1. AFGHAN IMBROGLIO & ITS IMPLICATIONS ON PAKISTAN'S SECURITY

2. INTRODUCTION

3. land of antiquity and promise

4. INTRODUCTION

6. Short lived thaw

7. Impact of 9/11

8. Baseless accusations

9. Issue of Durand Line and sp to Al-Qaida / Taliban

10. Growing Indian influence

12. AIM Critically analyse Afghan imbroglio, spanning areas of friction with Pakistan with a view to ascertaining future shape of Afghanistan in order to recommend a broad based response strat for safeguarding our national interests

13. SEQ Part-1Fact File & events leading to 9/11 Part-2External Dynamics of Afghan Imbroglio and areas of friction with Pakistan Part-3Present State of Afghanistan Part-4Future Shape of Afghanistan & Emerging Scenarios Part-5Recommendations

15. DEMOGRAPHY

16. HISTORY

17. 9 / 11 SCENARIOFACT FILE

18. GEOGRAPHY

19. GEOGRAPHY

20. 1206 KM 76KM 137 KM 744 KM 936 KM 2430 KM BORDERS

21. HINDUKUSH

22. KABUL HERAT QANDHAR

24. 25% 8% 10% 44% DEMOGRAPHY

25. RELIGION Sunni 84% Shi'a 15% Sikhs, Hindus/Jews 1%

27. Love for freedom and resistance to any foreign invasion.

28. Strong tribal system and Loyalty to own tribe.

31. GEO-STRAT IMP THE NEW ENERGY GREAT GAME Tri Junction of Three Strat Regions Natural Resources of Central Asian States Land Locked Nature of Central Asian States

32. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

33. BRITISH RULE AND GREAT GAME

34. SECOND AFGHAN WAR

35. KING ZAHIR SHAH ERA

36. SARDAR DAUD RULE

37. SAUR REVOLUTION DAUD TARAKAI

38. SOVIET INVASION AMIN BABRAK KARMAL

39. MUJAHIDEEN RESISTANCE

40. NAJIB ERA

41. ROLE OF PAKISTAN

42. SOVIET WITHDRAWAL

43. IMPACT OF SOVIET WDR

44. POLITICAL VACUUM

45. WAR LORDS AND FACTIONAL MILITANCY

46. RISE OF FUNDAMENTALISM

47. DRUG AND NARCOTICS

48. FOREIGN INTERFERENCE

50. Law and order problem

51. Drug /Kalashnikov culture

52. Demographic disturbances

53. Burdened civic amenities

54. Inc unemployment

56. RISE OF TALIBAN

57. INTERPRETATION OF ISLAM

58. US – TALIBAN RELATIONS

59. POST 9/11 SCENARIO

60. POST 9/11 SCENARIO Intl reaction Invoking of article 5 of NATO Majority of Muslim countries sided with US

61. POST 9/11 SCENARIO Pakistan’s stance Int Log Air bases

62. OP ENDURING FREEDOM

63. OP ENDURING FREEDOM

64. PART - II INTERESTS OF EXTERNAL PLAYERS INCL PAKISTAN

65. SEQUENCE Interests of external players Pakistan’s current policy Areas of friction

67. Contain China

68. Flow of narcotics

69. Religious extremism

71. Share in re-const of Afghanistan

72. Elimination of terrorism

74. Prevent spread of Islamic extremism/ prevention of terrorism

76. Presence of ERF

77. Economic opportunities

79. Offn LIC against Pakistan

80. Economic opportunities

82. Tn of hydro-carbon resources of CARs

85. Re-orientation of trade routes

87. Political interests

88. Economic interests

91. Legacy of mistrust

92. Durand line dispute

93. Influence of external players

94. Role of Northern Alliance

95. Repatriation of Afghan refugees

97. Al-Qaida and Taliban activities

98. Interference in internal affairs

99. Sharing of Kabul river water

101. BONN AGREEMENT(PARTICIPANTS) Reps Of Northern Alliance Tajiks Hazaras Uzbiks Exiled Factions Rome Gp Peshawar Gp Cyprus Gp

102. BONN AGREEMENT(PROVISIONS) Political future. Broad based govt Emergency loyajirga within 6 months Constitutionaloyajirga within 18 months Restores 1964 constitutuion Rep of women in LoyaJirga Election of head of state

103. BONN AGREEMENT(CONSTRAINTS) UN and US in favour of NA 18 x ministers from NA 8 x ministers from Rome gp All key portfolios to NA Pushtuns were under rep

104. LOYAJIRGA EMERGENCY LOYAJIRGA Held on 19 Jun It set up the transitional govt CONSTITUTIONAL LOYAJIRGA Held in Dec 2003 Secured a deal on constitution

105. AFGHANISTAN’S NEW CONSTITUTION President Elected for 5 yrs Parliament Consists of two houses WolesiJirga (The house of people) MeshranoJirga (The house of elders) Political Parties Not on the basis of sect, ethnicity, language or region Women 50% seats in MeshranoJirga

106. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPACT Strong presidential system Paves the way for elections Recognises multi ethnic make up Pushtuns remain unhappy Interpretation controversial

107. ISAF Under comd NATO Maj role – security / law and order in the capital 6100 soldiers depl Influence confined to Kabul and Kunduz Eventually to con the entire country

108. AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA) Formed in May 2002 Initially local malitia forced to join ANA Later based on volunteers Maj desertions on completion of trg Unlikely to meet the goal of 10,000 soldiers till elections and full str(70,000) till 2010

109. MENACE OF DRUGS Poppy production inc on departure of TALIBANS 3400 MT of Opium in past 3 years Generates 100-200 billion USD per year

110. REASONS FOR DRUG RESURGENCE Strict ban by Taliban- reduction by 90% Post Taliban Govt writ restd to Kabul NATO turning a blind eye to Narco Trade Drug peddling ensures loyality of war lords

111. ELECTIONS - 2004 Postponed till Sep 2004 Voters registration since Dec 2003 Only 2.5 million registered so far Maj impediments are :- Insecurity and violence Non finalization of constituencies Non registration of political parties Slow registration of voters Rivalry between war lords

112. RECONSTRUCTION War and drought Dependent on fin sp 15 billion $ needed 4.5 billion $ pledged Lack of security

113. THE KABUL GOVERNMENT

114. IMPEDIMENTS No writ beyond Kabul Pushtuns’ alienation War lordism Intervention of neighbours Slow reconstruction Uncertainty of US cmt

115. IMPLICATIONS (POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS) Pakistan’s cont relevance US willingness to negotiate with moderate Talibans Stability on estb of broad based govt Convergence of Pak-Afghan eco interests

116. IMPLICATIONS (AREAS OF CONCERN) Greater Indian influence Elm of mistrust Law and order sit Fallout of op in Tribal Area Ethnic rifts Estranged sp of pushtuns

117. PART-IVFUTURE SCENARIOS

118. IMP FACTORS Acceptable Ethnic Bal Competing Power Struggle Role of Global and Regional Powers Re-estb of State Institutions Substantial Eco Aid US Cmt (reconst, voters’ regn, elections, ISAF)

120. Status Quo Leads to Divided Afghanistan

122. SCENARIO-1BROAD BASED GOVT Envmt………cont…… Pakistan’s relevance to US Cont Expanded ISAF Warlords brought under govt con ANA and Police Provincial Reconst Teams (PRTs) depl in all maj towns

123. SCENARIO-1BROAD BASED GOVT Implications Pak-Afghan relations improve LIC by India Regional stability Chinese concern Gwadar Port Afghan reconst Extremism marginalized Return of refugees

124. SCENARIO-2STATUS QUO LEADS TO A DIVIDED AFGHANISTAN STAGES Stage-1.Status quo leads to anarchy and sharp ethnic div (upto 5 years) Stage-2.Div on ethnic lines (5-10 years)

125. SCENARIO-2STATUS QUO LEADS TO A DIVIDED AFGHANISTAN Envmt (Stage-1) Disenfranchisement of Pushtuns Northern Alliance Govt in the centre Pushtun marginalized Exiled Elite Pushtun class in the govt Pushtun heartland out of govt con Ethnic divide further widens

126. SCENARIO-2STATUS QUOLEADS TO A DIVIDED AFGHANISTAN Envmt (Stage-1) ANA commits excesses in the south DDRprogramme not successful Reconst Process Taliban and Al-Qaeda tgt coalition ISAF confined To Kabul

127. SCENARIO-2STATUS QUOLEADS TO A DIVIDED AFGHANISTAN Envmt (Stage-2) Factional fighting for con of Kabul USA depends on altn oil pipelines Disappearance of Unified Afghan State Coalition forces pull out Kabul taken over by Pushtun forces Ethnic divide sharpens and Country breaks up

128. SCENARIO-2STATUS QUOLEADS TO A DIVIDED AFGHANISTAN Implications Inc temptation among regional states Regional instability inc Smaller gps and warlords influence Population realignment

129. SCENARIO-2STATUS QUOLEADS TO A DIVIDED AFGHANISTAN Implications Pak-US eco interests jeopardized Most dangerous scenario for Pakistan Issue of Pukhtunistan likely to resurface Altn oil routes

130. SCENARIO-3STATUS QUO LDG TO POL RECONCILIATION STAGES Stage-1 (Status Quo). 1-5 years Stage-2 (Political Reconciliation). 5-10 years

131. SCENARIO-3STATUS QUO LDG TO POL RECONCILIATION Envmt (Stage-1) Elections could not be held Pol impasse cont Pushtun remain marginalized DDR Programme not successful ANA

132. SCENARIO-3STATUS QUO LDG TO POL RECONCILIATION Envmt (Stage-1) Govt tenure expired and extended Taliban and Al-Qaeda Reconst could not gather pace ISAF could not be expanded

133. SCENARIO-3STATUS QUO LDG TO POL RECONCILIATION Envmt (Stage-2) Warlords Law and order improves Pol reconciliation is finally achieved Elections are held Eco activities resume as per Scenario-1

134. SCENARIO-3STATUS QUO LDG TO POL RECONCILIATION Implications Status quo undesirable Instability detrimental to Pakistan’s interests Offn LIC by India Neg effs on Pakistan’s eco Gwadar Port Positive effs

135. RECOMMENDATIONS

136. POLICY OPTIONS

138. Pakistan to disassociate itself completely

139. Flawed policy under the circumstances

141. Policy based on non-interference, coop in ctr terrorism, anti smuggling and reconst projs

142. DrawbacksPolicy evolved under constrained geo-pol envmt No let-up in anti Pakistan sentiments Heightened security concerns Controversies about Durand Line, Kabul River & border vialations Marginalization of Pashtoons

143. Proactive Policy for Peace (PPP) Proactive version of existing policy Remain engaged at all lvls to safe gd own interests Based on principles of Non-interference Sovereign equality Enhanced trade and economic coop Normalisation/improvement of relations with all

145. Prudent apch towards resolution of outstanding issues / irritants

146. Need to put contentious issues on the backburner

147. Estb greater understanding with present Afghan Govt

148. Strengthening of trade and commercial ties

150. Concerns of neighboring countries be taken into acct

151. Imp of sustained engagement by maj powers in Afghanistan

152. Cont strife or balkanization of Afghanistan must be strongly opposed

155. Making US/West realize about the consequence of sidelining Pashtoons

156. Estb cordial relations with countries bordering Afghanistan

157. Winning over hearts of anti Pakistan gps

158. Opening of addl consulates

160. Dev of comm infrastructure having bg on our trade with CARs

161. Estb rail link from Quetta to Qandahar and subsequently to Kabul

162. AddlPIA flights to Kabul and Qandahar

164. Addl concessions in Afghan Transit Trade

165. Negative trade lists be completely abolished

166. Preferential processing of Afghani exports at Karachi and subsequently at Gawadar port

167. Const of new roads

168. Expediting Turkmenistan-Afghanistan–Pakistan Gas pipeline and related comm infrastructure dev projsECONOMIC COOP …

170. Undue media projection / coverage of the issue be discouraged

171. Issue be put on the back burner

173. Afghan Govt be vigorously pursed for the rel of detained Pakistanis

174. Attn of intl humanitarian orgs (ICRC) and NGOs be carefully drawn towards the plight of Pakistani prisoners, without causing embarrassment to Kabul

176. Accept Afghanistan’s right over the River and be prep to accept a drop in river flow

177. Reach an accord with Afghan Govt similar to Indus Water Treaty

178. Instead of Indians financing the hydel projs on the River, reach out to Afghans by offering tech and fin sp

180. Extend own diplomatic reach by opening consulates in non-Pashtoon areas as well

181. Dev better relations with the Afghan mil and civ bureaucracy through:

182. Trg of Afghan cadets in own academies on gratis basis

183. Trg of Afghan offrs in our schools of instr

184. Exch of mil delegations

186. Respect for local traditions and customs

187. Dev projs be undertaken in massive and visible manner

188. Consultation with the tribal chieftains

189. Tribal areas be gradually transformed into enlightened, prosperous and tolerant society for Pashtoons living across the border to emulate

191. Thank You