2. Increased likelihood of positive outcomes
among adults with higher literacy skills
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
Being
Employed
High wages Good to
excellent
health
Participation
in volunteer
activities
High levels of
political
efficacy
High levels of
trust
United States
2
(scoring at Level 4/5 compared with those scoring at Level 1 or below)
Odds ratio
3. 3 PISA in brief
• Over half a million students…
– representing 28 million 15-year-olds in 65 countries/economies
… took an internationally agreed 2-hour test…
– Goes beyond testing whether students can
reproduce what they were taught…
… to assess students’ capacity to extrapolate from what they know
and creatively apply their knowledge in novel situations
– Mathematics, reading, science, problem-solving, financial literacy
– Total of 390 minutes of assessment material
… and responded to questions on…
– their personal background, their schools
and their engagement with learning and school
• Parents, principals and system leaders provided data on…
– school policies, practices, resources and institutional factors that
help explain performance differences .
4. What do 15-year-olds know…
…and what can they do with what they know?
Mathematics (2012)
4
Each year OECD countries spend 200bn$ on math education in school
5. Singapore
Hong Kong-ChinaChinese Taipei
Korea
Macao-China
Japan Liechtenstein
Switzerland
Netherlands
Estonia Finland
Canada
Poland
Belgium
Germany Viet Nam
Austria Australia
IrelandSlovenia
DenmarkNew Zealand
Czech Republic France
United Kingdom
Iceland
LatviaLuxembourg Norway
Portugal ItalySpain
Russian Fed.Slovak Republic United States
LithuaniaSwedenHungary
Croatia
Israel
Greece
SerbiaTurkey
Romania
Bulgaria
U.A.E.
Kazakhstan
Thailand
Chile Malaysia
Mexico
410
420
430
440
450
460
470
480
490
500
510
520
530
540
550
560
570
580
Mean score
High mathematics performance
Low mathematics performance
… Shanghai-China performs above this line (613)
… 12 countries perform below this line
Average performance
of 15-year-olds in
Mathematics
Fig I.2.13
US
Massachusetts
Connecticut
Florida
26% of American 15-year-olds
do not reach PISA Level 2
(OECD average 23%, Shanghai
4%, Japan 11%, Canada 14%, Some
estimate long-term economic cost to be US$72
trillion )
6. Socially equitable
distribution of learning
opportunities
High mathematics performance
Low mathematics performance
Average performance
of 15-year-olds in
mathematics
Strong socio-economic
impact on student
performance
Singapore
Hong Kong-ChinaChinese Taipei
Korea
Macao-China
Japan Liechtenstein
Switzerland
Netherlands
Estonia Finland
Canada
Poland
Belgium
Germany Viet Nam
Austria Australia
IrelandSlovenia
DenmarkNew Zealand
Czech Republic France
United Kingdom
Iceland
LatviaLuxembourg Norway
Portugal ItalySpain
Russian Fed.Slovak Republic United States
LithuaniaSwedenHungary
Croatia
Israel
Greece
SerbiaTurkey
Romania
Bulgaria
U.A.E.
Kazakhstan
Thailand
Chile Malaysia
Mexico
13. 1515 Fostering resilience
The country where students go to class matters
more than what social class students come from
14. 1616
PISA mathematics performance
by decile of social background
300325350375400425450475500525550575600625650675
Mexico
Chile
Greece
Norway
Sweden
Iceland
Israel
Italy
UnitedStates
Spain
Denmark
Luxembourg
Australia
Ireland
UnitedKingdom
Hungary
Canada
Finland
Austria
Turkey
Liechtenstein
CzechRepublic
Estonia
Portugal
Slovenia
SlovakRepublic
NewZealand
Germany
Netherlands
France
Switzerland
Poland
Belgium
Japan
Macao-China
HongKong-China
Korea
Singapore
ChineseTaipei
Shanghai-China
Source: PISA 2012
15. It is not just about poor kids
in poor neighbourhoods…
…but about many kids in many neighbourhoods
18
17. 2121Lessonsfromhighperformers
Catching up with the top-performers
Low impact on outcomes
High impact on outcomes
Low feasibility High feasibility
Money pits
Must haves
Low hanging fruits
Quick wins
18. 2222Lessonsfromhighperformers
Low impact on outcomes
High impact on outcomes
Low feasibility High feasibility
Money pits
Must haves
Low hanging fruits
Quick wins
Commitment to universal achievement
Gateways, instructional
systems
Capacity
at point of delivery
Incentive structures and
accountability
Resources
where they yield most
A learning system
Coherence
19. 2323Lessonsfromhighperformers
Low impact on outcomes
High impact on outcomes
Low feasibility High feasibility
Money pits
Must haves
Low hanging fruits
Quick wins
Commitment to universal achievement
Gateways, instructional
systems
Capacity
at point of delivery
Incentive structures and
accountability
Resources
where they yield most
A learning system
Coherence
A commitment to education and the belief that
competencies can be learned and therefore all
children can achieve
Universal educational standards and personalization as
the approach to heterogeneity in the student body…
… as opposed to a belief that students have different
destinations to be met with different expectations, and
selection/stratification as the approach to
heterogeneity
Clear articulation who is responsible for ensuring
student success and to whom
20. United States
Poland
Hong Kong-China
Brazil
New Zealand
Greece
Uruguay
United Kingdom
Estonia
Finland
Albania
Croatia
Latvia
Slovak Republic
Luxembourg
Germany
Lithuania
Austria
Czech Republic
Chinese Taipei
France
Thailand
Japan
Turkey Sweden
Hungary
Australia
Israel
Canada
IrelandBulgaria
Jordan
Chile
Macao-China
U.A.E.
Belgium
Netherlands
Spain
Argentina
Indonesia
Denmark
Kazakhstan
Peru
Costa Rica
Switzerland
Montenegro
Tunisia
Iceland
Slovenia
Qatar
Singapore
Portugal
Norway
Colombia
Malaysia
Mexico
Liechtenstein
Korea
Serbia
Russian Fed.
Romania
Viet Nam
Italy
Shanghai-China
R² = 0.36
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
-0.60 -0.40 -0.20 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20
Meanmathematicsperformance
Mean index of mathematics self-efficacy
OECDaverage
Countries where students have stronger beliefs
in their abilities perform better in mathematics24 Fig III.4.5
21. Perceived self-responsibility for failure
in mathematics
Percentage of students who reported "agree" or "strongly agree" with the following statements:
0 20 40 60 80 100
I’m not very good at solving mathematics
problems
My teacher did not explain the concepts well
this week
This week I made bad guesses on the quiz
Sometimes the course material is too hard
The teacher did not get students interested in
the material
Sometimes I am just unlucky
%
France Shanghai-China OECD average
Fig III.3.6
25
US
22. The parent factor
Students whose parents have high educational expectations for
them tend to report more perseverance, greater intrinsic
motivation to learn mathematics, and more confidence in their
own ability to solve mathematics problems than students of
similar background and academic performance, whose parents
hold less ambitious expectations for them.
26
24. 2828Lessonsfromhighperformers
Low impact on outcomes
High impact on outcomes
Low feasibility High feasibility
Money pits
Must haves
Low hanging fruits
Quick wins
Commitment to universal achievement
Gateways, instructional
systems
Capacity
at point of delivery
Incentive structures and
accountability
Resources
where they yield most
A learning system
Coherence
Clear ambitious goals that are shared across the
system and aligned with high stakes gateways and
instructional systems
Well established delivery chain through which
curricular goals translate into instructional systems,
instructional practices and student learning (intended,
implemented and achieved)
High level of metacognitive content of instruction …
25. 2929Lessonsfromhighperformers
Low impact on outcomes
High impact on outcomes
Low feasibility High feasibility
Money pits
Must haves
Low hanging fruits
Quick wins
Commitment to universal achievement
Gateways, instructional
systems
Capacity
at point of delivery
Incentive structures and
accountability
Resources
where they yield most
A learning system
Coherence
Capacity at the point of delivery
Attracting, developing and retaining high quality
teachers and school leaders and a work organisation in
which they can use their potential
Instructional leadership and human resource
management in schools
Keeping teaching an attractive profession
System-wide career development …
26. 3030Lessonsfromhighperformers
Low impact on outcomes
High impact on outcomes
Low feasibility High feasibility
Money pits
Must haves
Low hanging fruits
Quick wins
Commitment to universal achievement
Gateways, instructional
systems
Capacity
at point of delivery
Incentive structures and
accountability
Resources
where they yield most
A learning system
Coherence
Incentives, accountability, knowledge management
Aligned incentive structures
For students
How gateways affect the strength, direction, clarity and nature of the
incentives operating on students at each stage of their education
Degree to which students have incentives to take tough courses and study hard
Opportunity costs for staying in school and performing well
For teachers
Make innovations in pedagogy and/or organisation
Improve their own performance
and the performance of their colleagues
Pursue professional development opportunities
that lead to stronger pedagogical practices
A balance between vertical and lateral accountability
Effective instruments to manage and share knowledge and spread
innovation – communication within the system and with
stakeholders around it
A capable centre with authority and legitimacy to act
27. 3131Lessonsfromhighperformers
Hong Kong-China
Brazil
Uruguay
Albania
Croatia
Latvia
Lithuania
Chinese Taipei
ThailandBulgaria
Jordan
Macao-China
UAE Argentina
Indonesia
Kazakhstan
Peru
Costa Rica
Tunisia
Qatar
Singapore
Colombia
Malaysia
Serbia
Romania
Viet Nam
Shanghai-China
USA
Poland
New Zealand
Greece
UK
Estonia
Finland
Slovak Rep.
Luxembourg
Germany
Austria
Czech Rep.
France
Japan
Turkey
Sweden
Hungary
Australia
Israel
Canada
Chile
Belgium
Netherlands
Spain
Denmark
Switzerland
Iceland
Slovenia
Portugal
Norway
Korea
Italy
R² = 0.13
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
-1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
Mathematicsperformance(scorepoints)
Index of school responsibility for curriculum and assessment
(index points)
Countries that grant schools autonomy over curricula and
assessments tend to perform better in mathematics
Fig IV.1.15
28. No standardised
math policy
Standardised math
policy455
460
465
470
475
480
485
Less school autonomy
More school autonomy
Schools with more autonomy perform better than schools with
less autonomy in systems with standardised math policies
Score points
School autonomy for curriculum and assessment
x system's extent of implementing a standardised math policy (e.g. curriculum and
instructional materials)
Fig IV.1.16
29. Schools with more autonomy perform better than schools with
less autonomy in systems with more collaboration
Teachers don't participate
in management
Teachers participate in
management455
460
465
470
475
480
485
Less school autonomy
More school autonomy
Score points
School autonomy for resource allocation x System's level of teachers
participating in school management
Across all participating countries and economies
Fig IV.1.17
30. Schools with more autonomy perform better than schools with
less autonomy in systems with more accountability arrangements
School data not public
School data public
464
466
468
470
472
474
476
478
Less school autonomy
More school autonomy
Score points
School autonomy for curriculum and assessment
x system's level of posting achievement data publicly
Fig IV.1.16
31. 0 20 40 60 80 100
Written specification of the school's curriculum and
educational goals
Written specification of student-performance standards
Systematic recording of data, including teacher and
student attendance and graduation rates, test results…
Internal evaluation/self-evaluation
External evaluation
Written feedback from students (e.g. regarding
lessons, teachers or resources)
Teacher mentoring
Regular consultation with one or more experts over a
period of at least six months with the aim of improving…
Implementation of a standardised policy for
mathematics
%
Percentage of students in schools whose principal reported that their schools have the
following for quality assurance and improvement:
Singapore OECD average
Quality assurance and school improvement Fig IV.4.14
35
32. 3636Lessonsfromhighperformers
Low impact on outcomes
High impact on outcomes
Low feasibility High feasibility
Money pits
Must haves
Low hanging fruits
Quick wins
Commitment to universal achievement
Gateways, instructional
systems
Capacity
at point of delivery
Incentive structures and
accountability
Resources
where they yield most
A learning system
Coherence
Investing resources where they can make most
of a difference
Alignment of resources with key challenges (e.g.
attracting the most talented teachers to the most
challenging classrooms)
Effective spending choices that prioritise high quality
teachers over smaller classes
33. 3737 Align the resources with the challenges
Hong Kong-China
Brazil
Uruguay
Croatia
Latvia
Chinese Taipei
Thailand
Bulgaria
Jordan
Macao-China
UAE
Argentina
Indonesia
Kazakhstan
Peru
Costa Rica
Montenegro
Tunisia
Qatar
Singapore
Colombia
Malaysia
Serbia
Romania
Viet Nam
Shanghai-China
USA
Poland
New Zealand
Greece
UK
Estonia
Finland
Slovak Rep.
Luxembourg
Germany
AustriaFrance
Japan
Turkey
Sweden Hungary
Australia
Israel
Canada
Ireland
Chile
Belgium
SpainDenmark
Switzerland
Iceland
Slovenia
Portugal
Norway
Mexico
Korea
Italy
R² = 0.19
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
-0.500.511.5
Mathematicsperformance(scorepoints)
Equity in resource allocation
(index points)
Greater equityLess equity
Adjusted by per capita GDP
Countries with better performance in mathematics tend to
allocate educational resources more equitably
Source: PISA 2012
34. 3838 Adequate resources to address disadvantage
Disadvantaged schools reported
more teacher shortage
Advantaged schools reported
more teacher shortage
-0.5
-0.3
-0.1
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7
0.9
1.1
1.3
1.5
Korea
Estonia
Israel
Latvia
Slovenia
Italy
Poland
Singapore
Argentina
Netherlands
Portugal
Colombia
France
Finland
Tunisia
Macao-China
Spain
Greece
Switzerland
Norway
RussianFed.
Japan
Austria
Montenegro
Croatia
Canada
OECDaverage
Germany
Denmark
Hungary
UnitedKingdom
Luxembourg
HongKong-China
Belgium
Iceland
VietNam
Ireland
UnitedStates
Chile
CzechRepublic
Serbia
Turkey
Mexico
Indonesia
Uruguay
Shanghai-China
SlovakRepublic
Sweden
Brazil
NewZealand
Australia
ChineseTaipei
Meanindexdifference
Difference between socio-economically disadvantaged and socio-economically advantaged schools
A shortage of qualified teachers is more of concern
in disadvantaged schools
36. 4141Lessonsfromhighperformers
Low impact on outcomes
High impact on outcomes
Low feasibility High feasibility
Money pits
Must haves
Low hanging fruits
Quick wins
Commitment to universal achievement
Gateways, instructional
systems
Capacity
at point of delivery
Incentive structures and
accountability
Resources
where they yield most
A learning system
Coherence
Coherence of policies and practices
Alignment of policies
across all aspects of the system
Coherence of policies
over sustained periods of time
Consistency of implementation
Fidelity of implementation
(without excessive control)
37. 4242Lessonsfromhighperformers
Low impact on outcomes
High impact on outcomes
Low feasibility High feasibility
Money pits
Must haves
Low hanging fruits
Quick wins
Commitment to universal achievement
Gateways, instructional
systems
Capacity
at point of delivery
Incentive structures and
accountability
Resources
where they yield most
A learning system
Coherence
38. 4343Lessonsfromhighperformers
Some students learn at high levels All students need to learn at high levels
Student inclusion
Routine cognitive skills, rote learning Learning to learn, complex ways of thinking, ways
of working
Curriculum, instruction and assessment
Few years more than secondary High-level professional knowledge workers
Teacher quality
‘Tayloristic’, hierarchical Flat, collegial
Work organisation
Primarily to authorities Primarily to peers and stakeholders
Accountability
What it all means
The old bureaucratic system The modern enabling system
39. Thank you !
Find out more about PISA at www.pisa.oecd.org
• All national and international publications
• The complete micro-level database
Email: Andreas.Schleicher@OECD.org
Twitter: SchleicherEDU
and remember:
Without data, you are just another person with an opinion
Notas del editor
(2) Here are some results. The first thing we found is that what people know and what they do with what they know has a major impact on their life chances. You see that highly skilled adults are twice as likely to be employed and almost three-times more likely to earn an above-median salary than poorly skilled adults. In short, poor skills severely limit people’s access to better-paying and more-rewarding jobs. Highly skilled people are also more likely to volunteer, and they see themselves as actors rather than as objects of political process. People with better skills are even more likely to trust others, so trust isn’t just about how you were brought up or about the people with whom you live, it closely relates to your skills. And that tells us that we can do something about trust by giving people the right skills. And that’s important, because without trust in public institutions, public support for ambitious and innovative policies is hard to mobilise, particularly where we ask people to make short-term sacrifices for long-term benefits. Without trust, citizens and businesses also avoid taking risks, and delay decisions on investment and innovation that are so important. So in the end, fairness, integrity and inclusiveness in public policy all hinge on the skills of citizens.
The red dot indicates classroom spending per student, relative to the spending capacity of countries, the higher the dot, the more of its GDP a country invests. High salaries are an obvious cost driver. You see Korea paying their teachers very well, the green bar goes up a lot. Korea also has long school days, another cost driver, marked here by the white bar going up. Last but not least, Korea provides their teachers with lots of time for other things than teaching such as teacher collaboration and professional development, which costs money as well. So how does Korea finances all of this? They do this with large classes, the blue bar pulls costs down. If you go to the next country on the list, Luxembourg, you see that the red dot is about where it is for Korea, so Luxembourg spends roughly the same per student as Korea. But parents and teachers in Luxembourg mainly care about small classes, so policy makers have invested mainly into reducing class size, you see the blue bar as the main cost driver. But even Luxembourg can only spend its money once, and the result is that school days are short, teacher salaries are average at best and teachers have little time for anything else than teaching. Finland and the US are a similar contrast.Countries make quite different spending choices. But when you look at this these data long enough, you see that many of the high performing education systems tend to prioritise the quality of teachers over the size of classes.
(Fig. II.4.5)
(Fig. II.4.5)
I want to conclude with what we have learned about successful reform trajectories In the past when you only needed a small slice of well-educated people it was efficient for governments to invest a large sum in a small elite to lead the country. But the social and economic cost of low educational performance has risen substantially and all young people now need to leave school with strong foundation skills.When you could still assume that what you learn in school will last for a lifetime, teaching content and routine cognitive skills was at the centre of education. Today, where you can access content on Google, where routine cognitive skills are being digitised or outsourced, and where jobs are changing rapidly, the focus is on enabling people to become lifelong learners, to manage complex ways of thinking and complex ways of working that computers cannot take over easily.In the past, teachers had sometimes only a few years more education than the students they taught. When teacher quality is so low, governments tend to tell their teachers exactly what to do and exactly how they want it done and they tend to use Tayloristic methods of administrative control and accountability to get the results they want. Today the challenge is to make teaching a profession of high-level knowledge workers. But such people will not work in schools organised as Tayloristic workplaces using administrative forms of accountability and bureaucratic command and control systems to direct their work. To attract the people they need, successful education systems have transformed the form of work organisation in their schools to a professional form of work organisation in which professional norms of control complement bureaucratic and administrative forms of control.