2. Contents
• Introduction
Definitions
Endemic vs epidemic and Outbreak vs epidemic
Sources of information to detect outbreaks
Early warning signals for an outbreak
• Why should we investigate outbreaks?
• Steps for investigation
• Constraints of field outbreak investigation
• Preparedness for Prevention and Control for Future Outbreaks
3. Endemic versus Epidemic
Endemic
• Constant presence of a disease or infectious agent at a usual level, without
importation from outside, within a given area or population
Epidemic
• Unusual occurrence of the
disease clearly in excess
of its normal expectation
• In a geographical location
• At a given point of time
20
15
10
5
0
Endemicity
Epidemic
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
4. What’s an epidemic?
• Unusual occurrence of disease or specific health related behaviour
in a community or region clearly in excess of expected numbers.
• An arbitrary limit of two standard errors from the endemic
frequency is used to define the epidemic threshold for common
diseases
5. What is an outbreak ?
• Occurrence of more cases of disease than expected
in a given area
over a particular period of time
among a specific group of people
• Occurrence of two or more Epidemiologically linked cases of a
disease of outbreak potential
• A single case of a new emerging disease/ eradicated disease
6. Outbreak and epidemic:
A question of scale
• Outbreaks
Outbreaks are usually limited to a small area
Outbreaks are usually within one district or few blocks
• Epidemics
An epidemic covers larger geographic areas
Epidemics usually linked to control measures on a district/state wide
basis
• Use a word or the other according to whether you want to generate or
deflect attention
7. Levels of response to different triggers
Trigger Significance Levels of response
1 Suspected /limited outbreak • Local response by health worker and
medical officer
2 Outbreak • Local and district response by district
surveillance officer and rapid response
team
3 Confirmed outbreak • Local, district and state
4 Wide spread epidemic
Natural disaster
• Local, district, state and centre
5 Pandemic • International
8. Disease Trigger 1 Trigger 2
Malaria •Single case of smear positive in an area where
malaria was not present for a minimum of three
months
•Slide positivity rate doubling over last three
months
•Single death from clinically /microscopically
proven malaria
•Single falciparum case of indigenous origin in
a free region
•Two fold rise in malaria in
the region over last 3
months
•More than five cases of
falciparum of indigenous
origin
Polio Even a single case will trigger outbreak investigations
Plague Rat fall At least 1 probable case of
plague in community
Jaundice More than two cases of jaundice in different houses irrespective of age in a
village or 1000 population
9. Sources of information to detect outbreaks
EVENT-BASED SURVEILLANCE:
Rumour register : To be kept in standardized format in each
institution
Community informants : Private and public sector
Media : Important source of information, not to be neglected
CASE-BASED SURVEILLANCE:
Review of routine data : review the data from the routine surveillance
and check if it crosses threshold levels
Trigger events
10. Investigations of an outbreak of jaundice,
Rohtak
Recognition of cases and reporting:
• People recognized their own signs and symptoms ……. Reported to health
facility
• Local press published the reports and drew attention of civil and
administrative authorities
• Health workers played a marginal role
• Private practitioners also, did not report
• District authorities appeared on the scene quite late
11. Diseases requiring investigations
• Endemic diseases with a potential of causing focal or large outbreaks, e.g.
malaria, cholera, measles, viral hepatitis, meningococcal meningitis, etc.
• Diseases under eradication or elimination phase; even a single case of such
disease may be treated as an outbreak, e.g. poliomyelitis
• Rare but internationally important diseases with high case fatality rate and
with the potential of importation due to existence of conducive
epidemiological conditions e.g. yellow fever, avian influenza etc.
• Outbreaks of unknown diseases/syndromes
12. Early warning signals for an outbreak
Clustering of cases
Increases in cases or deaths
Single case of disease of epidemic potential
Acute febrile illness of an unknown aetiology
Two or more linked cases of meningitis, measles
Unusual isolate
Shifting in age distribution of cases
High vector density
Natural disasters
13. Deciding whether to Investigate a Possible
Outbreak
• Severity of illness
• Number of cases
• Source / mode of transmission
• Availability of preventive & control measures
• Availability of staff & resources
• Public, political and legal concerns
• Public health program considerations
• Potential to affect others if the control measures are not taken
• Research opportunity
15. The balance between investigation and control
while responding to an outbreak
Source & mode of transmission
Known Unknown
Causative
agent
Known Control +++
Investigate +
Control +
Investigate +++
Unknown Control +++
Investigate +++
Control +
Investigate +++
CONTROL AND PREVENTION MEASURES
• Are cases continuing to occur ?
• Is the outbreak just about over ?
16. RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES
• Newly recognized disease
• define its natural history:
» Agent
» mode of transmission
» incubation period
» clinical spectrum
» characterize the populations at risks
» identify risk factors
• Well – characterized diseases
• assess control measures
• assess usefulness of new epidemiology and laboratory techniques
17. TRAINING
• Develop the following skills through practice and experience:
» Diplomacy
» Logical thinking
» Problem solving ability
» Quantitative skills
» Epidemiologic know-how
» Judgment
18. PUBLIC, POLITICAL or LEGAL
CONCERNS
• Sometimes override scientific concerns in the decision to
conduct an investigation
• Essential to be “responsibly responsive” even if the concern has
little scientific basis
19. PROGRAM CONSIDERATIONS
• Program Evaluation
» identify populations overlooked
» recognize intervention strategy failures
» identify changes in the agent or events beyond the
scope of the program
20. Importance of timely action:
The first information report
• Filled by the reporting unit
• Submitted to the District Surveillance Officer as soon as the
suspected outbreak is verified
• Sent by the fastest route of information available
Telephone
Fax
E-mail
22. Unusual health event
No Yes
Is this an outbreak
Etiology, source &
transmission
known?
Does the hypothesis
fit with the facts?
Yes
Yes
No
No
Institute control measures
Further investigation
(clinical ,lab.,
epidemiological)
Describe outbreak in
terms of Place, time
and Person
Develop Hypothesis regarding
source, transmission, aetiology
and people at risk
Institute control measures
Special studies
23. Conducting an outbreak investigation
in 10 steps
• Step 1: Prepare for Field Work
• Step 2: Establish the Existence of an Outbreak
• Step 3: Verify the Diagnosis
• Step 4: Define and Identify Cases
• Step 5: Describe and Orient the Data
• Step 6: Develop Hypotheses
• Step 7: Evaluate Hypotheses
• Step 8: Refine Hypotheses
• Step 9: Implement Control and Prevention Measures
• Step 10: Communicate Findings
24. Check-list for investigation and rapid
containment of the outbreak
1) Preparation for field
2) Make provisional diagnosis and develop working case-definition
3) Confirm existence of an outbreak
4) Line-listing of cases
5) Management of cases
6) Rapid household/community survey for case finding
7) Entomological and environmental investigations
8) Laboratory investigations
25. Check-list for investigation and rapid
containment of the outbreak
9) Data analysis
10) Institution of control measures
11) Interim report
12) Final report
13) Follow-up of outbreak
14) Testing of hypothesis
15) Evaluation of outbreak management including investigations
16) Documentation and sharing of lessons learnt
27. Preparation for Field Work
• Investigation
Scientific knowledge--have it or get it!
Supplies, equipment
Assemble your team
• Administration
Review local directives or plans
• Consultation
Know your role
• Sample questionnaires
• Key community contacts
• Laboratory containers and collection
techniques
• Identify Outbreak Team
Clinician /paediatrician
Epidemiologist
Microbiologist
Laboratory workers
Environmental health
specialists
Local health department
Other state agencies
28. Preparation for Field Work
• Before leaving for the field, the team leader(or members) should ensure
the following:
Verify rumours and collect preliminary information about the
episode from the State or Central Health Authorities working in the
affected area over telephone or through e-mail.
Make necessary technical, administrative and logistics arrangements
As per the preliminary information, prepare an “Outbreak
Management Kit”.
Brief members of RRT on purpose and their roles, responsibilities
and methods of self protection during outbreak investigation
32. Make provisional diagnosis and develop
working case-definition
• Provisional clinical diagnosis : by examining (including history taking
and review of case records) a few current reported cases / recovered cases
• On the basis of clinical profile and case records, develop a “working case-definition”
which may specify area, population affected and duration of
episode
• To help in establishing the diagnosis, collect adequate number of
appropriate clinical samples of current/ recovered cases and their
contacts. Record the details on “Laboratory Form”
33. Case-definition
• A standard set of criteria for deciding whether, in this investigation, a
person should be classified as having the disease or health condition
under study.
• A case definition usually includes four components:
• clinical information about the disease,
• characteristics about the people who are affected,
• information about the location or place, and
• a specification of time during which the outbreak occurred
34. EXAMPLE: CASE DEFINITION
OUTBREAK OF S. TYPHI JURA, M-J, 1997
CONFIRMED
Clinical
• Diarrhoea (>2 liquid stools/ day)
or
• Fever >38°C (+one day)
Place & person
• resident in Jura or neighbourhood
Time
• Since 12 May 1997
Biological
• Identification of S . Typhimurium
PROBABLE
Clinical
• Diarrhoea (>2 liquid stools/ day)
or
• Fever >38°C (+one day)
Place & person
• resident in Jura or neighbourhood
Time
• Since 12 May 1997
Biological
• None, but contact with confirmed case
35.
36. Investigations of an outbreak of jaundice,
Rohtak
Confirmation of diagnosis
Standard case definition applied:
• Acute febrile illness of short duration, (fever ) with malaise, anorexia,
followed by jaundice, hepatomegaly, and abdominal tenderness in right
upper quadrant, increase in ALT >2.5 times and serum bilirubin >2mg%.
• Limited number of blood samples drawn and tested in laboratory of
medical college, Rohtak to confirm the diagnosis
• Serological tests done through National Institute of Communicable
Diseases indicated HEV outbreak
37. Confirm existence of an outbreak
• Review clinical and laboratory records of the current and recovered cases
• Epidemiological linkages of suspected cases of “similar in nature”
• Compare the current situation (data) with the available data of the
corresponding period of past 2-3 years
For a notifiable disease: health department surveillance records.
For other diseases and conditions: find data from local sources such
as hospital discharge records, death (mortality) records, and cancer or
birth defect registries.
If local data are not available: make estimates using data from
neighbouring states or national data
38. Confirm existence of an outbreak
Caution!
• Seasonal variations
• Notification artefacts
• Diagnostic bias (new technique)
• Diagnostic errors (pseudo-outbreaks)
39. What could account for the increase
in cases?
Real increase
• Increase in population size
• Changes in population
characteristics– due to
population movement e.g.,
harvesting season, fairs, etc.
• Random variation
• Outbreak
Artificial increase
• Changes in reporting
procedures– increase in
number of reporting units or
change in case-definition etc.
• Improvements in diagnostic
procedures
• Increased interest because of
local or national awareness
• Contamination of specimens
40. Outbreak confirmed
Immediate control
measures?
Further
investigation?
- prophylaxis
- exclusion / isolation
- public warning
- hygienic measures
- aetiological agent
- mode of transmission
- vehicle of transmission
- source of contamination
- population at risk
- exposure causing illness
41. further investigations warranted
Epidemiologist
Laboratory specialist
Clinician
Outbreak confirmed,
Form Rapid
Response Team
Team coordinates
field investigation
42. Investigations of an outbreak of jaundice,
Rohtak
Establish the existence of an outbreak
People first:
• House to house survey was done in the affected areas in May 2000
• People interviewed ……. Confirmed that it was an unusual occurrence …..
Not witnessed in last ten years or so.
• Health institutions did not provide basic epidemiological data …..
Because of nonexistence of surveillance system
44. • Medical investigation - The physician / paediatrician clinically examines
the available cases (in the hospital or the community) and make a
clinical diagnosis.
• Laboratory investigation - The microbiologist performs appropriate lab
investigations. He advises on what samples are required, mode of
collection and method of transportation and also to which lab it has to
be sent. If the outbreak warrants entomological investigation should also
be done.
• Epidemiological investigation - The epidemiologist will look into the
epidemiological and environmental aspects of the outbreak. The basic
aim is to identify the source of the problem and the routes of
transmission.
46. Line-listing of cases
• Using “working case-definition” record name, address, age, sex, status of
immunisation, symptoms, date of onset, recent travel history, treatment /
hospitalization, outcome of each case or other variables as may be
required etc. in the “line-list” format
• Active surveillance
• Passive surveillance
47. Management of cases
• Manage cases appropriately with the help of local clinical facilities to
prevent deaths.
• If indicated, cases should be managed in isolation to prevent further
transmission of infection.
• Ensure medical logistics i.e. sufficient quantities of essential drugs and
supplies etc.
48. Rapid household/community survey for
case finding
• Search more cases in the community by using working case-definition
• Record information on survey formats
49.
50.
51. Laboratory investigations
• Ensure proper collection, labelling, transportation and storage of clinical
samples
• Wherever rapid diagnostic tests are available, use them in the field or
send the specimens to the concerned laboratory for testing.
• Follow bio-safety precautions during collection and handling of
specimens
• Follow national and international guidelines for transportation of
specimens.
52. Entomological, environmental and
zoonotic surveys
• Assess the type and density of vector(s) for the possibility of vector-borne
disease outbreak
• Collect data on:
- Rainfall
- Humidity
- Temperature
- Drinking water supply
- Environmental sanitation
- Man-made situations like developmental/irrigation projects etc.
- Any health activity (intervention) taken up in recent past
53. Investigations of an outbreak of jaundice,
Rohtak
Laboratory investigations and confirmation
• District health authorities collected water samples
• Orthotolidine test : negative in one-third of samples
• Coliform count in laboratory : 3 out of 5 samples were unfit due to
unacceptable coliform count.
54. Investigations of an outbreak of jaundice,
Rohtak
Other observations
• Poor sanitary conditions
• Open field defecation practiced by 6.7% households
• 30.3% did not wash their hands before eating
• Drinking water stored in pitchers in 84% households
• Ladle used by only 27.4% individuals
56. DEFINE THE POPULATION AT RISK
• Map of the area
• Get a detailed & current map of the area; if not available
prepare such a map
• Containing information concerning natural landmarks,
roads etc
• Dwelling units may designated by numbers
• Counting the population
• Denominator may be entire population or a subgroup
• Will help in much needed attack rates in various groups &
subgroups
57. Data Analysis
• Plot “Epidemic Curve” to describe the outbreak in terms of “time” (Time-analysis)
• Make maps and tables for describing place and person (Place and Person
analysis)
• Determine population at risk of infection
• Analyze rapid household survey data and calculate population-based
attack rates by age and sex groups
• Formulate a hypothesis which should include characteristics of affected
population, cause of disease, mode of transmission, incubation period,
genesis of outbreak etc.
58. Characterizing by time
• Time course of an epidemic is shown by drawing a graph of the number
of cases by their date of onset-- epidemic curve, or "epi curve”.......gives a
simple visual display of the outbreak's magnitude and time trend.
• Where we are in the course of the epidemic, and helps project its future
course.
• If the disease and its usual incubation period is known, probable time
period of exposure can be estimated and a questionnaire focusing on
that time period can be developed.
• The epidemic pattern can be interpreted—for example, whether it is an
outbreak resulting from a common source exposure, from person-to-person
spread, or both.
60. WEEKLY INCIDENCE OF JAUNDICE IN ROHTAK TOWN FROM
2
6
8
13
MARCH TO SEPTEMBER, 2000
22
31
42
32
37
19
12 12
20
18
10 10
24
15
11
9 8
6
8 7 6 5 4 3
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Cases
March April May June July August September
Weeks
61. Characterizing by place
• Assessment of an outbreak by place provides information on the
geographic extent of a problem and may also show clusters or patterns
that provide clues to the identity and origins of the problem.
• A simple and useful technique for looking at geographic patterns is to
plot, on a "spot map" of the area, where the affected people live, work, or
may have been exposed.
62. Drawing a spot map during an
outbreak investigation
• Rough sketch of the setting of
an outbreak
• One dot = One case
• Other locations of potential
importance are also recorded
• Does not adjust for
population density
63. Jind road
DISTRIBUTION OF
CASES OF VIRAL
Rtk Rly Stn
Vaish college
Shivaji colon
Janta colony
Naya Parav Kamala nagar
Sugar Mill Vijay Nagar
Hissar ROAD
JIND RLY LINE
GOHANA ROAD
HEPATITIS OUTBREAK IN
ROHTAK, 2000
Cases were distributed in 61 localities (400 cases).
272 cases(68%) clustered in 5 localities adjacent to each other and had
piped water supply from water works “2”.
Most affected locality was Janata Colony with reported127 cases
64. Characterizing by person
• Define such populations by personal characteristics (e.g., age, race, sex,
or medical status) or by exposures (e.g., occupation, leisure activities, use
of medications, tobacco, drugs). These factors are important because they
may be related to susceptibility to the disease and to opportunities for
exposure.
• Age and sex are usually assessed first, because they are often the
characteristics most strongly related to exposure and to the risk of
disease.
65. Investigations of an outbreak of jaundice,
Rohtak
Age and sex distribution
Sex distribution:
• Males = 66.5%
• Females = 34.5%
Age distribution:
• Children <= 14 years =22%
• 15- 59 years age = 77% (majority)
• > 60 years = 1%
Most house holds reported only single case.
66. AR & CFR OF VIRAL HEPATITIS OUTBREAK IN
ROHTAK, 2000
LOCALITY Population CASES AR Death CFR
Janata Colony 14420 127 0.88 2 1.6
Shivaji Colony 7625 66 0.80 0 0
Naya Parav 1856 33 1.78 1 3. 13
Kamla Nagar 3947 21 0.64 0 0
Vijay Nagar 4930 25 0.42 0 0
Other Localities 120000 128 0.10 0 0
Total 152778 400 0.33 3 0.75
67. Data Analysis
Person
Place
Time
Cases
25
20
15
10
5
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
0-4 '5-14 '15-44 '45-64 '64+
Age Group
Evaluate information
Pathogen? Source? Transmission?
69. Hypothesis
• Supposition made from data analysis & interpretation.
» Characteristics of the population –
» Specific cause ( Source, Agent )
» Environmental factors -
» Expected outcome –
» Dose response relationship –
» Time response relationship –
• May be generated by-
Considering what you know about the disease itself, or
Talking to few of the case patients, or
The descriptive epidemiology may provide useful clues that can be
turned in to hypotheses.
71. • Two approaches
• 1) comparison of the hypotheses with the established facts : when your
evidence is so strong that the hypothesis does not need to be tested.
• 2) analytic epidemiology, which allows to test your hypotheses : when the
cause is less clear
» Cohort studies
» Case-control studies
72. Cohort studies
• Best technique for analyzing an outbreak in a small, well-defined
population
• To identify the source of the outbreak from this information, you would
look for an item with:
a high attack rate among those exposedand
a low attack rate among those not exposed
most of the people who became ill should have been exposed
• Calculate the mathematical association between exposure and illness
called the relative risk (produced by dividing the attack rate for people
whowere exposed by the attack rate for those whowere not exposed .)
73. Case-control studies
• Where the population is not well defined
• odds ratio—to quantify the relationship between exposure and disease.
This method does not prove that a particular exposure caused a disease,
but it is very helpful and effective in evaluating possible vehicles of
disease.
Testing statistical significance
• The final step in testing your hypothesis is to determine how likely it is
that your study results could have occurred by chance alone.
74. STEP 8: REFINE HYPOTHESES
AND CARRY OUT ADDITIONAL
STUDIES
75. • When analytic epidemiological studies do not confirm your hypotheses
• Even when your analytic study identifies an association between an
exposure and a disease, you often will need to refine your hypotheses. .
Sometimes you will need to obtain more specific exposure histories or a
more specific control group.
• When an outbreak occurs, whether it is routine or unusual, you should
consider what questions remain unanswered about the disease and what
kind of study you might use in the particular setting to answer some of
these questions.
77. Institution of control measures
• Based on clinical, epidemiological and entomological findings,
implement appropriate control measures to prevent further
spread of the disease
• Institution of control measures and management of cases should
not be delayed pending laboratory confirmation of diagnosis
78. Investigations of an outbreak of jaundice,
Rohtak
Interventions
• Super chlorination of water done
• Home chlorination where ever OT test was negative
• Boiling of water accepted by 15% of families
• People educated to wash hands
• Public health department identified leakage and corrected those; choked
sewer was attended to urgently
• Health workers , anganwadi workers played pivotal role in inter-personal
communication
80. Daily situation updates
• During the period of the outbreak the nodal MO should continue to
give daily situation updates of the outbreak to the next level.
• This should continue even when the epidemic investigation team has
started its investigation
• Updates include the list of new cases, lab results received, any new
findings, any containment measures taken etc.
• Continues till the end of the outbreak
81. Interim report
• RRT submits an interim report within one week of starting their
investigation, response and control activities
• The report should cover
» verification of the outbreak,
» total number of affected cases/ deaths,
» time, person, place analysis,
» management of the patients,
» likely suspected source,
» immediate control measures implemented, etc.
• Also has provisional hypothesis of the causation of the outbreak and
comments/recommendations, if any, including whether any further
outside help is necessary.
82. Monitoring the situation
• The DSO should monitor the situation on a daily basis and give
feedback to the RRT as well as feed forward to the State.
• The main points to monitor are:
• The trends in the cases and deaths.
• The containment measures that are being implemented
• Drugs / vaccine stock
• Logistic issues – communications, vehicles,
• Community involvement
• Media response
• This should continue till the outbreak is officially declared to be over.
83. Declaring the outbreak over
• Role of the district surveillance officer
• Criteria
No new case during two incubation periods since onset of last
case
• Implies careful case search to make sure no case are
missed
84. Evaluation of outbreak management
including investigations
• Once the outbreak is over, request the local health authority to
evaluate following aspects:
• Genesis of the outbreak
• Early or late detection of outbreak
• Preparedness for the outbreak
• Management of the outbreak
• Control measures undertaken and their impact
85. Final report
• Within 10 days after the outbreak has ceased.
• Comprehensive and give a complete picture of the outbreak,
the precipitating factors,
the evolution of the epidemic,
description of the persons affected,
time trends, areas affected and direction of spread of the epidemic.
• Complete details of lab results
• Feedback from the report should be shared with the lower levels and also
other districts.
• Publication in a journal
Suggested Format for Writing Outbreak Investigation Report
86.
87.
88. Follow-up of outbreak
• Follow-up visits are important during the declining phase of an
outbreak to:
• Detect last case(s)
• Detect and treat late complications (if any)
• Complete the documentation of the outbreak
89. Documentation and sharing of lessons
learnt
• Organize post-outbreak seminar
• Provide feedback to State and district RRTs
• Develop case studies on selected outbreaks for training RRT
members
90. Constraints of field outbreak investigation
• Urgency to find source and prevent cases
• Pressure for rapid conclusion
• Statistical power often limited
• Media reports may bias interviewees
• Pressures because of legal liability
• Pressures because of financial liability
• Delays lead to limited human or environmental samples for testing
91. Preparedness for Prevention and Control
for Future Outbreaks
• Strengthen routine surveillance system
• Identify a nodal officer at the state and district levels
• Constitute an inter-disciplinary Rapid Response Team (RRT) at
state/district levels
• Train medical and other health personnel
• List the laboratories at regional /state/district levels
• List the hospitals (government/private/NGO) with level and type of
services available in the area
92. Preparedness for Prevention and Control
for Future Outbreaks
• List “high-risk” pockets in the rural / urban areas
• Establish a rapid communication network
• Undertake IEC activities for community participation
• Ensure that essential supplies are available at the peripheral health
facilities and buffer stocks are maintained at the district level
• Set-up an inter-departmental committee, including Non-Government
Organizations (NGOs) for inter-sectoral coordination
93. The reality….
Info:
Outbreak
suspected
time
Confirmation
Confirm Diagnosis
Form Outbreak
Control Team
Site visit
Case definition
Organize Data
Descripitve
Epidemiology
Line list
Recommendations
Analytic
Epidemiology
Control measures
Report
Publication
95. General framework of an outbreak
investigation report
1. Executive summary
< one page or < 300 words
Structure with subheadings
2. Background
Territory, origin of the alert, time of occurrence, places, official staff met
3. Methods used for the investigation
Epidemiological methods
• Case definition
• Case search methods, data collection
• Analytical studies if any
• Data analysis
Laboratory methods
Environmental investigations
96. General framework of an outbreak
investigation report
4. Major observations / results
Epidemiological results (population at risk, time, place and person characteristics)
laboratory diagnosis
Environmental investigation results
Current status of transmission, control measures adopted/ initiated
5. Conclusion: Genesis of outbreak (Diagnosis, source, vehicles)
6. Recommendations
97. Annexes of the report
1. TIME: Epidemic curve
2. PLACE: Map
Spot map
Map of incidence by area
3. PERSON: Table of incidence by age and sex
4. Analytical study results if any
98.
99. Control measures for an outbreak
• General measures
Till source and route of transmission identified
• Specific measures, based upon the results of the investigation
Agent
• Removing the source
Environment
• Interrupting transmission
Host
• Protection (e.g., immunization)
• Case management
100. Specific outbreak control measures
• Waterborne outbreaks
• Access to safe drinking water
• Sanitary disposal of human waste
• Frequent hand washing with soap
• Adopting safe practices in food handling
• Vector borne outbreaks
• Vector control
• Personal protective measures
• Vaccine preventable outbreaks
• Supplies vaccines, syringes and injection equipment
• Human resources to administer vaccine
• Ring immunization when applicable
101. Common Interventions Used to
Control an Epidemic
• Control the source of the pathogen. Remove the source of contamination (e.g., discard
contaminated food), remove persons from exposure (e.g., keep people from being
exposed to mosquito bites to prevent West Nile virus encephalitis), inactivate or
neutralize pathogen (e.g., disinfect and filter contaminated water) and/or treat
infected persons (e.g., treat pregnant patients with AIDS to avoid transmission to the
baby).
• Interrupt the transmission. Sterilize or disinfect environmental sources of
transmission (e.g., milk, water, air), control mosquito or vector transmission using
skin repellents, improve personal sanitation (e.g., washing hands before eating).
• Control or modify the host response to exposure. Immunize the susceptible hosts, use
prophylactic chemotherapy, modify behaviour or use a barrier (e.g., prevent exposure
to mosquito bites by wearing protective clothing and repellents).
102. 3. Monitoring the situation
• Trends in cases and deaths
• Implementation of containment measures
• Stocks of vaccines and drugs
• Logistics
Communication
Vehicles
• Community involvement
• Media response
103. Managerial aspects of outbreak response
• Logistics
Human resources
Medicines
Equipment and supplies
Vehicle and mobility
Communication channels
• Information, education and communication
• Media
Daily update
104. Reports
• Preliminary report by the nodal medical officer (First information
report)
• Daily situation update
• Interim report by the rapid response team
• Final report
105. Points to remember
1. Outbreaks cause suffering, bad publicity and cost resources
2. Constant vigil is needed
3. Prompt timely action limits damage
4. Emphasis is on saving lives
5. Don’t diagnose every case once the etiology is clear
6. Management of linked cases does not require confirmation
7. The development of an outbreak is followed on a daily basis
8. Effective communication prevents rumours
9. Use one single designated spoke person
10. Learn lessons after the outbreak is over
Notas del editor
The take home message is: There is no formal difference. You are the one who decide how much importance you want to give to the event.
If you are having lots of measles and none wants to help, call it a major epidemic.
If it is a cluster well under controlled that the press is blowing out of proportion, call it a small outbreak
WHO SHOULD RESPOND TO AN OUTBREAK
At the PHC and CHC level, the MO of the concerned institution will be the nodal officer who will respond to an outbreak. At the district, the Corporation, the State and the Central level special Rapid Response Teams need to be formed whose prime responsibility is to investigate outbreaks. If an outbreak is suspected, the local health team should verify the same. Once this is done and if there is a need to investigate, the RRT should take over and do the needful.
Triggers :There are triggers for each condition under surveillance, Various trigger levels may lead to local or broader response
Tables in the operation manual propose standardized actions to take following various triggers.
Threshold for diseases under surveillance that trigger pre-determined actions at various levels
Based upon the number of cases in weekly report
Trigger levels depend on:
Type of disease
Case fatality (Death / case ratio)
Number of evolving cases
Usual trend in the region
CHOLERA: If a single suspect case is confirmed
MEASLES: If a single suspect case is confirmed.
DENGUE/ DHF/ DSS: If a suspect case is confirmed.
JAPANESE ENCEPHALITIS: If a single suspect case is confirmed.
VIRAL HEPATITIS: If the number of new cases exceeds the upper limit of cases seen in a previous non-epidemic period in previous years.
DYSENTERY: If a single suspect case is confirmed
ACUTE DIARRHOEAL DISEASES: If the number of new cases exceeds the upper limit of cases seen in a previous non-epidemic period in previous years.
MALARIA: If the number of new cases exceeds the upper limit of cases seen in a previous non-epidemic period in previous years.
To arrive at provisional diagnosis, “Syndromic Presentation” of some of the common epidemic-prone communicable diseases are placed at Annexures-2 to 8.
Not always necessary to confirm all the cases
but confirm a proportion
throughout the outbreak
Whatever your criteria, you must apply them consistently and without bias to all of the people included in the investigation.
Ideally, your case definition should be broad enough to include most, if not all, of the actual cases, without capturing what are called "false-positive" cases (when the case definition is met, but the person actually does not have the disease in question). Recognizing the uncertainty of some diagnoses, investigators often classify cases as "confirmed," " probable," or "possible."
To be classified as confirmed, a case usually must have laboratory verification. A case classified as probable usually has the typical clinical features of the disease without laboratory confirmation. A possible case usually has fewer of the typical clinical features. Early in an investigation, a loose case definition that includes confirmed, probable, and even possible cases is often used to allow investigators to capture as many cases as possible. Later on, when hypotheses have come into sharper focus, the investigator may tighten the case definition by dropping the "possible" category
Some will turn out to be true outbreaks with a common cause, some will be unrelated cases of the same disease, and others will turn out to be unrelated cases of similar but unrelated diseases.
Even if the outbreak is suspected from the routine surveillance data, it must be verified (lest it may be a data entry error). The fastest way to verify is to contact the MO nearest to the location of the outbreak and request him/her for confirmation. This may be done telephonically or
through a special messenger. The MO should check
• if there is an abnormal increase in the number of cases or
• if there is a clustering of cases or
• if the cases are Epidemiologically linked or
• if some trigger events have occurred (see above) or
• if many deaths have occurred
If there is evidence of an outbreak, and if the etiology, the source and the route of
transmission is known, then the specific control measures need to be immediately
instituted. If however, any one of the above is unknown, then the outbreak must be
investigated to identify the specific cause. The RRT should be alerted and requested
to investigate the outbreak. At the same time, general control measures should be
instituted.
Whether or not you should investigate an apparent problem further is not strictly tied to your verifying that an epidemic exists (that is, that the observed number is greater than the number expected). As noted earlier, other factors may come into play, including, for example, the severity of the illness, the potential for spread, political considerations, public relations, and the availability of resources.
The history will include questions that will identify the possible source, routes of transmission and contacts. He will also review the case management (as per the recommended protocol) and recommend suitable amendments to the therapy if required
Establish a Case Definition
standard set of criteria for the health condition
clinical criteria (signs and symptoms)
restrictions by time, place and person
apply without bias
NOTE: Never include the EXPOSURE or RISK
FACTOR in the case definition!
usually base the units of time on the incubation period of the disease (if known) and the length of time over which cases are distributed. As a rule of thumb, select a unit that is one-fourth to one-third as long as the incubation period. Thus, for an outbreak of Clostridium perfringens food poisoning (usual incubation period 10-12 hours), with cases during a period of only a few days, you could use an x-axis unit of 2 or 3 hours. Unfortunately, there will be times when you do not know the specific disease and/or its incubation period. In that circumstance, it is useful to draw several epidemic curves, using different units on the x-axes, to find one that seems to show the data best. Finally, show the pre- and post-epidemic period on your graph to illustrate the activity of the disease during those periods.
Cases that stand apart (called "outliers") All outliers are worth examining carefully because if they are part of the outbreak, their unusual exposures may point directly to the source. For a disease with a human host such as hepatitis A, for instance, one of the early cases may be in a food handler who is the source of the epidemic.
Sporadic occurrence continued in the month of september indicating that hepatitis has established its roots as endemic disease.
If the size of the overall population varies between the areas you are comparing, a spot map, because it shows numbers of cases, can be misleading. This is a weakness of spot maps. In such instances, you should show the proportion of people affected in each area (which would also represent the rate of disease or, in the setting of an outbreak, the "attack rate").
68
The hypotheses should address the source of the agent, the mode (vehicle or vector) of transmission, and the exposures that caused the disease. Also, the hypotheses should be proposed in a way that can be tested.
If the epidemic continues unabated then the Hypothesis
would have to be reviewed. In such cases analytical studies like a case control
study might have to be conducted to confirm the hypothesis. The decision to investigate further or to institute control measures are dependent on whether the source and the transmission are known or not.
For example, in a large community outbreak of botulism in Illinois, investigators used three sequential case-control studies to identify the vehicle. In the first study, investigators compared exposures of case-patients and controls from the general public and implicated a restaurant. In a second study, they compared the menu items eaten by the case-patients with those eaten by healthy restaurant patrons and identified a specific menu item, a meat and cheese sandwich. In a third study, appeals were broadcast over radio to identify healthy restaurant patrons who had eaten the sandwich. It turned out that controls were less likely than case-patients to have eaten the onions that came with the sandwich. Type A Clostridium botulinum was then identified from a pan of leftover sautéed onions used only to make that particular sandwich
The RRT will submit an interim report within one week of starting their investigation,
response and control activities. The report should cover verification of the outbreak,
total number of affected cases/ deaths, time, person, place analysis, management of
the patients, likely suspected source, immediate control measures implemented, etc.
The report will include reports by the physician and microbiologist, and entomologist
(where applicable). The lab results received during that period, environmental factors,
etc. It will also have a provisional hypothesis of the causation of the outbreak and
comments/recommendations, if any, including whether any further outside help is
necessary.
The RRT will submit an interim report within one week of starting their investigation,
response and control activities. The report should cover verification of the outbreak,
total number of affected cases/ deaths, time, person, place analysis, management of
the patients, likely suspected source, immediate control measures implemented, etc.
The report will include reports by the physician and microbiologist, and entomologist
(where applicable). The lab results received during that period, environmental factors,
etc. It will also have a provisional hypothesis of the causation of the outbreak and
comments/recommendations, if any, including whether any further outside help is
necessary.
Final report:
Within 10 days after the outbreak has ceased, a final outbreak investigation report
must be submitted by the local health authorities. This report must be comprehensive
and give a complete picture of the multi-factorial causes of the outbreak, the
precipitating factors, the evolution of the epidemic, description of the persons affected, time trends, areas affected and direction of spread of the epidemic. It should have complete details of lab results including regional lab (cross verification and strain identification), confirmation of the provisional diagnosis and other relevant information.
It is important that feedback from the report is shared with the lower levels and also
other districts. Publication in a journal will ensure wider circulation of the lessons learnt.