1.
The Economic and Social Sustainability of Chaebol in South Korea
Christina McMahon
Abstract
South Korea has seen a tremendous amount of success in the past few decades, far
surpassing anyone’s expectations for what was one of the poorest countries in the world (Albrecht et
al. 2010). Much of Korea’s success can be accredited to their now world­renowned family­operated
business conglomerates, known as chaebol. While these conglomerates made Korea what it is today,
there are some underlying issues with the chaebol system that may prove to be economically and
socially unsustainable. Problems of fraud and power inequality have become increasingly relevant as
chaebol have entered the global market. Many question whether or not chaebol have become too
powerful for their own good and whether something should be done about it. The chaebol success
and power was once a strength of the Korean economy but may now be considered a weakness as
practically the entire Korean economy depends on these often corrupt chaebol. In order to overcome
this challenge, there will have to be strict government action that will level the playing field for small
and medium sized businesses so that they have a chance to compete with the overpowered
conglomerates.
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2. Economic Development in South Korea
During the last few decades, South Korea has demonstrated rapid economic development.
“Within the span of a single working life, its economy has grown 17­fold, its government has
evolved from an austere dictatorship into a rowdy democracy, and its culture, once scarred by
censorship, now beguiles the world with its music, soap operas and cinema” (“The Great
Decompression,” 2013). Korea along with Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan are known as the
Four Asian Tigers due to their recent rapid growth (Albrecht et al. 2010). A leading topic in
discussions of South Korea’s economy is globalization, or segyehwa in Korean, particularly after
the Asian financial crisis in 1997 (Lee et al. 2010). One of the most spectacular phenomenon in
the South Korean political economy since it first adopted capitalism in 1945, has been the rapid
escalation of international capital investment or globalization that has occurred since the late
1990s. The combination of sweeping liberalization measures and pro­foreign direct investment
(FDI) institutional reforms designed to lure foreign investors enabled Korea to achieve a
dramatic increase in inward FDI following the outbreak of the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Lee et
al. 2010). The crisis marked a turning point for Korea from a state­driven market with strong
nationalistic tendencies to a fully globalized economy. Chaebol, Korean family­operated
business conglomerates, have played a critical role in the recent history of the South Korean
economy and its development. When looking at Korea’s economy today, one will find that
chaebol are at the forefront.
To study chaebol, one must first have a basic understanding of the recent history of the
Korean economy. There are a few key factors that went into the rapid growth of South Korea’s
economy. First, there are cultural factors such as the fundamental Confucian values of education
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3. that Korea is known for having and the working mentality that makes Koreans so driven (Lee et
al. 2010). Secondly, Korea was lucky with its perfect timing since the global trade volume was
expanding by nine percent annually and there was a decline in trade protectionism during the
formation of chaebol. Lastly, the Korean government’s involvement in economic affairs and the
business sector was comprehensive. Korea’s success as a nation “emanated from the realization
that Korea, as a resource­poor, trade­dependent economy, had little choice but to embrace the
realities of globalization and tailor its policies and profit maximization strategies to the
conditions of neoliberal globalization (Lee et al. 2010).”
Few periods have changed South Korean history more than the Park Chung Hee era that
began in May 1961. During this time, Korea grew out of poverty into an industrial powerhouse
in one generation, albeit with some political, social, and economic costs (Kim 2011). Faced with
this unique transformation into a modern industrial economy, some analysts project an image of
“Korea, Inc.,” where the state and the chaebol deeply penetrated each other’s organizations by
personnel exchange at the top of their hierarchies, seeking to influence decisions and to learn
from the other’s organizational features and functions.
However, there are others who agree with the proponents of Korea, Inc., that the
state­chaebol relationship was extremely close during Park’s political rule, but give it the
opposite characterization of “crony capitalism” (Kim 2011). In this view, the chaebol captured
the state to pillage banks and sabotage market forces in pursuit of profit. Rather than the chaebol
serving national interests as defined by the state, it was the state that came to the aid of the
chaebol conglomerates (Kim 2011). In fact, it is unlikely that the chaebol were neither captives
of the state nor its masters. They were organizations based not only on traditional family ties but
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4. also on modern rational business enterprises that made their own decisions, albeit within the
confines of state policies.
For Park, the chaebol were indispensable for his political project of “rich nation, strong
army,” and for the chaebol Park was indispensable for their own growth into a corporate empire
(Kim 2011). “It was not really that one led the other into something that he did not want to do.
Park and [chaebol] formed a full­fledged partnership on the basis of broad trust, common vision,
and hard work” (Kim 2011). The chaebol embodied both the strengths and weaknesses of the
economic system constructed during the Park era. By forcing state banks to underwrite
investments and assume business risks through subsidized policy loans, Park encouraged chaebol
groups to become reckless and diversify into unrelated industries without adequate risk
management (Kim 2011). Once investments were made with bank loans, the chaebol became
burdened with an extremely vulnerable debt­equity structure that prevented their
owner­managers from corporate restructuring for fear of losing ownership and management
control. During this time, chaebol sought even more bank loans for business growth, lest any
stagnation in their business sales trigger a liquidity trap within the context of their extremely
high debt­equity ratio. However, by taking on more loans, they sowed the seeds for even bigger
financial crises and dragged society into a cycle of boom and bust (Kim 2011). In retrospect,
perhaps Park should have chosen to deal with the root cause of South Korea’s vicious cycle of
boom and bust by making the chaebol more cost conscious and less reckless in their risk
calculations.
Role of Chaebol in South Korea’s Economic Development
4

5. The Korean term chaebol comes from chae, meaning wealth, and bol, meaning family or
clan (Bulard 2013). The chaebol is a group of companies that often has a trading company at the
center. Its strength come from (1) its large size, based on the combined assets of the companies;
(2) flexibility, based on the ease of mobilizing and exchanging capital, technology, and personnel
among the companies; and (3) diversification, based on the wide range of businesses the chaebol
owns (Kim 1996). The chaebol is vertically oriented so it is maintained by family ownership of
companies and is strengthened by traditional Confucian values of filial piety and loyalty toward
the family (Kim 1996). Chaebol were mainly formed in the 1950s, a time when these
conglomerates received a significant amount of government support which encouraged
employment and overall stability throughout the country. Korean conglomerates grew rapidly
under government leadership, and the chaebol oligopolized most of the domestic market,
including light and heavy industries (Du Sig 2008). Selected chaebol were able to grow in size
and influence, largely due to the relatively generous provision of funds, as long as they followed
and satisfied the intention of the government. Consequently, they greatly increased their weight
within the Korean economy (Lee 2008).
It is certain that chaebol were the leading force of the Korean economy through the entire
economic development in general and throughout the 1970s and 1980s in particular. Chaebol
were in an extremely advantageous position in various ways (Lee 2008). The government erected
entry barriers to key industries and at the same time, provided almost unlimited financial
assistance to selected chaebol to prevent the risk of bankruptcy. As long as the chaebol complied
with the government’s industrial policy, they enjoyed benefits by way of export financing,
equipment funds, and protection against bankruptcy (Lee 2008). Until the 1980s, the relationship
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6. between government and business in Korea was an interdependent relationship. This relationship
was very closely held, with the state dominant over the business. In the 1970s and 1980s, the
government selected certain chaebol to undertake projects and channeled funds for these projects
from foreign loans. The government would guarantee repayment if for any reason the company
was not able to repay its creditors. This was the case until the late 1980s, when the chaebol
became multinational businesses and were too large to remain under the control of the state.
Many chaebol became financially independent and the government was no longer needed for
credit and assistance. It was at this point that the chaebol began to have considerable economic
and social influence in Korea and in the new global market and, as the Korean economy
progressed, the relationship between the government and the chaebol has reflected the changing
economic environment. They moved from a symbiotic to a competitive relationship based on
complementarity (Lee 2008). In fact, chaebol were thought to play such an important role in the
South Korean economy that the state was reluctant to allow large chaebol to fail. This guaranteed
continued existence of already established chaebol gave them freedom from market forces.
Chaebol no longer had to do what the market demanded, nor did chaebol have to make sound
market decisions since they had the support of the state. While the “guarantee of the state” was
greatly diminished after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, many executives continued to have
the mindset that they were too big to fail and that the state would only allow them to incur
minimal financial damage (Albrecht et al. 2010). From the late 1980s onward, chaebol became
more actively involved in new ventures such as information and communication technologies
and at the same time, they heavily invested in the electronics and the automotive industries, both
internationally and domestically. The chaebol also focused on developing high technology and
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7. building their brand and marketing channels, partly through obtaining or investing in foreign
companies (Du Sig 2008).
Problems Posed by Chaebol
As a consequence of overall growth of the Korean economy, many Koreans have
experienced a rise in living standards and a large number of people have moved into the
expanding middle class. The dominant public discourse in the 1980s was about creating one
large middle­class society, just as had occurred in Japan two decades earlier and in the U.S.
much earlier (Koo 2007). However, since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Korea has experienced
increased social and economic inequality. During the crisis, bankers feared that the chaebol
would go bankrupt so they allowed these businesses to roll over their loans each time they were
unable to repay their debts. They allowed this because there was a common misconception that
these conglomerates were simply “too big to fail” and so many believed that the chaebol were
incapable of collapsing and that the more they borrowed, the safer everyone was. However, this
theory was proven wrong when many businesses collapsed during the crisis. The focus on
capacity expansion created this debt that was manageable when the economy was growing.
However, when it stalled, debt­to­equity ratios became a huge problem. Since the crisis, the
chaebol now have less debt, so they are less vulnerable to similar crises but the growth of the
fewer remaining chaebol has meant that each occupy a larger portion of the economy. Now, if
just one or two of the largest chaebol were to collapse, so would the entire Korean economy.
Chaebol have gained so much power that some have said that they have about as much
power as the entire South Korean government. This is especially clear when large­scale frauds
committed by chaebol executives are easily forgiven since chaebol are seen as too important for
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8. the economy. This kind of power allows chaebol to get away with far too much but since such a
large portion of the Korean economy depends on chaebol, Koreans have few options but to allow
chaebol to continue to exercise that power. The nation’s economy has become so dependent on
chaebol that their collapse would jeopardise the entire economy (Lee 2008). There are some key
factors that contribute to the abuse of power that is seen in so many chaebol but these will be
discussed further in later sections of this paper. While some argue that chaebol like Samsung
Group are a key ingredient for the success of the Korean economy with their high­tech products
that now dominate the global market and their brand names that have become symbols of
Korea’s global status, others wonder if the chaebols’ success will last or whether there will be
too many economic and social obstacles (Kim 2013).
In order for any business, or country for that matter, to be sustainably successful, it must
consider the important sustainability issues: environmental sustainability, economic
sustainability, and social sustainability. While many know about the importance of
environmental sustainability, few discuss the importance of economic and social sustainability.
Economic sustainability implies a system of production that satisfies present consumption levels
without compromising future needs. On the other hand, social sustainability implies a system of
social organization that alleviates poverty and which calls for economic growth constrained by
the requirements of social equity (Basiago 1999). According to these definitions, how long will
chaebol last? In order to answer this question, one must evaluate the current sustainability
situation found at chaebol in South Korea.
Social Sustainability: Globalization, Family and Fraud
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9. Since the 1950s, conglomerates such as Samsung and Hyundai have helped transform
Korea’s economy while enriching themselves in the process but their power may have finally
reached too far. In recent months, there has been a shift in public support of these large
conglomerates, accusing them of using webs of cross­shareholdings to shift capital and expand
into new sectors. While cross­shareholding in chaebol is nothing new, the resulting lack of
transparency distresses investors even though politicians have traditionally not questioned it too
closely because the chaebol play such a key role in export industries (Yoon 2013). However, this
delicate balance has come under pressure through the combination of meagre economic growth,
the slowest increase in household income in more than a year and the chaebols’ continued
growth. “The public now understands that the trickle­down effect of helping the chaebol thrive
so that the profit will flow down to lower­income earners is not going to help feed them and that
it is an outdated growth strategy that needs to be changed (Yoon 2013).”
Park Geun­hye, South Korea’s president, led a campaign that promoted her ability to
crack down on the chaebols’ perceived unfair business practices and group expansion, a process
referred to as “economic democratization” (Yoon 2013). Her stated resolve is ironic given that it
was her father, former president Park Chung­hee, who gave the conglomerates the necessary
political and financial power to thrive during the 1960s and 1970s. Those ties leave many
sceptical of her commitment to rein in the chaebol (Yoon 2013). One effective solution to
moderate the influence of the chaebol would be to phase out the cross­shareholding structure, in
other words, this interlocking ownership and debt­financing is what allows chaebol­owners to
control chaebol­related companies with very little equity of their own (Lee 2008). Disentangling
chaebol subsidiaries from cross­shareholder structures would promote more competitiveness and
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10. better distribute public ownership of these companies, while preventing any families from
enjoying financial and business sway well above their ownership level. Unfortunately, signs of
this actually happening are not prevalent. Such a move would outrage the chaebol, which are
owned by some of the wealthiest and most politically connected people in the country.
In the last couple of decades, chaebol have become bywords for unfair business practices,
monopolistic corporate arrogance, and corruption. Most recently, chaebol have become bloated
oligarchies as Korea has shifted from being a highly equitable society in the 1990s to developing
a wealth gap approaching the level where it may threaten social cohesion (Manthorpe 2010).
Chaebol such as Samsung, Hyundai, and LG have been involved in large­scale frauds. These
frauds have contributed to the suffering of the middle class in Korea and the unemployment rate.
Chaebol have many opportunities for fraud, pressures to commit fraud, and rationalizations for
fraud to occur. With this being said, chaebols’ focus on the founding family has contributed to
the risk of fraud, particularly when it comes to social pressures. Some suggest that since most of
the founding families of these huge business conglomerates worked hard to start their chaebol,
they feel somewhat entitled to the business and hope to keep the chaebol in the family, even if it
means committing fraud (Albrecht et al. 2013).
In the past, bullying tactics by chaebol were not exposed to the public because consumers
had only small channels of information, but now the chaebol have come under greater public
scrutiny as social media enables consumers to share all kinds of information and to take
collective action against such corporate misbehavior (Jung­a 2013). Analysts say that these
tensions, buried during periods of rapid growth, are amplified as the slowing economy makes the
relationship between big conglomerates and their smaller partners more strained. As this
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11. inequality becomes more severe, there is greater demand by the public for a more even playing
field for the small and medium sized businesses forced to compete in a rigged system (Jung­a
2013). While culturally rich, the chaebol system does not justify the frequent occurrence of fraud
in chaebol organizations.
In recent years, the landscape of Korea’s social inequality has changed noticeably. Social
inequality has not only increased in size, but its nature and form have changed as well. This new
form of inequality has emerged in the context of globalization and is closely related to the
economic, cultural, and ideological changes brought about by this macro­global force (Koo
2007). The 1997 Asian financial crisis caused a major disruption in the Korean economy and in
the livelihood of the Korean people. The crisis inflicted huge consequences, propelling a
staggering number of business failures, a sharp increase in unemployment, frozen wages and
decreased domestic income (Koo 2007). In order for chaebol to be successful, they must have
the support of the government and the people. They usually get this support by providing jobs
and by increasing the country’s technological advancement through innovative design. However,
it could be argued that chaebol stifle innovation since they push aside small start­ups that can’t
afford to compete with the likes of Samsung and Hyundai (Hausmann 2013). In fact, the only
medium sized businesses that seem to thrive in Korea in recent years are the chaebols’ local
suppliers. Other than that, some young businesses such as internet search and gaming have done
well, but these are in a field where the chaebol cannot yet be bothered to tread. If they ever do,
they may smother rather than nurture independent talent (“Leaders: The Chaebol,” 2010).
“Every sustainable business should stand on a foundation that has strong values, legal
compliance, and high ethical standards (Mujtaba 2013).” Corporate social responsibility involves
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12. a business going above and beyond the responsibility to act legally and morally in the pursuit of
profit. This being said, due to chaebols’ unique corporate governance where founding family
members practically control every decision made within the business group despite being
minority shareholders, Koreans are not convinced about some of the ethics within chaebol (Park
2012).
Economic Sustainability: The Government and Power Disparity
Economic sustainability is often associated with terms such as growth, development and
productivity (Basiago 1999). In just a few decades, South Korea transformed itself from an
agricultural society to an industrialized nation exporting high­technology products such as cars,
TVs, mobile phones and computers (Keating 2012). “Conglomerates often play a key role in
transforming an economy and its exports. This is especially true in developing countries, where
many markets are missing and the business environment is often extremely challenging.
[Conglomerates] can start things on a scale that would be impossible for a startup” (Hausmann
2013). As South Korea experienced a prolonged period of strong economic growth, few directly
challenged the dominance of the conglomerates. Even today, employment at one of the
conglomerates remains the goal of most young Koreans. But as growth has slowed in recent
years, discontent has risen over their influence (Ramstad 2012).
Over the years, the government has maintained a cooperative relationship with chaebol
and so the Korean economy has fluctuated with its conglomerates (Kim 2013). Chaebol have
been granted many advantages by the government including: monopolistic access to resources,
financial assistance, low interest rates, tax benefits, import and export licenses, and foreign
investment incentives. In return, chaebol have provided jobs and the opportunity for Korea to be
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13. visible in world markets (Albrecht et al. 2013). While this trade off seemed fair at the start, many
have begun to wonder if perhaps chaebol are taking advantage of their privileges too much.
Since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, chaebol were forced to let go of a lot of their Korean
workers. However, many chaebol have not only recovered from the crisis but have even
expanded yet they have hired very little in Korea. There are some understandable factors such as
the new focus on technology which requires fewer but highly­skilled workers and, as the chaebol
become more globalized, they have had access to cheaper labor from other countries. However,
this does not make it any fairer to the Korean workers and the Korean government who have
contributed so much to the growth of chaebol.
At this point, there has been a transition of power from government to chaebol since
chaebol depended on the government for initial funding but now the government depends on
chaebol to employ local workers and support the local economy. Chaebols’ highly concentrated
economic power has greatly contributed to the income disparity found throughout Korea and so
some have even called Korea’s economic growth, “jobless growth” (Kim 2013). This inequality
of power also leads to the question of what might happen if the chaebol were to suddenly fail.
This would likely cause the entire Korean economy to collapse on itself which is why chaebol
must continue to exist but with less power so that smaller businesses can compete and contribute
to the economy. This is a slow but necessary process that should begin immediately so that
Korea does not wind up back where it started as one of the poorest countries in the world
(Albrecht et al. 2010).
Case Study: Samsung
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14. The driving force behind South Korea’s success has been its powerful conglomerates.
“With their dominance of the domestic economy, chaebol like Samsung, LG, and Hyundai had
the resources to compete internationally. They account for about 25% of the country’s workforce
but more than half of its economic output (Barmark 2013).” Less than 50 years ago, Samsung
was selling dried seafood and noodles and South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the
world. Lee Byung Chul founded Samsung on March 1, 1939. Since that time, the company has
grown to become one of the largest organizations within South Korea, with operations in almost
every sector (Albrecht et al. 2010). Samsung became what it is today by being the best at
copying. Samsung has used the strategy of building something similar to another company’s
product while making it better, faster, and cheaper for years (Sang­Hun 2012). However, now
that it is competing with some of the most innovative companies in the world, Samsung must try
its hand at innovative design to keep up with competitors like Apple. This emphasis on
innovation, combined with generous subsidies and policies that kept the won low in order to
boost exports, has helped Korean industrial giants like Samsung (Keating 2012).
Today the Samsung group, whose 74 companies have estimated annual revenues of more
than 400 trillion won (USD$387 billion), is by far the largest and most successful chaebol in
South Korea and holds about as much power as the government itself (“Samsung: Waiting,”
2014). It is even said that you can live a “Samsung­only life” in what some people call the
“Republic of Samsung”. “In South Korea, you are born in a hospital which belongs to a chaebol,
you go to a chaebol school, you get a chaebol salary, you live in a chaebol apartment, you have a
chaebol credit card and your leisure and shopping activities are provided by chaebol. You even
get elected thanks to a chaebol since these conglomerates fund parties on both the right and left
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15. (Bulard 2013).” All of this success and power has led Koreans to become somewhat skeptical of
the morals behind such dominating conglomerates. “Korean people have come to think of
Samsung as invincible and above the law (Harlan 2012).”
Samsung and Social Sustainability
Lee Kun­hee, chairman of Samsung Group, is Korea’s richest man. Lee, 72, “wields
absolute power over the direction of the [Samsung] group as well as its staff even though he only
owns less than three percent of the capital (Bulard 2013).” In 2005, two executives of Samsung
were convicted for arranging convertible bonds that allowed Lee’s children to buy 64 percent of
the holding company at less than one­tenth of the market value (Albrecht et al. 2010). Former
Samsung worker, Kim Yong­cheol, worked for a little over seven years for Samsung and claims
to have witnessed double accounting, slush funds for buying journalists and politicians, and
secret accounts for personal use. A commission of inquiry was set up in 2007, and Lee Kun­hee
got a three year suspended sentence, for tax fraud and breach of trust, but was pardoned by the
then president Lee Myung­bak (Bulard 2013). Kim Yong­cheol has been both celebrated as a
much needed whistleblower and, in a culture that emphasizes workers’ loyalty to their
employers, as a traitor driven by personal grudges. Kim even wrote a book, called “Think
Samsung,” which made sensational allegations of extensive corruption by the chairman of
Samsung. Since the release of Kim’s book, Korea’s major newspapers and websites have refused
to carry advertisements for the book and few South Korean publications have reviewed it
(Sang­Hun 2010).
Social sustainability encompasses notions of equity, empowerment, accessibility,
participation, sharing, cultural identity, and institutional stability (Basiago 1999). If Samsung’s
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16. leaders keep damaging the Korean economy by committing large­scale fraud, Samsung will
inevitably lose much of it’s home­country’s support which would surely lead to its demise,
further hurting the Korean economy. Lee needs to realize that his effort to keep the business in
the family is affecting more than just him and his son as he currently holds the key to many
Koreans’ futures through Samsung’s influence on the economy and Korea’s labor force. As an
increasing amount of Samsung workers like Kim see the corruption within their own work, they
will unite as social media further penetrates Koreans’ daily lives, making it easier to connect
with other dissatisfied workers and consumers. Also, as Samsung becomes increasingly
globalized, it will be held up to even higher standards by other developed nations, furthering
Samsung’s need to become socially sustainable.
Samsung and Economic Sustainability
Many Koreans have mixed feelings about Samsung since it is such a huge part of their
economy and admittedly makes some very good products but also has gained too much power
for any one entity. Some Koreans also wonder how Samsung managed to keep growing so much
despite the 1997 Asian financial crisis that took such a toll on the rest of Korea and Asia (Harlan
2012). Even though Samsung has seen a lot of success in recent years, there are reasons to worry
about its future as Korea’s wealthiest business. For one, Mr. Lee’s only son, Lee Jae­yong, looks
certain to take control of Samsung’s main businesses, and his two daughters will run some of the
smaller ones. The younger Mr. Lee, 46, joined Samsung Electronics in 2001 and ten years later
had the title of vice­chairman. “He is unproven as a manager,” says Chang Sea­jin, a
business­school professor. “Despite Samsung’s best PR efforts, most Koreans still associate him
with eSamsung, a disastrous internet venture (“Samsung: Waiting,” 2014).”
16

17. Although it would take a lot to bring down such a large and successful business like
Samsung, such challenges as facing the consequences for large­scale fraud, a crackdown by the
new president, Park Geun­hye, or poor leadership by the heir of Samsung, Lee Jae­yong, could
be enough to rein in their oversized power. Although chaebol like Samsung were essential to the
rapid growth of South Korea’s economy early on, Samsung now dominates the Korean economy
as the largest chaebol. So much dependence on one business is very risky for the economy and
could pose greater problems in the future, especially if Samsung continues to grow and
extinguish the competition. It is the responsibility of Samsung and the government to become
more economically and socially sustainable so that Korea’s great success can last more than just
a few decades.
Conclusion
It will be some time before chaebol like Samsung can fail because of their sheer size and
the fact that Koreans depend so heavily on them and so the government will probably do what it
can to keep them alive. However, it is likely that the government will have to bring them under
some control so that smaller Korean businesses have a chance at surviving in the competitive
market. As fraud continues to be a problem among chaebol, it is likely the government will also
crack down on this. As of now, chaebol are not socially sustainable as can be seen by the
large­scale corruption within the family structure of chaebol and are only somewhat
economically sustainable since they have greatly contributed to the economy in the past but to a
lesser extent today as they become more globalized. Perhaps Korea’s deep sense of insecurity
comes from the fact that it is sandwiched between the imperial dynasties of China and Japan or it
may have something to do with having a nuclear­armed hermit to the north. Either way, chaebol
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18. have proven themselves as highly successful capitalists and so the government should let them
take care of themselves and instead focus on helping the underdogs, the small and medium­sized
businesses that struggle to compete with the overpowered chaebol.
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