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@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
CONTENT SECURITY POLICIES
LET’S BREAK STUFF
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
BECAUSE YOU ALL TOTALLY CARE ABOUT THIS, RIGHT?!
ABOUT ME
▸ Senior Software Engineer at Viva IT

(those folks in orange hoodies at some conferences &
events you may have been to)
▸ @Brunty
▸ @PHPem
▸ mfyu.co.uk
▸ matt@mfyu.co.uk
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
BLAH BLAH… JUST GET ON WITH THE TALK
THINGS I DO
▸ Dungeon master for D&D campaigns
▸ Mentor, lead & teach apprentices and junior developers
▸ Run & organise PHP East Midlands
▸ Speak at user groups and conferences
▸ Break production sites with incorrectly configured
content security policies
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
OH GOOD, FINALLY WE’RE GETTING STARTED
A TALK IN 3 PARTS
▸ XSS

▸ CSP

▸ Break stuff

@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
THE SCARY STUFF
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
FIRST, SOME BACKGROUND
WHAT IS CROSS-SITE-SCRIPTING (XSS)?
▸ XSS enables an attacker to inject client-side scripts into
non-malicious web pages viewed by other users
▸ In 2016 there was a 61% likelihood of a browser-based
vulnerability being found in a web application
▸ Of those browser based vulnerabilities, 86% were found to
be XSS related
▸ That’s just over 52% of all web application vulnerabilities

https://www.edgescan.com/assets/docs/reports/2016-edgescan-stats-report.pdf
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
I MEAN, IT’S JUST A JOKE VULNERABILITY, RIGHT?!
WHAT CAN BE DONE WITH XSS?
▸ Put pictures of cats in web pages
▸ alert(‘💩’);
▸ Rickroll a user
▸ Twitter self-retweeting tweet

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zv0kZKC6GAM
▸ Samy worm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samy_(computer_worm)
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
WELL… IT’S NOT A JOKE VULNERABILITY
WHAT CAN BE DONE WITH XSS?
▸ Make modifications to the DOM - replace a form action to
point to your own script to capture credentials.
▸ Use XMLHttpRequest to send HTTP requests and load in
additional resources
▸ Access HTML5 APIs - webcam, microphone, geolocation
▸ Steal cookies (and therefore steal session cookies)
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
IT’S REALLY NOT A JOKE VULNERABILITY
WHAT CAN BE DONE WITH XSS?
https://www.wired.com/2008/03/hackers-assault-epilepsy-patients-via-computer/
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
TYPES OF XSS ATTACK
STORED XSS (AKA PERSISTENT OR TYPE I)
▸ Occurs when input is stored - generally in a server-side
database, but not always
▸ This could also be within a HTML5 database, thus never
being sent to the server at all
▸ who.is was a site Rickrolled by a TXT record in the DNS of
a website (yes, really)
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
TYPES OF XSS ATTACK
REFLECTED XSS (AKA NON-PERSISTENT OR TYPE II)
▸ Occurs when user input provided in the request is
immediately returned - such as in an error message, search
string etc
▸ Data is not stored, and in some instances, may not even
reach the server (see the next type of XSS)
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
TYPES OF XSS ATTACK
DOM-BASED XSS (AKA TYPE-0)
▸ The entire flow of the attack takes place within the browser
▸ For example, if JavaScript in the site takes input, and uses
something like document.write based on that input, it can
be vulnerable to a DOM-based XSS attack
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
TYPES OF XSS ATTACK
SELF XSS
▸ Social-engineering form of XSS
▸ Requires the user to execute code in the browser
▸ Doing so via the console can’t be protected by a lot of
methods
▸ Not considered a ‘true’ XSS attack due to requiring the
user to execute the code
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
STOP THE HACKERS
LET’S FIGHT BACK
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
HTTP RESPONSE HEADER TO
HELP REDUCE XSS RISKS
WHAT IS A CSP?
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
DECLARES WHAT RESOURCES
ARE ALLOWED TO LOAD
HOW DOES A CSP WORK?
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
BROWSER
SUPPORT
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
CSP TO THE RESCUE!
WHAT CAN WE PROTECT?
▸ default-src
▸ script-src
▸ style-src
▸ img-src
▸ form-action
▸ update-insecure-requests
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
FULL REFERENCE:https://content-security-policy.com

https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
img-src *
ALLOWS ANY URL EXCEPT DATA:
BLOB: FILESYSTEM: SCHEMES.
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
object-src 'none'
DON’T LOAD RESOURCES FROM
ANY SOURCE
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
style-src ‘self'
ALLOW LOADING FROM SAME
SCHEME, HOST AND PORT
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
script-src 'unsafe-inline'
ALLOWS USE OF INLINE SOURCE
ELEMENTS SUCH AS STYLE
ATTRIBUTE, ONCLICK, OR SCRIPT
TAG BODIES
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
DON’T USE
UNSAFE-INLINE
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
<script nonce="$RANDOM">...</script>
script-src 'self' 'nonce-$RANDOM'
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; script-src
'self' https://*.google.com 'nonce-random123'; style-src
'self'; img-src 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests; form-
action 'self';
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
I BROKE PRODUCTION WITH A
BAD CSP
LEARN FROM MY MISTAKES
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
DON’T DO WHAT I
DID
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
REPORT-URI
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
WHEN A POLICY FAILURE
OCCURS, THE BROWSER SENDS
A JSON PAYLOAD TO THAT URL
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
{
"csp-report": {
"blocked-uri": "self",
"document-uri": "https://mysite.com",
"line-number": 1,
"original-policy": "script-src 'self'",
"script-sample": "try { for(var lastpass_iter=0; lastpass...",
"source-file": "https://mysite.com",
"violated-directive": "script-src 'self'"
}
}
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
REPORT-URI.IO
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
REPORT-ONLY
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: [policy]; report-
uri https://app.report-uri.io/r/default/csp/reportOnly;
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
TRIAL STUFF
BEFORE ENFORCING
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
THERE WILL BE NOISE,
LOTS OF NOISE
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
WAYS TO MAKE DEALING WITH A CSP EASIER
TIPS
▸ Have an easy and quick way to disable the CSP in
production if required
▸ Better yet, have a way to switch it from enforced to report
only so you can get violations reported to help you debug
▸ Add the CSP at an application level if you need a nonce
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
WAYS TO REMOVE BARRIERS IN DEVELOPMENT
NONCES
▸ Don’t generate multiple nonces in the same request (but
do generate a new nonce on each separate request)
▸ If using a templating engine (such as twig) - add the nonce
as a global so it’s available in every template by default
▸ Write a helper to generate tags with a nonce if it’s
available
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
DEMO TIME!
LET’S BREAK STUFF
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
@SCOTT_HELME
(HE KNOWS HIS STUFF!)
(THIS ISN’T ME)
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
HOMEWORK TIME!
LINKS & FURTHER READING
▸ https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-site_Scripting_(XSS)
▸ https://content-security-policy.com
▸ https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy
▸ https://report-uri.io
▸ https://scotthelme.co.uk/just-how-much-traffic-can-you-generate-using-csp/
▸ https://www.edgescan.com/assets/docs/reports/2016-edgescan-stats-report.pdf
▸ http://theharmonyguy.com/oldsite/2011/04/21/recent-facebook-xss-attacks-show-
increasing-sophistication/
▸ https://github.com/Brunty/csp-demo
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
THANK YOU
@BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff
QUESTIONS?
@BRUNTY
@PHPEM
MFYU.CO.UK
MATT@MFYU.CO.UK

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Content Security Policies: Let's Break Stuff @ PHP London, Sept 2017

  • 1. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff CONTENT SECURITY POLICIES LET’S BREAK STUFF
  • 2. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff BECAUSE YOU ALL TOTALLY CARE ABOUT THIS, RIGHT?! ABOUT ME ▸ Senior Software Engineer at Viva IT
 (those folks in orange hoodies at some conferences & events you may have been to) ▸ @Brunty ▸ @PHPem ▸ mfyu.co.uk ▸ matt@mfyu.co.uk
  • 3. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff BLAH BLAH… JUST GET ON WITH THE TALK THINGS I DO ▸ Dungeon master for D&D campaigns ▸ Mentor, lead & teach apprentices and junior developers ▸ Run & organise PHP East Midlands ▸ Speak at user groups and conferences ▸ Break production sites with incorrectly configured content security policies
  • 4. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff OH GOOD, FINALLY WE’RE GETTING STARTED A TALK IN 3 PARTS ▸ XSS
 ▸ CSP
 ▸ Break stuff

  • 5. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff THE SCARY STUFF
  • 6. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff FIRST, SOME BACKGROUND WHAT IS CROSS-SITE-SCRIPTING (XSS)? ▸ XSS enables an attacker to inject client-side scripts into non-malicious web pages viewed by other users ▸ In 2016 there was a 61% likelihood of a browser-based vulnerability being found in a web application ▸ Of those browser based vulnerabilities, 86% were found to be XSS related ▸ That’s just over 52% of all web application vulnerabilities
 https://www.edgescan.com/assets/docs/reports/2016-edgescan-stats-report.pdf
  • 7. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff I MEAN, IT’S JUST A JOKE VULNERABILITY, RIGHT?! WHAT CAN BE DONE WITH XSS? ▸ Put pictures of cats in web pages ▸ alert(‘💩’); ▸ Rickroll a user ▸ Twitter self-retweeting tweet
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zv0kZKC6GAM ▸ Samy worm
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samy_(computer_worm)
  • 8. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff WELL… IT’S NOT A JOKE VULNERABILITY WHAT CAN BE DONE WITH XSS? ▸ Make modifications to the DOM - replace a form action to point to your own script to capture credentials. ▸ Use XMLHttpRequest to send HTTP requests and load in additional resources ▸ Access HTML5 APIs - webcam, microphone, geolocation ▸ Steal cookies (and therefore steal session cookies)
  • 10. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff IT’S REALLY NOT A JOKE VULNERABILITY WHAT CAN BE DONE WITH XSS? https://www.wired.com/2008/03/hackers-assault-epilepsy-patients-via-computer/
  • 11. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff TYPES OF XSS ATTACK STORED XSS (AKA PERSISTENT OR TYPE I) ▸ Occurs when input is stored - generally in a server-side database, but not always ▸ This could also be within a HTML5 database, thus never being sent to the server at all ▸ who.is was a site Rickrolled by a TXT record in the DNS of a website (yes, really)
  • 12. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff TYPES OF XSS ATTACK REFLECTED XSS (AKA NON-PERSISTENT OR TYPE II) ▸ Occurs when user input provided in the request is immediately returned - such as in an error message, search string etc ▸ Data is not stored, and in some instances, may not even reach the server (see the next type of XSS)
  • 13. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff TYPES OF XSS ATTACK DOM-BASED XSS (AKA TYPE-0) ▸ The entire flow of the attack takes place within the browser ▸ For example, if JavaScript in the site takes input, and uses something like document.write based on that input, it can be vulnerable to a DOM-based XSS attack
  • 14. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff TYPES OF XSS ATTACK SELF XSS ▸ Social-engineering form of XSS ▸ Requires the user to execute code in the browser ▸ Doing so via the console can’t be protected by a lot of methods ▸ Not considered a ‘true’ XSS attack due to requiring the user to execute the code
  • 16. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff STOP THE HACKERS LET’S FIGHT BACK
  • 17. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff HTTP RESPONSE HEADER TO HELP REDUCE XSS RISKS WHAT IS A CSP?
  • 18. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff DECLARES WHAT RESOURCES ARE ALLOWED TO LOAD HOW DOES A CSP WORK?
  • 19. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff BROWSER SUPPORT
  • 21. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff CSP TO THE RESCUE! WHAT CAN WE PROTECT? ▸ default-src ▸ script-src ▸ style-src ▸ img-src ▸ form-action ▸ update-insecure-requests
  • 22. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff FULL REFERENCE:https://content-security-policy.com
 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy
  • 23. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff img-src * ALLOWS ANY URL EXCEPT DATA: BLOB: FILESYSTEM: SCHEMES.
  • 24. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff object-src 'none' DON’T LOAD RESOURCES FROM ANY SOURCE
  • 25. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff style-src ‘self' ALLOW LOADING FROM SAME SCHEME, HOST AND PORT
  • 26. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff script-src 'unsafe-inline' ALLOWS USE OF INLINE SOURCE ELEMENTS SUCH AS STYLE ATTRIBUTE, ONCLICK, OR SCRIPT TAG BODIES
  • 27. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff DON’T USE UNSAFE-INLINE
  • 28. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff <script nonce="$RANDOM">...</script> script-src 'self' 'nonce-$RANDOM'
  • 29. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; script-src 'self' https://*.google.com 'nonce-random123'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests; form- action 'self';
  • 30. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff I BROKE PRODUCTION WITH A BAD CSP LEARN FROM MY MISTAKES
  • 31. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff DON’T DO WHAT I DID
  • 32. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff REPORT-URI
  • 33. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff WHEN A POLICY FAILURE OCCURS, THE BROWSER SENDS A JSON PAYLOAD TO THAT URL
  • 34. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff { "csp-report": { "blocked-uri": "self", "document-uri": "https://mysite.com", "line-number": 1, "original-policy": "script-src 'self'", "script-sample": "try { for(var lastpass_iter=0; lastpass...", "source-file": "https://mysite.com", "violated-directive": "script-src 'self'" } }
  • 35. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff REPORT-URI.IO
  • 37. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff REPORT-ONLY
  • 38. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: [policy]; report- uri https://app.report-uri.io/r/default/csp/reportOnly;
  • 39. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff TRIAL STUFF BEFORE ENFORCING
  • 40. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff THERE WILL BE NOISE, LOTS OF NOISE
  • 41. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff WAYS TO MAKE DEALING WITH A CSP EASIER TIPS ▸ Have an easy and quick way to disable the CSP in production if required ▸ Better yet, have a way to switch it from enforced to report only so you can get violations reported to help you debug ▸ Add the CSP at an application level if you need a nonce
  • 42. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff WAYS TO REMOVE BARRIERS IN DEVELOPMENT NONCES ▸ Don’t generate multiple nonces in the same request (but do generate a new nonce on each separate request) ▸ If using a templating engine (such as twig) - add the nonce as a global so it’s available in every template by default ▸ Write a helper to generate tags with a nonce if it’s available
  • 43. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff DEMO TIME! LET’S BREAK STUFF
  • 44. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff @SCOTT_HELME (HE KNOWS HIS STUFF!) (THIS ISN’T ME)
  • 45. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff HOMEWORK TIME! LINKS & FURTHER READING ▸ https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-site_Scripting_(XSS) ▸ https://content-security-policy.com ▸ https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy ▸ https://report-uri.io ▸ https://scotthelme.co.uk/just-how-much-traffic-can-you-generate-using-csp/ ▸ https://www.edgescan.com/assets/docs/reports/2016-edgescan-stats-report.pdf ▸ http://theharmonyguy.com/oldsite/2011/04/21/recent-facebook-xss-attacks-show- increasing-sophistication/ ▸ https://github.com/Brunty/csp-demo
  • 46. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff THANK YOU
  • 47. @BruntyCSP: Let’s Break Stuff QUESTIONS? @BRUNTY @PHPEM MFYU.CO.UK MATT@MFYU.CO.UK