Presentaton of ESID research on PSR in Ghana. GIMPA, 4 April 2016

1. Public Sector Reform
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS IN GHANA AND BEYOND
David Hulme | Pablo Yanguas | Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai | Daniel Appiah
Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre
[ GIMPA | 4 April 2016 ]

2. An Introduction to the
Effective States and Inclusive Development
Research Centre (ESID)
David Hulme
Chief Executive Officer
Effective States and Inclusive Development
Research Centre (ESID)
Professor of Development Studies
Global Development Institute,
University of Manchester

3. About ESID
 The Effective States and Inclusive Development
Research Centre is an international partnership of
researchers working in Africa, Asia, Europe and North
America
 It is based at the Global Development Institute (GDI),
University of Manchester
 ESID is funded by the UK’s Department for
International Development.

4. Partners
 The ESID consortium includes:
 Institute for Economic Growth, India
 BRAC Development Institute, Bangladesh
 Centre for Democratic Development, Ghana
 Centre for International Development, Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University
 …as well as research associates in Malawi, Uganda,
Rwanda, the UK and other countries.

5. ESID’s overarching question
 What kinds of politics can help to secure inclusive
development and how can these be promoted?
 ESID aims to deepen the understanding of the political
dimension of development and offer strategic and
operational guidance to development partners.

6. ESID Research Framework - Key questions
 What capacities enable states to help deliver inclusive
development?
 What shapes elite commitment to delivering inclusive
development and state effectiveness?
 Under what conditions do developmental forms of state
capacity and elite commitment emerge and become
sustained? In particular, what role do power relations
and ideas play?

7. “New” approaches meet “old” challenges in
African public sector reform
Dr Pablo Yanguas
University of Manchester

8. [ 1 ]
The failure of PSR

9. 1. The failure of PSR
Worldwide Governance Indicators
 Africa trailing the world in Government Effectiveness &
Control of Corruption
 Average score for SSA actually worsened 1996-2014
 Any good performers?
 Significant improvement: Rwanda
 Mixed trajectory: Ethiopia & Mozambique
 Too optimistic: Liberia

10. 1. The failure of PSR
Matt Andrews (2013)
Of 80 countries receiving PSR support between 2007
and 2009, fewer than 40% registered improved
institutional indicators; a third stayed the same; and a
quarter actually declined

11. 1. The failure of PSR
World Bank 2008 evaluation
Some success in PFM and tax administration, much
lower in civil service and anti-corruption:
 CS: “lack of a coherent strategy”, “inherent
political difficulty”
 AC: “direct measures … rarely succeeded, as they
often lacked the necessary support from political
elites and the judicial system.”

12. [ 2 ]
“Old” challenges

13. 2. “Old” challenges
World Bank 2008 evaluation
“Most developing countries today (such as Western
Europe and the United States 150 years ago) have
political systems that depend fundamentally on
patronage. Some countries have progressed more
quickly in recent years, but an open dialogue about the
realistic expectations has been missing.”

15. 2. “Old” challenges
Africa: A history of “persistent failure”
 “Juridical statehood” vs “empirical statehood”
(Jackson & Rosberg 1982)
 Neo-Patrimonialism (van de Walle 2001)
 A Weberian façade
 A patrimonial structure

16. 2. “Old” challenges
Political and moral economy of anti-reform
Challenges Pathologies
ADMINISTRATIVE
PATRIMONIALISM
Isolated reform efforts, persistent informal
practices, personal disincentives to
enforcement.
PUBLIC CORRUPTION
Disempowered reporting, social sanction of
corruption, political interference.
POLITICAL CAPTURE
Regime-state confusion, merging of the public
and private, lack of bureaucratic autonomy.

17. [ 3 ]
“New” approaches

18. 3. “New” approaches
Leadership
 Premise: Political commitment and capacity at the top is the key to reform
 Sample reform strategies:
 Delivery units
 Performance contracts
 Executive communications and agenda management
 Typical case: Tony Blair’s Africa Governance Initiative
 Challenge: Vulnerable to electoral cycles and “quick wins”

19. 3. “New” approaches
Social accountability
 Premise: Citizen participation and government transparency can increase
demand for public sector effectiveness
 Sample reform strategies:
 Participatory planning and budgeting
 Open government
 Co-production
 Typical case: Open Government Partnership
 Challenge: It assumes electoral accountability to work

20. 3. “New” approaches
Policy experimentation
 Basic claim: Diffusion of foreign templates results in copying the form but the
substance remains the same
 Sample reform strategies:
 Problem identification through dialogue
 Central-local collective action (APPP)
 Iterative design
 Typical case: Problem-driven iterative adaptation (PDIA)
 Challenge: It requires political will to experiment

21. [ 4 ]
Back to politics?

22. 4. Back to politics?
“New” approaches feel like
short-term fixes to donor problems
“Old” politics call for a clear
analysis of the challenges faced by reformers

23. 4. Back to politics?
ESID’s theoretical framework
 Political settlement: elite coalitions and bargaining,
underlying distribution of power in the polity
 Competitive vs dominant
 Policy entrepreneurs and coalitions
 Elite and policy ideas: normative paradigms (ideologies
of the public sector), policy models
 Transnational influences: donor technical assistance,
global norms, international standards

24. 4. Back to politics?
Our comparative project
 Ghana, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda
 C.2000-2015
 Management functions
 Coordination, Public service management, Public financial
management (budget, procurement)
 Compliance functions
 Auditing, Anti-corruption

25. The Politics of Core Public Sector
Reform in Ghana
Researchers
Daniel Appiah – University of Ghana Business School
Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai – University of Ghana Business School
25

26. Research Approach
 Competitive-Clientelist Political Settlement (CCPS) in Ghana
 Analysis: What is the impact of the CCPS on PSR processes and outcomes:
Public/Civil Service Management, Coordination of policy-making & delivery,
anti-corruption, procurement, and auditing?
 Data collection: Interviews, surveys, parliamentary Hansards, newspaper
reports and other secondary sources.
26
57.4
44.8 43.1 44.64 47.76 50.47 50.7
39.6
48.4
56.9
52.45 49.32 49.53 47.74
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1996 2000a 2000b 2004 2008a 2008b 2012
PERCENTAGEOFVOTES Ghana's Competitive-Clientelist Political Settlement
NDC NPP
57.4
44.8 43.1 44.64 47.76 50.47 50.7
39.6
48.4
56.9 52.45 49.32 49.53 47.74
0
20
40
60
80
100
1996 2000a 2000b 2004 2008a 2008b 2012
PERCENTAGEOFVOTES
NDC NPP

27. Public Service Management
Focus of Research & Analysis
 Weberian Administration: In law and practice, are public/civil servants
recruited in a meritocratic process and promoted according to a
performance monitoring and evaluation system?
Nature and Size of the Public Service
 Public Services (includes the Civil Service) (Article 190(1) of 92 Constitution
 About 428,000 public servants in MDAs MMDAs (CAGD, 2009, KPMG, 2012)
Public Services Management Reform
• Civil Service Act, 1993 (PNDCL 327)
• Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme: 1997-2001
• Fair Wages and Salaries Commission Act, 2007 (Act 737)
• 2014 HRMIS project led by the Public Services Commission
• Chief Directors Performance Agreement Contracts, 1997-2000, 2013-present
27

28. Public Service Management
.
13.3
6.9
9.7
12.6
10.7
0
3.4
15.5
36.1
22.4
0
0
0.6
0.5
0.5
86.7
89.7
74.2
50.8
66.4
1980-1990
1991-2000
2001-2008
2009-2014
TOTAL
MODE OF PUBLIC SERVICE RECRUITMENT (450 SURVEY RESP)
Family/Friend Network National Service Political Party Interview/Examination
i. Meritocratic recruitment in the Ghana public service is generally high (66.4%)
ii. 2011 Global Integrity Initiative (GII) survey reported that 50% of public servants are
appointed by merit and professional criteria.
iii. Effect of competitive politics on public service recruitment appears to be very low.
iv. 2015 Supreme Court ruling on politicisation of Public Service could be damaging
28

29. Public Service Management
 Performance-based promotion: Do the ‘jobs-for-life’ public servants care?
63.7
36.4
34.1
31.9
32.6
43.1
20.6
25.2
29.2
31.9
34.7
26
9.3
19.9
21.2
17.5
17.6
14.9
6.5
18.5
15.5
18.6
15.2
16
PUBLIC
SECTOR JOB
SECURITY
PRIVATE
SECTOR JOB
SECURITY
BE PART OF
PUBLIC
SECTOR
BE PART OF
PRIVATE
SECTOR
PUBLIC
SECTOR GIVES
GOOD SALARY
& BENEFITS
PRIVATE
SECTOR GIVES
GOOD SALARY
& BENEFITS
REASONS WHY GHANAIANS JOIN THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE SECTOR
Very important Important but not very important Not important Not important at all
Major problem in the public sector: Largely staffed with “a special breed of
persons who perhaps have the contentment of security of a job.”
29

30. Public Sector Coordination
 Focus of Research & Analysis
i. In law and practice, is there a central agency to coordinate
public policy-making, tracking & delivery of sector targets?
ii. In law and practice, do public sector bodies report
their targets to a central coordination department?
 Key policy-making and service delivery coordination agencies:
• The Cabinet (President, Vice-President & not less than 11
Ministers and not more than 19 Ministers)
• National Development Planning Commission (NDPC)
• Office of the Head of Civil Service (OHCS)
30

31.  Policy Coordination,
Monitoring and
Evaluation Unit
(PCMEU) headed by
Prof. K. Appiah –Adu
 Policy Delivery Unit
(PDU) headed by Mrs.
Chinery-Hesse
Whylackofreformsustainability?
The Presidency: Office of the President/Cabinet
 Policy Unit headed by
Dr. Christine Amoako-
Nuamah
 Policy Monitoring &
Evaluation Unit (PMEU)
headed by Dr. Tony
Aidoo
 Policy Unit headed by
Dr. Sulley Gariba
 PMEU dismantled
 Presidential Delivery
Unit headed by Dr.
Valerie Sawyerr
 2014-Present: PDU at
Cabinet Secretariat
Public Sector Coordination: Policy-making & Delivery
National Development Planning Commission: Policy Coordination, M&E
Office of the Head of Civil Service: Policy coordination, M&E at the level of MDAs
NPP Gov’t (under
Pres. Kufour 2001-8)
NDC Gov’t 1 (under
Pres. Mills: 2009-12)
NDC Gov’t 2 under
Pres. Mahama (2013-)
31

32. 0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
R2 (2002) R3 (2005) R4 (2008) R5 (2012) R6 (2014)
Afrobarometer: Trends in perceived corruption (%)
Presidency corrupt Legislature corrupt Gov't Officials corrupt
Assembly Rep corrupt Tax Officials corrupt Police corrupt
Judiciary corrupt
Public Sector Anti-corruption
.
32
Mr. Martin Amidu & Anas

33. Public Sector Anti-corruption
Comprehensive anti-corruption laws & institutions
• Comprehensive definition of corruption: attempted corruption, extortion,
offering & receiving a bribe etc. all illegal in Ghana (GII, 2012)
• High levels of commitment to anti-corruption expressed (e.g. ‘Zero
tolerance for corruption’ policy)
• Several recent anticorruption reforms (e.g. Whistles Blowers Act, 2007;
Public Procurement Act, 2003; Public Officers Asset Declaration Law, 1998)
• Key formal anti-corruption institutions: CHRAJ, EOCO, Auditor-General,
Attorney-General & Minister of Justice etc.
• GII has consistently hailed Ghana for having a ‘comprehensive anti-
corruption legislation framework’
33

34. Public Sector Anti-corruption
Weak enforcements is the problem
• In law, CHRAJ is constitutionally mandated to “investigate all instances of alleged
or suspected corruption and misappropriation of public moneys…” [Article 218,
1992 Constitution]
• But in practice, its effectiveness is undermined by several factors:
– CHRAJ’s Commissioners are presidential appointees who are often left in
‘acting positions’ for long.
– Can’t initiate an investigation without an identifiable complainant – a real
limitation (Richard Anane’s case – CRC Whitepaper accepts the need for
change.)
– Financially autonomous? A big no! Government Whitepaper rejected the
CRC’s recommendation to change the status quo (see p.28 of White paper on
CRC)
– Lack of prosecutorial powers: only the A-G & MoJ can initiate prosecution
34
So through constitutional designs, Ghana operates a system that allows for
independent investigations of corruption, but permits politicians to to decide which
cases they deem worth prosecuting

35. PFM: Public Procurement
• In law, there is a framework for
ensuring fairness and transparency
in procurement processes (Public
Procurement Act, 2003).
• But in practice, procurement
processes are still subject to several
forms of malfeasances
– PPA sometimes completely
bypassed (e.g. Arthur Kennedy’s
₵335million contract in 2008)
– contracts awarded through sole
source to help finance ruling
parties
– Require some informal payments
or kickbacks
Compared to the regional average of 36.34%, 61.23% of companies in Ghana said
they were expected to give a gift to secure government contract

36. 0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly DisAgree
PFM Reform Outcomes: Competition, Transparency, Accountability
and Politics in the award of Public Procurement Contracts?
(survey of 60 ‘budget end-users’ across 18 Ministries)
Procurement awarded through competitive tendering
Procurement awarded through single source
Procurement awarded through political and personal connections
Public Procurement Authority is effective in checking corruption
PFM: Public Procurement
36

37. PFM: Public Procurement
The PPA partly to blame for the politicisation of procurement
processes
• Political appointment of a 10-member Public Procurement Board
(PPB) by the President to “ensure that public procurement is carried
out in a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory manner.” (Public
Procurement Act, 2003, Act 663, Section 2)
• Tender Committees, Tender Review Boards, and Public Procurement
Authority are chaired by government Ministers & District Chief
Executives – all presidential appointees.
“Once you have a political master who can influence your
hiring, transfer, promotion and firing then you should know
your hands are tied sometimes. Politics plays a role in all
aspects of public sector delivery” (Procurement Officer)
37

38. Public Sector Auditing
38
Regional Coordinating
Councils (RCC)
Attorney-General (A-G): Give legal advice to
the President; Prosecute civil/criminal cases
of corruption in Auditor-General’s report
Parliament (Public Accounts Committee):
Examine reports of the Auditor-General and make
recommendations for action.
Internal Audit Agency: Co-ordinate,
facilitate & supervise internal audit
activities; appoints ARIC external members;
submit audit reports to Presidency
Auditor-General: Conduct external audits of
MDAs/MMDAs; surcharges and
disallowances where necessary; monitor
performance of ARICS
MDAs/MMDAs: Create & resource Internal
Audit Units (IAUs)
ARICs: Implements audits
recommendations & promote
effectiveness of IAUs
Presidency: Take action on public officials cited in
internal/external audit reports; Give directions to the A-
G on cases in audit reports ARICS most crucial: by
law, they are to ensure
that the head of an
institution, body or
organization pursues
the implementation of
all audit reports, both
internal & external

39. Public Sector Auditing
The political challenge of implementation lies mainly in the composition of
ARICs
• Serious conflict of interests: ARICs are dominated and are chaired by people
from the same agency whose audit reports are to be discussed by the ARIC
– What happens if the head of an agency is the subject of corruption in an
audit report, who is also the chair of the ARIC?
– “The Audit Report Implementation Committee is made up of the senior officers of
the institutions that were audited and the institutions committed all these financial
indiscipline. So, in effect, we are asking them to punish themselves. The result is
that, on all the reports that we have had, we make all the right noises in this House
and yet nothing happens” (MP, Parliamentary Debates June 28, 2012, Col 2085).
• Auditor-General only produces audit reports for Public Accounts Committee
and ARICs, but can’t prosecute: only Attorney-General can
39

40. Conclusions (Tentative)
o Political incentives in Ghana’s competitive clientelist settlements results in institutional
designs that undermine the effectiveness of PSR: e.g. Public procurement, auditing,
coordination and anti-corruption.
o Partly facilitated by constitutional designs that concentrate vast appointive powers in
the hands of the president, while weakening institutions of accountability
o Effective reforms have been difficult because the two dominant parties benefit from
the status quo when in power. So change is unlikely to occur without sustained efforts
from external actors, particularly donors.
o But problem appears so pervasive that donor reforms that focus on system-wide
changes are unlikely to succeed. Focus on building pockets of effectiveness (PoEs)?
o Lessons from donors’ efforts in strengthening Senegal’s bureaucracy may be useful:
donors’ impact was greatest where efforts focused on “generating political incentives
for governments to create pockets of effectiveness” (Johnson, 2015)
40

41. Thank you
www.effective-states.org/psr
www.effective-states.org/tag/public-sector-reform/