Presentation by Ruth Meinzen-Dick at “Commons Tenure for a Common Future” Discussion Forum on the first day of the Global Landscapes Forum 2015, in Paris, France alongside COP21. For more information go to: www.landscapes.org.
Training Of Trainers FAI Eng. Basel Tilapia Welfare.pdf
Commons tenure for a common future
1. Commons Tenure for a
Common Future
Ruth Meinzen-Dick
Collection Action and Property Rights (CAPRi) Research Program
Environment, Production, Technology Division
International Food Policy Research Institute
3. Importance of the Commons
• Whole landscapes or mosaics
• Livelihoods of the poor, women, pastoralists,
fishers, forest-dependent communities
– Fuel, fodder, medicines etc.
– Often not marketed, not counted
• Environmental services: carbon, water, soils,
biodiversity, pollenation
7. Secure Commons Tenure Requires
• External recognition
– Collective tenure less likely to have state recognition, so
more susceptible to “land grabs”
• Internal regulation
– Provision rules: who needs to contribute what
– Extraction rules: who can use what resources, when and
how
– Knowledge of the resource
– Knowledge of the rules, monitoring, sanctioning
– Involvement of the users in setting rules
8. Further Resources
• Resources, Rights and Cooperation: A Sourcebook on Pro
• The
six "ins" of climate-smart agriculture: Inclusive institution
insurance
• This
land is our land: Perspectives on land access and
restoration at the Global Landscapes Forum in Paris
www.CAPRi.cgiar.org
Notas del editor
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This is a framework that we use in CAPRi to identify the role of property rights and collective action in natural resource management.
The main axes of the box are space and time, and we see that different natural resource management practices fall at different space and time coordinates. Depending on where they fall along time and space, different kinds of property rights and coordination are necessary to motivate the practice.
Let me explain. Conventional on-farm technologies like new seeds (high yielding varieties) have a short, usually seasonal, time horizon.
They can be adopted by a single farmer—even by a tenant. Property rights and coordination impact this adoption less.
In contrast, other technologies may require longer time horizons between adoption and payoff. In those situations, farmers need secure tenure (property rights) to have the incentive and authority to adopt. For example, tenants are often not allowed to plant trees, or lack incentives to build terracing.
This figure also shows that time and property rights are correlated, as are spatial scale and coordination. However, there at larger spatial scales, collective action is often replaced by state actors.
Markets are also possible as coordination mechanism
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What do we mean by property rights and collective action? Does this mean…
Is that all we need?
Not Quite!
There is more to collective action than formal organizations
There is more to property rights than formal land titles and ownership issued by the government
What we do need is a better understanding of each of these institutions
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Property rights are not the same thing as land title because property rights function for many kinds of resources in addition to land, does not only look like a formal, government-issued claim, and can dictate a whole range of rights, beyond “ownership” or the sole authority to use a resource. Rather, it can be thought of as access to a “benefit stream” – from this picture, could be just walking through a forest or harvesting firewood from a common property forest. This graphic depicts the concept of “bundle of rights” and highlights the two main categories of property rights: 1) user rights and 2) control/decision-making rights.
As you can see from this graphic, different actors can hold overlapping rights to a resource over time and space. And it’s also important to note that who enforces the claim is not necessarily the state – could also be communities or other collective action institutions.
PR for incentives and ability to manage resources
Rights do not necessarily imply full ownership or the sole authority to use or dispose of a resource. Different individuals, families, groups, or even the state often hold overlapping use and decision-making rights. To be secure, rights should be of sufficient duration to allow one to reap the rewards of investment and should be backed by an effective, socially sanctioned enforcement institution. This institution is not always the government; communities or other institutions may provide the backing.
Legal pluralism – many sources of rights. Legal frameworks do not exist in isolation but influence each other
Can be defined as “the capacity to call upon the collective to stand behind one’s claim to a benefit stream,” according to Bromley (1991).
Withdraw (non-economic) – exploit (economic)
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