TDP As the Party of Hope For AP Youth Under N Chandrababu Naidu’s Leadership
The Politics and Institutions of EU Crisis Management
1. The Politics & Institutions
of EU Crisis Management
1 February 2014
Quentin Weiler
General Secretariat of the Council
First Secretary for Political Affairs, EU Delegation to Pakistan
2. Outline of Presentation
I. EU external relations after Lisbon
II. Institutional structures in practice
III. Q & A
3. CFSP and CSDP in context
CFSP / CSDP (ex-2nd pillar)
(Common positions on foreign policy issues, civilian/military
crisis management, sanctions policy, non-proliferation)
External relations wider than CFSP/CSDP:
- Development, Trade, Humanitarian Aid, Enlargement
- External aspects of internal Policies (climate change,
energy…)
EU COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
4. What is new with Lisbon Treaty?
President of the European Council
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy
European External Action Service (EEAS)
EU Delegations (139 in the world)
6. What’s the difference?
Presidency – FAC, PSC and Working
Group Chairs, agenda setting, statements
and declarations, external representation,
EU DELs representing locally
+ Council Secretariat – preparation of
documents
+ Commission – supervision of external
relations instruments
= EEAS
7. What does the Lisbon Treaty bring?
Continuity
Visibility
Coherence
8. Council Decision-making bodies (Pre-Lisbon)
European Council
General Affairs External Relations Council
(GAERC)
(+ Defence and Development Council)
Coreper II
(highest permanent representatives)
PSC
CIVCOM
RELEX
Regional and thematic Working Groups
eg. COEST, COARM, COWEB, COLAT...
i ah C
PMG
no ss mm C + S M
i i
o
(ambassador level)
9. Council Decision-making bodies (Post-Lisbon)
e
an
n
m
er
P
t
ir
ha en
C n
a
rm
Pe
*
t
ir
a
Ch
European Council
Council of Ministers (FAC)
(Foreign, Defence, Development Min.)
Coreper II
(highest permanent representatives)
n
m
er
a
(ambassador level)
PMG
n
ne
P
*
rs
t
i
ha
C
CIVCOM
RELEX
Rotating pcy
Regional and thematic Working Groups
eg. COEST, COARM, COWEB, COLAT...
*coming from EEAS
ah C
Pe
*
t
ir
a
Ch
PSC
no ss mm C + S M
i i
o
rm
e
an
20. HR and EEAS
foreign policy priorities
Neighbourhood
Relations with strategic partners
Setting up of the EEAS
21. HR and EEAS successes
Serbia-Kosovo
deal
Iran Nuclear Talks – E3+3
Tackling piracy
and stabilization
of Somalia
Supporting democracy & reforms
22. HR and EEAS failures
Lack of visibility
Missed opportunities
Lack of definition of EU's
strategic interests
23. CFSP tools / instruments
Public positions on International situation / events:
- Statements (HR alone or on behalf of the EU)
- Council Conclusions + Press releases after FAC
Legal acts authorising EU action: ‚Decisions‘
- Sanctions (currently Iran, Syria, Belarus, etc.)
- Non-proliferation (support to AIEA, NPT, etc.)
EU Special Representatives (currently 10)
Diplomatic (confidential) Instruments:
- Political Dialogue (from HR to officials’ level)
- Demarches (e.g. non recognition of Abkhazia)
24. Common Security and Defence Policy
Civilian missions (first one in BiH in 2003):
→ 23 up to date / 11 ongoing
→ HQ in Brussels (CPCC)
→ Financing: CFSP budget
Military operations (first one in DRC in 2003):
→ 7 up to date / 4 ongoing
→ HQ in one of the 5 pre-identified (DE, EL, FR, IT, UK)
→ Financing: Athena mechanism for common costs (based
on GDP) and voluntary contributions from Member States
→ Battle Groups (1500 troops): in principle 2 on stand-by
(currently EL + RO, BG and LT)
26. Military operations: 'Petersberg tasks'
1992
•Tasks of combat forces in
crisis management, including
peace-making;
•Humanitarian/Rescue tasks;
•Conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks.
2011
• Joint disarmament
operations;
• Military advice and
assistance tasks (e.g.
DDR and SSR);
• Post-conflict
27.
28.
29. EU's External financial instruments
Bilateral instruments
→ Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA)
→ European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)
→ Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)
→ European Development Fund (EDF)
Thematic Instruments
→ Instrument for Stability (IfS):
- short-term component: crisis response
- long term component: trans-regional threats
→ European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
(EIDHR)
→ African Peace Facility (APF)
30.
31. What happens in a case of crisis?
Crisis breaks out:
– information gathering: using all channels
– political track: PSC and/or Council
– operational track: evaluation of options and
PSC to consider action
Planning a Crisis Management mission:
- Crisis Management Concept (CMC) with several
options (from military to civilian engagement)
General Secretariat of the Council
32. Crisis management procedures
1 – Routine phase
2 – Outbreak of crisis and drafting of option paper
3 – Endorsement of one/several options
4 – Formal decision to act
and drafting of framework documents
5 – Implementation of the measures
6 – Review of the implemented measures
33. Crisis management procedures
After adoption of the CMC, EEAS to draft further
Planning Documents:
- CONOPS (discussed in WGs, PSC, FAC)
- OPLAN ([drafted with HoM], WG, PSC, FAC)
Contacts with host country: letter of invitation, status of
mission agreement (SOMA)
Parallel legal track: Decision (Relex/Coreper/ FAC)
Force generation Conference -> deployment
General Secretariat of the Council
34. Deliverable: Option paper
I. Executive Summary
II. Political and security situation
– Facts (situation and existing EU engagement)
– EU approach (political interest, legal framework, key objectives)
III. Options available through the various EU instruments
–
–
–
–
Political initiatives (UN, EUSR…)
Development and security cooperation (DCI, EDF, AFP, IfS, etc…)
Humanitarian aid
Crisis management
IV. Crisis management concept (CMC)
– EU objectives (why a deployment would be relevant)
– Options (incl. envisaged measures, risks, objectives, end state, etc…)
V. Evaluation of options and recommendation
35. Deliverable: Decision
Preamble
– Citation (legal basis – Art 28 in case of crisis
management mission)
– Recitals (“whereas” part, listing reasons, key
documents, relevant international legal acts..)
Articles
– Mission, Objectives, Tasks
– Chair of command, political control
– Financial arrangements
– Participation of third states
36. Deliverable: Decision
General structure (Title, Preamble,
enacting Terms)
Preamble
– Citation (legal basis – Art 28 in case of crisis
management mission)
– Recitals (“whereas” part, listing reasons, key
documents, relevant international legal acts..)
37. Case Study – Georgia
-
Outburst of conflict between Georgia and Russia (7 August)
-
Reaction of the Presidency – six points plan (12 August)
-
State of play political and security situation (PSC 12 August)
-
Council conclusions and mandate for option paper (GAERC 13
August)
-
Discussion on Option paper (PSC 19 August), recommendation on
option paper (PSC 27 August) launching of an explanatory mission
(PSC 29 August)
-
Detailed discussions of the CMC (CivCom 22 and 26 August)
-
Parallel contacts in NY (UN), Vienna (OSCE), Brussels (NATO) and
with third partners (US, Russia…)
38. Case Study – Georgia
Immediate Action: enhancing situational awareness,
humanitarian access, deployment of technical
experts, liaison with OSCE and UN,
reinforcement of EUSR office.
Option 1: support to UN and/or OSCE lead on
monitoring and/or interposition/protect effort
Option 2: EU civilian Monitoring Mission
Option 3: EU inter-position/protect mission (EUFOR)
non-CSDP EU Support Measures: longer term peace
process; civil protection assistance; further
range of stabilisation measures incl.
confidence building measures
General Secretariat of the Council
General Secretariat of the Council
39. Case Study – Georgia
-
Political roadmap at highest level (European Council 1 September)
o Support to six-point plan
o Support for appointment of an EUSR
o Support for CSDP deployment
-
Adoption of planning documents and transmission of Decision to Council
(PSC 10 and 12 September)
-
Launching of the mission and appointment of the Head of Mission.
Mandate: monitoring compliance six points plan, stabilization, confidence
building (GAERC 15 September).
-
Launching of the Geneva talks on situation at border (15 September)
-
Force generation conference (16 September)
-
Appointment of an EUSR for the crisis in Georgia (GAERC - 25 September)
-
Start deployment of the mission (29 September)
-
Donor conference in Brussels (29 September)
40. Case Study – Somalia
-
Launching of operation EU NAVFOR ATALANTA on the fight against piracy
off the coast of Somalia (GAERC – November 2008)
-
Signing of MoU with Kenya and the Seychelles for the transfer of arrested
pirates (February 2009) and later with Mauritius (March 2011)
-
Launching of IfS projects (€3.5M + €8M ) in support of judicial and
penitentiary systems of Kenya, Seychelles and Mauritius (May 2009) and in
support of security and safety of essential maritime routes (June 2009)
-
Launching of operation EUTM Somalia for the training of the Somali army in
Uganda (April 2010)
-
Adoption of "Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa" (November 2011)
-
Appointment of an EUSR for the Horn of Africa (January 2012)
-
Launching of mission EUCAP NESTOR on the strengthening of capacities
of regional coast guards in the Horn of Africa (July 2012)
-
"New deal for Somalia conference" in Brussels: EU biggest donor with
€500M to Somalia and €420M to AMISOM since 2008 (June 2013)
- CFSP: quick word about history
Maastricht very contested because of abandon of sovereignty (rejected in Denmark and adopted with small majority in France)
As a result, CFSP starts with little legitimacy and no structures in place (PD once a month) at a time of turmoil in the world (fall of USSR, dismantlement of Yugoslavia, instability in Africa)
Consequence: failure in the Balkans and no European converging interests.
Acceleration of the process afterwards (97 Amsterdam, 98 Saint Malo, 2001 Nice, 2003 first missions)
Initially, COM refused to participate in meetings of the PSC but steadily took part and adapted its structures (RRM and then IfS).
Illustration avec guerre des Balkans et inexistence de la réaction Européenne (« l'heure de l'Europe » selon le MAE luxembourgeois). Absence de moyens, d’influence et surtout de définition d'une réponse commune en raison des intérêts pas forcément convergents des trois grands.
Allemagne : seule directement concerné par disparition ex URSS avec sa réunification. Elle croit en la reconnaissance de l'indépendance des républiques yougoslaves pour contrecarrer la légitimité du conflit (guerre civile vs guerre d'agression) + liens forts avec la Croatie (historique, tourisme...). Mauvaise lecture et guerre mais impossibilité d'intervenir (constitution allemande).
France : position historiquement pro-serbe (allié durant 2 guerres mondiales) et méfiance vis-à-vis du nationalisme croate (soutien au nazisme dans années 40). Volonté de pas « ajouter la guerre à la guerre » selon les dires de Mitterrand. Culture jacobine de l'Etat donc méfiance d'un éclatement généralisé de la région. Paradoxalement, Etat européen le plus engagé dans le conflit pas peu enclin à employer la force contre la Serbie. Donc politique humanitaire de la France (Mitterrand à Sarajevo) mais peu efficace et humiliation avec prise des otages des casques bleus par les bosnos-serbes. 1995 Chirac résume nouvelle position française : « on tire ou on s'tire ».
Royaume-Uni : farouchement opposé à une intervention de peur d'une balkanisation de la région et de l'impossibilité de la solutionner par une intervention armée (expérience britannique durant les guerres mondiales). « Champion incontesté de la persévérance dans le cynisme » Pierre Hassner. Reconnaissance de la Croatie contestée : « vous voulez un nouveau Beyrouth ? » secrétaire d'Etat aux affaires étrangères Douglas Hurd
Grèce : balkanisation de la politique étrangère sous le gouvernement de Andréas Papandréou avec position sur la question macédonienne.
Italie : gouvernement Berlusconi s'oppose au rapprochement de la Slovénie avec l'UE en raison de la non-restitution des biens acquis après la chute de Mussolini en 1945.
- Dans ce contexte, US prennent leur responsabilité. Accords de Dayton en 1995 et réel traumatisme (Srebrenica…). Clinton critique les européens. Pires tensions transatlantiques depuis la crise de Suez en 1956. Renforcement de la puissance américaine et par corrélation de l'OTAN que les Etats-Unis mobilisent quand cela est nécessaire. Protection américaine et assistance au développement de l'Union européenne.
Continuity also in external representation (pol. dialogues).
About 80 Ministerial commitments per year (sometimes need to delegate).
Visibility: each of the 3 figures has a different agenda.
- Plus de continuité : pas de changement de priorités tous les six mois (est vs sud) ou d'inégalité entre les Présidences. Possibilité d'établir des relations de confiance (Clinton-Ashton) et sur la durée pour mettre des projets (identification de priorités pour le renforcement de la coopération avec de nombreux Etats : Chine dans piraterie, Inde dans contre-terrorisme, Corée du Sud Afghanistan et Libye, Brésil coopération au développement...).
The EU is able to speak on behalf of the Member States in the United Nations (personnalité juridique unique avec Traité de Lisbonne). This is the first regional group who is able to do so after a long and difficult campaign to convince all countries around the world. It resulted in the first speech ever of the President of the European Council at the occasion of the UNGA week.
- Plus de cohérence : rassemblement de l'ensemble des instruments sous un même toit avec un seul acteur décisionnel. Moins de lourdeur bureaucratique et possibilité d'utiliser de manière rationnelle l'ensemble des instruments de réponse à une crise (création des plate-formes de crise réunissant les acteurs compétents). Intégration des structures de gestion de crise dans SEAE. Programmation des instruments de développement et de coopération au sein du SEAE et mise en œuvre par la Commission (exécution budgétaire).
- Mise en cohérence du message européen : requests to the EEAS to provide MS national ministries with joint messages on EU line and useful background are growing; this is a clear acknowledgement of the EEAS value and critical analysis. The EU Delegations are often requested to assist the preparation of Member States high level visits on the ground. Delegations also assist EP members travelling on official visits.
- Service provider for EC and COM Presidents: participating in joint meetings and providing briefings for Commissioners (particularly Fuele with around 235 this year, Piebalgs with 51, Giorgieva and others), elaborating joint papers on definition of joint policies (e.g. neighbourhood policy communication). HR Ashton signed 27 joint declarations with both Presidents and/or Commissioners.
- The preparation of the Lisbon Treaty until its entry into force took nine years.
- Lisbon Treaty provided for the legal basis but there was still a lot to sort out. Discussions took almost a year until agreement was reached between the Commission, Council, Parliament and Catherine Ashton. The Decision of July 2010 provided the basic parameters of the new service, but it again it did not spell out in detail how to go about doing it; gaps remained to be filled.
- When the EEAS was launched in January a provisional organisational structure was created, putting together its constituent bits – parts of the European Commission, the Council Secreteriat and Member States diplomats who all came from different institutional cultures and adopting common IT, security and human resources procedures.
- Merging the Commission’s DG Relex, parts of the DG Development and parts of the Council Secretariat was not enough to ensure all EEAS tasks. To compare with, a Presidency country usually doubled its staff for the period of 1year to cope with the challenges, the EEAS did not. Nor had the time to prepare 6 months in advance (no top management in place) nor did get the resources to do sp.
- In addition, the EEAS faced a huge challenge when it comes to manage Human Resources. The EEAS has been criticised for the slowness of appointments. The EEAS received 8830 applications for 181 posts.
- By 2013 MS diplomats should make up 1/3 of the EEAS staff – depending on the creation of posts and vacancies. The EEAS will have reached the figure of 19% at the end of the year. Ownership by all of the EEAS is a key issue, and the buy-in of the MS is vital for the service to be seen as a legitimate co-ordinating and unifying actor.
- A part of this work has also been to start transformation the trade / assistance focused Commission Delegations around the world into full fledged EU Delegations, also covering Foreign Policy. EEAS can count on a very good network of by now 139 Delegations or offices (the most recent in Tripoli). However, EU Delegations had to adapt to sometimes totally new tasks, eg organising EU coordination on the ground and especially as regards political reporting. They have been reinforced with 80 additional posts (from 2011) budget. But they still have limited resources compared to national Embassies (certain EU delegations where political section is 2 to 3 persons while in MS’ Embassy it can be up to 25 persons).
- Le rôle impossible du Haut Représentant : trop de responsabilités pour la même personne, pas de temps pour accomplir toutes les tâches. Le Traité n'avait pas prévu de vice-Ministre. Pour dialogue politique, on fait appel à la présidence rotative (pas Commission car pas membre du Conseil) ou à d'autres Etats membres.
- Question de la relation du HR avec Etats membres : trouver équilibre entre droit d'initiative et consultations avec les Etats membres (cf Sarkozy en 2008 avec Géorgie).
- Relation avec les deux présidents : parfois difficile avec une représentation multiple et des messages parfois divergents (Ben Laden).
- Besoin d'un renforcement de l'appropriation des Etats Membres : SEAE n'a pas vocation à devenir un 28ème Etat membre mais à coordonner et à favoriser l'élaboration d'un même message (pas une seule voix mais un seul message). Besoin de coordonner les messages et visite sur le terrain (Égypte avec Cameron puis Ashton).
- Acception du travail du SEAE par EM à développer: rotating presidencies were allowed more leeway than the HR/VP and the EEAS. Il savait qu'ils allaient être dans la chaise à un moment donné. D'ou les diplomates dans le SEAE.
- Relations difficiles entre SEAE et grands/petits Etats membres : grands Etats veulent une relation privilégiée et petits Etats ont l’impression d'être mis de côté.
- Méthodes de travail dans les délégations à forger : exemple des démarches ou les EM ont du mal à accepter que le délégation le fasse seule. Problème britannique majeur qui a empêché l'UE de faire des déclarations aux Nations Unies.
- Besoin de créer un esprit de corps : the EEAS aims at creating (and maintaining) a team of the best and brightest, but it was/is a challenge to build an esprit de corps among people from 27 nationalities coming from various bureaucratic cultures.
- Contraintes pratiques : the EEAS still faces some working conditions constraints: (no protocol service, no conference organisation team), no existing compatible communication system allowing for circulating/sharing sensitive communication between colleagues in different buildings in Brussels and/or between EU Delegations and Member States Embassies.
EDF: own budget managed by COM. Contributions from EU MS and EIB.
APF: capacity building (100M), support to peace operations (600M) and early ressponse (15M)
