Sam Hickey. DSA 2015

1. The Effective States and Inclusive Development
Research Centre (ESID)
The politics of improving educational
outcomes: from quantity to quality?
A political settlements analysis of Bangladesh,
Ghana, Rwanda and Uganda
DSA Conference, Bath, 7-8 September 2015

2. ESID
www.effective-states.org
 Based at the Global Development Institute, University
of Manchester
 DFID-funded until end 2016
 What kinds of politics can help to secure inclusive
development and how can these be promoted?
 The role of state capacity and elite commitment
 What role do power relations and ideas play?

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PS Type Competitive clientelist Dominant party
Country/
Domain
Bangladesh Ghana Bolivia
Peru
Zambia
Rwanda Uganda Cambodia
Accumula
tion
Growth Growth
Natural
resources
Natural
resources
Growth Growth
Natural
resources
Growth
Redistrib
ution
Education
Health
Social
protection
Education
Health
Social
protection
Education
Health
Social
protection
Education
Health
Social
protection
Education
Health
Recognit-
ion
Gender Gender
Spatial inq’ty
Gender Gender
Spatial ineq’ty
Global PEA
Public Sectr
Reform
PEA
Public Sectr
Reform
Public Sectr
Reform
PEA
Public Sectr
Reform

4. The political economy of education
 Education: a social justice problem
 Growing concerns over the quality of provision
 More children in school than ever, but…
 ‘Schooling ain’t learning’
 50%+ of children complete primary schooling unable to
read even the simplest texts or perform simple arithmetic
 “…there is almost no information on the educational
attainment of any given cohort. Globally, how many 10
year olds can read fluently? No one knows” (Pritchett ‘13)

5. What shapes quality in education?
• Reforms
– Investment of financial and human resources
– Assessment systems; curriculum or methodology-based reforms
– Accountability and incentive mechanisms
– Poverty-focused and social protection measures
– Early years education
 What role does politics play?
 Politics matters, but we don’t know how (Kingdon et al ‘14)
 Ruling coalitions matter more than democracy (Kosack ‘12)
 Policy coalitions (Grindle ‘04)
• In-depth qualitative research; 5-country comparative case-study approach

6. Political settlement: ‘the balance of power between
contending social groups on which any state is based’
From Khan (2010) HORIZONTAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER: EXCLUDED ELITES
WEAK STRONG
VERTICAL
DISTRIBU
TION OF
POWER:
LOWER
LEVEL
FACTION
S
WEAK
STRONG
POTENTIALLY DEVELOPMENTAL
DOMINANT COALITION
RWANDA
Longer-term horizons
Implementation capabilities
high
VULNERABLE AUTHORITARIAN
COALITION
WEAK DOMINANT PARTY
UGANDA, CAMBODIA
Implementation capabilities
weakened by multiple
demands and ‘blockers’
COMPETITIVE CLIENTELIST
BANGLADESH, GHANA
Shorter-term horizons: threat
of powerful excluded elites
Implementation capabilities
weakened

7. From political settlements to sector
performance (Levy & Walton 2013)
Figure 2. The determinants of public organization performance
UNDERLYING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
DE JURE AND DE FACTO GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ORGANIZATION
HOW PERFORMANCE IS MANAGED
PERFORMANCE
SECTOR-LEVEL INTEREST GROUPS, COALITIONS AND IDEAS
SECTOR-LEVEL

8. Comparative findings
• The political settlement matters
– Balance of power incentivises access over performance (inc. donors)
– Links to problems of privatisation and problems of exit
– Elite ideas of education as modernity/nation-building
– Leads to a politicisation of educational policy and governance
• Does the type of political settlement matter?
 Competitive settings: greater ‘policy incoherence’ & rent-seeking
 Dominance: coherence; can limit scope for reform
• What works?
• Central and decentralised mechanisms rarely well-aligned/balanced
• Some positive examples of local ‘elite capture’ & political connectivity
• Local coalitions: SMCs, Heads, political players: not PTAs/NGOs

9. Policy implications?
• Build stronger coalitions of support for improved
performance at national and local levels
• From centralised to locally-driven solutions (Pritchett ‘13)
• The centralised approaches that helped to improve access are
often inappropriate for improving performance
• Move towards ‘thin’ forms of centralised accountability
(performance pressures) and ‘thick’ forms of localised
accountability (politically salient stakeholders)
• Go with the local (rather than the national) grain?