordinator
Assistant Director-General
Humanitarian and Peacebuilding Branch, AusAID

11.15 Civil-Military coordination during the
Pakistan Floods
Military Perspective on civil-military coordination in a
disaster zone
WGCDR Ross Wadsworth, Australian Defence
Force
Commanding Officer No1 Expeditionary Health
Squadron

11.40 NGO perspective on civil-military coordination in a
disaster zone
Jennifer Worthington
Oxfam Australia

12.00 Discussion and questions to Panel

12.30 Lunch


SESSION 2: Working Group Activity

Q1: What progress has been made in civil-military coordination
in disaster zones?

Q2: What could be done to further enhance civil-military
coordination in disaster zones?

FOCUS: Working groups will examine both civil-military issues and
prepare 15 min report back to plenary.

Chair: Mr Greg Flick, Senior Disaster Management Analyst, COE-
DMHA

13.15 Working Groups consideration

Michaelmas Cay 2

(Includes afternoon tea)

15.15 Working Groups report back
Michaelmas Cay 1

Discussion and comments by panel

17.00 Summary/Close Day 1
Commander Darryl Watters, APCMCOE

18.00-20.00 Networking Activity
Venue: Cairns Wildlife Dome
(Located adjacent to Hotel)


WEDNESDAY 18 May

Michaelmas Cay 1

08.00 Tea and coffee available

SESSION 3: Protection of Civilians in a multi-agency
environment in complex emergencies

FOCUS: To consider the draft UN framework on protection of civilians
and its use in complex environments


Chair: Dr Tony Murney, APCMCOE (Australian Federal Police
Secondee)

08.30 Keynote Address: Draft United Nations Framework
on the Protection of Civilians
Ms Leanne Smith, UN DPKO
Deputy Chief, Peacekeeping Best Practices section,
UN DPKO

09.30 Morning Tea

10.00 A Police perspective on POC
Chief Superintendent (Ret) David Beer
Former UN Police Commissioner in Haiti

10.20 Enhanced protection of civilians: ICRC perspective
Jeremy England
Head of Office Australia, ICRC

10.40 Grassroots protection: An NGO perspective
Kirsten Hagon
Head of Office Oxfam International, New York

11.00 A military perspective on POC
Major General Elhadji Mahamadou Kandji
Former Force Commander MINURCAT (United
Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and
Chad)

11.20 Discussion and questions to panel

12.00 Lunch


SESSION 4: Working Group Activity – Consideration of the
Draft UN framework on the protection of civilians

How does the POC mandate affect the way each of the elements of the
mission approach its tasks?

How can the draft POC framework be improved to assist the mission fulfil
its POC mandate, and to capacitate the host state’s ability to protect
civilians?

How might the draft framework be used to develop POC specific
benchmarks for mission drawdown and transition of
responsibility/capability to the host state?

Does the draft POC framework have utility for non-UN/AU missions
where population protection is a key objective?

FOCUS: Working groups will examine a civil-military issue and prepare
15 min report back.

Chair: Dr Tony Murney, APCMCOE (Australian Federal Police
Secondee)

13.00 Working Groups consideration

Michaelmas Cay 2

(Includes afternoon tea)

15.30 Working Groups report back

Michaelmas Cay 1

Discussion and comments by panel

17.00 Summary/Close Day 2
Commander Darryl Watters, APCMCOE

18.15 CONFERENCE DINNER
Pre-dinner Drinks: Arlington Bar
Dinner: Urchins 2&3

Co-Host: MAJGEN (Ret) Michael G. Smith AO,
Executive Director APCMCOE
Dinner Address: LTGEN (Ret) John F. Goodman,
Executive Director COE-DMHA


THURSDAY 19 May

Michaelmas Cay 1

08.30 Tea and coffee available

Closing Session: ‘New Ideas’ Presentation and Seminar wrap-up


Chair: SUPT Darren Rath, APCMCOE

09.15 ‘New Ideas’ Presentation

Working with hyperconnected information in conflicts
and disasters
Stephen Collins
On-line Communications Co-ordinator APCMCOE

09.45 Plenary Feedback/Key Issues
Opportunity to explore further issues by plenary

10.20 Rapporteur summary report
Sarah Shteir/Dave Lavers APCMCOE

10.40 Concluding Remarks
MAJGEN (Ret) Michael G. Smith AO, Executive
Director APCMCOE and LTGEN (Ret) John F.
Goodman, Executive Director COE-DMHA

11.00 Buses depart for Tjapukai Aboriginal Cultural
Centre

12.00-1630 Lunch and Cultural Activity


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