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Conferencia FIST Mayo/Madrid 2008 @



                      Sponsored by:




Access Control Management
          Vicente Aceituno, 2008
About me

Vice president of the ISSA Spain chapter.
  www.issa-spain.org

Vice president of the FIST Conferences
association.
  www.fistconference.org

Author of a number of articles:
  Google: vaceituno wikipedia

Director of the ISM3 Consortium
  The consortium promotes ISM3, an ISMS standard
  www.ism3.com


                                                         2
The other side




                 3
Access Control


Authentication
Authorization
Auditing

Enough?



                                  4
Yes…questions

User Account vs User
Credential
  ID.
  Information about the user.
  Proof of:
    Ownership: Password vs Criptographic Key
    Personality: Human? Older than 18? A Woman?
    From Barcelona?



                                                  5
Authentication


Proofs of identity, personality and
ownership:
  What I know: Passwords
  What I have: Tokens
  What I am: Eyes, Fingerprints, etc
  What I like:
  What I can do: Maths in German anyone?
  What I think: (values)



                                            6
Authorization


Permission of access to resources
Credential x Resources x Actions




                                         7
The hidden side


Authentication: Real Time Authentication
of Credentials vs Granting and Delivery of
Credentials to People.
  Proof of Identity, or Are you who you were?
  Proof of Personality.
Authorization: Real Time Access Grant vs
Granting Access Rights to Credentials.

                                                8
Session

Work session between user and
application
 Session between processes
 TCP Transmission session
 Frame transmission session
 su (nested session)
 Software agent session
 WAP2 session
 etc…
                                9
Session – User Account


H




              H




                        10
Session - Certificate


H




                      H




    H   X         Y




                               11
Access Control Management




                        12
Access Control Management




  H
      H




                        13
Auditing


Logs
Check ELML




                    14
ELML Markup

Every event can have an eventID.
If the event is not logged by the agent of the
event, the logger can be identified using a
loggerID.
The agent of the event can be identified using a
sourceID.
The agent of the event can stay in different
locations, identified using a addressID.
The credential used by the source to perform a
request can be identified using a credentialID.
The resource (subject) of the event is identified
using a resourceID.

                                                    15
ELML Markup

The request (access attempt) performed has a
RequestType and a Result. The reason for the
Result is stated in the ResultText.
The payload contains the information necessary
to perform the request.
dateTime is the date and time when the request is
performed.
signature is the digital signature of the event using
the credentialID.
hash is the digital summary of the event. It is
recommended that the hash of the previous event
in the Record is used to calculate it.


                                                        16
ELML Vocabulary
Component    Initiate   Finalize     Freeze      Unfreeze   Query   Change
                                                            State   State

Credential   create     delete       block       unblock    read    write


Session      login      logout       suspend     resume     read    write


Message      send       listen       retain      forward    read    write


Repository   create     delete       block       unblock    read    write


Interface    connect    disconnect   interrupt   continue   read    write


Channel      open       close        hold        release    read    write


Service      start      stop         pause       resume     read    write

                                                                             17
Multiple Credentials




                   18
Challenges
eDNI
Weak Passwords / Authentication
Identification vs Anonimity
Privacy vs Marketing
DRM
Physical Access
SSO
Password Synchronization
Logs Standarization
Expiry
Minimum Privilege
Work Role – Access Rights Synchronization
Identifiying Systems -> Phising
                                              19
Access Control


http://identity20.com/media/OSCON2005/
http://www.cerias.purdue.edu/weblogs/spa
f/general/post-30/




                                       20
Access Control


Identification
Authentication
Access Granting
Authorization
Auditing



                               21
Access Control




           22
Creative Commons
                                                        Attribution-NoDerivs 2.0
You are free:
•to copy, distribute, display, and perform this work
Under the following conditions:



                                 Attribution. You must give the original author credit.



                                 No Derivative Works. You may not alter, transform, or build upon this
                                 work.


For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to others the license terms of this work.

Any of these conditions can be waived if you get permission from the author.

Your fair use and other rights are in no way affected by the above.

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs License. To view a copy of
this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.0/ or send a letter to Creative
Commons, 559 Nathan Abbott Way, Stanford, California 94305, USA.
                                                                                                   23
@               with the sponsorship of:




    THANK YOU

                                                    24
www.fistconference.org

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Access Control Management

  • 1. Conferencia FIST Mayo/Madrid 2008 @ Sponsored by: Access Control Management Vicente Aceituno, 2008
  • 2. About me Vice president of the ISSA Spain chapter. www.issa-spain.org Vice president of the FIST Conferences association. www.fistconference.org Author of a number of articles: Google: vaceituno wikipedia Director of the ISM3 Consortium The consortium promotes ISM3, an ISMS standard www.ism3.com 2
  • 5. Yes…questions User Account vs User Credential ID. Information about the user. Proof of: Ownership: Password vs Criptographic Key Personality: Human? Older than 18? A Woman? From Barcelona? 5
  • 6. Authentication Proofs of identity, personality and ownership: What I know: Passwords What I have: Tokens What I am: Eyes, Fingerprints, etc What I like: What I can do: Maths in German anyone? What I think: (values) 6
  • 7. Authorization Permission of access to resources Credential x Resources x Actions 7
  • 8. The hidden side Authentication: Real Time Authentication of Credentials vs Granting and Delivery of Credentials to People. Proof of Identity, or Are you who you were? Proof of Personality. Authorization: Real Time Access Grant vs Granting Access Rights to Credentials. 8
  • 9. Session Work session between user and application Session between processes TCP Transmission session Frame transmission session su (nested session) Software agent session WAP2 session etc… 9
  • 10. Session – User Account H H 10
  • 15. ELML Markup Every event can have an eventID. If the event is not logged by the agent of the event, the logger can be identified using a loggerID. The agent of the event can be identified using a sourceID. The agent of the event can stay in different locations, identified using a addressID. The credential used by the source to perform a request can be identified using a credentialID. The resource (subject) of the event is identified using a resourceID. 15
  • 16. ELML Markup The request (access attempt) performed has a RequestType and a Result. The reason for the Result is stated in the ResultText. The payload contains the information necessary to perform the request. dateTime is the date and time when the request is performed. signature is the digital signature of the event using the credentialID. hash is the digital summary of the event. It is recommended that the hash of the previous event in the Record is used to calculate it. 16
  • 17. ELML Vocabulary Component Initiate Finalize Freeze Unfreeze Query Change State State Credential create delete block unblock read write Session login logout suspend resume read write Message send listen retain forward read write Repository create delete block unblock read write Interface connect disconnect interrupt continue read write Channel open close hold release read write Service start stop pause resume read write 17
  • 19. Challenges eDNI Weak Passwords / Authentication Identification vs Anonimity Privacy vs Marketing DRM Physical Access SSO Password Synchronization Logs Standarization Expiry Minimum Privilege Work Role – Access Rights Synchronization Identifiying Systems -> Phising 19
  • 23. Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs 2.0 You are free: •to copy, distribute, display, and perform this work Under the following conditions: Attribution. You must give the original author credit. No Derivative Works. You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to others the license terms of this work. Any of these conditions can be waived if you get permission from the author. Your fair use and other rights are in no way affected by the above. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.0/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 559 Nathan Abbott Way, Stanford, California 94305, USA. 23
  • 24. @ with the sponsorship of: THANK YOU 24 www.fistconference.org