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15-Minute Linux Live Analysis
Dr. Phil (Polstra)
Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania
What is this talk about?
● Determining with some certainty if you have been hacked
● In a matter of minutes
● With minimal disturbance to the subject system
● Automating the process with shell scripting
Why should you care?
● Someone calls you about a suspected breach
● You need to need to figure out if they were hacked
● Quickly so as to avoid further harm to your client
● Without destroying evidence
● Without taking down a critical machine
Who is the handsome man before you?
● Digital forensics professor at Bloomsburg University
● Programming since age 8 (in Assembly since age 10)
● Known to hack electronics from age 12
● Linux user from its start
● Author USB
Forensics
Insert cool
Cover art
Roadmap
● Opening a case
● Talking to the users
● Mounting known-good binaries
● Minimizing disturbance to the system
● Collecting Data
● Automation with scripting
● Next steps if there is a breach
Opening a Case
● Decide on case name (date?)
● Create a case folder on your laptop
● Start making entries in your notebook
● Bound notebook with numbered pages
● Easy to carry
● Hard to insert/remove pages
● No batteries required
First Talk to the Users
● They know the situation better than you
● Might be able to tell a false alarm before digging in
● Why did you call me?
● What they suspect
● No internal experts or policy to use outsider?
● Why do you think there was an incident?
● Everything they know about the subject system
USB Response Drive
● Contains known-good binaries
● Minimum /bin, /sbin, /lib for same architecture
● Might also grab /usr/sbin, /usr/bin, /usr/lib
● Must be on an ext2, ext3, or ext4 partition
● Could contain a bootable Linux on another partition
● This partition will probably be FAT
● Should be first partition
● See http://linuxforensicsbook.com/hdvideos.html Chapter 1
Mounting Known-Good Binaries
● Insert response drive
● Exec your bash binary
● Set path to your binaries (and only your binaries)
● Set LD_LIBRARY_PATH
● Run all shell scripts as bash <script>
● Don't use she-bang (#!) in scripts!
Demo: Mounting Binaries
Minimize Disturbance to System
● You will always change the system a little
● Goal is to
● Minimize memory footprint
● Never write to subject media
● Two basic options
● Save everything to your USB response drive
● Send it over the network
Sending data over the network
● Better than USB drive due to caching
● Use netcat
● Create a listener for “log” information on forensics workstation
● Send “log” information from client
● Also create a listener for interesting files on forensics
workstation
– Spawn a new listener when files are sent
Setting Up Log Listener
● netcat -k -l 9999 >> case-log.txt
● (-k) keep alive (-l) listen (>>) append
● From subject
● {command} | netcat {forensic ws IP} 9999
● Let's use shell scripting to automate this
● Shell not Python because we want to minimize memory
footprint
Automating the Log Listener
usage () {
echo "usage: $0 <case number>"
echo "Simple script to create case folder and
start listeners"
exit 1
}
if [ $# -lt 1 ] ; then
usage
else
echo "Starting case $1"
fi
#if the directory doesn't exist create it
if [ ! -d $1 ] ; then
mkdir $1
fi
# create the log listener
`nc -k -l 4444 >> $1/log.txt` &
echo "Started log listener for case $1 on $(date)"
| nc localhost 4444
# start the file listener
`./start-file-listener.sh $1` &
Automating the Log Client-Part 1
usage () {
echo "usage: $0 <IP> [log port] [fn port] [ft port]"
exit 1
}
# did you specify a file?
if [ $# -lt 1 ] ; then
usage
fi
export RHOST=$1
if [ $# -gt 1 ] ; then
export RPORT=$2
else
export RPORT=4444
fi
if [ $# -gt 2 ] ; then
export RFPORT=$3
else
export RFPORT=5555
fi
if [ $# -gt 3 ] ; then
export RFTPORT=$4
else
export RFTPORT=5556
fi
Automating the Log Client – Part 2
# defaults primarily for testing
[ -z "$RHOST" ] && { export RHOST=localhost; }
[ -z "$RPORT" ] && { export RPORT=4444; }
usage () {
echo "usage: $0 <command or script>"
echo "Simple script to send a log entry to listener"
exit 1
}
# did you specify a command?
if [ $# -lt 1 ] ; then
usage
else
echo -e "++++Sending log for $@ at $(date) ++++n $($@) n----end----n" | nc $RHOST $RPORT
fi
Automating Sending Files
● Listener on forensics workstation listens for file name
● When a new file name is received
● Create a new listener to receive file
● Redirect file to one with correct name
● Also log in the main case log (optional)
● On the client side
● File name is sent
● After brief pause send file to data listener port
Automating the File Listener
usage () {
echo "usage: $0 <case name>"
echo "Simple script to start a file listener"
exit 1
}
# did you specify a file?
if [ $# -lt 1 ] ; then
usage
fi
while true
do
filename=$(nc -l 5555)
nc -l 5556 > $1/$(basename
$filename)
done
Automating the File Client
# defaults primarily for testing
[ -z "$RHOST" ] && { export RHOST=localhost; }
[ -z "$RPORT" ] && { export RPORT=4444; }
[ -z "$RFPORT" ] && { export RFPORT=5555; }
[ -z "$RFTPORT" ] && { export RFTPORT=5556; }
usage () {
echo "usage: $0 <filename>"
echo "Simple script to send a file to listener"
exit 1
}
# did you specify a file?
if [ $# -lt 1 ] ; then
usage
fi
#log it
echo "Attempting to send file $1 at $(date)" | nc
$RHOST $RPORT
#send name
echo $(basename $1) | nc $RHOST $RFPORT
#give it time
sleep 5
nc $RHOST $RFTPORT < $1
Cleaning Up
# close the case and clean up the listeners
echo "Shutting down listeners at $(date) at user request" | nc
localhost 4444
killall start-case.sh
killall start-file-listener.sh
killall nc
Collecting Data
● Date (date)
● Clock skew on subject
● Time zone on subject
● Kernel version (uname -a)
● Needed for memory analysis
● Might be useful for researching vulnerabilities
Collecting Data (continued)
● Network interfaces (ifconfig -a)
● Any new interfaces?
● Strange addresses assigned?
●
Network connections (netstat -anp)
● Connects to suspicious Internet addresses?
● Strange localhost connections?
● Suspicious ports?
● Programs on wrong ports (i.e malware on port 80)
Collecting Data (continued)
● Open files (lsof -V)
● What programs are using certain files/ports
● Might fail if malware installed
● Running processes (ps -ef and/or ps -aux)
● Things run as root that shouldn't be
● No login accounts logged in and running things
● Might fail if malware installed
Collecting Data (continued)
● Routing info (netstat -rn and route)
● Routed through new interface
● New gateways
● Conflicting results = malware
● Failure to run = malware
Collecting Data (continued)
● Mounted filesystems (mount and df)
● Things mounted that shouldn't be (especially tempfs)
● Mount options that have changed
● Filesystem filling up
● Disagreement = malware
● Kernel modules (lsmod)
● New device drivers
● Modules that have changed
Collecting Data (continued)
● Who is logged in now (w)
● System accounts that shouldn't be allowed to login
● Who has been logging in (last)
● System accounts that shouldn't be allowed to login
● Accounts that don't normally use this machine
● Failed logins (lastb)
● Repeated failures then success = password cracked
Collecting Data (continued)
● User login info (send /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow)
● Newly created login
● System accounts with shells and home directories
● Accounts with ID 0
● Accounts with passwords that shouldn't be there
Putting It Together with a Script
usage () {
echo "usage: $0 [listening host]"
echo "Simple script to send a log entry to listener"
exit 1
}
# did you specify a listener IP?
if [ $# -gt 1 ] || [ "$1" == "--help" ] ; then
usage
fi
# did you specify a listener IP?
if [ "$1" != "" ] ; then
source setup-client.sh $1
fi
# now collect some info!
send-log.sh date
send-log.sh uname -a
send-log.sh ifconfig -a
send-log.sh netstat -anp
send-log.sh lsof -V
send-log.sh ps -ef
send-log.sh netstat -rn
send-log.sh route
send-log.sh lsmod
send-log.sh df
send-log.sh mount
send-log.sh w
send-log.sh last
send-log.sh lastb
send-log.sh cat /etc/passwd
send-log.sh cat /etc/shadow
Running the Initial Scan
Have I been hacked?
Who is Johnn?
/etc/passwd
Why do these accounts have
passwords?
/etc/shadow
Who's been logging in?
Results from last
Who failed to login?
Results from lastb
Looks Like They Were Hacked
Now What?
Live Analysis
● Use techniques described to
● Grab file metadata for key directories (/sbin, /bin, etc.)
● Grab users' command history
● Get system log files
● Get hashes of suspicious files
● Dump RAM
● Must compile LiME (off subject machine!)
● Risky – can cause a crash
Dead Analysis
● Unless the machine absolutely cannot be taken offline it is
strongly recommended that you shut it down and get a
filesystem image
● If you cannot shutdown the machine
● You can still get a filesystem image with dcfldd
● You probably cannot use this evidence in court
More on Dead Analysis
● Filesystem analysis is much more mature and powerful
than memory analysis
● The Linux support in Volatility is somewhat lacking
● Relatively new addition to a new tool
● Seems to fall down a lot with late 3.x and 4.x kernels
● None of the investigators I've talked to could come up with
a case where evidence existed only in memory
Finding Out More
● Heard there was a new book out (1 kg+ of knowledge)
● Resources on http://linuxforensicsbook.com
● Feel free to talk to me later
Questions?

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15-Minute Linux Live Analysis Automation

  • 1. 15-Minute Linux Live Analysis Dr. Phil (Polstra) Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania
  • 2. What is this talk about? ● Determining with some certainty if you have been hacked ● In a matter of minutes ● With minimal disturbance to the subject system ● Automating the process with shell scripting
  • 3. Why should you care? ● Someone calls you about a suspected breach ● You need to need to figure out if they were hacked ● Quickly so as to avoid further harm to your client ● Without destroying evidence ● Without taking down a critical machine
  • 4. Who is the handsome man before you? ● Digital forensics professor at Bloomsburg University ● Programming since age 8 (in Assembly since age 10) ● Known to hack electronics from age 12 ● Linux user from its start ● Author USB Forensics Insert cool Cover art
  • 5. Roadmap ● Opening a case ● Talking to the users ● Mounting known-good binaries ● Minimizing disturbance to the system ● Collecting Data ● Automation with scripting ● Next steps if there is a breach
  • 6. Opening a Case ● Decide on case name (date?) ● Create a case folder on your laptop ● Start making entries in your notebook ● Bound notebook with numbered pages ● Easy to carry ● Hard to insert/remove pages ● No batteries required
  • 7. First Talk to the Users ● They know the situation better than you ● Might be able to tell a false alarm before digging in ● Why did you call me? ● What they suspect ● No internal experts or policy to use outsider? ● Why do you think there was an incident? ● Everything they know about the subject system
  • 8. USB Response Drive ● Contains known-good binaries ● Minimum /bin, /sbin, /lib for same architecture ● Might also grab /usr/sbin, /usr/bin, /usr/lib ● Must be on an ext2, ext3, or ext4 partition ● Could contain a bootable Linux on another partition ● This partition will probably be FAT ● Should be first partition ● See http://linuxforensicsbook.com/hdvideos.html Chapter 1
  • 9. Mounting Known-Good Binaries ● Insert response drive ● Exec your bash binary ● Set path to your binaries (and only your binaries) ● Set LD_LIBRARY_PATH ● Run all shell scripts as bash <script> ● Don't use she-bang (#!) in scripts!
  • 11. Minimize Disturbance to System ● You will always change the system a little ● Goal is to ● Minimize memory footprint ● Never write to subject media ● Two basic options ● Save everything to your USB response drive ● Send it over the network
  • 12. Sending data over the network ● Better than USB drive due to caching ● Use netcat ● Create a listener for “log” information on forensics workstation ● Send “log” information from client ● Also create a listener for interesting files on forensics workstation – Spawn a new listener when files are sent
  • 13. Setting Up Log Listener ● netcat -k -l 9999 >> case-log.txt ● (-k) keep alive (-l) listen (>>) append ● From subject ● {command} | netcat {forensic ws IP} 9999 ● Let's use shell scripting to automate this ● Shell not Python because we want to minimize memory footprint
  • 14. Automating the Log Listener usage () { echo "usage: $0 <case number>" echo "Simple script to create case folder and start listeners" exit 1 } if [ $# -lt 1 ] ; then usage else echo "Starting case $1" fi #if the directory doesn't exist create it if [ ! -d $1 ] ; then mkdir $1 fi # create the log listener `nc -k -l 4444 >> $1/log.txt` & echo "Started log listener for case $1 on $(date)" | nc localhost 4444 # start the file listener `./start-file-listener.sh $1` &
  • 15. Automating the Log Client-Part 1 usage () { echo "usage: $0 <IP> [log port] [fn port] [ft port]" exit 1 } # did you specify a file? if [ $# -lt 1 ] ; then usage fi export RHOST=$1 if [ $# -gt 1 ] ; then export RPORT=$2 else export RPORT=4444 fi if [ $# -gt 2 ] ; then export RFPORT=$3 else export RFPORT=5555 fi if [ $# -gt 3 ] ; then export RFTPORT=$4 else export RFTPORT=5556 fi
  • 16. Automating the Log Client – Part 2 # defaults primarily for testing [ -z "$RHOST" ] && { export RHOST=localhost; } [ -z "$RPORT" ] && { export RPORT=4444; } usage () { echo "usage: $0 <command or script>" echo "Simple script to send a log entry to listener" exit 1 } # did you specify a command? if [ $# -lt 1 ] ; then usage else echo -e "++++Sending log for $@ at $(date) ++++n $($@) n----end----n" | nc $RHOST $RPORT fi
  • 17. Automating Sending Files ● Listener on forensics workstation listens for file name ● When a new file name is received ● Create a new listener to receive file ● Redirect file to one with correct name ● Also log in the main case log (optional) ● On the client side ● File name is sent ● After brief pause send file to data listener port
  • 18. Automating the File Listener usage () { echo "usage: $0 <case name>" echo "Simple script to start a file listener" exit 1 } # did you specify a file? if [ $# -lt 1 ] ; then usage fi while true do filename=$(nc -l 5555) nc -l 5556 > $1/$(basename $filename) done
  • 19. Automating the File Client # defaults primarily for testing [ -z "$RHOST" ] && { export RHOST=localhost; } [ -z "$RPORT" ] && { export RPORT=4444; } [ -z "$RFPORT" ] && { export RFPORT=5555; } [ -z "$RFTPORT" ] && { export RFTPORT=5556; } usage () { echo "usage: $0 <filename>" echo "Simple script to send a file to listener" exit 1 } # did you specify a file? if [ $# -lt 1 ] ; then usage fi #log it echo "Attempting to send file $1 at $(date)" | nc $RHOST $RPORT #send name echo $(basename $1) | nc $RHOST $RFPORT #give it time sleep 5 nc $RHOST $RFTPORT < $1
  • 20. Cleaning Up # close the case and clean up the listeners echo "Shutting down listeners at $(date) at user request" | nc localhost 4444 killall start-case.sh killall start-file-listener.sh killall nc
  • 21. Collecting Data ● Date (date) ● Clock skew on subject ● Time zone on subject ● Kernel version (uname -a) ● Needed for memory analysis ● Might be useful for researching vulnerabilities
  • 22. Collecting Data (continued) ● Network interfaces (ifconfig -a) ● Any new interfaces? ● Strange addresses assigned? ● Network connections (netstat -anp) ● Connects to suspicious Internet addresses? ● Strange localhost connections? ● Suspicious ports? ● Programs on wrong ports (i.e malware on port 80)
  • 23. Collecting Data (continued) ● Open files (lsof -V) ● What programs are using certain files/ports ● Might fail if malware installed ● Running processes (ps -ef and/or ps -aux) ● Things run as root that shouldn't be ● No login accounts logged in and running things ● Might fail if malware installed
  • 24. Collecting Data (continued) ● Routing info (netstat -rn and route) ● Routed through new interface ● New gateways ● Conflicting results = malware ● Failure to run = malware
  • 25. Collecting Data (continued) ● Mounted filesystems (mount and df) ● Things mounted that shouldn't be (especially tempfs) ● Mount options that have changed ● Filesystem filling up ● Disagreement = malware ● Kernel modules (lsmod) ● New device drivers ● Modules that have changed
  • 26. Collecting Data (continued) ● Who is logged in now (w) ● System accounts that shouldn't be allowed to login ● Who has been logging in (last) ● System accounts that shouldn't be allowed to login ● Accounts that don't normally use this machine ● Failed logins (lastb) ● Repeated failures then success = password cracked
  • 27. Collecting Data (continued) ● User login info (send /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow) ● Newly created login ● System accounts with shells and home directories ● Accounts with ID 0 ● Accounts with passwords that shouldn't be there
  • 28. Putting It Together with a Script usage () { echo "usage: $0 [listening host]" echo "Simple script to send a log entry to listener" exit 1 } # did you specify a listener IP? if [ $# -gt 1 ] || [ "$1" == "--help" ] ; then usage fi # did you specify a listener IP? if [ "$1" != "" ] ; then source setup-client.sh $1 fi # now collect some info! send-log.sh date send-log.sh uname -a send-log.sh ifconfig -a send-log.sh netstat -anp send-log.sh lsof -V send-log.sh ps -ef send-log.sh netstat -rn send-log.sh route send-log.sh lsmod send-log.sh df send-log.sh mount send-log.sh w send-log.sh last send-log.sh lastb send-log.sh cat /etc/passwd send-log.sh cat /etc/shadow
  • 30. Have I been hacked?
  • 32. Why do these accounts have passwords? /etc/shadow
  • 33. Who's been logging in? Results from last
  • 34. Who failed to login? Results from lastb
  • 35. Looks Like They Were Hacked Now What?
  • 36. Live Analysis ● Use techniques described to ● Grab file metadata for key directories (/sbin, /bin, etc.) ● Grab users' command history ● Get system log files ● Get hashes of suspicious files ● Dump RAM ● Must compile LiME (off subject machine!) ● Risky – can cause a crash
  • 37. Dead Analysis ● Unless the machine absolutely cannot be taken offline it is strongly recommended that you shut it down and get a filesystem image ● If you cannot shutdown the machine ● You can still get a filesystem image with dcfldd ● You probably cannot use this evidence in court
  • 38. More on Dead Analysis ● Filesystem analysis is much more mature and powerful than memory analysis ● The Linux support in Volatility is somewhat lacking ● Relatively new addition to a new tool ● Seems to fall down a lot with late 3.x and 4.x kernels ● None of the investigators I've talked to could come up with a case where evidence existed only in memory
  • 39. Finding Out More ● Heard there was a new book out (1 kg+ of knowledge) ● Resources on http://linuxforensicsbook.com ● Feel free to talk to me later