1. Regional Meeting of the BSPN, Chisinau, Moldova,
15 – 17 May, 2013
Natalya Belitser,
Pylyp Orlyk Institute for democracy, Kyiv

2. This presentation is an attempt to address
more practical aspects of a possible regional
cooperation between the different parts of
the BSPN.
It contains no clear-cut answers to the
arising questions, nor does it intend to provide
ready-made solutions.
Rather, it is an invitation for a general
discussion of issues of mutual interest.

3. ‘Could’ and ‘should’
Considering the possibility of regional cooperation, the difference
between the two verbs implies our vision of its nature
The first option consists is based on the assessment of a general
potential of the BSPN, of our intellectual and organisational
capacities, experience, human and other resources
If pooled together, they can, in principle, enrich and enforce our
common efforts in the wide sphere of peacebuilding activities – for
example, by developing a comprehensive, multi-factorial and/or
comparative analysis of the ongoing conflicts in the region, and
identifying its probable flashpoints
The second approach suggests ‘prioritising’ of our objectives in such
a way as identifying a particular situation that demands urgent
mobilisation of the existing resources and using them to prevent a
dangerous escalation of conflict in this or that area of the Black Sea
region; these two approaches are not mutually exclusive.

4. Steps and stages
In any case, for the effective cooperation it is necessary:
‘Inventorying’ and assessment of all of our resources and
abilities
Analysing the state of affairs (conflict potential) in the
BSR
Identifying those concrete aim(s) and geographic areas
where our joint – and thus fortified – activities might be
the most effective
Deciding on what additional resources of CSOs and other
actors are needed and/or desirable (for example, HR
NGOs, media, think tanks etc.)

5. Also, we should take a decision about what kind of
conflicts we intend to deal with:
 ‘geopolitical’ (separatist) conflicts in the BSR?
 ‘ethnopolitical’, i.e. related to ethnic, religious and/or
linguistic divides?
 ‘identity-based’ conflicts – is this broader definition more
suitable for our purposes?
 are ‘purely political’ or social conflicts (e.g. between
ruling and oppositional forces, gaining momentum in a
number of the BSR countries) to be included into the
agenda of the BSPN?
 other types of conflicts – which exactly?

6. • After these preliminary stages are passed, BSPN wouldAfter these preliminary stages are passed, BSPN would
be better equipped to go further, namely, to developbe better equipped to go further, namely, to develop
certain concrete common projects and engage in lookingcertain concrete common projects and engage in looking
for their financial and organisational supportfor their financial and organisational support
• Some of the proposed steps can be done within the
framework of the current BSPN regional meeting
• For example, each of the participants may express his or
her good will to subscribe to one of the following
categories of joint activities, thus forming the WG for:
 research/analysis;
 peace education;
 civil mediation (direct contacts with representatives of the
conflicting sides);
 preparing and conducting trainings for different target
groups;
the list is open for additional entries.

7. Language issues as a conflict-
generating factor
This factor is proposed as a possible subject of regional
cooperation because:
It is topical for a number of the BS countries but not enough
studied
For post-Soviet states, it is of special importance because of its
high sensitivity and politicisation leading to a number of risks and
challenges
Language and education problems, although being country-to-
country specific, often have underlying common denominator/s
Countries of the BSR have already accumulated certain
experience of trying to develop adequate language policies; both
failures and achievements are worth sharing

8. Conflict potential of language issues:
Ukraine
In 2010, after the ’Orange team’ was removed from power, and
the Party of Regions took an upper hand, there was an attempt
to replace the outdated language law by the new one, favouring
Russian and detrimental to the not yet entrenched Ukrainian
– formally the only state language, and also all other languages
used by minority groups
Due to numerous protest actions and negative expertise
provided by the Venice Commission and OSCE HCNM, the
draft law was not included into the agenda of the next two
sessions of the VR
That particular ‘language conflict’ was then settled peacefully,
without violence from either the police or protesters.

9. Protest Action, Kyiv, October 4, 2010

10. “SAVE YOUR LANGUAGE!”
and
“Don’t antagonise us along linguistic lines!”

11. ‘Language Wars’ of 2012
Sharp escalation of tensions occurred in 2012, in the run-up to
the parliamentary elections planned for October 28
Multiple comments, objections and proposals accompanied
preparation of a draft law ’On the foundations of state language
policy’; in May, on the occasion of its passing in the first reading,
there was a fistfight in the Verkhovna Rada. Then, suddenly, the
law passed on July 3, leaving behind a trail of question marks
Opposition was taken by surprise, because the version presented
by the two Party of Regions’ MPs – Kolesnichenko and Kivalov –
was not previously discussed, and over 2000 proposals for
amendments not considered. Besides, the voting took place with
numerous procedural violations, including the demand for MPs
personal voting.

12. July 2012, protests
Hunger strikes and other forms of peaceful protest actions
spontaneously followed the (illegitimate) adoption of the
language law. In response, Kyiv Oblast’s Administrative Court
prohibited any meetings at central places of the capital for a
period between July 4–9; this move was repeated by courts in
many other cities
Protests against the new language bill were backed up by
some NGOs of national minorities, in particular, by a leading
Jewish organisation VAAD-Ukraine, Polish cultural society et
al.
On July 3 – 4, leaders and activists of all oppositional parties,
including not yet parliamentary UDAR and ‘Svoboda’, took
part in a peaceful protest action in central Kiev; this time,
‘Berkut’ riot police violently attacked protesters using tear
gas.

13. Kyiv, July 4, the European Square

14. Consequences: particularConsequences: particular
Notwithstanding all protests and appeals, ignoring warnings andNotwithstanding all protests and appeals, ignoring warnings and
recommendations of the OSCE HCNM and Venice Commission, on 8recommendations of the OSCE HCNM and Venice Commission, on 8
September 2012 President Yanukovych signed the scandalous bill, andSeptember 2012 President Yanukovych signed the scandalous bill, and
on August 10, it entered into forceon August 10, it entered into force
Decisions on providing ‘regional’ status for Russian are alreadyDecisions on providing ‘regional’ status for Russian are already
adopted by 9 oblasts’ regional councils and a number of city councils inadopted by 9 oblasts’ regional councils and a number of city councils in
the east and south of Ukraine, while three regional councils declaredthe east and south of Ukraine, while three regional councils declared
the law not to be enforced in territories under their jurisdictionthe law not to be enforced in territories under their jurisdiction
 Although some languages of national minorities – Hungarian,Although some languages of national minorities – Hungarian,
Romanian, and Moldovan – also obtained the status of ‘regional’,Romanian, and Moldovan – also obtained the status of ‘regional’,
others did not: for example, this status was denied for Bulgarianothers did not: for example, this status was denied for Bulgarian
Since actual implementation of the language law requires billions ofSince actual implementation of the language law requires billions of
hryvnyas (absent in the state budget), for all languages except Russianhryvnyas (absent in the state budget), for all languages except Russian
it remains mostly on paper.it remains mostly on paper.

15. Consequences: generalConsequences: general
In general, these and certain other developments essentiallyIn general, these and certain other developments essentially
polarised andpolarised and radicalisedradicalised Ukrainian societyUkrainian society
As a result, bothAs a result, both radical leftradical left (Communist Party of Ukraine) and(Communist Party of Ukraine) and
radical rightradical right (All-Ukrainian Union ‘Svoboda’) achieved unexpectedly(All-Ukrainian Union ‘Svoboda’) achieved unexpectedly
high results at the parliamentary elections of October 28high results at the parliamentary elections of October 28 (CPU –(CPU –
13.18%, ‘Svoboda’ – 10.44%;13.18%, ‘Svoboda’ – 10.44%; UDAR entered the VR with 13.96%)UDAR entered the VR with 13.96%)
It is noteworthy that ‘Svoboda’ (‘Freedom’) has never before evenIt is noteworthy that ‘Svoboda’ (‘Freedom’) has never before even
neared the electoral threshold; its best result, in 2007, wasneared the electoral threshold; its best result, in 2007, was 0.75%0.75% ofof
votes. Now, having obtainedvotes. Now, having obtained 10.44%10.44% (and(and 12%12% according to theaccording to the
national exit-poll) it became for the first time a parliamentary partynational exit-poll) it became for the first time a parliamentary party
withwith 37 MPs37 MPs (CPU –(CPU – 32 MPs32 MPs))
For comparison:For comparison: ‘Russian Bloc’ received only 0.31‘Russian Bloc’ received only 0.31

16. Civil Society Reactions
These highly worrying consequences of a ‘new’ language politics
resulted, however, in one positive development: intense activation and
invigoration of civil society
All-Ukrainian Committee for the defence of Ukrainian was established,
uniting 300 outstanding public figures in spheres of culture, education,
science etc. Many initiatives from below (‘grass root level’) to support
Ukrainian – in particular, ‘Ukrainian clubs’ inviting Russian speakers to
engage in friendly communication in Ukrainian – emerged in a number
of cities, including eastern and southern ones
Monitoring of 315 catering companies and services in Kyiv by over 100
volunteers during 2012, and their endeavours to persuade the owners
and personnel, resulted in a substantial progress: 61% of restaurants,
café, and bars reversed their ‘Russian only!’ policy in favour of
introducing Ukrainian (see the next slide)

18. Conflict potential of language issues:
Moldova
Conflict potential of language issues in Moldova is also rather high
Although ethnic Russians are not the largest minority here, Russian
has enjoyed a privileged role, having been used alongside
Romanian/Moldovan in all areas of public life; only since 2008,
public officials have been required by law to know Romanian
Language situation in Moldova is additionally complicated by such
factors as:
a) identity problems (‘Moldovan’ versus ‘Romanian’)
b) continued education for minorities with predominantly Russian
language of instruction
c) lack of progress with the revival of Gagauzian: this area remains
overwhelmingly ‘Russian-speaking space’ despite the establishment
in 1994 of a national-territorial unit Gagauz-Yeri
d) language problems in the breakaway Transnitrian region

19. Independent experts developed a set of recommendations of
how to cope with a difficult task of integrating minorities
without assimilating them
Regrettably, Moldovan law-makers have not paid enough
attention to these well-substantiated opinions and
recommendations
Moreover, in March 2013, against a backdrop of a renewed
political crisis, a draft law was submitted stating that Romanian
shall be the language of communication in public dealings with
both state bodies and non-profit organisations, also within all
public or private institutions
Its adoption may invole further destabilisation of thr internal
situation and deepen the already existing splits within the society

20. Language issues: Transnistria
Although formally, in the Transnistrian region three languages
– Russian, Moldovan and Ukrainian – are supposed to function
on equal footing, in reality, only Russian is being used in all
spheres of public and social life
Soviet-times usage of the Cyrillic alphabet for
Moldovan/Romanian is demonstratively kept
Brutal pressure on Chisinau-subordinated schools with Latin
script was applied, especially in summer of 2004
In December 2004, a group of 170 students and parents from
three Transnistria-based Moldova-run schools submitted the
files to the European Court of Human Rights
On 19 October 2012 ECHR took a decision admitting, in
particular, that Russia is guilty for violating the right to
education in the Transnistrian region. The Court granted the
plaintiffs 1 million 20 thousand euro as moral prejudice
and 50 thousand euro as representation costs

21. Common Approach?
Therefore, although there is a wide range of different conflict-
generating factors in the BSR, some of them, especially among the
post-Soviet states, have common roots, and language issues are among
the latter
The main problem consists in developing such language policies that
will ensure further integration and consolidation of our societies by
supporting cultural (including linguistic) rights of both majority and
minorities without assimilation of minority groups
This aim can be gradually achieved through multilingual – in the case of
Crimea/Ukraine, trilingual (Ukr, Rus, Crimean Tatar) – education
Similar concept is being developed by Moldovan independent experts
(in particular, by the Resource Center for Human Rights headed by
Sergey Ostaff)
For the BSPN this provides an opportunity to develop a common
approach by sharing and analysing both positive and negative
experience, and then engage in a joint pilot project

22. What Ukrainian Expert Council of the BSPN can offer
Our national network can share with other members of the BSPN the
results of theoretical and empirical research; provide educational
materials/manuals/programmes for trainings aimed at different target
groups, also skilful personnel and trainers
The latter might be perceived by conflicting sides as impartial, having
no selfish interests of their own but possessing deeper knowledge and
understanding of the background and historical roots of this or that
particular conflict than some professionals from the more remote
geographic areas
BSPN can also benefit from the current Ukraine’s OSCE chairmanship,
in particular, by establishing direct contacts with Special
Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office responsible for
conflict-related issues within the OSCE space
Since Transnistrian conflict is a priority for the Ukraine’s OSCE
chairmanship, we would be interested in focusing on this particular
conflict; we believe that essential positive input into its settlement
could be possible due to the concerted efforts of civil society actors –
members of the BSPN.

23. Recommendations
• Make inventory of national and international projects dealing with
geopolitical and identity-based conflicts in the Black Sea region in order
to reveal the points of crossover and/or duplication, and aim at developing
a more consolidated, better coordinated and cost-saving approach
• Apply efforts for establishing closer cooperation with such international
organisations and initiatives as the OSCE, BSEC and Eastern Partnership,
advocating and promoting their role as the platforms for potential
partnerships between donors, CSOs and other actors committed to and/or
interested in peacebuilding and conflict prevention activities
• Use the BSPN intellectual resources for providing objective and accurate
information on what the course on ‘European integration’ actually means
in terms of values-based transformation of the transition societies and
‘win-win’ strategies for solving the conflict situations
• Accept the notion of cultural (ethnic, religious, linguistic) diversity as a
valuable resource and asset rather than potential source of conflict
• To enable the people’s conscious choiceconscious choice of the integration vector, provide
the equally objective information on the Customs Union, Eurasian Union
and other Russia-led geopolitical initiatives, adding analysis of the most
probable consequences of this or that decision.

24. THANK YOU!
belitser.n1@gmail.com