1. Russia's Quest for Devine Security and How the U.S. Should Conduct its Foreign Policy
The interactions among the world's greatest powers create an important dynamic in
foreign affairs. State leaders play a pivotal role in balancing their involvement in international
imperatives and domestic politics, defining their depth of participation. The nature of play
between these powers can implement effective and proactive policy in the world, or it can
completely thwart it. A prime example of this has been the long and evolving relationship
between the East and West, proving both outcomes true in a myriad of different circumstances.
President Vladimir Putin's agenda, for example, arises from his experiences, goals, his beliefs
about the world, and sensitivity to the political context given the history of Russia. While he is
regarded as a power hungry, authoritarian ruler in the international community, his self-
awareness is that he is doing what he deems best for his country. Putin is irrepressibly a man of
circumstance and timing, responding to current affairs in Russia and the global community based
on his country's prior involvements. Given the context of Russia's past experiences, it is easy to
rationalize that the driving force behind Putin's various acts of aggression in the international
community are attributed to his pursuit for national security.
Russia has long been scrambling to attain a stable and desirable level of security that it
feels it is entitled to, holding the status of a superpower and upon Putin's his assumption of
power in 2000, he wasted no time unveiling a more pragmatic approach to Russian foreign
policy. His change of heart in comparison to Yeltsin was particularly visible in his dealings with
the West, as he unapologetically asserted Russia’s interests with increasing tenacity.1
Despite
temporary rapprochement in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, sharp disagreements
had developed between the United States government and Russia on a wide range of important
1
Roberts, Kari. 2014. "Détente 2.0? The Meaning of Russia's 'Reset' with the United States." (International Studies
Perspectives Feb 2014, Vol. 15 Issue 1), 3.

2. Jamros 2
issues including US plans for missile defense in Europe, NATO expansion, external involvement
(both Russian and American) in domestic political developments in several post-Soviet states,
including Georgia and Ukraine, agricultural exports and the Iranian Nuclear Program.2
The
Kremlin has been working through multiple political outlets in the post-cold war era to
strategically reach Russia's ultimate goal of soviet recovery and internal victory. This is being
done in three, interrelated ways: territory acquisition, economics/resources and military. The
manner in which Russia has been conducting its foreign policy in order to reach this point
however is questionable. Overall, Putin has made the process of securing his country's interests a
painful one and in the process, has invoked disapproval from the United States on many grounds
while also attracting much international criticism.
Territory acquisition is one of the most notable modes of conduct that Russia has been
taking advantage of to achieve security. The first instance of seeing this unfold was in 2008
when Georgia was invaded and the United States' relationship with Russia undoubtedly began to
sour. The Russo-Georgian conflict was ignited over the provinces of Ossetia and Abkhazia
which had previously subordinated themselves to Russian authority and declared autonomy from
Georgia,3
however, Georgian President Saakashvili continued to push for complete autonomy for
the provinces within a unified Georgian state.4
The ensuing tensions between Russian separatists
in the region and the unstable Georgian government provided what Putin saw as an invitation to
facilitate the conflict in a way that would complement Russia's interests, primarily because it
never quite sat well with Putin that Russian majority of South Ossetia and Abkhazia had been
2
Deyermond, Ruth. 2013. "Assessing the reset: successes and failures in the Obama administration's Russia policy,
2009–2012." (European Security Dec2 2013, Vol.22 Issue 422), 3.
3
Ronald Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation (Indiana University Press, 1994), 325.
4
Vladimir Soccor, "Georgia offers far-reaching autonomy to Abkhazia" Eurasia Daily Monitor 5 (April 2008): 61.

3. Jamros 3
restored to Georgian control.5
On August 1, 2008, the first momentous act of aggression took
place. A Georgian police lorry was blown up at 8 am by an IED on the road near Tskhinvali,
injuring five Georgian policemen. That same evening, Georgian snipers retaliated by attacking
the South Ossetian border checkpoints, killing four Ossetians and injuring seven.6
Ossetian
separatists began systematically shelling Georgian villages as early as August, with a sporadic
response from Georgian peacekeepers and other troops in the region. Violence continued through
the weeks and on April 20, a Russian jet shot down a Georgian drone flying over Abkhazia.
Abkhazia covered for Russia by claiming that the drone was shot down by an "L-39 aircraft of
the Abkhaz Air Force".7
The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)
confirmed that, that was in fact not true and that the jet did belong to the Russian Air Force.
Putin attempted to downplay this invasion of Georgia by claiming that Russia was acting
as a peacekeeper and protecting its neighbor, ally and former subject. Georgia was in fact
facilitating ethnic cleansing in South Ossetia, and Putin's motives went far beyond
"philanthropy." This region appealed to Putin for very specific reasons, supplementing his drive
for regaining lost territory. Georgia serves as a buffer zone between Russia and the Middle East.8
Along the southern border of Georgia, Turkey and Iran are in close proximity and this is an area
where Putin clearly feels vulnerable, as these countries have a high Muslim population and
access to nuclear energy. In order to deter the entry of terrorists into Russia by using Georgia as
a port and to ensure the security of its ex counterpart, he implemented a plan to take the reins of
Georgia to assure that never happened.
5
Charles King, "Tbilisi Blues" Council on Foreign Affairs (August 2004)
6
M.S. Barabanov, A.V. Lavrov and V.A. Tseluiko, "The Tanks of August" Center for Analysis of Strategies and
Technologies. (August 2009) 45.
7
BBC News Europe, Russia Shot Down Georgia Drone. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7358761.stm
Accessed November 22, 2014.
8
Svante Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus (London:
Curzon Press, 2001). 331-332.

4. Jamros 4
Involvement in Georgia called for a change with the how the United States was
communicating with Russia as a fellow superpower. While not blatantly challenging the
Kremlin's wishes, the US was provoking Georgia's rebelliousness by providing foreign aid and
military training for its troops. US president at the time George W. Bush said, "Russia has
invaded a sovereign neighboring state and threatens a democratic government elected by its
people. Such an action is unacceptable in the 21st century."9
However, to the Clinton
Administration's response to the disaster created by the Chechen Wars, Bush refused to use
military force. Cognizant of the already deteriorating relationship with Russia, the use of military
force against the Kremlin would only provoke unwanted conflict with another superpower. A
senior Republican staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee told the Washington,
Post that the United States should hasten the expansion of NATO in order to promote the
"encirclement" of Russia with democracies and free market economies, claiming, "We should
start acting like victors in the Cold War, not apologists."10
Nevertheless, the United States chose
to not intervene with Putin and the Kremlin to any degree, sending an international message that
Russia's actions were acceptable, and that ex-soviet bloc countries were not worth running the
risk of getting involved in a third world war with the US already wrapped up in the middle east.
The act of hostile territorial acquisition appeared again a little less than a decade later. In
November of 2013, pandemonium broke out in Ukraine after severe dissatisfaction with the
conduct of the Ukrainian government. In 2004, the Orange Revolution sent the country into a
whirlwind of economic adversity, currency devaluation, and an inability to successfully receive
9
New York Times (New York City), 22 May 2010.
10
Petro, Nicolai N. 1997. "Legacy of Containment: Reshaping US Foreign Policy toward Russia." (Harvard
International Review, 1997.) 7.

5. Jamros 5
funding from public markets.11
In an attempt to right the wrongs of the country's financial
system, President Victor Yanukovych began to negotiate deals with the European Union that
would strengthen the country's bond, both democratically and economically with Western
Europe and launch talks of Ukrainian accession to the EU. With Yanukovych ready to commit
to a momentous phase to westernizing Ukraine, Putin jumped in and stole the show, offering a
multi-billion dollar loan to Ukraine. Yanukovych, favoring his Russian ties, forgot about the
money the EU would have supplied for Ukraine's reforms and went behind his country's back to
sign away with Russia. This was the start to yet another bloody and nostalgic crusade between
Russia and an ex-soviet state. Riots ensued in the street of Kiev and 80 people12
were killed in a
span of only three days. The civil unrest amid the protesters and law enforcement combined with
President Yanukovych running for his life back to the motherland, only made it easier for Putin
to do what he does best: invade.
Roughly three months after the start of the Euromaidan on February 21, Yanukovych was
officially ousted by the unsatisfied people of Ukraine, and just a few days in to the interim
government, Russia invaded and seized Crimea claiming that the rapid collapse of the Ukrainian
government was the result of a coup and was completely illegal. Subsequently, what did Putin
do? He authorized an illegal referendum, and Crimea was annexed. This was to be the start to the
2014 Crimean Crisis. It didn't take long for the pro-Russian separatists to begin their side of the
protests. On February 26, pro-Russian forces began to take up arm against strategic positions and
infrastructure across the Crimean peninsula,13
including parliamentary buildings. With the
country in an absolute mess and violence worsening by the day, a referendum was called to take
11
International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Ukrainians Pessimistic about Country’s Future; Confidence in
Political Leaders Falling. Available from http://www.ifes.org. Internet. Accessed November 28, 2014.
12
Senator Benjamin Cardin, Congressional Hearing on Ukraine: Confronting Internal Challenges and External.
Commission on Security & Cooperation in Europe: U.S. Helsinki Commission. April 19, 2014.
13
AlJazeera (London), 8 March, 2014

6. Jamros 6
place on the fate of Crimea's autonomy. The referendum took place on March 16 and officially
resulted in a 96.77% (Crimea) and 95.6% (Sevastopol) affirmative vote, but was condemned by
the EU, the US, Ukraine and the representatives of the Crimean Tatars for violating Ukraine's
constitution and international law. 14
The Crimean Parliament soon after self-declared
independence from Ukraine, asked to re-join Russia, and signed a treaty annexing the Republic
of Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation. On March 27, the UN General
Assembly passed a non-binding Resolution 68/262that declared the Crimean referendum invalid
and the incorporation of Crimea into Russia illegal. 15
On April 17, Russian president Vladimir
Putin confirmed Russian involvement in Crimea, remarking that "of course, Russian servicemen
backed the Crimean self-defense forces."16
Putin's plan for action in Ukraine put Russia on its worst terms with the United States and
the West since the Cold War and consequently, has severely shifted U.S. foreign policy with
Russia. Not only were his actions illegal, but they violated numerous international obligations,
including the core principles of the Helsinki Final Act.17
In addition to the Helsinki Final Act,
which played a vital role in concluding the Cold War, the US and Ukraine agreed that
by annexing Crimea, Russia violated terms of the Budapest Memorandum on Security
Assurances,18
which included security assurances against threats or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine.19
With Russia breaking agreements and
treaties left and right, uneasiness has developed between Obama and Putin. It is up for debate at
14
Daniel Schearf, Voice of America: Crimea Applied to Join Russia. 17 March, 2014
15
Reuters (London), 27 March 2014.
16
The Washington Post (Washington, DC), 2 October 2014.
17
Cardin, par.6
18
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ukraine, Joint Statement by the United States and Ukraine. Available from
http://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-news/20572-spilyna-zajava-ukrajini-ta-spoluchenih-shtativ-
ameriki. Internet. Accessed on November 20, 2014.
19
Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances, Council on Foreign Relations. December 1994. Available from
http://www.cfr.org. Internet. Accessed on November 20, 2014.

7. Jamros 7
any moment whether or not Putin would continue on his path of wreaking havoc in Eastern
Europe. The status regarding abiding by treaties such as the START and NPT have also come
into question of how serious he takes them and what would happen if he chose to break ties with
them. President Obama responded to the invasion in Ukraine by stating that there would be
consequences if violence continues and that the Ukrainian military should not step into a
situation that could be resolved by civilians.20
Obama has also thus far authorized a visa ban on
20 senior Ukrainian officials and individuals who were considered to be part of the protest
brutalities. There was also an overwhelming bi-partisan support for a $1billion aid package,21
passed in U.S. Congress has also been a soft means of condemning Russian foreign policy at this
time.
Enhancing the capacity of the Russian economy through resource management is a
second method that Putin is using to fortify Russia's security. Manipulation of gas routes and
pipelines is a discernable option for Putin and also partially accounts for why he has chosen to
use territorial aggression. A state can only pursue its goals if it has access to money […] and the
ability of the state to extract revenue from society has long been viewed as one of the best
indicators of state capacity.22
In this sense, Putin is literally extracting his money from the earth.
Russia is a huge supplier and facilitator of oil and natural gas and has been a valuable player in
the European energy sector, being the second biggest oil producer in the world after Saudi
Arabia.23
Russia's largest oil company, Rosneft, has been collaborating with US based
20
Reuters (London), 19 February 2014.
21
Cardin, par. 37
22
Taylor, Brian D. 2011. State building in Putin's Russia: policing and coercion after communism. (Cambridge
University Press 2011). 100.
23
Goichi Komori, Sanae Kurita and Keishi Nakashima. Russian Oil Policies and Its Oil Industry Trends. Japan: The
Institute of Energy Economics, 2008

8. Jamros 8
ExxonMobil in Arctic drilling plans24
but recently they have hit a few bumps in the road as to
how the companies will exploit the resources and split the risks, costs since the imposed
sanctions. Putin also undoubtedly has an underlying fear that the United States will attempt to
gain access to Asian oil companies and make arrangements with China, interfering with Russia's
eastern relations in its own domain. In addition to safeguarding natural gas and oil, Russia is also
looking abroad to create partnerships with other resource rich countries. A strain is relations is
also being caused by Russia expressing significant economic interests in Iran, and does not share
America's concern on the Iran Nuclear Program as one of the principal contemporary threats to
international security.25
Military stabilization and growth is also on Putin's agenda for a stronger, more
formidable Russia. Russia is now engaged in its largest military buildup since the collapse of the
Soviet Union more than two decades ago, with major increases in defense spending budgeted
each year to 2020. 26
This is in part due to a growing fear that Russia’s vast natural resource
endowment, particularly in the Arctic, is vulnerable if the country lacks the means to protect it.
Russia feels threatened by NATO's presence in this region and so has implemented extra
measures to assert its sovereignty in the high north. It is estimated that by 2020, Russia's army
will be strongly dependent on easily deployable brigades with 70 percent equipped with next-
generation weaponry and equipment along with a million active-duty personnel, 2300 new tanks,
roughly 1200 new helicopters and planes, a navy equipped with fifty surface ships and twenty-
eight submarines and one hundred new satellites.27
24
The Wall Street Journal (New York), 27 September 2014.
25
Deyermond, p.17
26
Gvosdev, Nikolas K. "The Bear Awakens: Russia's Military Is Back." The National Interest. November 12, 2014.
http://nationalinterest.org. 2.
27
Gvosdev, p.2

9. Jamros 9
While a navy fleet and a growing presence in the Arctic and Baltic Seas are the most
attention worthy aspects of Russia's armed forces stabilization, military ground units are also
adapting a new program known as Ratnik. The Ratnik program is supplying Russia with new
rifles — the AK-12 and the AK-103-4, which increase effectiveness of the Russian soldier. This
program also has the potential to introduce more sophisticated navigation equipment,28
some of
which has already been used in Crimea a year ago.
How the U.S. Should Conduct Foreign Policy with Russia Based on Moscow's Motives:
It would be an understatement to claim that Washington and Moscow hold contrasting
interests in politics. The uniqueness of each country's culture and saga makes cooperation and
negotiation an arduous job, but it is imperative for these two nations to reconcile their differences
for the well-being of international community. Obama must accept and humbly confront a world
today that is much less unipolar than the one in previous decades. Multilateral cooperation in
achieving international goals is not only highly beneficial, but almost mandatory. The United
States is currently spread thin due to the ongoing war in Iraq and military operations in
Afghanistan. The newly posed threat of ISIS is consuming majority of America's time and
military assets, and simply cannot afford to act as the global police force. The U.S. needs not to
look at the rise of other superpowers such as Russia as a negative outcome, but an opportunity to
reinforce a competitive regional power. The Obama Administration as well as the next
presidential candidate, needs to objectively look at the position Russia is in, and discriminate
where they are going to use force, and where they are going to let the country run its course.
Russia's assertiveness with pushing into countries of which have formally broken off from
the Soviet Union need to be taken seriously and the internationally community needs to take a
28
Gibbons-Neff, Thomas. "With Weapons Modernization, Russia’s Military Ups Its Game as West Watches
Closely." The Washington Post, February 6, 2015. par.3

10. Jamros 10
united front on this issue. Putin has long craved to reclaim what he feels was unjustly stripped
away from the Motherland. Eastern Europe is regarded as an area of interest due to their small,
manageable size and considerable political instability. Many of these countries however, have
made leaps and bounds in their "quest for the West" with the help of the U.S. and the European
Union. Accession talks for these countries into organizations such as the EU and NATO, have
intensified Russia's mistrust with the U.S. and Europe because Russia sees it as an official
goodbye to its little ex-soviet bloc countries and an infringement on what it still considers
territory under its surveillance. Politically, NATO promotes democratic values and encourages
consultation and cooperation on defense and security issues to build trust and, in the long run,
prevent conflict. Militarily, NATO is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes. With this
in mind, if diplomatic efforts fail, it has the military capacity needed to undertake crisis-
management operations. Naturally, Russia feels threatened by this motion because it is not a
country fully supporting democratic values, but is surrounded by a myriad of countries that want
to join the NATO alliance or are already members.
I would argue that Russia's goal is not to refuse NATO's expansion, but that it wants
reassurance that it won't infringe on its borders. As with the case of Ukraine, the annexation of
Crimea was illegal and unnecessary. This is an instance where U.S. foreign policy with Russia
may take a more assertive approach. The United States could pass a floor resolution to the
United Nations, suggesting mediated talks between Washington, Simferopol, and Moscow where
an agreement similar to the Good Friday Agreement could be made. This would allow the two
governments to continue to work independently of one another, while also acknowledging the
majority ethnic Russians in Crimea who do not identify as strongly with Europe. Military forces
could be withdrawn as long as there is institutional oversight. This could preserve U.S. Russian

11. Jamros 11
relations by allowing the mainland of Ukraine to move towards western integration as it wishes
with a population that identifies itself as Ukrainian.
Russia can actually see NATO expansion to its advantage. Suggested by Alexander
Ageev of the Moscow Aviation Production Organization (MAPO), Russia could sell fighter
aircraft to NATO members since the Polish, Hungarian, and Czech air forces rely almost
exclusively on these fighters. The integration of Russian-built and European-made aircraft and
control systems has already been tested in France and South Africa. This would be an elegant
and practical way to how to integrate Russia into European security structures.29
U.S. Russian relations in the economic and resource sector could use a softer approach as
well. A recurring theme of concern over the Arctic region has presented a particularly difficult
problem because most sovereignty concepts presume the existence of only land and water,
leaving the legal status of ice undetermined.30
The Russian strategists are also concerned about
the future US plans in the Arctic because given the ice-free Arctic in the foreseeable future (at
least for the part of the year) the Russian military is wary of the U.S. utilizing a submarine fleet
and sea-based anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems in the Arctic Ocean to intervene and prevent
Russian offensive forces.31
The Kola Peninsula in the Arctic region has strategic importance to
Russia’s national security given how it provides direct access to the Arctic and Atlantic oceans
and its proximity to potential U.S./NATO targets. Russia has two-thirds of its sea based nuclear
forces in this region32
and has no plan of removing them. This does not warrant a reactionary
response from the U.S. however, because Moscow's presence in the Peninsula and higher waters
is based strictly on economic interests. These attempts must also be internationally recognized by
29
Petro, par.26
30
Van Efferink, Leonhardt A S. 2012. "Polar Partners or Poles Apart? On the discourses of two US think tanks on
Russia's presence in the 'High North'." (Geographical Journal 178, no. 1) 3.
31
Konyshev, Valery, and Alexander Sergunin. 2014. "Is Russia a revisionist military power in the Arctic?." 5.
32
Konyshev, p.4

12. Jamros 12
the U.S. with Russia's intentions in the Black Sea region. This area is not under U.S. diction and
should not be an area of friction with Russia. If the United States sees the Black Sea region as a
reliable way to move natural gas and oil from the Caspian and Central Asia to Europe and the
West,33
then it should eventually open trade talks with Russia to create a partnership of energy
supplier-energy purchaser. The east has something that the west needs, and while exerting
dominance in the Arctic region as a world power seems like the more attractive option,
strengthening an already existing partnership to remind Russia of its dependence on the U.S. and
the West would improve foreign policy relations.
As a whole, it is the Unites State's best interest to respect Russia's choices that it is
making regarding expanding its economy and military, as it is a superpower and has the right to
do so. What the U.S. needs to be reactive to in its foreign policy with Moscow, are acts of
aggression with neighboring countries that cannot stand up to a force like Russia. This not only
inflates Russia's bully mentality, but also provokes many human rights discrepancies, and the
United States cannot tolerate another super power committing inhumane acts. The international
community has expressed concern with Putin's handling of refugees, citizens and foreigners
alike. Russian separatists and military troops have exhibited flawed conduct in Ukraine and the
Crimean peninsula since protests started about a year ago. Authorities have in many cases
suspended or not honored protest liberties and journalistic privileges. For example, authorities
have compelled Crimean residents who were Ukrainian citizens to declare Russian citizenship,
or be considered foreigners in Crimea.34
Russia also continues to experience internal civil rights
hindrances. The country has had a history of internal scandal concerning elections and fraud
33
Mitchell, Lincoln A. 2008. "More than location: crafting a US policy for the Black Sea region." Journal Of
Southeast European & Black Sea Studies. 4.
34
Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Human Rights in Decline. Available from
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/17/crimea-human-rights-decline. Internet. Accessed on November 28, 2014.

13. Jamros 13
which led the US to sign the Magnitsky Act in 2012. In 2009, Russian lawyer and auditor Sergei
Magnitsky died in a Moscow prison after investigating fraud involving Russian tax officials.35
After his death, the investigation was essentially dropped and no fair trial was given. Corruption
is among the other major problems that Putin has failed to tackle. In fact, he has only instigated it
during his presidency. Russians experience about twice as much police violence and corruption
in a course of two to three years than Americans do in their entire life.36
All things considered, Russia is not a direct threat the West, but should still be monitored
and given considerable attention, specifically to its foreign policy initiatives concerning
surrounding states which lack the type of military capacity that Russia has. Putin is well aware
that the chances that the only other country which could match him in power and pressure,
(America) does not have the money, resources, or time to get involved in another war with a
nuclear superpower, and he is assuredly taking advantage of that fact. Although NATO states
that an attack on one is an attack on all, I cannot see the organization jumping into a war to save
a country like Ukraine, Estonia or Moldova. These states are not entirely politically or
economically substantial, but rather are important because they act as gateways between the East
and West. While Putin may have been overly reactive, echoing Cold War tensions with his
invasion of Ukraine last year, he is doing his best to pull his country together so as to be a
respectable and involved superpower in global affairs. The psychology of U.S. Russian relations
presents itself as bipolar at times, with America's altruism perceived as infringement on Russia's
internal governance system. However, communication is necessary between two superpowers
when one is not upholding values of humanitarian respect or international recognition of
sovereign states. Aggression unchallenged is aggression unleashed, and the Obama
35
BBC News Europe, Q&A: The Magnitsky Affair. Available http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20626960.
Internet. Accessed on November 28, 2014.
36
Taylor, p.182

14. Jamros 14
administration needs to realize that working alone to encourage peaceful results in Moscow's
trail to security is not an effective way to check a superpower. Participation among other
Security Council members and the international community as a whole is imperative in making
sure Russia does not overstep its boundaries (literally and figuratively) during this reset.

15. Jamros 15
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