1. EU TRADE
POLICY
Do interest groups hamper the EU’s
reputation as a champion of trade
liberalisation?
Adelina Valeva
Katalin Jakucs

2. Contents:Contents:
 The EU in world trade
 EU trade policy - institutional structure
 Lobbying the EU trade policy
 The Commission – pan-European solutions
 National governments and the Council of Ministers –
protectionist lobbying
 Lobbying the European Parliament?
 Are NGOs influential?
 Concluding remarks
EU Trade Policy

3. The EU in world trade
EU Trade Policy

4. The European
Commission

5. The Council of
Ministers

6. The European
Parliament

7. Lobbying EU Trade policy
• Business representation is relatively
recent
• High degree of institutional complexity
• The Commission works intensively to
solicit business input in order to gain
bargaining leverage vis-à-vis third
countries and EU MS.
• ‘Two channel logic of trade policy
lobbying:
 Corporate actors to be successful if
propose pan-European trade policy
solutions to the Commission in
liberalizing trade.
 Protectionist goes through the national
route
 NGOs fairly limited in influencing policy
outcomes but present; willing to make the
trade policy process more transparent.
EU Trade Policy

8. Lobbying the European
Commission
• The Commission is happy to hear the views of
business – new EU-level business representation
encouraged by the Commission
• Two objectives: technical expertise and finding
pan-European solutions to prevent disputes with
MS
• Works closely with industry representatives in
financial services and telecommunication
services; DG Trade and DG Industry – stable
relations with groups
• Firms – immediate advantage or long-term goals
EU Trade Policy

9. National governments and the Council of Ministers –
protectionist lobbying
• Protectionist lobbying goes through the national channel
• By aiming to affect the consensus in the Council
• Politicians have incentives to satisfy the demands of interest
groups
• National interest groups push their government to block a trade
agreement in the Council
• Nationalist lobby only successful when backed by the government
• For example: Agriculture vs. Textile sector (Woll, 2006)
EU Trade Policy

10. The role of the European Parliament after Lisbon
• “effective interest representation in
the Parliament […] requires wider
coalitions, better networking, non-
technical approaches, combined with
an acute sense for regional or even
local political priorities”.
(Lehmann, 2009)
• the enhanced powers of the EP
in the post-Lisbon era have
opened it up as a new point of
access for trade policy lobbyists
•lobbying the EP is challenging
due to its political fragmentation
and multiple access points
•lobbysts have to be very fined-
tuned to the local and regional
priorities of individual MEPs
•it seems that business groups
will continue to focus most of
their lobbying efforts on the
Council
EU Trade Policy

11. Are NGOs influential?
• NGOs find it difficult to threaten or enhance political
actors’ chances of re-election or re-appointment
• NGOs are unlikely to have the option to threaten
withdrawal of investment or employment
• NGO representatives are rarely in a position to provide
precise and detailed policy information
• They defend extreme positions that are difficult to
achieve
• NGOs’ influence on trade policy
outcome is unsignificant
h
u
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EU Trade Policy

12. Do interest groups hamper the EU’s reputation
as a champion of trade liberalisation?
• interest groups are present and work closely with the
Commission in order to propose pan-European trade
liberalization solutions
• interest groups interact with national governments when
trying to push for protectionist measures
• however, protectionist lobby is only successful when backed
by the government
• societal groups do not exercise influence over policy
outcomes
• when the Commission opts for pan-European regulation
instead of pan-European liberalization it is not a result of
successful trade policy lobbying
EU Trade Policy

13. References
• De Bièvre, Dirk/Dür, Andreas 2005. Constituency Interests and Delegation in
European and American Trade Policy, in: Comparative Political Studies 38: 10,
1271-1296.
• De Bièvre, D. and Dür, A. 2007. 'Inclusion without Influence? Civil Society
Involvement in European Trade Policy', Journal of Public Policy.
• Dür, Andreas 2008a. Bringing Economic Interests Back Into the Study of EU Trade
Policy-Making, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 10: 1,27-45.
• Meunier, S. 2005. Trading Voices: The European Union in International Commercial
Negotiations. first ed. Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press.
• Mugge, D. 2004. Financial Liberalization and the European Integration of Financial
Market Governance, 03/4 December. Koln.
• Nugent, Neill 2006. The Government and Politics of the European Union,
Houndmills.
• Woll, C. 2006. Trade Policy Lobbying in the European Union: Who Captures
Whom? Max Planck Institute for the study of societies, 06/7 October.
• Zimmermann, H. 2006. Wege zur Drachenzähmung. Die EU und die USA in den
Verhandlungen um die Aufnahme Chinas in die WTO, 1985–2001, BadenBaden.
EU Trade Policy