Multiagency Assessment and Planning: A Concept for Conflict Prevention

MULTIAGENCY ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING:
A CONCEPT FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION

Strengthening Australia’s Comprehensive Approach
to Peace and Stabilisation Operations

The Centre would like to acknowledge the work of Noetic Corporation in the development and
preparation of this document.

The content is published under a Creative Commons by Attribution 3.0 Australia
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/au/) licence. All parts of this publication
may be reproduced, stored in retrieval systems, and transmitted by any means
without the written permission of the publisher.

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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................2
PROJECT OVERVIEW .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................5
Project Methodology .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................6
BEST PRACTICES MODEL ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
Intent of the Model .....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................8
Defining the Concept of Conflict Prevention..........................................................................................................................................................9
Challenges Facing Conflict Prevention ............................................................................................................................................................................ 9
Making the Argument for Conflict Prevention ................................................................................................................................................ 10
Conflict Prevention Assessment and Planning Process [the Model] ................................................................................. 12
THE ROLE OF CULTURE ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 23
Acknowledging the Impact of National Culture ............................................................................................................................................ 23
Acknowledging the Impact of Organisational Culture ............................................................................................................................ 24
Australian Culture .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 25
Reflections from the American Perspective ........................................................................................................................................................ 26
The Role of External Actors ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 28

COMPLEMENTARY PROJECT FINDINGS ................................................................................................................................................................... 31
Strong Institutional Leadership ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 31
Conflict Prevention Funding ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 32
Deployable Government Civilian Capacity ........................................................................................................................................................... 33
CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 35
ANNEX A: LITERATURE REVIEWED.................................................................................................................................................................................. 37
ANNEX B: ORGANISATIONS CONSULTED ......................................................................................................................................................... 40
ANNEX C: WORKSHOP SUMMARIES ........................................................................................................................................................................... 42
C.1. Concept Development Workshop, Washington, D.C. ........................................................................................................... 42
C.2. Concept Validation Workshop, Washington D.C......................................................................................................................... 45
C.3. Concept Validation Workshop, Canberra ........................................................................................47

MULTIAGENCY ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING: A CONCEPT FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Conflict prevention is difficult to define, measure, and conduct, but nonetheless it is critical
in the pursuit of certain strategic goals. Furthermore, given the breadth of expertise needed
and the complexity of issues involved, engagement in conflict prevention operations should be
undertaken within a multiagency framework. This paper presents the case for two concurrent
approaches: promoting recognition of conflict prevention as a foreign policy imperative, and
expanding effective multiagency collaboration initiatives for conflict prevention.

2. These approaches have been synthesised into a proposed model for conflict prevention
assessment and planning. The model outlines the critical components of a proactive, multiagency
approach to conflict prevention. It does not imply that none of these interactions occur already
or that existing mechanisms are dysfunctional. Rather, the model serves as an attempt to clarify
understanding of where the necessary interactions occur and their relationships to each other in
the context of shared conflict prevention goals. It is intended to inform initiatives to improve or
refine conflict assessment and planning.

* The process is not intended to be linear, and is drawn as such for illustrative purposes only. It does not operate in isolation.
Host nation government and host nation society involvement are pre-requisites for success.

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3. The model is based on the assumption that a full spectrum of international assistance (from
a single nation, regional bodies, and the international community writ large) in addition to the
activities initiated domestically can work to improve conditions and potentially avert conflict
in a host nation. Therefore, promoting recognition of conflict prevention as a foreign policy
imperative, including explicit recognition of conflict prevention objectives, is important to define
the policy space and facilitate resource allocation and unity of effort.

4. The model is presented in a linear fashion for clarity, but the process it defines is dynamic
rather than linear. The model highlights the importance of aligning conflict prevention planning
to a broader strategy. Substantial and frequent multiagency input is important to both the
broader strategy, and to the intelligence assessment priorities that inform strategy development.
A defined mechanism for identifying fragile or conflict-affected countries to invest in should
be created or refined, and a multiagency approach to assessment undertaken that balances
numerous factors that would impact planning and the eventual response. These include the
ability for the intervening country to influence the situation being targeted, the national interest
in investing in that country or region, the priorities and challenges facing the particular agencies
that are involved in the assessment, and the critical role and existing activities of the host nation
and host society.

5. The model is the product of a research project that synthesised the lessons and best practices
of governments and non-government actors engaged with the problems of unstable or conflict
environments. The best practices focus on the strategic level but also link to existing operational
and tactical tools and guidance. They reflect the reality of operating with existing policy, funding,
and structural challenges that can often impede the development of comprehensive, multiagency
crisis and conflict prevention and management activities. A summary of these key points can be
found in the text boxes below.

6. This research paper does not make prescriptive recommendations, nor advocate one
standardised approach to conflict prevention and management. Instead, it offers a notional model
based on relevant contemporary defence, development and diplomatic engagement principles.
The focus is on a relatively narrow aspect of conflict studies, reflecting primarily on conflict
prevention rather than more broadly on the actual implementation of conflict management
activities, which are often supported by peace-building and other measures. Nonetheless, this
paper informs discussion on the topic of international interventions and the model is a timely
addition to the developing practice of conflict prevention.


7. Summary of key findings:

Conflict prevention: Multiagency collaboration:
• “Conflict prevention” is complex • Multiagency conflict prevention begins
and erroneously implies that conflict with a shared diagnosis of the situation.
can—and should—be prevented in all
• A multiagency approach should build on
circumstances.
existing organisational structures that have
• Conflict prevention is “an investment, been vetted and are in place, even when
not a purchase.” a high-profile crisis hits.
• There is no cohesive multiagency approach • A multiagency group works best when
to conflict prevention despite the broad there is strong and deliberate political
recognition that international development leadership and interest in a particular
and diplomacy, including capability building end-state.
initiatives, education, governance and rule
• The full range of capabilities across
of law programs and stabilisation activities
government should be evaluated in each
can be considered conflict prevention tools.
context for appropriateness and potential
• Conflict prevention must be promoted as a effectiveness in an unstable environment.
foreign policy imperative, including explicit
• The multiagency approach is already
recognition of conflict prevention objectives.
partly utilised in Australia, but needs
• Conflict can be prevented or improvement.
mitigated through a multi-pronged,
• Multiagency collaboration should
multiagency approach.
be expanded, experimented with
and critiqued.

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PROJECT OVERVIEW
Introduction
1. The last decade has brought increasing recognition by the Government of Australia, other
governments, the United Nations and other international bodies of the importance and benefits
of preventing conflict, and of managing or stabilising violence. Conflict is categorised in many ways
including through a geographic lens, such as conflict between states or internal conflict within
states by groups indigenous to that region, with or without external or diaspora support. Conflict
is motivated by many factors, including structural and root causes, competition over increasingly
scarce resources, particular triggers such as a coup d’état, ideological or political movements, etc.
Conflict is destabilising regardless of its motivation or structure.

2. The Australian Government has robust experience, significant expertise, and a range of ongoing
initiatives aimed at preventing and managing conflict overseas. Recent experiences of Australian
and allied governments in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted an urgent need for effective
whole-of-government approaches to preventing conflict and responding to escalating or
continuing crises abroad. However, the nature and range of expertise relevant to comprehensive
conflict prevention is scattered across various agencies. Competing agency priorities, national
and organisational cultures, and budgetary constraints have curtailed the development of widely
accepted concepts and a comprehensive model for multiagency1 conflict prevention. Inadequate
coordination of a multiagency response can result in the inefficient use of limited resources.
In terms of strategy and planning uncoordinated approaches will be unsuccessful in both
determining and reaching appropriate multiagency goals in conflict prevention and management,
and could produce detrimental effects on the ground.

3. This working paper is one effort to address the need for greater multiagency coordination, and
to understand how interventions may be undertaken earlier in the conflict cycle. Its emphasis
on conflict prevention recognises there are significant strategic, resource, and humanitarian
imperatives to early action. The paper is the culmination of a project undertaken by Noetic
Corporation (Noetic) which was commissioned by the Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of
Excellence (the Centre).2 The project sought to identify current best practices in assessment and
planning for conflict prevention and management in a multiagency context, in order to support
strategic decision-making and effective operational outcomes.

1 The term multiagency is descriptive of more than one government agency, department, or office working together. In the American
context, interagency is the more common term. However, the term the “multiagency” in the Australian context is not used in the way
that “the interagency” is used in the U.S. to describe the broad interactions between various government entities. For simplicity’s sake,
the term multiagency is used in this paper to describe both the Australian and American contexts.
2 The project is part of the Australian Government’s broader Multiagency Peace and Stabilisation Operations Project (MAPSOP), which aims
to strengthen Australia’s comprehensive approach to peace and stabilisation operations.


4. This paper synthesises the lessons and best practices of governments and non-government actors
engaged with the problems of unstable or conflict environments. The best practices focus at the
strategic level but link to existing operational and tactical tools and guidance. They reflect the
reality of operating with existing policy, funding, and structural challenges that can often impede
the development of comprehensive, multiagency crisis and conflict prevention and management
activities. The paper does not make prescriptive recommendations, nor does it advocate one
standardised approach to conflict prevention and management given the complexity of the
environments and actors in emerging or ongoing crises. Instead, this paper offers a notional
model based on contemporary general defence, development and diplomatic engagement
principles. The focus is on a relatively narrow aspect of conflict studies, reflecting primarily on
conflict prevention rather than more broadly on the actual implementation of conflict mitigation
activities, which are often supported by peace-building and other measures.

5. The model has been developed in an ‘organisationally-agnostic manner’, based on a civil-military
construct that is broadly applicable to the Australian and other contexts. The model is
particularly relevant to internal decision making on how to prioritise and engage in conflict
prevention in government. It is but one contribution to the broader discussions within
Australia and more widely in the sphere of conflict prevention and management.

Project Methodology
Project Design
6. The information and concepts presented in this paper are the products of desktop research
and of interviews and workshops with a number of relevant agencies conducted by Noetic’s
Washington, D.C. and Canberra offices between April and June 2011. All discussions were
non-attributable. The project team also reviewed a selection of literature from government
(Australian, U.S. and others) and international non-governmental sources.3

7. Subsequently more than thirty high-level policymakers and practitioners from Australia,
the United States, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and other non-governmental
organisations were interviewed and asked to share their best practices from first-hand
experience in home capitals, host nation capitals, and field locations.4

8. A Concept Development Workshop held in Washington, D.C. on 23 May 2011 brought together
subject matter experts to define the scope and explore the critical elements of a multiagency
model. The project team facilitated a lively discussion that addressed strategic and operational
considerations for engaging and operating in a conflict environment.

3 See Annex A for a full list of documents consulted during this project
4 See Annex B for a full list of organisations consulted during this project

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9. The project team presented its preliminary findings at a Concept Validation Workshop on
10 June 2011 in Washington, D.C. Australian, British and U.S. Government and non-government
stakeholders were invited to critique the candidate model’s effective principles, consider
counterintuitive practices, and offer views on what a useful model should comprise. The candid
discussions served to validate and further refine the best practices and lessons learned.

10. A third and final workshop was held in Canberra on 21 June 2011. This half-day workshop
gathered senior leaders from the Australian multiagency environment, including representatives
from the Department of Defence, Joint Operations Command, Military Strategic Commitments,
Australian Federal Police, AusAID, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian
Parliament, and the World Bank. The participation of these organisations ensured the model
was vetted for its viability in the Australian context.

11. The goal in adopting this approach was to ensure the production of a robust, contemporary,
organisationally-agnostic, strategically relevant and practical model for the Australian Government
and other actors.

Structure of the Paper
12. There are three parts to this working paper.
• This part introduces the project methodology.
• The next part presents a notional multiagency assessment and planning model for conflict
prevention and management, building on an exploration of critical considerations and
select best practices learned through the research phase of the project. This section initially
defines the concept of conflict prevention, reflects on the challenges facing the discipline,
and then explores the importance of making the case for conflict prevention. The notional
model is then presented with best practices from the project woven into the explanation of
its constituent parts. This is followed by a discussion of underlying organisational cultures and
how national culture(s) can motivate, hinder, or simply not encourage investment in conflict
prevention. Specific reflections and best practices are drawn from Australian Government
dynamics and culture, the U.S. Government and U.S. multiagency dynamics, and from
limited engagement with the United Nations and other multinational actors. Finally, three
far-reaching challenges that surfaced during the research are explored in more detail, with
best practices defined and offered for each. These challenges include ineffective leadership,
funding restrictions, including a discussion of the still controversial concept of pooled funding
for conflict prevention, and determining effective deployable civilian government capacity for
conflict response work.
• The final part of the paper presents the conclusions from the analysis.


Best Practice Definition
13. A best practice is a method or process that has consistently achieved desired impacts better
than other methods or means. The best practices in this paper reflect the lessons that have
been identified over combined decades of efforts at conflict prevention and management in the
select literature, and by the individuals and agencies consulted in this project. They are necessarily
open to refinement, and their suitability and utility will depend on the circumstances to which
they would be applied. They are offered here to provide valuable, tested information for those
engaged in similar environments.

BEST PRACTICES MODEL
Intent of the Model
14. The purpose of the model is to present, primarily to government audiences, a notional method
for initiating assessment and planning for conflict prevention. It could be applied in Australian,
American, or other contexts.

15. The model is intended to inform the development and/or improvement of more detailed
processes or mechanisms at, and between, each step identified. It also provides a context for
understanding the application of identified best practices. Clearly, its graphical representation
is but a simplified interpretation of a very complex set of issues.

16. A number of issues are important to acknowledge in developing a multiagency assessment
and planning model for conflict prevention and management. These critical considerations are
themes that influence why a nation decides, or should decide, to invest in conflict prevention
and management, and when.

17. The model:
• Proposes a set of basic, practical organising principles needed to more effectively bring
a multiagency approach to the conduct of conflict prevention and management.
• Identifies the necessary elements in a comprehensive multiagency approach;
• Recognises that existing mature bureaucracies such as in the United States and Australian
Governments currently possess numerous relevant tools, specific approaches, and
frameworks that could be used at different points along the stages of the model5, and
should be incorporated where possible.

5 An example is the potential use of the State/CRS Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) at Step 4

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Defining the Concept of Conflict Prevention
18. The Centre has defined conflict prevention in its Multiagency Peace and Stabilisation Operations
Project (MAPSOP) literature as follows: “[Conflict prevention] involves the application of
structural or diplomatic measures to keep low-level or long-festering tensions and disputes from
escalating into violent conflict, but it can also apply to efforts to limit the spread of violence if it
does occur, or to avoid the reoccurrence of violence. Ideally, it should build on structured early
warning, information gathering and a careful analysis of the factors driving the conflict. Conflict
prevention activities may include the use of the Secretary-General’s “good offices,” early warning
systems, confidence-building measures (hotlines, notification of troop movements), preventive
deployment, and sanctions. Conflict Prevention is sometimes also referred to as preventive
diplomacy. (UN Capstone Document 2008 and USIP Peace Terms Glossary 2011)”

Challenges Facing Conflict Prevention
19. Conflict prevention is a complex discipline. In the Australian and U.S. contexts, there is not
an agreed upon theory of change, or change model, for incorporating a “conflict prevention”
mindset into the business of government. During the project process, a universal comment noted
that there is a critical need to promote the recognition of the importance of conflict prevention
across the multiagency context, and Government, and with it the commensurate processes and
policies to support it. It is recognised that international development and diplomacy, including
capability building initiatives, education, governance and rule of law programs and stabilisation
activities can be considered conflict prevention tools, but there is not currently a cohesive
multiagency approach to conflict prevention. Clearly, the levers that could cause positive change
towards a more robust whole-of-government focus on conflict prevention are unique to each
government and organisation, and may differ within the constituent parts of each.

20. Secondly, the term “conflict prevention” makes the assumption that conflict is to be prevented
in all circumstances, which is a mischaracterisation. From a geopolitical standpoint, the initiation
of conflict may achieve a particular changed end-state that may sometimes coincide with a
potential intervening government’s interest and support their strategic goals. For example, the
U.S. and most Western partners have presented the spread of democracy as a global goal.
Each democracy is unique, and in seeking to become one, it is important to note that the process
of democratisation is inherently destabilising and can be a preceding factor to violent conflict.
Not attempting to stop a conflict is sometimes a pragmatic option as evidenced in the civil war
in Angola that brought the demise of Jonas Savimbi, which led within six weeks to a cessation of
violence and UNITA rebels laying down their arms. More recently the civil uprising in Tunisia in
early 2011 led to the ousting of long-time President Abidine Ben Ali.


21. From a broader perspective, the assumption that the actions of one actor have a direct,
causal impact on another is inherently precarious. It is difficult to conclude that one actor’s
preventative initiatives were the deciding factor in preventing violent conflict from escalating
or occurring. The number and effect of different, overlapping or interlinking factors are not
predictable or absolute. In other words, it is difficult to prove that an intervention prevented or
stopped something that didn’t happen. However, this is perhaps something in which it is worth
investing. Certainly it was noted that investments in baseline assessments (followed by periodic
reviews) allow for the measuring of trends in at-risk or conflict affected situations. Increasingly
sophisticated, system-wide Monitoring and Evaluation Frameworks for interventions that include
of a range of data sources can also provide meaningful information about actual and perceived
levels of stability, security and development in countries and societies.

Making the Argument for Conflict Prevention
22. Participants in the project shared many motivations for supporting conflict prevention assessment
and planning. National security concerns were raised as reasons for seeking to stabilise volatile
regions overseas that could become “hot beds for terrorists.” In some cases, political leadership
and related investment in conflict prevention was seen to hinge on personal interest on the part
of senior leaders. A more nebulous “moral” obligation was raised as a factor to make the case
for conflict prevention (recognising that conceptions of morality and ethics are unique down
to the individual level), noting the “imperative” to provide assistance and to mitigate the loss
of life wherever and whenever possible. While international response for relief or humanitarian
purposes will inevitably continue, intervention abroad is consistently aligned with the foreign policy
objectives of a particular nation. Each interviewee or workshop participant brought a different
perspective to the table on why a nation, or organisation, should invest in conflict prevention.

23. The oft-cited “CNN effect” may also be a motivator for a nation to attempt to stabilise another,
as public or global outcry demands action to stop violence. Along the opposite track, many
commentators note that a lack of media coverage and international interest in an escalating
conflict scenario can be the deciding factor for international actors not to intervene and respond,
which can result in more intense and prolonged crises.

24. Elected officials (as almost universally referenced by the U.S. based interviewees) are swayed
by the demands of their constituencies. Elected representatives will be cognisant of the need to
manage the expectations of constituents in terms of what can actually be achieved in a particular
place, and in the decision to intervene at all. Should public outcry or extensive constituent
pressure grow to a strong degree, political decision makers may be motivated to support or
not support conflict prevention and, more often, conflict or crisis action responses.

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25. Deterrence is a fundamental objective of any intervention overseas, including conflict prevention.
As such, the importance of investing in intelligence gathering, including financial intelligence,
and information technology such as an offensive cyber capability, particularly in light of growing
links between criminal elements and irregular threats, is increasingly important. Demonstrating
national interest, presence and capability (overtly or by suggestion, particularly in those
previously listed) in unstable regions or nations can conceivably contribute to deterring activity
by destabilising forces as well as those who seek to capitalise on a lack of indigenous capacity.
Just as with conflict prevention generally, however, proving causation, or at least correlation,
between deterrence and the absence of conflict or instability is problematic.

26. Unfortunately, once a particular approach has been defined, there is a tendency to apply the
same formula to every circumstance or environment. Instead, for an effective conflict prevention
approach, the full range of capabilities across government should be evaluated in each context
for appropriateness and potential effectiveness in an unstable environment that has also been
defined as strategically or politically important.

27. Conflict prevention requires both an immediate perspective, in terms of understanding how
short-term reactions to current events prompt long-term impact, as well as a long-term strategy
over decades. It is, in brief, “an investment, not a purchase.” Long-term state-building focuses
on governance and requires reducing pockets of exclusion, ensuring mechanisms for political
mediation (national and local level) exist and are used, investing in education and wide-ranging
skills-training, while building the legitimacy of and confidence in the custodians of the state.
According to many project interviewees, the role of outsiders should be to assist through
facilitation and development of local solutions, mentoring and/or training rather than to transplant
and impose external (and sometimes alien) solutions.

28. One critical best practice drawn from the research highlighted the importance of linking a clear
national interest to any investment in conflict prevention activities. Whether the strategy is to
promote regional stability, act in order to invest in a stable world order, or promote economic
stability for business development purposes, the investment in conflict prevention assessment
and planning will necessarily be motivated by national interest.


Conflict Prevention Assessment and Planning Process [the Model]
29. The following graphic describes the proposed conflict prevention assessment and planning
process. The model explores the particular steps, in an ideal circumstance, of an effective
multiagency assessment and planning for conflict prevention and management activities.

* The process is not intended to be linear, and is drawn as such for illustrative purposes only. It does not operate in isolation.
Host nation government and host nation society involvement are pre-requisites for success.

Institutional Goals
30. The findings of this project indicate that, in order to facilitate success and to ensure conflict
prevention assessment and planning attracts appropriate resources and support two overarching
institutional goals should be promoted.

31. These goals are as follows:

Goal #1:

Promote recognition of conflict prevention as a foreign policy imperative

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32. Both government and non-government stakeholders reflected that many development, security,
economic and rule of law activities, among others, may prevent conflict even if conflict prevention
was not the specific end state identified when they were planned and implemented. The
spectrum of international activities from external countries, regional bodies, and the international
community writ large, in addition to the activities initiated at the host country level, can work to
improve pre-conflict and post-conflict conditions. Promoting recognition of conflict prevention
as a foreign policy imperative, including explicit recognition of conflict prevention objectives,
is important to define the policy space and facilitate resource allocation and unity of effort.

Goal #2:

Expand effective multiagency collaboration initiatives

33. While there is continued recognition that working in a multiagency environment is, simply put,
both the reality and the ideal, there are few examples of multiagency collaboration initiatives
to serve as best practice models. In order to develop the necessary organisational trust, and
warrant decision-makers to expend political capital in changing bureaucratic structures and
incentives to support change, multiagency collaboration should be expanded, experimented
with and critiqued, with the lessons diffused widely and applied to future multiagency initiatives.

Process
34. The conflict assessment and planning model is not bound as a linear process. It is represented as
such in the graphic for illustrative purposes only. For example, a multiagency plan or a standing
coordination mechanism for supporting that plan may already exist for a particular scenario
(process step 7a.) If so, efforts may commence at this stage, with single agencies developing
their plans (process step 7b.) and then moving into continual evaluation and review (process
step 8) and the process can circle back to clarifying and articulating the government strategy
(process step 1) and ensuring alignment with the plan. In addition, depending on organisation and
country or area of proposed intervention, the “entry point” into the process will not necessarily
be the proposed process step 1. A refrain from the project participants noted that there is no
one, single multiagency or intra-agency assessment tool that is perfectly appropriate for every
situation. Therefore, relevant assessment and coordination mechanisms should be utilised and
brought together as needed.


PROCESS STEP 1: CLARIFY AND ARTICULATE GOVERNMENT STRATEGY

35. In order to determine whether or not a case can be made for initiating conflict prevention
assessment and planning, it is important for planners and others involved in the process to
understand the overall government strategy. For example, if the predominant government focus
is on a major, domestic crisis, or leadership has clearly stated during election campaigning or
in recent policy documents that there are limited resources or interest in new foreign affairs
endeavours, it is important to be aware of this broad contextual reality.

36. The rationale for investing in conflict prevention and management is derived from security
concerns, strategic ambition, inherent moral interests and the many different factors within
each which exert influence at the strategic, operational, or political levels of government.
Practical considerations of decision makers include having the opportunity, the political will, the
resources to act, while being mindful to “do no harm”. According to many project participants,
governments should exert discipline in standing back from interventions overseas that are not
aligned with defined strategic political objectives.

37. In Australia, there are clearly defined national strategic objectives to contribute to stability
and security in Australia’s immediate neighbourhood6. Even so, in the model, the initial “clarify
and articulate government strategy” step is one that is not often well understood in both the
Australian and US contexts. A process of clarifying and articulating government strategy involves
marrying stated, enduring strategic interests with the domestic and foreign policy priorities of
the day to contextualise specific issues and problems in an appropriate political framework. The
model provides for a clear articulation of government strategy to form the necessary foundation
for effective engagement across the multiagency community and with the government in the
assessment and planning of conflict prevention activities.

PROCESS STEP 2: PROMOTE MULTIAGENCY INPUT TO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSESSMENT PRIORITIES

38. Determining appropriate areas of focus for conflict prevention (and management) activities
will be influenced by the credibility of the information available about a particular region or
country. In order to attempt to promote a particular area for attention, it would be important
to be aware of, and ideally influence, the data sets that are analysed by the official intelligence
community. Given that different internal organisational cultures, priorities and mandates exist
within governments, multiagency input into these priorities would help to ensure that all drivers
and dynamics of violent conflict are reviewed. This is expanded on further below in process
steps 6 and 7.

6 Australian Government, Department of Defence, “Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030”, Commonwealth of
Australia: Canberra, 2009, p. 54 (para 7.10)

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39. One senior level official during the U.S. interview process noted with concern that in the present
American system, there is a fundamental lack of synchronisation between intelligence support
(based on a Cold War system as the predominant lens and entrenched structure to understand
the threats facing the American state) and crisis action planning. As such, the weighting of open
source, near-impossible to verify social media streams may be overlooked as a result of the
focus on the reporting from existing classified mechanisms. Similar concerns were raised in the
Australian context, particularly highlighting a need for greater multiagency input into national
intelligence priorities. Some participants also recognised the limitations on sharing information
given that open source data is often classified once incorporated into intelligence analysis.
Communication with the broader international community and the analyses presented by the
UN, World Bank, non-governmental organisations, among other diverse groups, would be useful
in order to gather balanced information about a fragile conflict-affected area.

PROCESS STEP 3: DEFINE MECHANISM TO IDENTIFY COUNTRIES TO CONSIDER FOR
MULTIAGENCY CONFLICT PREVENTION

40. Each area of government will have unique ways of identifying the factors and prerequisites
for increasing focus on a particular region, country, or trend. However, in order to ensure
that there is in fact multiagency (as opposed to individual agency) assessment and planning,
a mechanism should be defined for coordinating information and allocating appropriate roles
and responsibilities. The mechanism may differ depending on the geopolitical strategic focus
on the country (or region) in question, and/or its relative weight to other political priorities.
As noted above in defining a key, underlying institutional goal, to “expand effective multiagency
collaboration initiatives,” defining the identification mechanism would benefit from existing
multiagency collaboration initiatives and exercises. The National Security Staff could be expected
to play a robust role in defining and endorsing these mechanisms in the U.S. context. In Australia,
the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet could also play an essential convening role.

41. An important finding from the project indicated the importance of committing to retain existing
organisational structures that have been vetted and are in place, even when a high-profile
crisis hits. Wasting time and resources to create entirely new organisations and coordination
mechanisms when some already exist is not logical or recommended. The key question then is
not whether existing organisations, capabilities and mechanisms should be dramatically changed
or replaced, but how they can operate with greater coherence and complementarity for conflict
prevention and management. One interviewee noted that current U.S. program and funding
mechanisms are unable to sufficiently support the complex, multidimensional requirements of
pre- and post-conflict environments. A collaborative model for organising multiagency assessment,
planning and implementation was offered where individual agencies plug into a “conflict centre”
with a discrete funding line and staffed not by development or rule-of-law specialists, but rather
by conflict specialists who know when and how to draw on development, rule-of-law, security
and diplomacy expertise when planning and responding to instability and conflict.


42. In order to effectively assess the pre-conflict environment, the project findings note three
areas that are recommended in developing a functional model. These are described as process
steps 4, 5, and 6 in the model.

43. It is worth stating that the term “assessment” differs in traditional meaning between the
military and civilian arenas. Often, a civilian understanding of assessment, typically relating to
programmatic assessment, is to evaluate measures of effectiveness and performance, though this
is not to suggest that civilian programs lack contextual analysis as a basis for program planning.
A prominent interpretation of assessment in the military is in the context of intelligence, as the
information and contextual understanding of a situation, event, group and/or other entity.

PROCESS STEP 4: CONDUCT ASSESSMENTS DRAWING ON MULTIAGENCY EXPERIENCE

44. Best practice multiagency or multinational assessment starts with a shared diagnosis of the
situation by the agencies or nations involved. A collective appraisal of relevant issues facilitates
the development of synchronised and complementary assessments and plans, while the process
of analysing the problems together enables a shared vision and vocabulary to be developed.

45. The particular bias of any one office or personality can impact the findings of an assessment.
Therefore, it is critical to draw on multiagency experience to mitigate the threat of any one
opinion or perspective gaining undue dominance. For example, a stereotypical criticism has been
that any expert in rule of law will determine the most critical conflict prevention approach to be
a rule of law, security sector assistance response, or that a public health officer will determine
that the most stabilising factor in an unstable environment would be to bolster the health service
in a particular area. Bringing together multiagency perspectives would ideally mitigate these
types of concerns by ensuring competing views and perspectives are addressed and mitigated
early on in the process. In addition, the use of conflict specialists who have a comprehensive,
interdisciplinary and inherently multidimensional understanding of conflict and its precursors
can assist in the development of balanced, comprehensive assessments. A range of tools already
exist in the assessment space and should be utilised as appropriate to the context and the actors
involved, though few represent holistic, multidimensional assessments combining multiple levels
of assessment.

46. An essential part of assessment involves the incorporation of relevant early warning systems
pulled from both inside government, and from external multinational actors. Many organisations
within the international community evaluate the drivers of conflict in existing early warning type
systems.7 Key drivers include factors such as political polarisation, economic elitism, widespread
or uncontested corruption, recruitment of militia, and a noticeable change in criminal statistics.

7 Some examples include Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE), TCAF, ICAF, etc.

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47. Unfortunately, some of the current literature still refers to the possibility of there being one
or multiple pre-defined “triggers” that can be predicted to “spark” widespread violent conflict.
There is rarely a predictable, singular “trip point” that initiates an increase in violent conflict.
The underlying assumption reflects a linear interpretation of events that would be better
described as wicked problems.8

48. The interviewees in the U.S. context were chosen due to their extensive understanding of
and work in conflict prevention or related activities. The majority of them emphasised the
importance of nuanced analysis of the drivers of conflict and expressed concern with the
oversimplification of complex problems by bureaucrats and especially elected officials in the
United States.

49. Early warning is undertaken in different ways by different parts of government. For example,
in the defence context, early warning systems could be understood as the standard intelligence
tools that analysts draw on in order to assess security and political conditions on the ground in
a particular area. Diplomatic and government international development personnel would also
use intelligence tools and analysis to better understand the changing dynamics of a fluid situation
on the ground. Open source materials have played an increasingly important role over the past
ten years. Non-governmental and international organisations including the World Bank and the
United Nations evaluate different indicators on the ground to assess the timing and level of direct
assistance. Commercial entities including multinational, regional and national corporations are
also cognisant of changing conditions in the areas where they invest, and adapt their actions and
reactions accordingly.

50. Therefore, it is important for decision makers and individual agencies or offices to refrain from
making simplistic causal linkages between pre-conflict factors and the escalation of violent
conflict. Mainstream media can feed into this dynamic of limited assessment and analysis in favour
of overblown news stories. A critical element of effective assessment is to incorporate different
types and sources of information into any early warning and assessment process.

8 The phrase “Wicked problem” was first used in social planning to describe a problem that is extremely challenging or impossible to solve
because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that impact the problem space. These requirements and the related
impact from them are often difficult to recognise. It is possible that the effort to solve one aspect of a wicked problem may highlight or
create other problems. (Paraphrased from Ritchey, Tom; “Wicked Problems: Structuring Social Messes with Morphological Analysis,”
Swedish Morphological Society, last revised 7 November 2007.) An additional resource on wicked problems can be found at
http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications07/wickedproblems.pdf


PROCESS STEP 5: ASSESS AGAINST KEY FACTORS

51. There are multiple factors that a department, agency, or office should assess against when
determining how best to develop, and contribute to, a multiagency assessment and planning
process. Determining that there is, in fact, an ability to influence a particular sector, society,
country or region is a critical element. This includes understanding the financial, human, and
political resources available. The assessment should weigh the current and expected national
interest in planning for, and then responding to, an area or country in pre-conflict conditions. The
internal policies or circumstances of each department, agency or office may impact the ability of
that entity to respond due to factors such as the legislated authorities vested in that office, or in
the funding streams appropriated to it. It is highly beneficial for any actor in a pre- or post-conflict
environment to honestly assess the unique capability that it brings to bear and any restrictions
on their capacity to act. Further, the willingness of actors to discuss, frankly, those capabilities
and restrictions with other actors in a multiagency forum facilitates both a clear understanding
of what capabilities and capacity exists, and complementary planning for the most effective and
efficient use of limited resources.

52. In addition, the host society and host nation should not be assumed to be a homogenous entity.
The host opinions are central to a comprehensive assessment of conditions on the ground and
host views are vital to the success of any conflict prevention plan. It is important to be aware
of, and incorporate, local contextual knowledge and understanding into any assessment and
planning efforts in conflict prevention and management. Power dynamics in the host government
and society, as well as between the intervening and host actors are important to understand
when incorporating local information and views. Engagement across host governments, other
political actors, civil society and the general population is required for a comprehensive picture
of a host perspective, and critically important in understanding both the factors and dynamics
that destabilise the environment as well as those that have the capacity to produce or support
stability. An accurate assessment of what is often described as the “human terrain” in a potential
target area, country or region will impact the level and focus of investment in longer-term,
sometimes hard-to-define conflict prevention and management objectives.

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53. In general terms, assessments should include local, country, and regional levels of analysis in
order to account for actors and activities taking place further afield than affect the environment
in focus. Assessment should be both contextual and thematic in focus areas, such as incorporating
the impact of transnational crime, terrorism, and trafficking. The traditional conception of the
nation-state and the structural design and culture of governments to operate within those
confines constrain effective engagement on issues that cross borders and involve significant
non-government actors. This is particularly concerning in light of the prevalence of terrorists and
criminals operating across national borders, as well as the rising influence of non-state actors
within nations. National borders of fragile and unstable states tend to be sparsely populated,
unmonitored by law enforcement, far from the bases of foreign intelligence actors, and provide
opportune access to multiple markets, thus making them favoured by those with insalubrious
intent.9

54. According to a number of experienced practitioners, assessments should be led by those with
a strong multidisciplinary background, and supported by experts (or subject matter experts,
to include so-called conflict specialists). Those with the multi-disciplinary background are
sometimes referred to as “generalists” who have a broad understanding of the context or
area being evaluated, but are not specific experts in any one field. Civilian participants should
be experienced in working in unstable environments in the field, and with marginally or non-
functioning bureaucracies. Each office, agency, or department has its own interests, experts,
and funding pools, and in order for an assessment report to be actionable, it requires the full
support of its host office. If feasible, each office may decide to gather the information in the
manner it sees fit in the field, and then participate in the “cross-walk” of assessment findings
at headquarters. An alternative might be a multiagency assessment team conducting in-country
assessment and engagement, supported by conflict specialists.

9 The U.S. Government’s Regional Strategic Initiative was an attempt at overcoming the structural constraints to effective management of
cross-border problems. It was under-pinned by principles that more agencies are not necessarily better. A shared diagnosis of the problem
is highlighted as the most useful starting point for multiagency activities. It argues that “host” nations fare better when dealing with actors
unified in their analysis of the issues. In this initiative, the U.S. Embassy hosts representatives of relevant government agencies from the
countries affected by the cross border activity. The first set of meetings consists of agency briefings leading to the development of a shared
diagnosis of the problem, the identification of programs and needs, and negotiations to decide who will be responsible for what action.
Subsequent to the meeting one report (in cable form) agreed to by all the agencies party to the meeting is sent back to Washington
with joint action recommendations. If Phase One is successful, the group meet again, typically a few months later, to again diagnose the
problem and identify priorities. Representatives of the countries affected by the cross-border activity are invited to the table in order to
join the process of dividing responsibilities. A third phase prescribed by the initiative has seldom been undertaken but brings together the
governments of affected nations at a high level to work through a similar process.


PROCESS STEP 6: ADVISE GOVERNMENT AND REQUEST GUIDANCE

55. While it may seem self-evident that there would need to be a particular decision point in an
assessment and planning process, given the concern noted by many during the project that there
are insufficient or nebulous decision points in when and how to plan in the multiagency context,
it is important to highlight where one is most usefully situated. A number of participants noted
that while there is an overall perspective that conflict prevention (and stability more inherently)
is important as a part of an overall foreign policy goal, there are few mechanisms or structures
through which senior level leadership can or do specifically demand increased investment in this
area. This decision point is necessary so that the diverse multiagency actors are vested in the
outcomes of planning, and are also held accountable to the overall success of the eventual plan.
Recommendations from one area of government to senior decision makers, be they on the policy
side such as the National Security Council or from external lobbyists to the Congress in the U.S.
context, may prompt further study and analysis before planning is made a multiagency priority.
This is conveyed by the link back to the “Promote Multiagency Input to National Intelligence
Assessment Priorities” step of the process.

56. Assessment and planning should not be construed as sequential processes. Instead, it is an
iterative process, with information feeding back and forth between processes. A holistic concept
for planning begins with assessment, ideally with the relevant, action-oriented stakeholders
involved throughout the process, and it extends through to review and evaluation. There
are three areas in the process model that focus predominantly on planning: developing the
multiagency plan and establishing a standing coordination mechanism; facilitating single agency
plans to support the multiagency one; and instituting a perpetual monitoring, evaluation and
review process. The following three sections discuss this in more detail.

PROCESS STEP 7A: DEVELOP MULTIAGENCY PLAN AND ESTABLISH COORDINATION

57. A standing coordination mechanism for evaluating conflict related activities occurs at multiple
levels within the U.S. Government. Often, when an expected crisis environment begins to
deteriorate, increasingly senior levels of the government bureaucracy are brought in, culminating
with a Deputies Committee (Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense, for example) meeting
regularly at the National Security Council level. It is important to establish parameters such as
the appropriate roles and responsibilities of participants and the venue and frequency of meetings
to effectively coordinate the many different actors in the chaos of an escalating conflict situation.
One useful coordination mechanism example is a joint leadership effort, such as an empowered
Special/High Representative focused on political issues, a Pro Consul with responsibility for overall
coordination of all civilian and military activities in a particular country or area of responsibility,
with a senior in-country military commander reporting to the Pro Consul. These processes and
mechanisms may vary, or require modification, from case to case.

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58. The relatively small size of the multiagency community in Australia means personnel are
reasonably likely to interact repeatedly with other agencies (and, in many cases, the same people)
over the years, building relationships and mutual understanding of roles, working cultures, and
capabilities. The close physical proximity of some agencies enables much informal communication
and chance meetings that further enhance cooperation. On the other hand the small size of
Australian bureaucracies is an oft-cited reason for being unable to provide or spare personnel for
participation in and contributions to multiagency collaborative forums, particularly those with a
more deliberate, conflict prevention rather than conflict response focus. Certainly the strength
of the Australian arrangement is derived from the network of personal relationships and hence
is vulnerable to the loss of any one of those critical relationships.

59. Additionally, there are relatively few individuals who work in the multiagency sphere on a regular
basis. Therefore when agencies are engaged in multiagency interventions in a conflict situation
a great number of staff members tasked with working on a response effort are often much less
familiar with other agencies roles, responsibilities, programming and funding mechanisms, etc.
At a higher level, these interactions in formal mechanisms such as Inter-Departmental Emergency
Task Forces (IDETFs) primarily serve as opportunities for sharing information and, to a lesser
extent, coordinating activities of separate agencies. They are not tasked with or used for
development of an overarching multiagency plan or planning guidance. Furthermore, such
mechanisms are currently activated in response to a crisis, not to consider conflict prevention.

PROCESS STEP 7B: SINGLE AGENCIES DEVELOP PLANNING TO PLUG INTO/SUPPORT
THE MULTIAGENCY PLAN

60. At the same time that the overarching multiagency plan is developed and socialised, each of the
relevant departments, agencies, and offices will also need to develop detailed plans to enact
their contributions to the multiagency effort. These would be directly in support of the broader
planning process, but may also include particular elements that are unique to that agency. There
may be funding ramifications across different funding lines that require modifications at a variety
of levels and impact multiple agencies. In the U.S. context, these would then involve the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB). In Australia the Treasury and Department of Finance and
Administration play a vital role in costing and funding for contingencies and could conceivably
contribute to a stronger basis for costing and funding multiagency endeavours. This starting point
for any plan in determining the institutional baseline of each contributing actor is critical.

61. Defining the essential core functions of each agency and office is crucial so that all actors are
aware of what others are bringing to the negotiation and response table. While there may
be a lot of representatives at the planning table, it should be acknowledged that not every
agency can or should make the same level of contribution. A well-documented best practice
in planning indicates that any conflict prevention or mitigation plan should be informed by, and
where appropriate link to, existing planning processes such as U.S. Department of Defense,


Combatant Command-led theatre campaign planning, Department of State Mission Strategic
Resource Plans etc. In an Australian context multiagency conflict prevention plans should
be informed by AusAID Country Strategies & Plans, DFAT engagement priorities, Defence
International Engagement Programs and operational engagements and other Australian
Government agency programs that have an international engagement element. It should be
noted that the relationship between a multiagency and individual agency plan is a two-way
interaction, with multiagency efforts likely resulting in efficiency and effectiveness dividends
at the agency level, while individual agency specialisation and focus can provide the necessary
nuance and detail to overarching multiagency approaches.

PROCESS STEP 8: EVALUATE AND REVIEW

62. Planning is a constantly evolving process across all levels of a response. The commitment to,
and mechanism for, continual monitoring, evaluation and review should be built into the process.
More importantly, the learning from the evaluation should be deliberately indoctrinated and
internalised where relevant in order to improve the process for future iterations. Depending on
the circumstance, it may be more effective to develop plans that propose scalable interventions,
and be broadly defined to allow for minor and, when needed, major revision in reaction to
frequently changing on-the-ground dynamics. What is valid on day one of an assessment in a
pre-conflict, post-conflict or transitional environment will not be valid on day sixty.

63. Comprehensive planning to simultaneously support foreign policy and foreign aid objectives,
military-to-military security sector assistance (SSA), justice, rule of law and policing assistance
and other security and governance engagement , is a distinctly complex and difficult task.
Best practice indicates that it is important to understand these broader strategies and their
specific objectives in order to design a conflict prevention and management plan that stands
in complement rather than competition to these other plans.

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THE ROLE OF CULTURE
64. The role of “culture” arose as a critical, central point to any discussion regarding conflict
prevention. The activities that encompass conflict prevention as a discipline, as well as its
methods, motivations, and effectiveness measures, are not strongly defined and are therefore
susceptible to ongoing change and interpretation. In addition to lacking a substantial, theoretical
and policy grounding, conflict prevention sits in an institutional grey area, with no widely
understood structural home (foreign affairs versus development versus civil-military stability
operations). As a result, the impact of individual and organisational cultures greatly (and possibly,
disproportionately) influences the interpretation of appropriate conflict assessment and planning,
as well as the metrics to build accountability into these processes.

Acknowledging the Impact of National Culture
65. “Cultural baggage” gives context to common differences such as diagnosis of a problem and
approaches to problem solving but is often disregarded or underestimated in the assessments
and planning for external engagement. The Australian and U.S. Governments, among others,
tend to assume and automatically default to creating foreign institutions broadly in their own
image, assuming that Australian and U.S. normative concepts of public good, social contract, and
the purpose of government are, or should be, the same in all cultures. The research affirmed
that there is also no one, uniform Australian or American culture or one, homogenous Australian
or U.S. Government. These terms are used for simplification purposes here in order to articulate
a fundamental point.

66. A frequent American sentiment indicates support for the “quick fix” in foreign engagements,
rather than long-term, institutional or structural investment. Nations (and institutions) need
to be aware of what cultural baggage they bring to understand how that influences decisions,
approaches, and interactions internally and with external partners. In order to do so, and to
mitigate “quick fix” solutions obfuscating longer-term strategies, continuous review and evaluation
of assessment, planning, and response should be built into multiagency initiatives and structures.

67. A predominantly Western or Northern perspective raised during the interview phase indicated
that informal systems are perceived to be less legitimate, sophisticated, or adequate than formal
structures. This attitude can lead to a disinclination to try ideas suggested by host nationals.
Nevertheless, clearly the West does not have the monopoly on knowing what will work best for
others, and indigenous programs may have equal possibility of having a positive impact. If the goal
is ultimately for local populations to manage their internal conflict in a way that is acceptable to
the donors, their ideas and methods for doing so should be heard, evaluated, and incorporated


into plans. Even marginally effective indigenous-inspired programs can add value for both the
host nation and the wider community. In addition, it can be expected that the host culture will
impact to varying degrees how compatible, and likely to succeed, the systems and approaches
of external actors are.

Acknowledging the Impact of Organisational Culture
68. Within governments there are unique subcultures among the military, police, diplomatic, and
development areas—and each of these does not represent a homogenous group. In recent years,
there has been a growing body of literature and commentary on the role of individual cultures
within the multiagency government structure. Overcoming the assumptions and preconceptions
of where one sits, and the impact that these have on action or inaction requires honest reflection
and bureaucratic structures to support behaviour change. Even when these implicit differences
are acknowledged (such as between military infantry and civil affairs officers, relief and long-term
development workers, field-based and headquarters staff) incentives and disincentives need to
be in place that support coordination and cooperation.

69. A culture of risk aversion permeates many bureaucracies, which limits creativity and can inhibit
effectiveness in program design. The project research validated this sentiment in both the
U.S. and Australian Government contexts. In order to achieve broad consensus, or at least
tacit acceptance of the role of conflict prevention, it is important to incentivise working in a
multiagency environment. Bureaucrats are promoted within the bureaucracy for protecting their
turf and being effective advocates of their agency perspective or position, not for playing nicely in
the ‘multiagency sandbox’.

70. Investments in conflict prevention will always be confined by national interests, and periodically
in politically sensitive cases, motivated by the humanitarian imperative. A comprehensive focus
on conflict prevention encourages a view of national interest across a longer timeframe, and
thus would require significant political courage to challenge a risk-averse system that currently
incentivises a much shorter-term planning time horizon.

71. The organisational culture of the host nation and host society is equally important to the
potential for effective conflict prevention strategies. Ideally, the host nation’s government (and
potentially non-government actors) inputs into the priorities, and the international community
generally supports them. There will be circumstances, however, wherein a supposedly legitimate
central government is not widely supported and there are active popular dissident factions,
or where supporting the government is not in an external actor’s best interests. Though this
complicates matters it does not preclude effective conflict prevention. In fact it further reinforces
the notion that governments’ methods and approaches for conflict prevention need to broaden
beyond government to government interaction and do more to understand how to leverage and
engage local actors and capacities in civil society and the non-government sector.

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72. Working with and through local capacities for peace is critical. This demands a detailed
understanding of local dynamics to be able to seek the opportunities that may be present with
local structures and systems, and not contribute to further instability. People will bring to bear
different ethics, values, and leadership needs. Engaging with host nations and host societies
requires the development of relationships across the spectrum of a multiagency and multi-actor
environment. Not only is investment in the host nation and society needed in the assessment
and planning of any kind of operation, but attaining local ownership is also a pre-condition for
reducing or withdrawing external assistance.

Australian Culture
73. The above points regarding the impact of organisational culture are generally applicable, but
there are also some differences between the Australian and U.S. organisational cultures and
dynamics that need to be noted. The principle of ministerial responsibility inherent within the
Australian system of government shapes the environment within which multiagency collaboration
occurs. This means that individual ministers are accountable for all actions undertaken by their
department and, hence there is a limitation on how much agencies can be bound by decisions
taken below ministerial level.

74. Yet Australia is no stranger to the multiagency approach. There are already many areas, such as
in the response to natural disasters and conceptualising contributions to peace and stabilisation
operations that are conducted on a multiagency basis. This is partly due to the relatively small
size of Australia’s bureaucracy, which is conducive to productive interpersonal relationships and
the broad awareness among agencies of what direction other agencies are heading. However,
as previously noted the lack of depth within most Australian Government bureaucracies tends
to focus personnel on “core business” and limits the capacity for agencies to collaborate as a
multiagency community outside of crises.

75. The Australian military has demonstrated a greater willingness than their U.S. counterparts to
work under civilian direction in the operational environment. A unique example of this approach,
frequently cited during the Australian-based interviews for this report, has been the Regional
Security Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands (RAMSI). In the case of RAMSI, direction
comes not only from a civilian, but one who is also formally a representative of a multinational
regional forum. This was determined as the approach in response to a unique set of demands
and circumstances, which may or may not be repeated in the future when the next Special
Coordinator is announced.


Reflections from the American Perspective
U.S. Government Culture
76. Expanding further on the culture of risk aversion permeating most U.S. Government agencies,
entrenched structural disincentives have led to a prevailing perspective among civilian U.S.
Government personnel that they have “everything to lose and nothing to gain” from taking risks.
Ambassadors are not incentivised to take bureaucratic risks often in fear of the ramifications
of a negative review from the Accountability Review Board. As a system obsessed with
checks and balances, mid to senior level U.S. Government personnel actions are routinely
scrutinised internally by multiple oversight bodies such as the Government Accountability
Office, Accountability Review Board, Special Inspectors General, and externally by savvy media.
Absolute success is expected with little acceptance of nuanced “results.” A cultural shift is
required within government to accept a measure of risk taking, and recognition that in complex
pre-conflict and conflict environments, initial failures are not only likely, but sometimes the
necessary precursors for success.

77. Creative or counterintuitive methods for designing programs are limited given budget
appropriation and allocation constraints, rendering mechanisms such as multi-year contingency
funding improbable in the near term. Operational risk has been routinely devolved downwards.
Often, decisive responsibility for taking chances rests on individuals on the front line, who are
ironically often those who have the most to lose professionally and personally from taking
chances. The effect of this institutional reluctance to take risks is a continuation of the status
quo, even if that means that mediocre, possibly wasteful and occasionally counter-productive
programs endure.

78. During candid reflection at the DC Concept Validation Workshop, U.S. Government civilians
noted that, unlike DOD, civilians typically do not see themselves bound, or constrained, by defined
plans. Civilian agencies make plans but do not always feel obligated to follow them. Furthermore,
they often note that it is important to constantly question plans that have been made when
situations change. Historical reflection notes that once a crisis occurs, often plans are discarded and
new ones devised by whoever is leading the effort in situ. However, once changes to plans are put
in place, DOD is often better equipped than civilian agencies to adapt to those changes.

79. For the U.S. Government, investment in long-term conflict prevention and management would
require a fundamental paradigm shift in how it typically perceives its role oversees. There remains
in government the view that the U.S. should be ready and willing to intervene and assist overseas
in nearly every circumstance with diplomacy, money, and troops, and particularly those that flash
across international global media. However, the long timeframes and large number of exogenous
factors at play mean that it is difficult to identify tangible outcomes from conflict prevention
activities. This is a major factor preventing greater funding for conflict prevention.

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80. The project research indicated that a “forward” or field-based assessment, planning, and
coordination process when working in either a multiagency and/or a civil-military context
proved more effective in reaching the strategic and operational goals outlined in the project
implementation plans than a headquarters-driven process. In addition, the earlier civilians are
involved in military planning improves the odds of having effective non-military engagement and
commitment later on.

U.S. Multiagency Dynamics
81. The diverse and sometimes conflicting cultures of U.S. Government agencies mean efforts for
personnel within those agencies to work together are inherently challenging, but not necessarily
incompatible. As evidenced in everything from resource allocation to defining national security
objectives, each actor does not have an equal voice in the multiagency environment.

82. The military is effective at planning for a military engagement, when it has near full control of
almost all aspects of a situation. In contrast, the military has not proven successful in planning
for, and implementing, effective conflict prevention engagement such as in state-building.
In Stability Operations which are akin to conflict prevention activities, there is some doctrine and
operational experience but their evaluation is limited. The recent institution of Theater Campaign
Plans at U.S. Geographic Combatant Commands seeks to increase the emphasis on the
achievement of long-term stability, including through increased interaction with other agencies.
The effectiveness of implementation of these structures, however, has been mixed.

83. The U.S. Department of Defense is a cohesive and highly structured organisation that, by
necessity, has a rigid chain of command. As has been expanded upon extensively in other
literature, this rigidity can make it difficult for the U.S. military to work with and in different
cultural environments.

84. In the U.S. the lack of coherent whole-of-government planning reflects a tendency in the
Government to constantly be in “crisis response mode” and incrementally develop policy rather
than proactively addressing issues. In addition, the absence of critical reviews of policies means
there is little opportunity to identify gaps and understand how divergent policies might impact
one another—or how innovations in one area could diffuse elsewhere.

85. The National Security Council is considered by many to be the ideal coordination point for U.S.
multiagency efforts because of its unrivalled authority and effectiveness in getting things done
politically and strategically. However in reality the NSC is persistently focusing on the latest issue
and lacks the capacity to do complex strategic or operational planning, a challenge intensified by
the tendency for NSC staff to be lacking in experience and often motivated by political agendas.


86. The “whole of government” approach currently only happens in the immediate and medium
term. However, agencies such as State Department, often USAID, and certainly DOD, have
long-standing relationships and ongoing programs in nations where a conflict prevention effort
is needed. The real imperative for these actors to come together to act is generally driven
by conflict or crisis however, and is generally characterised as an entirely different form and
structure of intervention. After an initial investment in conflict resolution and management,
USAID for long-term economic development, the State Department, for ongoing diplomatic
engagement, and DOD for military capacity building and engagement will resume separate and
largely unsynchronised programs and plans. Any attempts at developing a consensus, or mutually
beneficial focus on conflict prevention and management should be pragmatic and take into
consideration the history and the resiliency of surviving structures.

87. For example, the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS) model of being “interagency in a box” was, not surprisingly, rejected by
incumbent regional bureaus who perceived that S/CRS was duplicating existing skills already
present without the Department of State and USAID structures. Building anything new runs the
risk of being bureaucratically threatening or disempowering to existing structures. In another,
equally detrimental tactic, if a designated agency on conflict prevention is created, other agencies
could react by deferring responsibility to that agency entirely rather than analysing the skills they
each bring to bear in conflict prevention, or aligning conflict prevention with overall agency or
organisation strategies.

88. In the civilian domain, the functional lines of government will default to reporting up their
respective chains of command, even if individuals are seconded or assigned to an interagency
assessment, planning, or response team. This is in contrast to the military where being seconded
to augment a joint mission frequently occurs and is accepted. In order for robust multiagency
assessment and planning to occur, these unique approaches should be acknowledged and
managed—either pragmatically in that all actors support a joint goal or in that individual lines
of government define goals that can be reinforced among all lines.

89. While the “big thinkers” in a particular field, such as conflict studies, are important, it is also
important to find the “good enough” solutions that work across and within extant structures
and the target host nation, and within the broader international community.

The Role of External Actors
Multinational Actors
90. Given the scope of the project, exploration into the role of other multinational actors was
relatively limited. However, project interviewees, particularly those that have spent substantial
time in the field, noted the importance of not making the assumption that an external actor

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is the only, or primary, effective actor when planning for conflict prevention and planning. The
role of international, regional multinational and international and indigenous non-governmental
organisations, community based organisations, and other civil society, grass-roots entities can be
critical in the sustainability of all planned activities, be they externally or internally initiated.

91. There are different configurations of entities that are present within the society facing conflict and
from the outside that play a role in conflict prevention. These include governments and non-state
actors including international organisations such as the United Nations, the World Bank Group,
and the International Monetary Fund. Non-governmental organisations in humanitarian response
and advocacy, universities, independent foundations, and individuals can also be involved in conflict
prevention. Each entity brings a particular set of benefits and disadvantages to preventing conflict,
depending on the context and other factors working together or in opposition.

92. Regional economic and political organisations also play a role in conflict prevention. These
include the African Union, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the
ASEAN Regional Forum, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Central Asia Regional Economic
Cooperation, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Asia Development Bank, among
others. Any government multiagency conflict prevention plan would benefit from discovering and
acknowledging the aims and impact of these organisations where they are relevant to the context
being analysed.

United Nations Culture
93. The United Nations plays a unique role in conflict prevention and management overseas as
compared to the initiatives of individual governments. Often the UN Country Team on the
ground is well versed in the local and regional dynamics that contribute to the escalation of
violence. The Resident Representative /Humanitarian Coordinator should be aware of the
overall dynamics at play, and play a coordinating role among the many UN agencies and offices in
country, while maintaining close contact with other international, non-governmental, civil society,
and governmental actors. The UN may in some scenarios be the best equipped to lead in the
analysis of a conflict environment, and conflict prevention measures—but may not in others.

94. According to a number of interviewees, the structure and nature of the UN system unfortunately
constrains the Department of Peacekeeping Operation’s ability to effectively plan for conflict
prevention and management. Effective, integrated, and strategic planning requires longer timelines
than are usual in the establishment of peacekeeping operations. The stove-piped nature of
the United Nations system presents similar challenges to collaboration and cooperation that
governments face.


95. Political sensitivities of member countries may limit the UN’s ability to plan effectively, particularly
should national actors object to certain contingencies for which the UN wants to plan. However,
the United Nations is a representative of the international community, and possesses tools such
as leveraging sanctions and asserting Security Council resolutions to support international action.
As an entity, it is a critical player in conflict prevention and management and can often provide
nearly universally accepted legitimacy to the actions of individual states.

96. The peace-keeping and peace-building communities play a unique role in conflict prevention
and in state-building, wherein a variety of tools and structures support these aims. UN Special
Envoys, should be used carefully, but also can play a pivotal role in supporting conflict prevention
initiatives, working either in a lead or a supporting role to country-led activities.

97. The rigidity of the World Bank’s timelines and limited interaction between peacekeeping
personnel, World Bank, and Country Teams compound the challenges of developing and
implementing a comprehensive approach.

WORLD BANK
98. The World Bank plays a dynamic role in conflict prevention through support to fragile and
conflict-affected countries. These activities include coordinating donor contributions and
managing multi-donor trust funds (such as in Afghanistan and Sudan), and supporting community
development, social services, public administration, education and other initiatives. The World
Bank has called for a paradigm shift in how the broader, international development community
works in fragile and conflict-affected environments given the Bank’s conclusion that violence and
related conflict cannot be solved by “short-term or partial solutions in the absence of institutions
that provide people with security, justice, and jobs.”10
99. The World Bank has researched the fundamental differences between violent, fragile
environments as compared to those that are stable and developing, and has recommended
different approaches to supporting institutional transformation and promoting good governance
in each. One of the tenets articulated by the World Development Report 2011 supports one of
the main findings in this small study; that “in fragile transitions or situations of rising risk, successful
reforms have […] taken time [and] [t]he task of transforming institutions and governance is slow.
Historically, no country has transformed its institutions in less than a generation, with reforms
taking from 15 to 30 years.” In brief, the World Bank links the crucial importance of short-term
confidence building activities to this long-term change through bottom-up state-society relations
in insecure areas, security and justice reform programs that link policing with civilian justice, basic
job creation, the pivotal involvement of women, and anti-corruption efforts. These are along
a track of refocusing assistance on confidence building through a prevention lends. In addition,
reforming of international agency involvement, regional response, and renewing cooperation
among lower, middle, and higher income countries are central recommendations.

10 World Development Report 2011

30

COMPLEMENTARY PROJECT
FINDINGS
100. During the project, three subject areas arose that have played a role in the development of the
model described herein, and warrant further discussion in order to capture the best practices
gathered during the discussion of these three themes.

Strong Institutional Leadership
101. A best practice throughout the project research that had a positive impact on assessment and
planning, not only for conflict prevention but from the perspective of any initiative, was the
central importance of strong institutional leadership. In the U.S. context, this was presented
in examples from both Washington and field contexts wherein the commitment and focus of
key individuals directly affected the multiagency “buy-in” to a particular process or response.
A multiagency group works well together when there is strong and deliberate political leadership
and interest in a particular end-state, such as reportedly in the U.S. Government community in
response to the Haiti Earthquake in January 2010, or in response to violence in Kyrgyzstan.

102. Within the U.S. Government there are different leadership training models. The particular
commitment and training of U.S. Military personnel has been very effective in building a cadre
of strong leaders whose strong willed resolution in crisis situations is exceptional. Civilian
counterparts rarely have exposure to professional development of leadership skills. One
recommendation from project participants focused around the need to develop the leadership
skills in both the civilian and military spheres to respond to the modern challenges facing all actors
in the foreign affairs arena, including diplomacy, international development, and foreign military
deployments in support of a variety of missions but in particular, stabilisation and reconstruction
activities and humanitarian assistance. The opportunities for cross-training are few and far
between. The confidence to work well together comes with practice.

103. One entirely new structural solution proposed by U.S. stakeholders during the project was
presented by the office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR):
the creation of a U.S. Office for Contingency Operations (USOCO). A SIGIR lessons learned
report from February 2010 (Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and
Reconstruction Operations) recommended the establishment of this new entity, which would
be responsible for the management of all aspects of U.S. stabilisation and reconstruction
operations. The planning, staffing, funding, execution and accountability measures would be
housed in this office. The idea for USOCO was presented at the U.S. validation workshop,


Multiagency Assessment and Planning: A Concept for Conflict Prevention

Multiagency Assessment and Planning: A Concept for Conflict Prevention

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Multiagency Assessment and Planning: A Concept for Conflict Prevention