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The Kegworth Crash:
What happens when one of the 2
engines on your plane catches on
fire? And the pilots shut down the
wrong engine?
The Rule of Seven:
Every catastrophe has 7 events.
Six Cascade Events leading to the
final event, the catastrophe. At
least one of the Cascade Events
involves human error. Thus most
catastrophes can be avoided.
Anatomy of Catastrophe
Passenger when the pilots shut
down the right engine:
“We were thinking: ‘Why is he doing
that?’ because we saw flame coming
out of the left engine. But I was only
a bread man. What did I know?”
British Midlands Flt 92
The Danger of Trusting Experts.
On 8 January 1989, a Boeing 737-
400 crashed just short of the
runway near Kegworth in the UK.
47 people were killed and 74
received serious injuries out of a
complement of 126 on board.
THE FACTS
8 January 1989
7:52 pm: Flight BD092 takes off from Heathrow
en route to Belfast International.
8:05 pm: Flight 092 experiences severe vibration
and a smell of fire. Engine #2 is shut down.
8:20 pm: Power is increased to engine #1 at three
thousand feet on approach to Midland Airport.
At nine hundred feet engine #1 fails.
8:24 pm: Flight 092 crashes a quarter mile short
of Midland Airport runway.
THE TIMELINE
Engines were upgraded but not thoroughly
tested and the pilots were never trained on the
upgraded aircraft.
The 737-400 was an upgraded version of the
737. The pilots never had simulator training for
the 737-400, even though it was a different
version of the aircraft. The first time they faced
an emergency in this new model, it was real,
not a simulation.
Cascade 1
Lesson: Equipment has to be tested in the exact
environment in which it supposed to function. And
upgrades to an existing piece of equipment must be viewed
as essentially making the equipment brand new, requiring
all the testing required of such.
A blade broke in the left engine.
This is a purely mechanical failure. By itself,
it was not a catastrophe. The 737, and all
multi-engine jets, can operate on the other
engine.
Of course, this failure was compounded by
Cascade One, and, as you will see, became
part of the overall fatal Final Event.
Cascade 2
LESSON: Mechanical failures will happen.
Safety designs and equipment redundancy
prepare for this and very rarely do they cause
a final event by themselves. This is why we
must focus on those Cascade Events that are
human caused such as . . . Cacade 3.
The pilot shut down the wrong engine.
As soon as they felt the vibration and received the report that
smoke had begun to seep into the cabin, the pilot disengaged
the autopilot and asked the copilot which engine was the
problem. The copilot replied “It’s the le—no, the right one.”
What both pilots failed to realize is that they were relying on out
of date data and training. In the version of the 737 they were
used to, the left engine supplied air to the cockpit (where there
was little smoke) while the right supplied the cabin with air. If it
had been the left engine, there would have only been smoke in
the cockpit. But since there was smoke in the cabin? Ergo, the
smoky air in the cabin had to come from the right engine.
What they didn’t know was that in the upgraded 737-400, the
left engine feeds the flight deck and the after cabin, while the
right feeds the forward cabin.
Cascade 3
LESSON: Any time equipment is upgraded or changed; the operators need to
be thoroughly trained on all the changes. Even the tiniest change in details
can have enormous repercussions. Here, the pilots made their initial estimate
of the problem based on a previous version of the plane.
The shut down brought erroneous data in terms
of reduced smoke and vibration to the crew, who
were not trusting their instruments.
There was a gauge, which would have alerted
them to the correct engine with the problem
from the start. There is a vibration readout for
each engine on the video display and it indicated
that the left engine was maxed out at 5, thus the
source of the problem.
Cascade 4
LESSON: Trust instrument readings.
We often make wrong choices because we base the
decision on our experiences rather than real data. Pilots are
taught never to trust what they physically feel, but rather
always trust their instruments. Alarms, gauges, and
warnings are put in place for a reason. Feeling abnormal
vibration, assuming it was from the engines, wouldn’t it
have made sense for the pilot or co-pilot to check the
engine vibration readouts?
People in the passenger compartment saw the problem
in the left engine in terms of sparks and smoke, then
heard the captain announce shutting down the right
engine, but no one reported this disconnect to the
cockpit. They all assumed the experts knew what they
were doing.
By the time, the pilots realized their error, it was too
late.
Pilots in a cockpit don’t have a view of the plane. They
can see forward, not back.
Cascade 5
Lesson: Don’t assume experts have all the data or
know exactly what they’re doing. Don’t ever
completely give up control of your environment.
Report suspicious data when you see it. An average
person seeing, hearing, smelling, noticing
something that just doesn’t look right, and
reporting it has averted many catastrophes.
The review of data and instruments was interrupted by a
call from the tower and never resumed.
As per SOP in the event of a malfunction, the pilot began
to recheck all instruments and decisions. However, before
he could complete this, a transmission from the airport he
was heading toward gave him flight information for
landing. After the transmission, he didn’t resume his
checks and instead began to descend as per the
instructions. It is likely he would have discovered his error
in shutting down the wrong engine if he’d continued the
checks and seen the vibration meter.
Cascade 6
LESSON SOPs exist for a reason.
Beware interruptions when conducting critical tasks.
The plane crashed a quarter mile short of the runway.
Two miles from the runway, the left engine completely
disintegrated, sending pieces flying about. The fire warning
light finally went off, and for the first time the pilot realized
which engine really had the problem.
This meant, of course, that he still had a good engine; except
it wasn’t running. The pilot’s attempts to ‘windmill’, using
the air flowing through the engine to rotate the blades and
start the right engine, failed.
Just before crossing a major highway, the M1, the plane’s
tail struck the ground, but luckily, the aircraft bounced up,
over the highway, and then crashed on the far embankment.
It broke into three major sections.
Final Event
LESSON: Changes were made after this event.
The vibration readouts were made more visible. Crews are
encouraged to do more communication between cockpit and
cabin during an inflight emergency. Pilots must receive
simulator training on any upgraded version of an aircraft.
Since there were so many survivors of this impact,
researchers were able to do something unprecedented:
examine the position of passengers at the time of impact and
their injuries. They found that the crash position promulgated
at the time led to severe injuries. This led to the hands behind
head, leaning forward, feet back under the seat as far as
possible position we now see as the industry standard.
Final Event
Seven Ways to Prevent Catastrophes
1. Have a Special Ops preparation mindset
2. Focus by utilizing both big picture & detail
thinkers
3. Conduct Special Forces Area Studies
4. Use the Special Forces CARVER formula
5. Have a “10th man”
6. Conduct After Action Reviews
7. Write and USE Standing Operating Procedures
(SOPs)
Are you interested in a presentation about various catastrophes
and how the cascade events could have been prevented?
Events covered range from human-machine interface, to
leadership, to communication, cost-cutting, engineering, group
think, perseverance, systematic failure, and more?
Catastrophes are cascade events culminating in disastrous
chaos. War is chaos. Special Forces is the most elite unit trained
for a variety of combat situations.
What makes Special Forces elite is our mindset and
preparation.
Are you interested in a presentation on how to use Special
Forces tactics, techniques and mental attitude to help your
organization anticipate and prevent potential catastrophes?
Please email bob@bobmayer.com
Summary
More Free Information
I constantly update free, downloadable
slideshows like this on my web site for
preparation and survival and other topics.
FREE SLIDESHOWS
Also, I conduct Area Study workshops for
those interested in properly preparing for
their specific circumstances.
The guide on the left is the complete preparation and survival
guide. The one on the right is a pocket-size manual with just the
survival portion. Useful in your Grab-n-Go bag, car and kitchen
drawer.
SURVIVAL GUIDES
The Book
"The best preparation guide available, bar none. A
must have for anyone concerned about man-
made and natural disasters. Mayer points out
that preparation is key and he walks the reader
through it, each section building on the one
before. From page one, I felt more prepared.
Get it!" Assembly Magazine.
New York Times bestselling author, is a graduate of West Point and
former Green Beret. He’s had over 80 books published, including the
#1 bestselling series Green Berets, Time Patrol, Area 51, and Atlantis.
He’s sold over 5 million books. He was born in the Bronx and has
traveled the world. He’s lived on an island off the east coast, an island
off the west coast, in the Rocky Mountains, the Smoky Mountains and
other places, including time in East Asia studying martial arts.
He was an instructor and course developer/writer for years at the
JFK Special Warfare Center and School which trains Green Berets and
also runs the SERE school:
Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape.
www.bobmayer.com

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What Do You Do When The Pilots Shut Down The Wrong Engine?

  • 1. The Kegworth Crash: What happens when one of the 2 engines on your plane catches on fire? And the pilots shut down the wrong engine?
  • 2. The Rule of Seven: Every catastrophe has 7 events. Six Cascade Events leading to the final event, the catastrophe. At least one of the Cascade Events involves human error. Thus most catastrophes can be avoided. Anatomy of Catastrophe
  • 3. Passenger when the pilots shut down the right engine: “We were thinking: ‘Why is he doing that?’ because we saw flame coming out of the left engine. But I was only a bread man. What did I know?” British Midlands Flt 92 The Danger of Trusting Experts.
  • 4.
  • 5. On 8 January 1989, a Boeing 737- 400 crashed just short of the runway near Kegworth in the UK. 47 people were killed and 74 received serious injuries out of a complement of 126 on board. THE FACTS
  • 6. 8 January 1989 7:52 pm: Flight BD092 takes off from Heathrow en route to Belfast International. 8:05 pm: Flight 092 experiences severe vibration and a smell of fire. Engine #2 is shut down. 8:20 pm: Power is increased to engine #1 at three thousand feet on approach to Midland Airport. At nine hundred feet engine #1 fails. 8:24 pm: Flight 092 crashes a quarter mile short of Midland Airport runway. THE TIMELINE
  • 7. Engines were upgraded but not thoroughly tested and the pilots were never trained on the upgraded aircraft. The 737-400 was an upgraded version of the 737. The pilots never had simulator training for the 737-400, even though it was a different version of the aircraft. The first time they faced an emergency in this new model, it was real, not a simulation. Cascade 1
  • 8. Lesson: Equipment has to be tested in the exact environment in which it supposed to function. And upgrades to an existing piece of equipment must be viewed as essentially making the equipment brand new, requiring all the testing required of such.
  • 9. A blade broke in the left engine. This is a purely mechanical failure. By itself, it was not a catastrophe. The 737, and all multi-engine jets, can operate on the other engine. Of course, this failure was compounded by Cascade One, and, as you will see, became part of the overall fatal Final Event. Cascade 2
  • 10. LESSON: Mechanical failures will happen. Safety designs and equipment redundancy prepare for this and very rarely do they cause a final event by themselves. This is why we must focus on those Cascade Events that are human caused such as . . . Cacade 3.
  • 11. The pilot shut down the wrong engine. As soon as they felt the vibration and received the report that smoke had begun to seep into the cabin, the pilot disengaged the autopilot and asked the copilot which engine was the problem. The copilot replied “It’s the le—no, the right one.” What both pilots failed to realize is that they were relying on out of date data and training. In the version of the 737 they were used to, the left engine supplied air to the cockpit (where there was little smoke) while the right supplied the cabin with air. If it had been the left engine, there would have only been smoke in the cockpit. But since there was smoke in the cabin? Ergo, the smoky air in the cabin had to come from the right engine. What they didn’t know was that in the upgraded 737-400, the left engine feeds the flight deck and the after cabin, while the right feeds the forward cabin. Cascade 3
  • 12. LESSON: Any time equipment is upgraded or changed; the operators need to be thoroughly trained on all the changes. Even the tiniest change in details can have enormous repercussions. Here, the pilots made their initial estimate of the problem based on a previous version of the plane.
  • 13. The shut down brought erroneous data in terms of reduced smoke and vibration to the crew, who were not trusting their instruments. There was a gauge, which would have alerted them to the correct engine with the problem from the start. There is a vibration readout for each engine on the video display and it indicated that the left engine was maxed out at 5, thus the source of the problem. Cascade 4
  • 14. LESSON: Trust instrument readings. We often make wrong choices because we base the decision on our experiences rather than real data. Pilots are taught never to trust what they physically feel, but rather always trust their instruments. Alarms, gauges, and warnings are put in place for a reason. Feeling abnormal vibration, assuming it was from the engines, wouldn’t it have made sense for the pilot or co-pilot to check the engine vibration readouts?
  • 15. People in the passenger compartment saw the problem in the left engine in terms of sparks and smoke, then heard the captain announce shutting down the right engine, but no one reported this disconnect to the cockpit. They all assumed the experts knew what they were doing. By the time, the pilots realized their error, it was too late. Pilots in a cockpit don’t have a view of the plane. They can see forward, not back. Cascade 5
  • 16. Lesson: Don’t assume experts have all the data or know exactly what they’re doing. Don’t ever completely give up control of your environment. Report suspicious data when you see it. An average person seeing, hearing, smelling, noticing something that just doesn’t look right, and reporting it has averted many catastrophes.
  • 17. The review of data and instruments was interrupted by a call from the tower and never resumed. As per SOP in the event of a malfunction, the pilot began to recheck all instruments and decisions. However, before he could complete this, a transmission from the airport he was heading toward gave him flight information for landing. After the transmission, he didn’t resume his checks and instead began to descend as per the instructions. It is likely he would have discovered his error in shutting down the wrong engine if he’d continued the checks and seen the vibration meter. Cascade 6
  • 18. LESSON SOPs exist for a reason. Beware interruptions when conducting critical tasks.
  • 19. The plane crashed a quarter mile short of the runway. Two miles from the runway, the left engine completely disintegrated, sending pieces flying about. The fire warning light finally went off, and for the first time the pilot realized which engine really had the problem. This meant, of course, that he still had a good engine; except it wasn’t running. The pilot’s attempts to ‘windmill’, using the air flowing through the engine to rotate the blades and start the right engine, failed. Just before crossing a major highway, the M1, the plane’s tail struck the ground, but luckily, the aircraft bounced up, over the highway, and then crashed on the far embankment. It broke into three major sections. Final Event
  • 20. LESSON: Changes were made after this event. The vibration readouts were made more visible. Crews are encouraged to do more communication between cockpit and cabin during an inflight emergency. Pilots must receive simulator training on any upgraded version of an aircraft. Since there were so many survivors of this impact, researchers were able to do something unprecedented: examine the position of passengers at the time of impact and their injuries. They found that the crash position promulgated at the time led to severe injuries. This led to the hands behind head, leaning forward, feet back under the seat as far as possible position we now see as the industry standard. Final Event
  • 21.
  • 22. Seven Ways to Prevent Catastrophes 1. Have a Special Ops preparation mindset 2. Focus by utilizing both big picture & detail thinkers 3. Conduct Special Forces Area Studies 4. Use the Special Forces CARVER formula 5. Have a “10th man” 6. Conduct After Action Reviews 7. Write and USE Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs)
  • 23. Are you interested in a presentation about various catastrophes and how the cascade events could have been prevented? Events covered range from human-machine interface, to leadership, to communication, cost-cutting, engineering, group think, perseverance, systematic failure, and more? Catastrophes are cascade events culminating in disastrous chaos. War is chaos. Special Forces is the most elite unit trained for a variety of combat situations. What makes Special Forces elite is our mindset and preparation. Are you interested in a presentation on how to use Special Forces tactics, techniques and mental attitude to help your organization anticipate and prevent potential catastrophes? Please email bob@bobmayer.com Summary
  • 24. More Free Information I constantly update free, downloadable slideshows like this on my web site for preparation and survival and other topics. FREE SLIDESHOWS Also, I conduct Area Study workshops for those interested in properly preparing for their specific circumstances.
  • 25. The guide on the left is the complete preparation and survival guide. The one on the right is a pocket-size manual with just the survival portion. Useful in your Grab-n-Go bag, car and kitchen drawer. SURVIVAL GUIDES
  • 26. The Book "The best preparation guide available, bar none. A must have for anyone concerned about man- made and natural disasters. Mayer points out that preparation is key and he walks the reader through it, each section building on the one before. From page one, I felt more prepared. Get it!" Assembly Magazine.
  • 27.
  • 28. New York Times bestselling author, is a graduate of West Point and former Green Beret. He’s had over 80 books published, including the #1 bestselling series Green Berets, Time Patrol, Area 51, and Atlantis. He’s sold over 5 million books. He was born in the Bronx and has traveled the world. He’s lived on an island off the east coast, an island off the west coast, in the Rocky Mountains, the Smoky Mountains and other places, including time in East Asia studying martial arts. He was an instructor and course developer/writer for years at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School which trains Green Berets and also runs the SERE school: Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape. www.bobmayer.com

Notas del editor

  1. Time 1:38 for Captain to come in
  2. LOOPHOLE!
  3. Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) was begun in 1979 as a result of a NASA workshop. One of the key elements was to make sure that co-pilots would be more responsive to warning/advising the pilot. In the case of Air France Flight 447, they didn’t even get to that stage, with two co-pilots, both of whom tried to control the plane. Instead of working together, they actually worked against each other. The situation got worse when the Captain entered the cockpit, with neither co-pilot filling him in on the sequence of events and vital readings which might have allowed the Captain to quickly assess the situation.
  4. One minute 38 seconds