1. PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN FATA:
SOME REFLECTIONS*
(Manzoor Ahmad Naazer)
*Paper presented in a National Conference on FATA organized by the
Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, at Barhagali (summer)
Campus of the University on August 29 – 31, 2013.

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PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN FATA:
SOME REFLECTIONS
Manzoor Ahmad Naazer*
Peace and harmony in FATA is essential for peace, progress and prosperity in Pakistan
and Afghanistan. FATA is an area the hit by violence the worst in both countries. Allegedly, it is
an epicenter of militancy and cause of sufferings of people in both countries. In turn, it also
increases miseries of the people living in FATA caused by heightened search and security
operations by Pakistani forces besides drone strikes and other attacks from across the border.
The prevailing situation in FATA warrants an in-depth analysis of the problem. The
present researcher intends to explore the root causes of the problem and to suggest remedial
measures. The study has been divided into five parts: the first part contains a brief introduction
of FATA; the second and third part consists of a survey of the underlying and proximate causes
of militancy in FATA, respectively; fourth part includes some recommendations / policy
guidelines, and; fifth part is the concluding one.
I
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), consisting of 7 agencies and 6 Tribal
Regions, covers an area of 27220 sq. km inhabited by 3.15 million people. FATA was one of the
most peaceful areas of the country till the dawn of the 21st
century when the situation took a new
turn in the history of the area. After 9/11, Pakistani policies created strong resentment among the
people of the area which ultimately led to the rise of militancy. The ongoing insurgency has so
far taken lives of over 50,000 people in Pakistan besides costing a loss of more than $ 100 billion
since 2001.
* The author is a Ph. D. scholar and also works as Research Associate at the Department of Politics & International Relations,
Faculty of Social Sciences, International Islamic University, Islamabad.

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II
There are several underlying and proximate causes of the ongoing problem in FATA. The
UNDERLING CAUSES include:
a. Political, Administrative and Legal Vacuum
Due to FATA’s autonomous status since its accession to Pakistan, the government did not
interfere with the liberties of its people whose lives are governed more under local traditions than
the ordinary law of the country. There existed no political parties, principle of direct election and
universal adult franchise and related political process till recently which created political vacuum
in the area.
Administratively, the government relied on tribal Maliks and staff of Khasadar force who
were incapable of meeting any serious challenge such as posed by the militants. The notorious
Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) is a decades old system and cannot provide justice in its true
sense to the local people.
The prevailing political, administrative and legal vacuum provided a fertile ground for
nourishment of insurgents on different pretexts. The militants filled this vacuum without any
effective check from the government. They established their own courts, which they claimed,
provided the people free and speedy justice according to the Shariah Law. They also promised
people to liberate them from the clutches and cruelties of Maliks. Thus, the militants were able to
get sympathies and support of the local people and to establish their authority in the area.
b. Illiteracy, Unemployment and Underdevelopment
Illiteracy, unemployment and underdevelopment are the hallmarks of FATA which the
militants successfully used for advancement of their political agenda. The insurgents
misguided the illiterate and less educated people, exploited deprivations of the common man
and used unemployed youth for anti-state activities in the area and beyond.

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c. Legacy of the Past Policies
The successive governments used FATA as sanctuary of local and foreign militants
during the Afghan war without anticipating its adverse effects in the future. No body
expected that the holy warriors, who were fighting for the glory of Islam and enforcement of
Shariah in Afghanistan, after its independence from Soviet occupation, would one day stand
up against the very state which had nourished them and put a demand for implementation of
Shariah in Pakistan. The authorities did not take any step to bring them back to normal
activities of life. Thus, the militants were left-over to go anywhere and to be used by anyone
for any / some noble cause.
III
In the presence of the above-stated underling causes, the following PROXIMATE CAUSES
gave rise to and intensified the militancy in FATA.
a. Reaction to Pakistan’s External and Internal Policies
Musharraf government pursued several policies which created strong resentment in the
country. These policies included: taking of a U-turn on Afghan policy and supporting the US-led
coalition forces in the war against Taliban and al-Qaeda; banning of and cracking down on
several militant organizations operating in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir (IJK); Imposition of
liberal agenda under the name of “enlightened moderation” on comparatively religious-oriented
moderate society of the country. These policies angered the religious community who became
determined to foil such moves by every means.
b. External Links of Militancy in Pakistan: the US Connection
There exist several external links of militancy in Pakistan, American connection being the
most important one. In order to understand American connection to ongoing militancy, one has
to understand the nature of relations and divergence of interests between the US and Pakistan.
Though, the interests of both countries never converged completely, but divergence of their
interests sharpened in the post cold war era, particularly in the following four areas:

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 Militancy / terrorism: The US perceived Islamic militancy as a threat to its
security and was determined to curb it. Pakistan allegedly used militancy as a part
of its national policy.
 Nuclear Issue: Nuclear non-proliferation was the one of main objectives of the US
foreign policy. Pakistan not only pursued its own nuclear program but also helped
other countries.
 Policy towards India: The US perceived India a key strategic partner in the
context of rising Chinese power. Pakistan continued to see India as its enemy No
One.
 Relations with China: The US strived to contain Chinese power and influence
through building strategic partnerships / ties with other countries in Asia.
Washington also wanted Pakistan to be part of this scheme but Islamabad
perceived China the most trustful friend and a strategic partner. Pakistan also
strived to improve these relations and give China a shorter route to link with the
outer world.
 Pakistan’s Islamic identity and potential to emerge as a great power and any
remote chance of posing any challenge to the American hegemony in the unipolar
world also conflicted with the US interests.
In spite of its conflict of interests with Pakistan, Washington could not take any action
against Pakistan which still professed its friendship with the US. The US could attack
Pakistan soon after 9/11 but Pakistan strategic retreat protected it from American open
aggression. However, Washington had an option of launching a secret war against Islamabad.
In fact, Pakistan’s concessions to the US to collect intelligence and conduct secret operations
provided Washington the opportunities to build a large intelligence and security network
which was later on used for a secret war against Pakistan.

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c. Supply / Demand and Import / Export Dynamics of Militancy
The main task of the US intelligence network was to create militant organizations willing
to fight against the state of Pakistan. Meanwhile, the US also created, what in economics
terms can be said, as a demand of militancy in Pakistan. The local demand of militancy and
creation of insurgent organizations could help achieve several American objectives:
1) Pakistani militants could swell the ranks of Afghan Taliban fighting against the US-led
coalition forces. But creation of a local demand for militant activities in Pakistan would
divert their attention from Afghanistan (and also Kashmir);
2) Once the supply or export of militants from Pakistan to Afghanistan was stopped, its
movement could be reversed, i.e. now the militants could be exported / supplied to Pakistan
from neighbouring Afghanistan which would further decrease pressure on the allied forces;
3) The rise of militancy and attacks on security forces and civilians would decrease
public support for such activities in Pakistan which would help control militancy in future.
4) The attacks on security forces and defense installations would show weakness of
Pakistan’s defense forces. It would provide the West a pretext for propagandizing, and
possibly taking an action, against Pakistan’s nuclear program on the pretext of safety issues.
5) The insurgency in KPK (and Baluchistan) would help contain China by disrupting any
plan of giving it any trade and energy corridor through these territories.
d. Ideological and Religious Rationale
Despite all merits of such a scheme, it was not an easy task to create militant
organizations willing to fight against Pakistan because: it is the state which was created on
the name of Islam; it is the state known as fort of Islam; it is the state which is an hope of
Islamic revival; it is a state which is believed to be a hub of Islam and home of jihadis.
However, a major shift in Pakistan’s policy could provide the militants an ideological
rationale and religious justification for waging a war against the country. It happened soon
after 9/11 when, on the US pressure, Musharraf government changed its Afghan policy and
delinked itself from Taliban; provided logistic support and other facilities to NATO forces;

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declared itself as the front-line state in the war against international terrorism; became
America’s major non-NATO ally; and cracked down against the Islamic militants within
Pakistan and captured several Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders and handed them over to the US.
These steps provided the needed religious justification for a war against Pakistan.
The militants were told by their mentors that: 1) Pakistan being an ally of the US was an
enemy country; 2) It was supporting non-Muslims in their war against Muslims thus it was in
a state of war against Muslim. As such, it was also an enemy of Islam and must be fought
against in a holy war. 3) The Takfiri beliefs were used to justify attacks against the civilians;
4) The militants were further brainwashed that the constitution, national laws and
government system such as democracy in Pakistan were un-Islamic and Shariah was not
enforced in the country. They were told that only through armed struggle they could establish
Khilafa, enforce Shariah and Islamic economic system in the country.
e. Strategy: Tools and Techniques
As a first part of the strategy, the US dragged Pakistan into its war against Taliban and al-
Qaeda and forced it to take steps which created a local demand of militancy in Pakistan. In its
reaction, the militants in FATA raised arms against Pakistani forces and they claimed that
they did so in their self-defense.
As a second part of the strategy, the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) played
a major role in creating the militant groups willing to attack Pakistani security forces and the
civilians in different parts of the country. It used the angry elements particularly the detainees
of the notorious Guantanamo Bay prison. They were captured either in Afghanistan or
Pakistan and subjected to every type of torture, humiliation and hatred. They naturally
considered Pakistan as responsible for their all miseries and could take revenge from it if get
freed. Some of them were psychologically and mentally prepared for the purpose and freed
from the prison. They were supported to raise militant groups now loosely held together
under the banner of TTP.
The American authorities played a double game with Pakistan. On one hand, they kept on
asking Pakistan to “do more” and take harder steps against the militants. On the other hand,

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the CIA through its agents used these Pakistani steps as pretext for a war and inciting the
militants to attack its people and security forces. Every action of one side was used as a
pretext for a reaction from the other side, thus blood bathed only Muslims and mainly
Pakistani citizens. Washington was able to keep or bring into power in Pakistan the people
and parties willing to fight American-led war. Meanwhile, it also supported TTP leaders who
were ready to fight against Pakistan. It continued to carry out drone strikes which the
militants used as a pretext for suicide and other attacks in Pakistan. The CIA targeted only
those militants who were either not willing to fight against Pakistan or had expressed some
intentions of making a peace deal with Islamabad (Nek Muhammad and Wali-ur-Rehman).
f. Role of Other Powers
Several other countries including India and Afghanistan also inflame militancy in
Pakistan. It is widely believed in Pakistan that FATA has become a battlefield for proxy wars
of various states including China, India, Iran, Afghanistan, Russia, Israel, Turkey and Gulf
countries. Particularly, India’s secret agency RAW is reportedly involved in supporting TTP
(and also Baluch insurgents). It uses Afghan territory obviously with the approval of both
Washington and Kabul to create disturbance in Pakistan. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has
openly admitted and justified Afghan support to militants in Pakistan on the plea that
Islamabad was supporting Afghan Taliban.
The role of Afghan Taliban is complex and confusing. Generally, it is believed that they
have nothing to do with TTP activities in Pakistan. In fact, Afghan Taliban can neither
openly approve nor disapprove TTP’s agenda in Pakistan. If they openly endorse TTP’s
activities, it would hurt their relations with Pakistani officials. At the same time, they cannot
disapprove TTP agenda particularly its demand of enforcement of Shariah in Pakistan and
Islamabad’s withdrawal from the American-led war against Islamic militants. Rather they
would support such demand and also would like to take revenge from and put pressure on
Pakistan. The following facts also suggest that Afghan Taliban and TTP have some links
with each other: 1) TTP leadership considers Mullah Umar as their central leader (Ameerul
Momineen); 2) Afghan Taliban several times mediated between various rival groups within

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the ranks of TTP. Thus, it can be said that the Afghan Taliban also play a double game with
Pakistan and implicitly support TTP.
g. Pakistan’s Poor Response to Militancy
Pakistan has no clear and well defined Anti-Militancy Policy. Its unclear, ambiguous and
confusing response - use of both peaceful and military means, and both halfheartedly -
intensified the problem.
h. Lack of Public Support to the Campaign against Militancy
They government did not take any appropriate measures to counter the propaganda of the
militants and to create awareness about various aspects of the problem due to which the
campaign against militancy lacks the public support which is vital for its success. Not only the
common people, but also some mainstream political and religious parties consider this war as an
American war which Pakistan must quit as early as possible. The ideological and religious
rationale used by the militants, discussed above, also attract these people and also some elements
from within the armed forces.
IV
CONFLICT RESULTION: LOOKING FOR A WAY FORWARD
The ongoing problem in FATA is complex and multidimensional and no simple and easy
solution can help address it. Since different factors and forces are directly or indirectly involved
in the issue, therefore, a multipronged and multidimensional strategy would be needed to address
the problem. The government needs to take short-term, medium-term and long-term measures to
completely root out militancy from FATA and other parts of the country. These measures should
have two aims: 1) Negotiations and Reconciliation with moderate ones, 2) Isolation and
elimination of the most extremist ones. Some of these measures are listed below:
a. Ownership of the War against Militancy:

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Irrespective of the fact that what are its causes and how Pakistan was dragged into this war,
we must accept this reality that now it has become our war and we have to fight it out. The
notion that it is just an American war and it will be over if Pakistan withdraws its support to the
US is misleading. Now it is a war of our own as well as our national survival and security and
integrity of our beloved country. Second, militancy and insurgency is our problem and we have
to find its solution – an indigenous solution according to the local needs and environment. We
must not accept any foreign dictation on this issue. Third, militants are our own people who have
become annoyed and revolted against Pakistan due to some misunderstanding or mishandling by
the government. We must do our utmost to bring them back to the national fold.
b. Religious and Ideological Counter-Offensive
The government should use every mean to foil the propaganda of the militants without which
this war cannot be won. Due to government inability and inactivity in this regard, the militants
have even infiltrated in the ranks of armed forces. The government should utilize electronic and
print media and arrange lectures, workshops and seminars to expose the real face of the militants.
c. Use of Diplomatic Channels against the Foreign Involvement
The government should use every channel to stop foreign support to militants. It should
collect and provide evidence of such involvement to respective governments and expose them
into national and international media. It should also use services of friendly countries and the
platforms of international organizations, including the UNO, to pressurize such countries.
d. Administrative, Legal and Political Measures
The government should take these administrative, legal and political measures to address the
problem on permanent basis. It should give FATA the status of a province and urgently raise its
administrative machinery including police and other provincial agencies related to law and
security to curb the militancy at local level.
In order to bring an end to the prevailing legal vacuum in FATA and to isolate the militants
the government should accept the demand of the majority of the local people regarding

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enforcement of Shariah law / regulations as it did in Swat. In order to further isolate militants in
the country, government can initiate a process of Islamization of laws in Pakistan on the
recommendations of Islamic Ideological Council, as provided in the constitution. Lastly, the
government must introduce political reforms in FATA. Particularly, the local government system
should be extended to FATA.
e. Education, Development and Employment Opportunities
The government must take urgent steps to address the issues of illiteracy, underdevelopment
and unemployment. It should set up educational institutions keeping in view the local needs.
These institutions must give both modern and religious education and also give vocational
training to youth which can help them find better employment. The development projects should
be devised in a way that they help improve socio-economic conditions of the people and also
provide government a speedy and deeper access to the area. It should also establish special
economic zones with foreign assistance to provide better employment opportunities to the youth.
f. Dialogue and National Reconciliation
The government should prefer and use dialogue as a first option. The use of military option
has already cost Pakistan over 50,000 lives and economic loss of more than $ 100 billion. In fact,
there are dozens of militant groups and many of them can be persuaded through negotiations to
give up arms and come back into national fold. The government should welcome and
accommodate as many such groups as possible because of three reasons: 1) it will save valuable
lives from both sides; 2) it will isolate the most extremist elements from the moderate ones and
hence decrease the strength of the militants, and; 3) it will save valuable resources of security
agencies which can be used far more effectively, precisely and efficiently against those still
determined to fight against Pakistan.
g. Effective and Efficient Use of Military Power
The government must use all out force, as a last resort, against the real rebels and enemies of
Pakistan. The force should be used effectively, precisely and efficiently to eliminate the most

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extremist elements. Pakistan will have to improve its intelligence network as well as cooperation
and coordination between various agencies and departments of federal and provincial
government. It also needs to set up a special anti-militancy force better equipped and trained to
meet the challenge. The government should also take steps to stop flow of money to militants.
h. Integration of the Militants into the Mainstream
The government should devise and launch a special rehabilitation program for integration of
the militants of the following two kinds into the mainstream society and bring them back to the
normal activities of life: 1) those who have given up arms after fighting against Pakistan or have
been arrested by security forces; 2) who got training in the past and could be used by anti-state
elements in the future. They should be provided with psychological treatment as well as
employment opportunities according to their talent, education and training etc. mostly in civilian
government departments.
CONCLUSION
The ongoing problem of militancy and insurgency in Pakistan is complex and multi-
dimensional and it needs a multipronged, all-encompassing, holistic and comprehensive strategy
comprising of short-term, medium term and long-term measures to deal with it.